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Abstract/ Synopsis 
This thesis is about the nature of the rapid growth of the jute manufacturing industry in 
colonial India in the age of the “imperialism of free trade”. It seeks to understand how the 
managing agents who controlled the jute mill companies in Calcutta internalised a competitive 
advantage that generated lucrative rents through a case study of the history of the Dundee-
based managing agents, Thomas Duff & Co. 
The thesis argues that the industry experienced a pattern of extensive growth with static 
technology that led to rising costs and pressure on profits and dividends. Nevertheless, the 
pattern of entry into the industry indicates the existence of institutional barriers to entry. 
Managing agents like Thomas Duff & Co were able to take advantage of and shape these 
barriers through strategic behaviour. They created a company form that allowed the 
structuring of incentives to reproduce a functional managerial hierarchy and renew their 
competitive advantage over time. 
Strategic behaviour by the founding directors of Thomas Duff & Co extended to actively 
shaping the business environment in which the firm operated by anticipating and neutralising 
threats to their control of the directorate, intervening in the supply chain to manage costs and 
cajoling other managing agents to cooperate to manage competition. The success of these 
strategies led to growth, which entailed the creation of a popular base of shareholdings. This 
dilution of formal ownership proved to be compatible with retaining control and generating 
rents while minimising risk. 
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Introduction 
 
From its inception in 1855, with the setting up of the first jute mill at Barnagore by the Borneo 
Company, the jute manufacturing industry in Calcutta experienced rapid growth, coming to 
dominate world production.1 By 1900, Calcutta mills consumed 38 per cent of Bengal’s raw 
jute production, which monopolised the world supply.2 The profits enjoyed by the industry 
during the First World War ensured dividends of two hundred per cent for investors and 
inspired a rush of investment to set up new mills in the post-war period.3 B.R. Tomlinson has 
estimated that: “By 1921, jute was in first place [as an export-earner] representing 26.5 per 
cent of India’s exports”.4 The jute mills were an important factor in the growth of an urban, 
industrial sector in India from the late nineteenth century, employing 339,000 workers by 
1928.5 
Stewart considers the “relative neglect” by an older generation of historians of this industry 
compared to the attention given to cotton manufacturing in Bombay to be surprising in the 
light of jute’s contribution to Indian export earnings, which was crucial to the whole imperial 
structure of the British economy.6 Thus, the export of raw jute and jute manufactures made an 
important contribution to the perennial unrequited export surplus of the Raj, which permitted 
the British economy to continue consuming ‘beyond its means’ - famously described as the 
                                                          
1
 D. R. Wallace, The Romance of Jute; A Short History of the Calcutta Jute Mill Industry, 1855-1927, 
(Second Edition, London, 1928), p. 106. 
2
 Government of Bengal, Report of the Internal Trade of Bengal for the Year 1899-1900, (Calcutta, 1901). 
3
 Bagchi, Private Investment in India, p. 276; G.H. Le Maistre, Investors India Year Book, 1919, (Calcutta, 
1920), Section III, “Jute”, pp. 68-111. Henceforth “IIYB”. 
4
 B.R.Tomlinson, ‘India and the British Empire, 1880-1935’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 
Vol. 12 (1975), p. 340, cited in Gordon Stewart, Jute and Empire: The Calcutta Jute Wallahs and the 
Landscapes of Empire (Manchester, 1998), p. 12. 
5
 Stewart, Jute and Empire, p. 16. 
6
 Tomlinson, ‘India and the British Empire’, p. 11. 
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“drain of wealth” by early Indian nationalist commentators such as Dabodhai Naoroji.7 More 
recently, the industry has received considerable attention from business and labour historians 
making use of company archives and government records to explore a variety of themes 
pertinent to the study of the development of the global economy and Britain and India’s 
respective positions within it. 
Unlike the cotton industry in Bombay, the jute industry in Calcutta was dominated by 
European businessmen resident in Calcutta, with a preponderance of Scots. The technology 
and knowledge of the industry was imported from Dundee, the birthplace of the industry in 
the 1840s. Supervisory and technical labour was recruited from Dundee and its environs from 
the Calcutta industry’s inception. In contrast to the Bombay cotton industry, cheaper 
indigenous supervisors and engineers were never substituted for the Dundonians before 
independence, reflecting a particular racial division of labour specific to Eastern India, where 
British colonial rule was most entrenched. The capital invested in the industry to finance its 
growth tended to take the form of public limited companies floated as “Rupee companies” on 
the Calcutta stock exchange. There were a minority of “Sterling companies”, whose share 
capital was raised in London, Glasgow and Dundee, which participated in the growth of the 
industry through foreign direct investment. In the period studied from 1870-1921, Indian 
shareholders were initially a small minority but became increasingly important, as Marwari 
businessmen used the dominance they would establish in the raw jute trade during the war as 
the basis to enter jute manufacturing at the end of the war.  
This thesis will analyse the economic history of the industry up to 1921. It will focus on a case 
study of a Dundee-based firm, Thomas Duff & Co, to study the industry as a whole. 
 
  
                                                          
7
 Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India (London, 1901). 
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The Political Economy of Empire. 
Any historical account of the jute industry in Calcutta necessarily situates itself – whether 
explicitly or implicitly – within a broader interpretation of the political economy of the Empire 
within which it developed. The role of the Raj has been ascribed malign characteristics 
retarding economic development by Nationalist historians while some British accounts of the 
period see its influence in benign terms. Gordon Stewart, in his work Jute and Empire, finds 
this ‘a tedious, argumentative framework for studying Indian economic history’. He appeals to 
the authority of more recent historical work, which - citing Chakrabarty - he posits to have 
‘advanced beyond the predictable, blame-assigning categories of the old debate [and] broken 
with these constricting polarities to look at the Indian economy in a “broader context of 
colonial political economy and capitalist world markets”.’8 If the second volume of The 
Cambridge Economic History of India which covers the period from 1750 may be taken to be 
representative of the kind of more recent work that Stewart has in mind, there are serious 
objections to be raised to Stewart’s formulation of the problem.9 It is questionable whether 
nationalist critics of and British apologists for empire neglected the broader context to which 
he refers. Rather, they took opposing views about what could be inferred from it. Moreover, 
one of the difficulties with more recent work by historians of British India is precisely the 
neglect of this broader context. As Irfan Habib, editor of the first volume of the Cambridge 
History, pointed out, the structure of the second volume breaks down the study of the Indian 
economy into a series of regional and sectoral studies that militates against considerations of 
the broader context.10 In part, this is a function of the proliferation of more detailed, 
specialised studies of different aspects of the economy in British India, as is this study. Clearly, 
                                                          
8
 Stewart, Jute and Empire, pp.23-25. 
9
 Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of India. Vol.2, C.1757-
C.1970 (Cambridge, 1983). 
10
 Irfan Habib, ‘Studying a Colonial Economy—Without Perceiving Colonialism’, Modern Asian Studies, 
Vol. 19, No. 3, (1985), pp. 355-381 
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such work has added substantially to our knowledge and is essential to inform the work of 
synthesis, which Habib wishes to see. What questions do more general histories of the political 
economy of empire in India pose for the study of the jute industry and how should they inform 
this study? In turn, what contribution can the study of jute make to our understanding of the 
political economy of empire? 
At the most stylised level of abstraction, histories of this political economy have located British 
India within the wider imperial context as a market for British manufactures and an exporter of 
raw materials to Britain and other industrialised countries in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. From the second half of the nineteenth century, Edelstein has examined how the 
imperial periphery served an important function as a destination for the foreign investment of 
capital accumulated in Britain seeking profitable investment opportunities overseas but that 
these investments were largely concentrated in more developed parts of the British empire in 
the colonies of settlement and largely bypassed British India.11 Clearly, the British capitalists 
who invested in the Indian jute industry, which exported jute manufactures from the colonial 
periphery to compete with manufacturers in the industrialised countries, do not sit 
comfortably within this framework. Given the generally accepted association between 
development and the export of manufactured goods, it follows that the history of jute 
manufactures is of considerable interest in studying whether British rule promoted or retarded 
Indian economic development by establishing the basis for industrialisation. To consider this 
question with any precision requires greater attention to the economic mechanisms through 
which British rule functioned. 
                                                          
11
 Michael Edelstein, Overseas Investment in the Age of High Imperialism: The United Kingdom, 1850-
1914 (London, 1982)., ; see also S. B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870-1914, (Liverpool, 
1960); P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (London, 
1993). 
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As the leading industrialised nation, Britain benefited from what Robinson and Gallagher term 
‘the imperialism of free trade’.12 This system subsumed a variety of categories of imperial rule 
or influence – from formal, direct rule in India to informal control in China to settler 
colonialism in South Africa and Australia – and benefitted a number of different interests 
within the British economy – from textile manufacturers to merchants and financiers, their 
relative weight in the process of the formation of imperial policy being the subject of much 
debate.13 Within this complex system, British rule in India may have developed in an ad hoc 
fashion from the opportunism of the East India Company in the eighteenth century up to the 
imposition of direct rule after the Mutiny of 1857, but it came to occupy a crucial place in the 
imperial system.  
A strategically important base to project military power as an auxiliary to free trade in China 
and elsewhere in the region, it had the advantage of supplying the troops for its own and 
others’ subjugation while paying the British for the privilege through the mechanism of the 
Home Charges paid annually by the Government of India. This entailed the raising of revenue 
through the regressive taxation of the peasantry – the Zamindari system in Bengal and 
Ryotwari in other regions – which refined the Mughal system of military feudalism through the 
greater administrative capacity of the Raj, setting the revenue demand at a high and inflexible 
level. The harshness of the revenue demand contributed to the devastating famines that took 
place from the 1870s to the 1890s; life expectancy declined 20 per cent over the period from 
1871 to 1921.14 Included in the Home Charges were the repayments on the loans raised in 
London for the building of the Indian railway network. These loans were guaranteed by the 
                                                          
12
 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," Economic History Review 
(August 1953) 6.1, pp 1–15. 
13
 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (London, 1993), 
Chapter 10. 
14
 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts : El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World, (2000); 
Habib, ‘Studying a Colonial Economy’, p. 373, citing statistics from Kingsley Davis, The Population of 
India and Pakistan (Princeton, 1951), p. 62. 
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Government of India at a rate of return above the prevailing market rate and constituted by Rs 
350 million of the total capital invested in India, dwarfing the Rs 50 million invested by the 
private sector, in which the British managing agents predominated.15 Together with some 
investment in irrigation in the Punjab and a few other regions, this was the sole instance of 
investment in industry by the Government of India on any significant scale. Both irrigation and 
the railways promoted the incorporation of the agrarian hinterland into the world economy as 
a supplier of raw materials based on the operation of market forces of supply and demand. As 
well as being extremely profitable for risk-averse portfolio investors, the railways provided an 
impetus to British heavy industry as the railway boom in Britain itself was exhausted. The 
potential for positive linkages with nascent industrial sectors in India in machinery and 
steelmaking was never pursued.16 Rather than prevent famine by allowing trans-shipment of 
food grains from surplus to deficit regions, it facilitated their export abroad, as India became a 
major supplier of grain to the industrialised countries, as testified by the fortunes of firms like 
Ralli Brothers, which relocated there from Southern Russia towards the end of the nineteenth 
century.17 The rolling stock for the railways’ operation was turned over to the managing 
agents, which charged much higher freight rates within India than for shipments to Indian 
ports for export.18 
In exchange for the export of food grains and raw materials from the agrarian sector, India 
became by far the most important market for British exports of cotton manufactures from the 
1820s. From being the world’s leading producer of cotton manufactures in the eighteenth 
century, India’s large handloom sector could not compete with Manchester’s mechanised 
output without tariff protection, leading to deindustrialisation. One indicator of this process is 
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the decline of the urban population through the course of the 19th century, with cities such as 
Oudh and Patna losing up to 50 per cent of their residents to the countryside.19 India’ regional 
trade – and related sectors such as indigenous banking and shipping - was displaced by the 
British managing agents. 
Throughout the period of British rule, India ran a large export surplus on the balance of 
payments. The East India Company pioneered the export of opium to China. As demand for 
opium receded towards the middle of the nineteenth century, indigo exports took up the 
slack. By the end of the century, exports of jute and cotton yarn increasingly ensured a 
surplus.20 The British evolved a monetary system to permit the remittance of surplus 
accumulated through trade, developing the system of council bills and concentrating power 
over the money supply in the hands of the Empire bank controlled by the Government of India, 
while this facility was removed from the private Presidency Banks.21 This system permitted the 
British to subsidise its own balance of payments deficit with other industrialising countries, 
while providing new markets in shipping, insurance, foreign exchange and government debt in 
the City of London.22 In periods of emergency, the flow of tribute could be supplemented by a 
levy on the Government of India, which contributed large sums to the British war effort, 
leading to fiscal deficits addressed through deflationary monetary and fiscal austerity and 
retrenchment in the 1920s.23 
Brian Tomlinson, reviewing this period, writes that: ‘The history of trade and manufacture in 
colonial India is dominated by counter-factual questions about the process of industrialisation.’ 
Tomlinson is cautious about indulging in this approach to historical enquiry. Critics of British 
rule have been drawn to analyse the size of the “drain of wealth” – the surplus remitted to 
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Britain. At 5 per cent of national income, the counter factual inference that is drawn is that this 
represented a substantial surplus that might have been invested in industrialisation in India 
itself.24 Comparisons are drawn with the Japanese experience and the level of surplus required 
to initiate industrialisation in the absence of colonial control.25  
If this line of reasoning is pursued, it seems logical to infer that the mechanisms of imperial 
rule outlined above cleared the way for investment by the British managing agents with access 
to cheap capital in industries such as jute manufactures while clearing the field of potential 
Indian competition. The legal system enforced a system of property rights favourable to British 
business while the managing agents were able to organise themselves into powerful 
associations through the chambers of commerce and gentlemen’s clubs to articulate their 
needs and influence government policy, as their Indian rivals recognised: 
Given their much larger world connection and experience, these concerns [British managing agents] 
are able to compete on more than equal terms with the corresponding Indian concerns in the same 
field. They obtain all the fiscal and financial advantages open to Indians: in addition, they have the 
silent sympathy from the mystical bond of racial affinity with the rulers of the land, which procures 
them invisible, but not the less effective, advantage in their competition with their indigenous rivals. 
This device cannot be too strongly opposed.
26
 
British fiscal policies created a cheap labour force from the distressed agrarian areas of Bihar, 
U.P. and Orissa. To the extent that an industrial policy existed, it created the infrastructure to 
facilitate the export of manufactures with few linkage effects to benefit the development of 
related industries in India. The narrowness of the market for domestic consumption under the 
pressure of regressive taxation exacerbated this tendency. Tariff and monetary policies 
facilitated the repatriation of profits – a more progressive taxation system might have 
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facilitated their reinvestment in the social overhead capital and development of technical 
training which hardly existed at the time in India. 
This genus of Nationalist criticism, reprised above, of the contribution of British rule to the 
dynamism – or lack thereof – of the economy in general and the modern industrial sector in 
particular was continued by radical critics of the market, who wanted to see a greater role for 
planning in the post-Independence period. It has been contested, both at an empirical and 
conceptual level, by “revisionist” historians. Revisionist accounts that challenge the Nationalist 
case have tended to posit a sharp disarticulation between a ‘modern’ urban industrial sector 
dominated by foreign capital, and the ‘traditional’ agrarian sector. Thus, B.R.Tomlinson writes: 
[I]t might well emerge that the really important question to ask about the decline of expatriate 
enterprise is how strong it ever was in the first place. Certainly the expatriates dominated the 
'organized' economy of eastern India in 1900, and in 1950 they did not, but the 'organized' economy-
although attractive to scholars and relatively easy to analyse-may not have been the decisively 
important sector. Even with their close contacts with a would-be interventionist government since 
1947 Indian entrepreneurs in the 'organized' sector have often found difficulty in forcing petty 
traders, producers and consumers to conform to their vision of economic progress. It may be that 
expatriate businessmen were never in reality more than fleas on the buttock of Mother India; they 
have been replaced by parasites that have been more persistent and elusive, but that have not yet 
become a great deal more firmly established.
27
 
The metaphor of the flea of expatriate business feeding on the agrarian host suggests a 
parasitic but essentially passive relationship, with no fundamental consequences to the 
functioning of the host organism. It seems peculiarly inapt as a description of the urban jute 
industry’s complex interaction with and transformation of the agrarian hinterland of Bengal, as 
outlined by Goswami, in terms of the commodification of markets for peasant production of 
jute, and the attendant transformation of relationships of land tenure, of agrarian factor 
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markets and money lending.28 Here, the collision of the modern and traditional sectors is 
constitutive of new, hybrid forms of economic relationships. 
It is possible to discern in Tomlinson’s work the traces of neo-populist concerns that 
industrialisation after Independence was privileged at the expense of progressive change in 
agriculture, as popularised in the work of Michael Lipton.29 The dichotomy between the 
agrarian and industrial sectors is then projected backwards in time to emphasize the continuity 
of the economic problems facing an undeveloped country such as India before and after 
independence. The effect is to normalise British rule and to reduce its ramifications to a 
technical, managerial question. 
At the opposite pole to neo-populism, modernisation theory has presented a positivist 
optimism about the scope of industrialisation’s contribution to economic development, as 
represented by Morris D. Morris’ article in the Cambridge Economic History. 30 However, 
Morris shares with Tomlinson the view of an unchanging, stagnant agrarian sector 
characterised by undeveloped market relationships constraining the dynamism of the 
economy. 
Before proceeding to consider the existing historiography specifically relating to the jute 
industry, this review of some of the themes and debates raised by general accounts of the 
political economy of British colonialism in India, poses questions that inform the ensuing study 
of Thomas Duff & Co and the Calcutta jute industry. This study will consider how foreign 
investment was used as a vehicle to import capital and knowledge and to facilitate technology 
transfer. The colonial context and the economic policies of the Government of India had 
significant effects, both positive and negative, in facilitating the process of the creation of an 
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enclave of rapid industrialisation in a sea of agrarian backwardness. On the one hand, the 
imperialism of free trade left British businessmen a relatively free hand to invest, with minimal 
government interference in factor markets and markets for output prior to the inter-war 
period. On the other hand, British business experienced considerable difficulties negotiating 
the volatility that accompanied the unprecedented openness to market forces of the colonial 
Indian economy, particularly with respect to the decline in the value of the currency from the 
1870s to the early 1890s. The advantages certainly outweighed the disadvantages. Market 
forces were extremely effective at securing supplies of cheap labour and raw material from the 
mofussil, while preferential access for European businessmen to foreign exchange markets 
monopolised by the European banks were a distinct advantage in securing them cheap sources 
of credit and working capital from which Indians were excluded. 
This study does not focus on the processes by which colonial economic policy was formed or 
the relationship between business and the colonial state. These are only explicitly considered 
to an extent in a later chapter considering the role of Thomas Duff & Co in the strategy of the 
Indian Jute Mills Association. However, the study of the industry and the case study of Thomas 
Duff & Co illuminates how the colonial context and government policy affected a major 
industry and growth sector in the colonial economy during this period. 
 
The Historiography of the Jute Industry. 
The historiography of jute manufacturing in Calcutta can be divided into three broad 
categories. The first category comprises general studies of Indian economic history which sets 
the industry in the broader context of the development of the Indian economy and evaluate 
the extent to which British rule played a progressive or retarding role in this development. The 
second category comprises monographs about the jute industry which tend to focus on labour 
history. The third category comprises business historians seeking to understand the 
23 
 
institutional nature of the international networks of firms central to Britain’s imperial economy 
- in which Indian jute was one node amongst many. 
 
Economic surveys. 
Morris’ survey of industrialisation in the Cambridge Economic History presents an archetypal 
view of colonial capitalists as a source of dynamism in a backward economy. A consequence of 
Morris’ view of a colonial economy constrained by the dominance of a stagnant agrarian sector 
is that he posits a scarcity of capital in the traditional sector which had to be made good by 
foreign investment.31 In his account, Morris contrasts British domination of the jute industry in 
Bengal, with Indian domination of the cotton industry of western India. Collusion in the jute 
market by British managing agents is contrasted with atomistic competition between Indian 
entrepreneurs in cotton. He sees the overcapacity in jute resulting from the IJMA agreements 
leading to lower profit margins relative to cotton, speculating that the non-entry of Indian 
firms until the 1920s can therefore be explained by the existence of better opportunities in 
other sectors, rather than any racial hostility on the part of the British incumbents. He further 
speculates that British shareholders viewed jute mill shares as a secure investment and that, 
partly, this was premised on the employment of European supervisors despite the availability 
of cheaper Indian substitutes.32 Whatever the empirical validity of these observations about 
the relative economic performance of jute manufacturers, Morris’ view of the ‘colour-blind’ 
nature of the industry is contested by Misra, who believes that the managing agents’ business 
strategy was governed by an exclusivist racial superiority. She argues that this prevented them 
from diversifying into more dynamic sectors and from forming alliances with Indian capital to 
preserve their position in sectors such as jute where they were already established in ways 
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that were detrimental to their interests in the long term.33 Misra’s argument exemplifies a 
species of argument which is concerned to emphasize the heuristic importance of ‘culture’ in 
explaining the actions of different interest groups in British India. This approach is 
counterposed to structuralist explanations which, in failing to address the culture of the 
imperial encounter, are depicted as reductionist and deterministic. It is necessary to consider 
the institutional structure of the jute mill companies in more detail, specifically the content of 
the managing agency company form, to evaluate the strengths of these different approaches. 
Before examining the characteristics of the management of the industry, the nature of the 
labour employed in the industry is described. The historiography of this aspect of the industry 
has also been marked by divergent views about the proper weight of structural and cultural 
factors in explaining the evolution of industrial relations and employment practices in the jute 
mills. 
Amiya Bagchi’s Private Investment in India, 1900-39 stands out as the authoritative 
restatement of the nationalist, drain-of-wealth, position, counterposed to Morris. This work is 
informed by an analytical concern to understand colonial India’s industrial stagnation in the 
light of the developmental capacities demonstrated by the state in uncolonised Japan.34 Bagchi 
marshals a mass of empirical evidence to demonstrate the lack of linkage effects in high 
growth sectors such as jute and cotton manufacturing – with a broader array of industries 
required to achieve the critical mass for industrial takeoff – such as steel and machine tools.35 
He rejects neo-classical supply-side explanations which rely on the myth of a scarcity of Indian 
capital and entrepreneurship to undertake profitable investment, pointing instead to the 
salience of demand-side factors such as the Government of India’s laissez-faire trade policies 
and preferential treatment for manufactures imported from Britain, and the impoverishing 
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effect of colonial taxation on Indian consumer demand.36 Bagchi’s case study of the jute 
industry emphasizes the enclave nature of the industry – in its predominantly European 
ownership and export orientation – that is consistent with his focus on the failures of colonial 
industrial policy to foster virtuous linkage effects.37 Bagchi’s analysis of the industry’s 
development was limited by the empirical evidence available to measure the quantitative 
growth of the industry, which is examined in Chapter 1. 
Bagchi’s optimistic account of the scope for an interventionist industrial policy has fallen out of 
fashion since the 1970s. The revisionism of the Cambridge School of the historiography of 
colonial India has tended to eschew systemic analysis, preferring a focus on more detailed 
regional and sectoral studies.38 General surveys tend to focus on the continuities in the 
incapacity of the colonial and post-colonial states to address intractable problems of agrarian 
backwardness swamping the potential for industrial transformation.39 
 
Monographs about the jute industry 
Perhaps the best known strand of scholarship about the jute industry comes from the field of 
labour history. The publication in 1989 of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Rethinking Working Class 
History has inspired a series of monographs by Indian historians examining different aspects of 
the history of labour in the jute industry. Chakrabarty utilised the framework of the Indian 
Subaltern Studies school of history to attempt to ‘liberate’ jute labour from the perceived 
condescension of a Marxist-influenced, Eurocentric, teleological reductionism in the existing 
literature on Indian labour history.40 While the focus of the present work is avowedly about 
capital not labour, Chakrabarty’s work – and subsequent work inspired by it - contains a wealth 
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of sources and telling observations about the jute industry. His central thesis challenges the 
depiction of the industry as an island of modernization in a sea of agrarian backwardness and 
teleological and unilinear causal narratives which telescope processes of development in the 
colonial/ post-colonial context. Chakrabarty presents evidence of the persistence of a 
communal, “pre-capitalist” identity and culture amongst the jute workers to make this case.41 
He applies this logic to analyse how the colonial context of the industry’s development shaped 
the operation of “managerial authority” in the jute mills. He describes managers as in “Ma-
Baap” – which translates as “parental” – relationship to their workers, which is compared to a 
form of “paternal despotism”.42 Antony Cox’s work seeks to transform the concept by 
extending it to apply to the mainly female workforce in Dundee through the operation of an 
“imperial nexus” of relationships governing jute manufacturing labour in the periphery and the 
metropole.43 In a different way, both Gordon Stewart and Maria Misra have extended 
Charkrabarty’s concept – at least implicitly – beyond the walls of the factory. Stewart discusses 
the transformation of Scottish businessmen into “merchant princes” in Calcutta.44 Misra 
contends that the relationships of European jute capitalists with Indian counterparts in the 
jute value chain were characterized by a racialised cultural superiority that ran counter to 
rational economic decisions.45 
A series of other works have focused upon the economic crisis of the interwar period and its 
impact on the jute industry. Samita Sen has studied how female labour bore the brunt of 
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retrenchment by the employers.46 Das Gupta, Basu and Cox have contested aspects of 
Chakrabarty’s thesis about the communal nature of labour relations, with particular reference 
to the general strikes of 1929 and 1937. 47 This debate has informed the work of British 
historians examining the culture of ex-patriot British capitalists who ran the industry.48  
 
Business history and institutional theories 
Business historians have sought to understand the institutional nature of the international 
networks of firms central to Britain’s imperial economy - in which Indian jute was one node 
amongst many. These networks differed in important respects from the paradigm of the 
modern multi-division, multinational corporation exporting a competitive advantage 
developed in the domestic market, as laid down by the work of American business historians, 
such as Chandler.49 Chapman identifies path dependency and declining returns to mercantile 
capital in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as factors driving the entry of colonial 
merchants into fixed investments in manufacturing.50 Wilkins identified ‘free standing 
companies’ as an important vehicle for channelling investment funds to the colonies which 
served as a corrective to the prevailing view that portfolio investment was the dominant 
vehicle for foreign direct investment.51 The term ‘free standing’ captures the way in which 
these companies were formed for the specific purpose of undertaking a foreign investment. 
                                                          
46
 Samita Sen, Women and Labour in Late Colonial India: The Bengal Jute Industry (Cambridge, 1999). 
47
 Ranajit Das Gupta, Labour and Working Class in Eastern India: Studies in colonial history, (Calcutta, 
1994); Subho Basu, Does Class Matter?: Colonial Capital and Workers' Resistance in Bengal, 1890-1937 
(Oxford, 2004). Cox, Empire, Industry and Class. 
48
 Stewart, Jute and Empire; Maria Misra, Business, Race, and Politics. 
49
 Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 
Mass ; London, 1977); ibid., Scale and Scope : The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass., 
1990). 
50
 Stanley D. Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to World War I 
(Cambridge, 1992). 
51
 Mira Wilkins, “The Free-Standing Company, 1870-1914: An Important Type of Foreign Direct 
Investment”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, (May, 1988), pp. 259-282; Mira Wilkins and 
Harm Schroter, The Free-Standing Company in the World Economy 1830-1996 (Oxford, 1998). 
28 
 
More recently Jones focused upon the performance of British merchants which evolved into 
multinationals with diversified investments in the periphery.52 Casson argued that these British 
firms did internalise a competitive advantage. In his view, most of the free-standing companies 
identified by Wilkins were ‘property-related’ – plantations, mining, utilities – and reverted to 
portfolio investment once the non-generic specificity of the managerial skills required to be 
internalised in the initial investment phase of these projects passed. However, he argued that, 
in the case of manufacturing investments, their operations continued to require non-generic 
managerial skills where the locus of strategic control from overseas remained salient.53 The 
debate between business historians over the institutional forms taken by foreign investment – 
variously categorised in the form of the ‘investment group’, the ‘free standing company’, the 
merchant turned multinational, and the ‘multinational managing agent’ or ‘ex-patriot 
multinational’54 – points to the need for further research to understand and conceptualise the 
substance of the institutional relationships involved in British foreign investment in the period 
1870-1914, of which the jute industry in Calcutta is a specific case. 
Some historians, such as Misra, believe that a British business ‘culture’ of ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’ constituted a barrier to Chandlerian ‘modernisation’, although many business 
historians seek to avoid such normative categories.55 This historiography will inform this case 
study of Thomas Duff; in turn, such a case study, it is hoped, can serve to illuminate in an 
original way the themes and test some of the hypotheses in this literature. 
Among these records, the Thomas Duff Archive at Dundee University represents one of the 
most detailed sets of company records from the 1870s through to the 1960s, comprising 
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company accounts, minutes of board meetings and correspondence between the head office 
in Dundee and managers in Calcutta and have been extensively referred to.56 This study will 
seek to analyse the history of Thomas Duff and Company in more detail.  
 
The Managing Agency System. 
Jute mills here were set up by the managing agencies, run and controlled by British capitalists 
resident in India, who dominated the small formal industrial sector in Bengal. A managing 
agent was a firm delegated by another firm’s principals with responsibility for the day-to-day 
operational management in return for a fee, often a commission on the managed firm’s sales 
or profits.57 Managing agents provided a service based upon their informational advantages in 
terms of knowledge of capital markets, export markets and access to finance. They often acted 
as promoters and under writers of share issues in the managed firms.  
These managing agencies had nominally originated to circumvent the ban on employees of the 
East India Company trading on their own account. Run by merchants independent of the 
Company, they served as a conduit for the capital of Company employees or of British 
residents seeking investment opportunities in the colonial economy but lacking the knowledge 
to monitor such projects.58 The agents were involved in the export of opium to China which 
secured valuable specie for London as part of the larger circuit of the triangular trade. In the 
1830s, they mobilised large sums for the speculative boom in indigo production, used for the 
making of dyes prior to the second industrial revolution, but many of the agencies were 
bankrupted after having made large advances to the indigo plantations which could not be 
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repaid when the price of indigo fell.59 A second generation of managing agents rose to 
prominence in the 1840s, most notably the multiracial partnership of Carr-Tagore with 
interests in river steamers and banking which marked the last serious large scale business 
venture by a Bengali entrepreneur in an increasingly racialised, post-Mutiny, Raj.60 These 
ventures again floundered in the face of the crisis of the late 1840s and the small size of the 
domestic market.  
Chapman has argued that the next generation of managing agencies to emerge in the 1850s to 
set up the Calcutta jute mills should be clearly distinguished from the earlier examples which 
went by the same nomenclature and criticizes Kling for obscuring this difference; Chapman 
prefers to bracket them under the broader category of “investment groups”.61 This is 
considered in more detail later in this chapter. At any rate, the later managing agencies were 
better integrated into international circuits of mercantile capital and proved to be a much 
more stable and enduring institution. They came to dominate the economy of Eastern India 
and its Bengali hinterland, with diversified interests initially in trading but increasingly came to 
use their local expertise and access to capital markets in London to develop interests in 
manufacturing, with large investments in jute, coal, tea, river, coastal and intercontinental 
shipping, and played an important role in developing local capital markets and banking, setting 
up the Calcutta stock exchange, the Presidency Banks and coordinating their activities through 
the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, with headquarters on Clive Street.62 
An important feature of the historical schema outlined by Chapman is that he views the 
adoption by the agency houses of the functions of managing agents as an important aspect of 
their evolution into consolidated “investment groups”. Another aspect conditioning this 
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evolution was the impact of the communications revolution on the relative profitability of 
mercantile and productive investments in colonial India. This comprised a cluster of 
innovations that radically restructured the conditions of conducting business in India through 
the compression of time and space that marked “the first globalization”. This led to the 
integration of Indian markets through the construction of the railway network from the 1850s, 
the introduction of steam shipping services utilizing the Suez canal for passengers, mail 
services and commodity exports to Europe, telegraphic transmission of business 
correspondence, market information and bank transfers.63 These innovation gave added 
impetus to the scope of export demand for the primary and processed products which the 
managing agents were sinking increasing quantities of fixed capital into extracting and 
manufacturing. It also led to a long term secular decline in freight rates charged by shipping 
companies. In the case of the destination of jute manufactures, this eroded the competitive 
edge enjoyed by Dundee because of its relative proximity to its most important export market, 
the Eastern seaboard of the United States.64 
The communications revolution also had more direct implications for the organization of the 
agency houses. The integration of markets for agricultural commodities on a global scale – and 
the instantaneous transmission of local prices and their transformation into a world market 
price – reduced opportunities for arbitrage by mercantile capital. Only firms operating on a 
larger scale than hitherto seen – with the requisite creditworthiness in the eyes of the 
accepting houses at the apex of the banking system in the City of London - could continue to 
specialize purely in commodity brokerage. Rallis, the Greek trading company, which had 
transferred their operations from the Black Sea to Calcutta, stands out in this respect, with the 
unrivalled scale and international scope of their position in raw jute dealing. This process had 
organizational implications for the managing agents in that it accentuated the need to expand 
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into productive outlets while encouraging a process of consolidation in order to raise the 
requisite finance for their activities. This led to the increasing integration of corresponding 
firms in different locations, and dovetailed with the increasing ease with which business 
operations could now be conducted by senior partners who had returned to London or 
elsewhere in the UK to prepare for their retirement.65 
 
The Calcutta jute industry and Thomas Duff & Co in outline. 
Before proceeding to a more detailed survey, a brief description of the history of the jute 
industry and the role played by Thomas Duff and Company is necessary to provide some 
context. The origins of the jute industry in Calcutta should be recognised as quite separate 
from the Dundee industry.66Jute manufacturing originally developed around Dundee, in 
Scotland, when raw jute imported from Bengal was found to be a cheap substitute input for 
flax imported from Russia in the traditional linen industry of the region, once treatment with 
whale oil succeeded in giving the raw jute the necessary physical properties for the 
manufacture of yarn. The initial impetus for the development of the industry in Scotland 
derived from the disruption of flax supplies during the Crimean War. Jute manufactures of 
hessians and sacking were an intermediate product and came to a position of predominance as 
the cheapest wrapper for a rapidly increasing world trade in raw materials in the second half of 
the nineteenth century relative to existing substitutes such as flax or cotton. The growth of this 
labour intensive industry attracted large numbers of poor Irish and Highland peasants recently 
expelled from the countryside, who ensured a cheap supply of labour with a strong female 
component. The profits of the jute mills in Dundee created a prosperous local bourgeoisie, 
which reinvested a large portion of their profits in growth sectors of the American economy 
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promising a swift return, such as railways. Investment in manufacturing in India was perceived 
as too risky by comparison.67 
The growth of the industry indicates that the Calcutta mills were able both to take advantage 
of the development of new markets through the expansion of world trade in raw materials 
requiring a wrapper but also to take markets away from Dundee. Stewart has analysed how 
this led the Dundee mills to adopt the strategy of seeking new markets in more technologically 
advanced markets such as carpet backing and intermediate products for linoleum flooring and 
furniture because they could not compete with the Calcutta mills on the basis of price.68 The 
Calcutta mills enjoyed a clear competitive advantage. They enjoyed access to capital markets 
on the basis of the managing agents’ good reputation. Machinery could be purchased from the 
same textile machinery engineers that serviced Dundee or second hand from the Dundee mills 
themselves. Labour was relatively cheap, with a plentiful supply of workers moving out of the 
depressed agriculture of the poor and populous neighbouring states of Bihar and United 
Provinces with some appropriate skill – many Bihari Muslims who entered the weaving 
sections of the mills came from families of handloom weavers.69 The land purchased for the 
erection of the mills occupied a sixty-five mile stretch of the Hooghly river to the North and 
South of Calcutta, with excellent railway and river steamboat infrastructure which ensured a 
cheap supply of raw jute from North and East Bengal, and a flexible supply of workers who 
could be expelled back to their home districts when there was a fall in demand.70 Proximity to 
supplies of raw jute ensured raw material could be purchased much more cheaply than the 
price obtaining for competitors in Dundee. The mills enjoyed access to the well developed 
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shipping networks of the Empire for the sale of their manufactures.71 The existence of low 
barriers to entry to the industry entailed that the mills would have to coordinate production in 
order to take advantage of their competitive advantage and remain profitable. This would lead 
to the formation of the Indian Jute Mills Association, (IJMA) in 1884.72 
Thomas Duff and Company played an important role in the setting up the IJMA. The IJMA was 
very influential in the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, the voice of British ex-patriot capital in 
Calcutta, and would later succeed in successfully lobbying for a separate electoral constituency 
for British business with the coming of provincial autonomy in the 1930s.73 Seventeen of the 
fifty four chairmen of the IJMA up to 1940 were directors of Thomas Duff, a position 
monopolised by the “big four” jute manufacturers – Duff, Yules, Bird and Jardine-Skinner.74 
From its foundation, the IJMA would grapple with the problem of how to coordinate the 
actions of its membership in an industry with low barriers to entry and an intermediate 
product whose purchasers enjoyed considerable market power. According to Goswami: 
By 1913, the United States alone accounted for 40 per cent of the total value of Indian 
gunny exports. This was not an unmixed blessing, for Calcutta soon became thoroughly 
dependent on the demand of a single national market. Moreover, the U.S. purchases were 
controlled by a handful of importers in New York and Savannah – of whom Bemis Brothers 
was the largest – and these firms soon had the strength to wield considerable pressure on 
the Calcutta mills.75  
Thus, oligopolistic strategies utilised by producers in consumer goods industries, such as 
branding and marketing to create barriers to entry, were not available to the IJMA. Instead, 
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the IJMA would resort to a series of working-time agreements to limit production at times of 
low demand. The success or failure of this strategy is considered in more detail below. 
 
Wartime. 
A new phase of expansion of Calcutta jute manufactures was heralded by the First World War. 
The spare capacity deriving from the IJMA’s short-time working agreements allowed the mills 
to increase output rapidly to meet the huge demand for sandbags from the British state. At the 
same time, the wartime disruption to shipping and the loss of German and Austrian markets, 
depressed the price of raw jute. By 1918, nearly all the mills enjoyed profits of more than 
100%, 3 mills of more than 250%. The mills paid out dividends at up to 330% while 
accumulating huge reserves. Seven new mill companies were floated during the war but could 
not start production because the necessary shipments of machinery could not be sent.76 Many 
new mills were floated in the years following the end of the war. 
The immediate post-war period marked a significant shift in the political context in which 
Indian industry functioned. State intervention in the British economy continued in peacetime 
and was reflected in debates in India about the role of the state as a promoter of domestic 
industry to build on the achievements of the wartime economic boom.77 The Indian 
Retrenchment Committee – to which Sir Alexander Murray, a former director of Thomas Duff, 
was appointed in 1922 – attempted to return the Raj to its pre-war commitment to free 
markets through swingeing cuts in expenditure by the Government of India.78 This policy, 
together with the renewed commitment to a deflationary monetary policy embodied by the 
revaluation of the rupee against sterling - was fiercely criticised by a resurgent Nationalist 
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movement.79 The low wages and precariousness of employment in Indian industry were drawn 
into the ambit of government policy through discussion of India’s proposed membership of the 
International Labour Organisation and official disquiet at the growth of Communist influence in 
the trade unions.80  
 
Outline of the Thesis. 
Chapter 1 presents a quantitative study of the development of the jute industry in Calcutta 
from 1870 to 1921. It presents an original empirical account of industry performance 
integrating firm-level and industry-level data. It creates a framework that allows the often 
impressionistic judgments in the existing literature to be assessed. The quantitive study of the 
industry confirms that there was limited technical change in the industry over time and limited 
scope to innovate and to capture internal economies of scale. High profits relative to other 
industries led to impressive rates of investment and growth. This growth was extensive, driven 
by the application of more factors of production, rather than a qualitative improvement in 
productivity or product- and process- innovation. An analysis of the cost structure of the 
industry shows the dominance of raw jute as the crucial input dominating industry 
performance. Raw jute prices experienced a long-term secular trend to increase in real terms 
by 50% during the period that put pressure on profit margins. Labour was very cheap and 
plentiful in the long-term and remained cheap. This cost structure entailed a strategic 
imperative to buy jute cheaply at the right point in the seasonal cycle, leading to rising jute 
stocks held by the industry over time, which necessitated access to sources of credit to finance 
working capital. 
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Relatively high profitability permitted a dividend performance that attracted investors to 
finance a high rate of capital accumulation, while permitting the managing agents of the jute 
mill companies to extract very significant rents. It is shown that the period from 1870-1921 
was punctuated by three distinctive sub-periods. There was relative volatility in the industry’s 
performance in terms of profitability and returns to investors in the 1870s and 1880s 
punctuated by the crises of 1879-80 and 1884-86. This was followed by a long period of 
relative stability and accelerating growth in the 1890s and 1900s, accompanied by stagnating 
profits and declining dividends and a return to crisis in 1905-06, 1908-12 and 1914. There was 
an interlude in the war years when the industry was extremely profitable. If the war years are 
excluded, there was a long term trend for profits to decline, mirrored by a narrowing of the 
equity base on which shareholders could earn high dividends. The evidence presented is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the formation of the Indian Jute Mills Association in the 
1880s and the use of short-time working to limit output in periods of depressed demand was 
successful at managing competitive pressures in the industry, while storing up the seeds of 
crisis in the inter-war period. 
Having determined the pattern of the industry’s development, Chapter 2 develops a 
quantitative assessment of the variations in the performance of different firms within the 
industry. As there was no distinctive trend for new mill companies to perform better than 
older companies over time – and for ease of exposition – the managing agent is taken as the 
basic unit of analysis. It is demonstrated that there were significant variations in performance 
of the mill companies under different managing agents over time, permitting some managing 
agents to expand rapidly and increase market share at the expense of others whose market 
share declined or who were forced out of the industry. While the technical barriers to entry in 
the industry were low, it is demonstrated that there was limited entry by new managing 
agents during the period, suggesting significant barriers to entry in terms of access to the 
information and other forms of competitive advantage internalized by those managing agents 
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which survived. A series of quantitative indicators are considered which show that the degree 
of variation in managing agents narrowed in the long run up to the war. This suggests a 
convergence in firm performance under competitive pressures and the diffusion of good 
practice through the auspices of the IJMA. The managing agents who survived the period of 
volatility experienced in the 1880s and 1890s converged on a range of performance which 
allowed most to remain profitable, while the variation in performance was sufficient to permit 
some managing agents to expand market share significantly and to experience rapid growth. It 
is also shown that there were significant differences in the performance of managing agents 
based in Calcutta who managed Rupee companies, and those based in the UK who managed 
Sterling companies. The Rupee companies were more susceptible to competitive pressures 
than the Sterling companies in general because of their relationship to the discipline of capital 
markets and tended to perform better over time, while the excessive rents charged by some of 
the managing agents of Sterling mills had a deleterious effect on firm performance. It is shown 
that Thomas Duff & Co, one of the managing agents of Sterling mill companies, was an 
exception. Along with three other managing agents in Calcutta, it succeeded in combining high 
profitability and returns to investors with rapid expansion of it productive capacity to increase 
its market share. 
The quantitative evidence of industry- and firm-level performance poses questions about the 
nature of the competitive advantage that firms internalized. The following chapters assess 
some of the questions posed through a case study of Thomas Duff & Co, a managing agency 
based in Dundee which controlled three mill companies in Calcutta – the Samnuggur, Titaghur 
and Victoria mill companies. Thomas Duff & Co were atypical of the managing agents 
operating in the Calcutta jute industry in some ways. They were the only managing agents with 
a headquarters in Dundee, the birthplace of the jute industry and they remained specialized in 
jute production. Most of the other managing agents were based in Calcutta and had followed 
the path described by Chapman in diversifying from mercantile activities into a range of 
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manufacturing activities requiring fixed investments. Thomas Duff & Co was a private limited 
company whereas the other managing agents operated as partnerships. Nevertheless, it is 
precisely the atypical nature of Thomas Duff & Co as an incorporated jute specialist that 
permits it to serve as a case study allowing inferences to be drawn about the functioning of the 
managing agency system, while not neglecting its specificity. Its relatively transparent accounts 
and its specialism in jute permit an assessment of the scale of rents derived from the jute 
industry by the managing agency system. 
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the historically specific and path-dependent evolution of 
Thomas Duff & Co into a “multinational managing agency”.81 Unlike most Calcutta managing 
agents, the principal actors in Thomas Duff & Co were originally the directors of a “free-
standing company” manufacturing jute in Calcutta, the Samnuggur Co. They had to learn the 
skills of a Calcutta managing agent before internalizing them after ten years of the 
Samnuggur’s existence. However, the other sources of competitive advantage are considered 
which permitted the actors who would later become Thomas Duff & Co to enter the Calcutta 
industry. The use of the public limited company form allowed the directors of the Samnuggur 
Co to pool location-specific knowledge from both Dundee and Calcutta and to internalize their 
collective competitive advantage, while solving principal-agent problems to establish an 
effective multinational management structure. This was not possible for more established 
Dundee firms under family control. The plc form did not dissolve the importance of family 
networks in the operation of Thomas Duff & Co and its managed firms. Rather, the resources 
of various family networks – in the form of knowledge and equity - were pooled, while the 
hereditary aspect was attenuated in relation to the appointment of firm managers to enable 
the efficient handling of the firm’s affairs in the interests of the original family networks. 
Particular attention is given to the way in which the directors of Thomas Duff & Co utilized the 
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technologies associated with the ‘first globalisation’ – improved international shipping and 
more rapid communication through telegraph and post – to surmount the difficulties of 
managing a multinational engaged in manufacturing. It is also shown how the firm succeeded 
in creating a virtuous circle of profitability of the managed firms that permitted the 
maintenance of high returns to ordinary shareholders, rapid growth of productive capacity 
while permitting the extraction of very significant rents by the managing agents that allowed 
for a rapid accumulation of wealth which was a distant memory for most of their peers 
amongst Dundee’s jute capitalists. 
Chapter 4 proceeds to consider some more specific aspects of the Thomas Duff & Co’s history. 
Protecting and renewing the competitive advantage internalized in the firm required the 
judicious handling of managers and the creation of a career path to incentivize and reward 
Calcutta managers by giving them access to the stream of rents captured by the managing 
agency’s directors. This had to be balanced against the imperative to restrict access sufficiently 
in order not to dilute the stream of rents paid to individual directors. Several episodes are 
considered of how internal dissension within the directorship over access to managing agency 
rents was contained. These episodes threatened to call the whole structure into question 
through unwanted attention in the eyes of the media and the law courts – and by extension – 
the ordinary ‘outsider’ shareholders. 
The following section demonstrates how Thomas Duff & Co addressed the problem of rising 
jute prices by an informal process of backwards integration which allowed it to capture the 
directors of the raw jute trading firm of R Sim & Co, Robert Sim and John Smith, while limiting 
the risks associated with fluctuating prices. Rather than formally integrate backwards, Robert 
Sim and John Smith brought valuable information on to the board of Thomas Duff & Co while 
market power combined with family networks to ensure privileged access to the raw material. 
The chapter concludes by delineating the way in which Thomas Duff & Co was able to bring its 
distinctive competitive advantage as a jute specialist to bear in playing a disproportionately 
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prominent role in the affairs of the Indian Jute Mills Association. While the other participants 
were highly diversified with conflicts of interest as suppliers of inputs to the industry and in 
marketing the industry’s output, Thomas Duff & Co played a significant role in advocating a 
strategy of managed competition through short-time agreements and periodic restrictions on 
investment in new capacity that enabled the industry to consolidate after the volatility 
experienced during the 1870s and 1880s. Although this entailed short-term costs to the firm in 
terms of sacrificing its competitive lead in certain destination markets, it served its long-term 
strategy of managing the effects of competition as a relatively small firm without the financial 
resources to weather crisis of some of its more diversified competitors.  
Chapter 5 considers the way in which Thomas Duff & Co engaged in a process of learning in 
relatively competitive Calcutta capital markets and pioneered the controlled expansion of its 
equity base to take on a more popular character – encompassing professionals, petit bourgeois 
and their own skilled employees. This permitted the managing agents to raise investment 
funds on a sufficient scale to finance the rapid expansion of the jute companies they managed, 
while retaining sufficient stakes themselves to maintain control and maintain access to 
lucrative managing agency rents. 
 
 
Sources. 
The thesis draws on a range of archival sources accessed in UK collections, including individual 
company archives such as those of Thomas Duff & Co at the University of Dundee and of James 
Finlay & Co at the University of Glasgow, as well as India Office records at the British Library, 
and extensive research in both British and Indian newspaper archives. These sources were 
supplemented by fieldwork in Calcutta, which permitted me to consult the annual reports of 
the Indian Jute Mills Association at the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, and Capital, the weekly 
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financial newspaper of European business, at the National Library, Calcutta, which I have used 
extensively. 
Chapters 1 and 2 condensed a mass of quantitative data in order to measure the performance 
of the industry over time and to draw comparisons between the performance of the mill 
companies managed by Thomas Duff & Co and that of other firms. Some firm-level data are 
aggregated to estimate industry measures in Chapter 1 and the same data are used to study 
the relative performance of managing agents in the industry in Chapter 2. 
As all the firms in the industry – with the exception of Birkmyre Brothers’ Hastings mill - were 
public companies with a stock exchange listing, their annual or half-yearly results were 
published regularly in commercial newspapers, detailing firms’ balance sheets and profit and 
loss accounts. I have collated reports published in the Dundee Advertiser and in the weekly 
Calcutta commercial newspaper, Capital, published from 1889 onwards. Capital also published 
weekly share prices and share transactions and half yearly tables for variables such as raw jute 
held in stock by the jute mill companies. I have supplemented this data with the data from the 
Investor’s India Year Book annual series published from 1911, which provides the data for the 
Calcutta-listed jute mill companies’ profit and loss accounts from 1903 and balance sheets 
from 1912. 
Because all of the jute mill companies in Calcutta except Birkmyre’s Hasings mill were public 
companies with published accounts – and there were never more than a few hundred looms 
operating elsewhere in India during the period of study – it has been possible to use the firm-
level data to construct aggregated estimates of the industry’s performance, estimating a small 
number of missing values based on the share of an individual firm in total industry loom 
capacity. 
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Methodology. 
Chapters 1-2 present a quantitative study of the evolution of the Calcutta jute industry, taking 
the industry as a whole then examining variation between firms. This represents original work 
in its own right based on the analysis of industry-level and firm-level data together to present a 
battery of descriptive statistics. Further work on the data series is required in order to be able 
to test the statistical relationships between the variables presented and has not been 
attempted in this study, although a basic measure of the correlation between raw material 
prices and output prices is presented. 
Drawing on the approaches of business historians and institutionalist economists cited above, 
Chapters 3-5 focus on the case study of an individual firm based on the firm’s internal records 
and accounts, particularly the minutes of the directors, to attempt to illuminate and make 
intelligible some of the quantitative economic trends in industry and firm performance 
identified in Chapters 1-2. Specifically, it will be seen that an analysis that incorporates the 
networking and information aspects of business relationships can contribute a more 
developed understanding of the strategies of the Calcutta managing agents who invested in 
the jute industry. Forms of networking – through family ties or personal acquaintance in prior 
transacting giving rise to trust – provide a crucial dimension for understanding firm strategy 
and choices about contracting. This is particularly the case in the specific historical context of 
this study, which analyses British businesses in the process of transition from family 
enterprises to public limited companies, who were investing in a colonial context which 
required effective contracting to protect and reproduce location-specific knowledge and 
competitive advantage within the firm. The contribution of networked relationships to the 
success of Thomas Duff & Co can be observed in their relationships in export markets, in 
controlling risk in relationships with their raw materials suppliers, and in controlling market 
conditions through collusion with other Calcutta manufacturers, as well as in the creation of a 
loyal base of insider shareholders to finance the firm’s expansion while retaining control. 
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Chapters 3-5 also demonstrate the particular salience of an analytical focus on information 
flows in a multinational manufacturing enterprise such as Thomas Duff & Co, which took the 
form of a “managing agency”. The spatial and temporal dimensions of the efficient 
management of information flows across national boundaries in the age of Suez and the 
telegraph are examined. It is shown that Thomas Duff & Co was successful at creating an 
institutional structure to generate, protect and reproduce knowledge of different types of 
information necessary to sustain profitable performance and growth – technical information of 
production processes and commercial information to control input costs and market output. 
The institutional form of the managing agency draws the reader’s attention to the existence of 
information asymmetries between firm principals and agents, explaining the ability of agents 
to generate rents. Rent-seeking is referred to, not in a normative sense, but contributes to an 
understanding of the motivation of the directors of Thomas Duff & Co to shape firm strategy in 
a fashion that they profited from while ensuring good returns to their principals, the 
shareholders. The discussion of principal-agent relationships is found to be useful as a 
descriptive tool firmly rooted in an analysis of historical context and the substantive power 
relationships and information advantages of the directors of the managing agency, which 
clearly departs from the methodological individualism of classical principal-agent theory. 
Agency in the formation of firm strategy and in the design of efficient incentives is located in 
this analysis in the collective will of the directorate of Thomas Duff & Co, who were both major 
principals in their capacity as substantial shareholders of the managed companies, and agents 
in their capacity as directors. The directorate stood in turn as the principal in relation to a 
series of subsequent principal-agent relationships within the firm’s managerial hierarchy, 
which they were able to consciously shape and adapt to growth and changed circumstances. 
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Chapter 1. The Calcutta Jute Industry, 1870-1921; a 
quantitative study of the industry. From boom and 
bust to steady growth. 
 
This chapter provides a detailed quantitative assessment for the first time of the jute industry’s 
growth based upon detailed empirical research of primary source material. A detailed 
description of the primary source material and the methodology adopted in developing the 
statistical evidence for this chapter can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
Sketch of Growth of Industry 
The Bengali jute industry was initiated in 1855 - when George Acland constructed the Rishra 
jute mill - catering to domestic markets for packing agricultural exports.1 By the 1870s, the 
industry had begun to find export markets. The existing mills were extremely profitable, 
encouraging a wave of new entrants, who funded the construction of new mills in a wave of 
investment euphoria in jute mill shares floated on the Calcutta stock exchange. Many of the 
managing agents who promoted these concerns had no technical knowledge of the industry. 
Euphoria turned to depression in 1880, followed by a brief upturn, and then prolonged 
depression through the mid-1880s, leading to the formation of the Indian Jute Manufacturers 
Association (IJMA) in 1885, which coordinated the consolidation of the industry through a 
series of short-time working agreements that ran continuously for five years from 1886 to 
1891 cutting the working time by up to 50% to limit output and maintain prices. The 
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effectiveness of the agreement was reinforced by a ban on investment in new productive 
capacity.2 
The summary statistics in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 below indicate the impressive rate of growth of 
the industry up to 1920 in terms of the number of mills, workers employed, their spinning and 
weaving capacity and output. In contrast, the quantity of raw jute exported to service the mills 
of Calcutta’s rivals in the world market stagnated from 1890 onwards. 
 
Table 1.1: Growth of Calcutta Jute Industry, 1880-1920, quantities. 
Year 
(1) Number of 
companies 
(2) Persons 
employed 
(3) Looms 
(4) 
Spindles 
(000s) 
(5) Raw jute 
exports 
(million 
cwt) 
(6) Jute 
consumed by 
Calcutta mills 
(million cwt) 
1880 19 27,494 4,946 71 6.7 1.9 
1890 22 59,541 7,704 157 12.0 3.7 
1900 29 102,449 14,119 295 12.4 8.9 
1910 40 204,104 31,418 646 12.7 14.6 
1920 56 280,431 41,045 856 9.4 20.1 
Sources: Columns (1), (2) from Statistics of British India, Vol 1, Commercial Statistics, "Progress of the 
jute mill industry in India." 
Columns (3)-(4) from Statistics of British India, 1919-20, Vol 1, Commercial Statistics, p.76, "Progress of 
the jute mill industry in India 1879-80 to 1919-20".. 
Column (5) from Kirti Chaudhury, Chapter on “Foreign Trade” in Kumar & Raychaudhuri (eds), CEHI, 
volume 2, p. 851. 
Colum (6) 1880 and 1889 figures from Government of India, annual survey of jute mills, 1900-20 figures 
from IJMA, Annual Report of the Committee 1921, Statement I, “Local Consumption of Raw Jute, p. 211. 
 
Table 1.2: Paid up share capital of Calcutta jute mill companies, 1880-1920, values (money 
values in constant 1873 rupees, millions). 
Year 
Paid up 
capital 
1880 23 
1890 30 
1900 60 
1910 109 
1920 146 
Source: Statistics of British India, Vol 1, Commercial Statistics, "Progress of the jute mill industry in 
India." 
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Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the very large increase in productive capacity in terms of the physical 
quantities of factor inputs and output for the whole period 1880-1920and the value of share 
capital invested in jute mill companies. There was an overall 920% increase in persons 
employed while spinning capacity increased 1109% between 1880 and 1920. This suggests that 
increases in physical capital employed per worker were rather marginal. The overall increase in 
weaving capacity of 730% as measured in terms of looms employed is slightly misleading 
because the increasing proportion of wide looms employed for weaving hessian cloth relative 
to narrow sacking looms led to a rising ratio of spindles employed relative to looms.   
Over the four decades under consideration, large additions to productive capacity from a very 
low base during the 1870s were followed by relatively slow growth in loom capacity 
amounting to a 56% increase during the 1880s, then accelerating growth in capacity in the 
1890s that continued into the following decade. The rate then slowed markedly with the 
occurrence of a brief recession of 1910-11 followed by the war, which forced plans for further 
investment to be deferred. The growth of the factors of production employed in the industry is 
depicted below, taking spindles, looms and workers employed measured in index numbers. 
 
Figure 1.1: Growth of factors of production employed in the industry, 1876-1921, index nos 
(1900 = 1). 
 
Source: Statistics of British India, 1919-20, Vol 1, Commercial Statistics, p.76, "Progress of the jute mill 
industry in India to 1919-20". 
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While capturing the accelerating growth of the physical scale of the industry from the mid-
1890s up to the war, Figure 1.1 is also remarkable in that it depicts a static relationship in the 
employment of looms, spindles and workers, which suggests that production techniques 
underwent limited change over time in so far as they affected the combination of factors of 
production. This is confirmed by the trends in spindles employed per loom, spindles per 
worker, and looms per worker. 
 
Table 1.3: Long term industry trends in proportions of factors of production employed. 
 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Spindles per loom 17.6 20.9 20.6 20.6 
Workers per loom 7.2 7.6 6.9 6.6 
Workers per spindle 0.41 0.36 0.33 0.32 
Looms per mill 274 348 492 521 
Source: Statistics of British India, 1919-20, Vol 1, Commercial Statistics, p.76, "Progress of the jute mill 
industry in India to 1919-20". 
 
The figures for workers per loom and per spindle measure the size of the whole workforce 
relative to looms and spindles employed. The data indicates an extensive pattern of growth, 
whereby productive capacity increased by the duplicative addition of new mills utilising similar 
techniques to the existing physical capital. There appear to have been a very limited realisation 
of economies of scale in terms of the physical capital employed per worker. In terms of 
spindles employed per loom, one would expect this ratio to rise, given the increasing 
proportion of wide looms employed to weave hessian cloth, which required more spindles per 
loom than narrow sacking looms. Therefore, the stability of this ratio does suggest an 
improvement in spinning techniques over time. This is supported by reports of the 
introduction of a more efficient spinning frame at the new Khardah mill, closely followed by 
the Thomas Duff & Co mills, which was rapidly adopted across the industry3: 
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1904, where it was stated “exactly the spinning machinery of fifty years ago” was in in use. It was said to 
“have brought about great smoothness in running, and consequently, light and regular driving of the 
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[The Calcutta office was] in favour of extending new mill to 900 looms in all, as with the Boyd-
Phillip spindle drive the mill engine will have sufficient power to drive the machinery forming 900 
looms… The board were pleased to see that the Boyd-Phillips drive was so well thought of by the 
manager.
4
 
Where internal economies of scale were most likely realised was in the increasing size of mill 
units, which nearly doubled from the 1880s up to the 1890s. Thus, the Calcutta newcomer 
would have enjoyed a significant advantage in being able to exploit a relative abundance of 
land and to introduce a more rational application of up to date techniques in industrial 
architecture and the arrangement of mill machinery more cheaply than its Dundonian 
competitors, burdened with old capacity. Crucially, they benefitted from the ability to harness 
the benefits of rapid developments in sources of power, probably the most dynamic aspect of 
the suite of mechanisms in use in the industry where rapid technical progress occurred. 
Improvements in engine were followed in the twentieth century by the introduction of 
turbines and electrification.5 
Figure 1.2 shows the increasing share of new capacity devoted to hessian production over time 
to cater to the growth of relatively more profitable outlets for hessian cloth, particularly in the 
American export market. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
spindles”, improving the quality of yarn. The mechanism was driven by an electric motor, driving 71% 
more spindles per HP. It was self-lubricating, requiring oiling once a month rather than the three times 
daily oiling of the existing machinery. The advantage of the swing rail mechanism patented by J & T Boyd 
of Glasgow was that it could be adapted to the existing spinning machinery. The introduction of the 
frames “would bring about to the mills and factories electric motor power for driving and lighting 
purposes.”, “New Jute Spinning Patent. Successful Venture in Dundee.” , Dundee Courier, 29 Jan 1904, p. 
5. See also “New Development in Jute-Spinning Machinery”, Dundee Courier, 3 Oct 1904, p. 7. 
4
 MS 86/3/1/9, Titaghur Co, p. 186, Minutes of the Directors [henceforth MOTD], 10 Oct 1905; MS 
86/3/1/9, Titaghur Co, p. 333 MOTD, 3 Apr 1906. 
5
 MS 86/1/1/17, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 9 Sep 1919, p. 282. 
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Figure 1.2: Hessian and sacking looms, 1872-1921. 
 
Sources: DR Wallace, The Romance of Jute, (Calcutta, 2
nd
 edition, 1928), p. 95. All industry per loom 
measures in this chapter are derived from this source. Sacking and hessian loom figures from Anon, Jute 
Mills in Bengal, (Dundee, 1880), p. 88; DR Wallace, The Romance of Jute, (Calcutta, 2
nd
 edition, 1928); 
annual series ‘Jute Mills in India’ published by Calcutta firms of jute brokers, Poppe, Delius & Co, JA 
Dykes & Co, Moran & Co, reproduced in Friend of India & Statesman, 1879-83, Dundee Courier and 
Dundee Advertiser, Indian Jute Mills Association, Annual Reports 1905-21.  
 
Figure 1.2 demonstrates that the rapid growth in the industry’s weaving capacity was 
dominated by the increasing deployment of hessian looms relative to sacking looms from a low 
base. The average proportion of sacking and hessian is given below. 
 
Table 1.4: Proportion of sacking and hessian looms employed, %. 
  1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Sacking 76% 73% 64% 47% 42% 
Hessian 24% 27% 36% 53% 58% 
Sources: Anon., Jute Mills in Bengal, (Dundee, 1880), p. 88; DR Wallace, The Romance of Jute, (Calcutta, 
2
nd
 edition, 1928), p. 95. 
 
Thus, a large proportion of the increase in weaving capacity as investment accelerated from 
the mid-1890s was devoted to hessian looms, although the utilisation of sacking looms started 
to increase again more rapidly from 1905. It should be noted that there was some adaptability 
at the margin in terms of the use of narrow and wide looms for sacking and hessian outputs 
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respectively. Mill companies were able to turn some medium width looms to work on sacking 
or hessian outputs depending on market conditions.6 Evidence from the minute books of the 
mill companies managed by Thomas Duff & Co from 1906 to 1913 provides disaggregated data 
for the relative profitability of sacking and hessian outputs which reveals that the latter were 
consistently more profitable by an order of magnitude. 
 
Table 1.5: Samnuggur & Titaghur mills, managed by Thomas Duff & Co, average monthly 
profits per ton of hessian and sacking output (nominal rupees), 1907-13. 
Year Hessian Sacking Ratio 
1907 70 10 7.3 
1908 42 25 *1.7 
1909 30 8 3.9 
1910 11 4 2.5 
1911 23 7 3.2 
1912 72 22 3.2 
1913 91 13 7.2 
Average 49 13 3.8 
* Result reflects the sharp economic contraction in the US market for hessians from May 1907 to June 
1908. 
Source: Derived from regular monthly statements of working accounts in UDA, MS 86/1/1/10-15, 
Samnuggur Co, Minutes of the Directors [henceforth ‘MOTD’]; MS 86/3/1/10-14, Titaghur Co, MOTD. 
 
While it would have been rational for new mills to have specialised in hessian lines of 
production, the technical constraints on doing so were insurmountable, given the spatial and 
geographical structure of the Calcutta jute industry. Unlike in the more geographically 
concentrated environs of Dundee, a specialised division of labour between spinning, weaving 
and calendaring establishments – together with the development of speciality lines such as 
carpets - did not emerge in the period of this study.7 In Dundee, smaller firms might specialize 
in one activity while larger firms integrated them. The Calcutta mills were constructed as 
integrated spinning and weaving establishments from the start. Crucially, the mid-range 
                                                          
6
 See Champdany Co. 7/1/2/2/1, MOTD, 1873-9, 9 June, 1875. 
7
 See listings of “Mill and Factory Managers” in the “Trades and Professions” section of the annual 
Dundee Directory, whose notation indicates a division of labour between spinning mills, weaving 
factories, finishing calendars, and foundries for the maintenance of machinery, passim. 
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qualities of raw jute assortments could either be used for hessian warp yarn or for sacking weft 
yarn. Therefore, the most cost-effective way to process raw jute assortments of various 
qualities of jute suitable for sacking or hessian outputs was to produce a mix of sacking and 
hessian outputs.8 
 
The cost structure of the jute industry 
What were the long term trends in the value and quantity of raw jute by the Calcutta mills and 
in the output and sales of jute manufactures? 
Figure 1.3 shows a price series for fine Naraingunge jute and an average of all classes of 
Naraingunge jute, compared with price series for hessian 40 inch cloth  and for cornsacks, the 
most common sacking output. 
 
Figure 1.3: Raw jute and jute manufactures, relative prices per ton of (Rs, constant prices, 1873 
= 1). 
 
G. H. Le Maistre, Investors India Year Book (IIYB), 1920 (Calcutta, 1921), p. 114, “Area under Jute, 
Outturn and Prices, 1900-19.” 
                                                          
8
 See UDA, MS 86/1/1/8, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 66, 27 Nov 1901; “[The agents] estimate that [the 
jute stock] contains 35% of hessian warp, 25% of hessian weft and sacking warp, and 40% of sacking 
weft, and totals in all 440,000 m[aun]ds. They also state that in full normal working the requirements 
will be 23%, 50% & 27% of the above respective qualities. On this basis the stock shows a surplus of 
hessian warp and sacking weft and a considerable shortage of hessian weft and sacking warp, and is 
thus badly balanced and handicaps buying operations as regards taking advantage of the relatively 
cheap price at which medium and low jute can now be purchased.” 
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The two comparisons show the close correlation of raw jute prices from 1900 up until the war 
with the most common sacking and hessian outputs.9 
It is possible to construct estimates to calculate the long-term trend in the cost structure by 
examining three main sources, Government of India annual statistics for foreign and coastal 
trade in raw jute and jute manufactures, Government of India annual returns of jute mills and 
data provided by the Indian Jute Mills Association annual reports from 1904. 
 
Figure 1.4: Estimated values (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1) and quantities (index nos) of raw 
jute consumed and sales of jute manufactures by the Calcutta jute industry. 
 
Sources: Government of India, Statistical Abstract of British India, series on jute mills in Bengal 1876-90; 
Government of India, Annual Statement of the Trade and Navigation of British India with Foreign 
Countries, and of the Coasting Trade of the Several Presidencies and Provinces; Government of India, 
Annual Statement of the Seaborne Trade of the Bengal presidency with Foreign Countries and Indian 
Ports; Indian Jute Mills Association, Report of the Committee for the year ended 31
st
 December 1921 
(Calcutta, 1922), p.211, “Statement I. Local Consumption of Raw Jute including Cuttings as returned 
yearly by Members…”, and p.217, “Statement VII. Comparative Statement of Annual Jute Forecasts, 
Consumpt of Jute by Local Mills, Exports of Jute and Gunnies and Imports of Jute.” 
 
                                                          
9
 It is difficult to draw conclusions about value added as the two classes of raw jute listed correspond to 
jute marks used in spinning hessian weft and warp; average prices for inferior marks of raw jute would 
be required to calculate value added in sacking manufacture. 
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Figure 1.4 reinforces the evidence above of the rapid extensive growth of the industry over 
time. Values and quantities of inputs and outputs followed the same long run trend apart from 
during the war period from 1914. 
Discontinuities in price series, mismatches in annual reporting periods, the difficulty of 
isolating raw jute that was exported from that which was consumed domestically, and the 
difficulty of matching different qualities of inputs and outputs are discussed further in the 
appendix below. These factors make it difficult to estiumate standardised price series for 
aggregated units of inputs and outputs for the Calcutta industry over time in order to test 
correlation between input and output prices. However, the price series for the average of all 
classes of Naraingunge jute does correspond reasonably well to the mix of qualities of the raw 
material used in the manufacture of warp and weft threads woven into hessian 40 inch cloth, 
price series for which are both shown in Figure 1.3. Excluding the war years, when input and 
output prices behaved very differently, these two price series for the period 1900-13 were 
highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.90. The category “all classes of 
Naraingunge jute” corresponds less closely to the mix of qualities of raw material used in 
cornsacks and other sacking outputs than it does for hessian cloth and other hessian outputs. 
Nevertheless, the price series for all classes of Naraingunge jute for 1900-13 was also closely 
correlated to the price series for cornsacks in Figure 1.3, with a correlation coefficient of 0.80. 
This price series for raw jute, when compared to a price series constructed from IJMA figures 
for sacking and hessian output by estimating a standardised price per ton of output for the 
period 1905-13 gave a correlation coefficient of 0.89. The three coeeficients were all 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Together, these results would suggest that the 
hypothesis that raw jute prices were by far the most significant determinant of output prices 
cannot be discounted, making it vital for jute manufacturing firms to control their raw material 
costs to operate profitably. 
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Figure 1.5 examines long-term trends in prices for inputs and outputs, (although the units are 
incommensurable). 
 
Figure 1.5: Price of raw material and manufactured output (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: Government of India, Annual Statement of the Trade and Navigation of British India with 
Foreign Countries, and of the Coasting Trade of the Several Presidencies and Provinces; Government of 
India, Annual Statement of the Seaborne Trade of the Bengal presidency with Foreign Countries and 
Indian Ports, DR Wallace, The Romance of Jute, (Calcutta, 2
nd
 edition, 1928), p. 95. 
 
The long term trend was for the real price per unit of manufactures to fall until the war while 
the real price of raw jute rose considerably, suggesting increased competition for inputs and 
outputs. The path followed by the real price of standardised bags demonstrates the increasing 
dominance of hessians, followed by a brief period where huge increases in sacking output 
during the war reversed this trend. The stability of real sacking prices during the war is 
interesting, as it may indicate that large war time profits were based less on “profiteering” 
than on the large volumes of war orders for sacking at a fixed mark up, (combined with a 
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reduction in working hours), which also had the indirect effect of forcing up hessian prices to 
very high levels.10 
In order to draw inferences about productivity, it is necessary to take into account fluctuations 
in annual working hours, which varied considerably under the aegis of the short-time working 
agreements introduced periodically by the IJMA. While no precise data exist for average long-
run working hours across the whole industry, precise data do exist for the mills managed by 
Thomas Duff & Co. From the reports of various Indian Factory Labour Commissions, it appears 
that these mills worked marginally shorter hours than many of the other mills.11 Nevertheless, 
the total working hours of all the mills followed the same trend over time as the mills managed 
by Thomas Duff. If we take these hours to broadly represent the trend, an approximate 
estimate of the trend in the consumption of inputs and production of outputs per loom per 
hour can be attempted, as in Figure 1.6 below. The level will represent an overestimate for the 
reasons stated above and also because the Hooghly mill remained outside the IJMA until the 
early 1890s in order to work longer hours and the Hastings mill worked a night shift with 
electric light for several years during the mid-1890s.12 The series is presented from 1883 
because the data for hessian sales prior to that year is given in unintelligible units of “pieces”. 
 
  
                                                          
10
 Goswami, Industry, Trade and Peasant Society, pp. 92-96. 
11
 Sir John Leng MP, Letters from India and Ceylon, (Dundee, 1896), Chapter on “The Indian Dundee”, 
pp. 630-8; Indian Factory Commission, Report of the Commission on Indian Factories, 1890 (London, 
1891), pp. 87-94; Indian Factory Labour Commission, Report and Appendices, Volume I, (London, 1908), 
p. 675, pp. 707-14. 
12
 MS 86/1/1/2, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 1 Jun 1886, p. 133; MS 86/1/1/4, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 30 May 
1894, p. 373. 
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Figure 1.6: Hourly input and output per loom. 
 
Sources: Government of India, Annual Statement of the Trade and Navigation of British India with 
Foreign Countries, and of the Coasting Trade of the Several Presidencies and Provinces; Government of 
India, Annual Statement of the Seaborne Trade of the Bengal presidency with Foreign Countries and 
Indian Ports, DR Wallace, The Romance of Jute, (Calcutta, 2
nd
 edition, 1928), p. 95. Calculation of hourly 
working from UDA, MS 86/1/1/1-7, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, and MS 86/3/1/1-6, Titaghur Co, MOTD, 
1872-1900, monthly estimates on working account; MS 86/5/13/9 Thomas Duff & Co, “Working Hours”. 
 
A number of trends may be remarked on, although it should be noted that the units of the 
three variables are incommensurable. The trend was for the hourly consumption of raw jute 
per loom to fall while the three different measures of hourly output per loom increased 
substantially. The decline in the former can be accounted for by the increasing utilisation of 
hessian looms, manufacturing a less bulky product, but it also reflects a more efficient 
utilisation of raw material. The minute books of the Champdany Co. and of the mills managed 
by Thomas Duff & Co. suggest that wastage – measured as the differential between the weight 
of output for a given input - was reduced from about 12% in the 1880s to about 3% by the war. 
The most notable aspect of the rise in hourly output per loom is the rapid improvement in 
hessian outputs up to the end of the century before they stabilised. One explanation for this 
trend might be the piecemeal way in which small numbers of hessian looms were added to 
total capacity through the extension of existing mills and that mills experienced difficulties 
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rearranging their spinning to efficiently meet the new configuration of weaving capacity. From 
the mid-1890s, the wave of investment in new mills identified in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 allowed 
firms to pursue a more systematic approach to integrating additional capacity for hessian 
production. Another important factor explaining the rise in overall hourly output would seem 
to be the more efficient application of sources of power, with firms investing in much larger 
engines, while introducing more efficient methods of harnessing engine power through 
adopting newer techniques in shafting and driving that permitted spinning and weaving 
machinery to be run at a faster pace.13 Another, related, factor would be the difficulties mills 
experienced initially in selecting the appropriate qualities of raw jute to produce a satisfactory 
quality of output in these new, more sophisticated product lines.14 
 
Jute Stocks and Strategy. 
It is difficult to calculate with confidence the proportion of raw jute costs relative to the total 
costs of production of jute manufactures for the industry as a whole with the available data. 
This data does exist for firms such as the Titaghur Co. and the Champdany Co., managed by 
Thomas Duff & Co. and Finlay, Muir & Co. respectively. 
 
Table 1.6: Raw jute, % of total costs. 
 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Champdany Co 62% 66% 67% 69% 64% 
Titaghur Co n/a  58% 65% 69% 69% 
Glasgow University Archive, MSS UGD 91/7/1/2/1/1-2, Champdany Co, General Meeting Minutes, MSS 
UGD 91/7/1/5/1-3, Champdany Co, Annual Reports and Accounts, MSS UGD 91/7/3/1/2, Champdany 
Co, Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Accounts; UDA MS 86/3/5/1-5, Titaghur Co, Half-yearly balance 
sheets, Reports of the directors, balance sheet, working account and profit and loss account. 
 
                                                          
13
 Leng, Letters from India, pp. 72-82. 
14
 MS 86/3/1/4, Titaghur Co, MOTD, 9 Mar 1897, p. 360. 
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These figures indicate that the cost of jute was the most significant component of total costs 
over time, until the exceptional conditions of the war transformed the raw jute market into 
one favouring purchasers with the slump of effective overseas demand. Assuming that these 
firms were representative of the industry trend, profitability depended to a large extent on the 
minimisation of raw jute costs. In the context of a long term secular trend for the real price of 
raw jute to rise, combined with short-term fluctuations in price, as different firms in a growing 
industry competed for raw materials, firms within the industry sought to develop strategies to 
minimise the cost of the raw material while controlling the risk of market fluctuations through 
the timing of their purchases of raw jute. This involved a complex calculation based on 
expectations of relative changes in prices in the raw jute market, in the market for jute 
manufactures and in the money market which firms relied on to borrow funds to raise working 
capital. Figure 1.7 shows the estimated rise in the real value of jute stocks held by the Calcutta 
industry, based on the half-yearly reports of the majority of firms whose accounting half-years 
ended on December 31st and June 30th. 
 
Figure 1.7: Value of industry stocks of raw jute, . 
 
Sources: Estimated from aggregated half-year reports of the majority of individual mill companies that 
reported at 30 June and 31
 
December in Anon., Jute Mills in Bengal (Dundee, 1880), Dundee Advertiser, 
IIYB. 
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Jute purchases were concentrated in the months from September to December when the new 
crop came on to the market, peaking in October and November.15 Stocks held on December 
31st increased more rapidly over time than stocks held on June 30th, at the end of the jute 
season. What was the trend in real terms raw jute stocks held per loom? 
 
Figure 1.8: Real terms value of raw jute stocks per loom, (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: Estimated from aggregated reports of individual mill companies in Anon., Jute Mills in Bengal 
(Dundee, 1880), Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
The trend indicated in Figures 1.8 was for a rising real value of jute stocks per loom. Therefore, 
firms’ profitability depended not only on their control of raw material costs, but on their 
management of these rising costs over time.16 
 
 
  
                                                          
15
 IJMA, Report of the Committee, 1918 (Calcutta, 1919), pp. 160-2. Statements IV – VI, ‘Imports of Jute 
into Calcutta” give monthly figures for jute imported by rail, road and river transport. 
16
 See Appendix for estimates which show a long-term trend for rising volumes as well as values of 
physical jute stocks per loom. 
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IJMA figures can be compared with the price of raw jute at Naraingunge, the biggest market, 
for the period 1904-1919. 
 
Figure 1.9: Change in jute stocks (tons)/ real price of raw jute, (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: Indian Jute Mills Association, Report of the Committee for the year ended 31
st
 December 1921 
(Calcutta, 1922), p.211, “Statement I. Local Consumption of Raw Jute including Cuttings as returned 
yearly by Members…”; Government of India, Statistical Abstract of British India, “Jute, Bengal, first 
assortment (average of maximum prices).”; G. H. Le Maistre, Investors India Year Book, 1920 (Calcutta, 
1921), p. 114, “Area under Jute, Outturn and Prices, 1900-19. Average price per 400 lbs of Naraingunge 
jute.” 
 
The evidence suggests that the rise in the real value of jute stocks per loom was not simply an 
artefact of the rising real price of jute, or of the shift to hessian production requiring more 
expensive marks of jute as an input. The long term trend was for jute stocks held at December 
31st to rise from about 8 tons per loom to about 14 tons, and from 5 to 7 tons at the end of the 
jute season at 30th June. The IJMA data support the evidence that there was a rise in the 
quantity of jute stocks, with the change in jute stocks remaining positive in most years from 
1904. Typically, firms sought to ensure they had secured the bulk of their requirements, 
particularly for the finer marks of jute used in hessian manufacture by the end of December, 
then to continue purchasing for the remainder of the season until the end of June at 50% of 
the rate at which they were using up their stocks, in order to ensure they had sufficient stocks 
at the end of the season to carry them over to the new season. Crucially, large jute stocks 
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permitted firms to enter into forward contracts, ensuring a degree of certainty about future 
profits. It appears that firms lacked the financial resources to pursue this strategic logic from 
season to season, an inherently more risky endeavour in any case given the uncertainty 
surrounding the future course of the following year’s jute crop compared to making 
predictions during the course of the season. Both these parameters were briefly suspended in 
the exceptional conditions obtaining during the war. Paradoxically, the abundance of jute 
during the war led firms to carry over larger stocks from year to year while being less 
concerned to engage in strategic purchases at the height of the season from September to 
December. Uncertainty about the future demand from government orders and the availability 
of shipping for exports on the free market would also have been contributing factors. As will 
be shown in Chapters 3-4, the ability to purchase jute at low prices was central to the 
competitive advantage developed by Thomas Duff. 
 
Working capital 
Given the imperative that firms should be able to purchase large stocks of jute in specific 
months of the year, it was essential that firms should be attentive to the management of their 
working capital in addition to raising the long term investment funds to be sunk in fixed 
capital. This required firms to seek sources of short term liquidity on reasonable terms to 
finance their investment in liquid assets. Figure 1.10 and Table 1.7 shows the trend for the 
industry’s total working capital relative to total invested capital in fixed assets. Working capital 
is estimated by taking liquid assets, (good debts owing, stocks of raw material and inventory, 
and any external investments in short term assets), and subtracting current liabilities, (short 
term loans from banks or managing agents, other outstanding debts owed. 
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Figure 1.10: Working capital as % of total invested capital, (constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: Aggregated from individual mill company half-yearly reports to 1913 published in Dundee 
Advertiser, Investors India Year Book, 1913-21. 
 
Table 1.7: Working capital, % of total invested capital. 
 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 1870-1913 1870-1921 
Industry average 1% 3% 4% 7% 35% 5% 14% 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
From 1877 to 1913, liquid assets generally exceeded current liabilities, working capital 
averaging 5% of total invested capital, although it was negative in seven of these years, 
suggesting that the industry was well capitalised and did not have to rely on short-term 
financing to meet its long-term obligations. The decade of the war presents a radically changed 
picture with firms investing large financial surpluses in a variety of government securities, such 
as war bonds, presumably to minimise their liabilities to a rising incidence of corporate 
taxation. 
Figure 1.11 shows the absolute increase in the industry’s demands on short term capital 
markets for liquidity, and the close correlation between jute stocks and liquid assets – and by 
extension current liabilities - until their divergence during the exceptional conditions of the 
war. 
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Figure 1.11: Estimates of working capital, current liabilities, liquid assets, jute stock, (Rs, 
constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
Figure 1.12 presents the same data on a per loom basis, suggesting that there was a real terms 
increase in the short term financing requirements of the industry, which is consistent with the 
discussion in the previous section in relation to the rising trend in jute prices and the value of 
jute stocks per loom. 
 
Figure 1.12: Per loom values of liquid assets, current liabilities, working capital, jute stock (Rs, 
constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
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Of course, without considering the short-term interest rates on loans for working capital, for 
which data is scant, it is impossible to evaluate how efficiently managing agents behaved in 
meeting the short term financing needs of the mills they manage. Accounting practice evolved 
by the 1890s so that loans were often not shown as a separate item on the published balance 
sheet but were lumped in with “debts”. Moreover, the provenance of these loans was also 
often not disclosed when in fact loans were often made to the jute mills by the managing 
agents themselves. It is difficult to ascertain whether the agents derived rents from this service 
at the expense of the mills or whether the mills benefitted from access to short-term liquidity 
on more favourable terms than they might otherwise be able to obtain, either directly from 
the agents of with agents using their own assets as collateral on behalf of the mills obtaining a 
bank loan.17 
 
Cost of fixed capital 
The other key component of the cost structure of the industry was the cost of investment in 
fixed capital – defined in company accounts as land, buildings, machinery and transportation 
equipment. Was there any systematic cheapening of the Calcutta mills’ expenditure on fixed 
capital over time? There is no precise way to calculate the incremental cost of additions to 
loom capacity for the industry as a whole because aggregated measures of expenditure on 
fixed capital include elements such as depreciation and the value of equipment written off. An 
alternative measure is used in Table 1.8 below, taking decadal averages for the real cost of 
equipping new mill companies. This is measured on a per loom basis in order to obtain a 
standardised unit that permits comparison, following the convention in the business pages of 
                                                          
17
 See, for instance, James Finlay & Co acting as guarantors of a loan to the Champdany Co, MS UGD 
7/1/2/2/3, MOTD 1883-9, 22 Sep 1886. Jardine Skinner were said to receive “heavy charges for interest 
on advances” from the Kamarhatty and Kanknarrah mills under their management, Capital, 3 Mar 1904, 
p. 368, “Managing Agents of Jute Mills.” 
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the newspapers of the time, but includes in the numerator investment in all categories of fixed 
capital required to equip a new mill. 
 
Table 1.8: Initial cost of investment in fixed capital, per loom, (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Cost per loom 5068 5746 5398 4681 4269 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB.  
 
Table 1.8 suggests that the cost per loom to new mill companies did decline steadily from the 
1880s in real terms. However, the decline in the value of the rupee until its stabilisation at the 
end of the century put rupee companies at a disadvantage in taking advantage of any 
cheapening of the cost of machinery in sterling terms. The evidence from the turn of the 
century is consistent with Bagchi’s finding that the price of importing jute textile machinery 
from the UK was static from 1904-14. There is qualitative evidence that British manufacturers 
of textile machinery, for weaving, spinning, winding and driving machinery in Dundee, Leeds, 
Belfast and Greater Manchester respectively developed long-term relationships and brand 
loyalty with specific Indian jute manufacturers. These relationships were mutually beneficial. 
British machinery manufacturers in each segment were able to protect their customer base 
from incursion by competitors while Indian jute manufacturers were able to negotiate 
discounts and favourable treatment in the expeditious performance of repairs when required. 
However, periods of boom where the jute manufacturers rushed to introduce new capacity led 
to significant bottlenecks which drove up machinery prices.18 This coincided with a trend for 
                                                          
18
 The directors of Thomas Duff & Co referred to a two-year delay in ordering spinning machinery from 
Fairbairn of Leeds in 1907: “New mill:- a telegram was received from Mr Smith advising that several 
Calcutta firms were floating new mills forthwith and that there were rumours of others following suit, 
and suggesting that, if the board are seriously inclined in the near future to proceed with a new mill, it 
would be advisable to get the first refusal of machinery. Communication has already been had with 
Messrs Fairbairn regarding this, who advise that machinery for a 600 loom mill could not be given until 
the autumn of 1909, and agreeing to hold themselves open for reply by March, and not to book orders 
from others without giving this company the first option.” MS 86/5/1/3, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, 24 
Dec 1907, p. 5. 
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the British manufacturers in each segment to merge into large combines – Combe-Barbour in 
Belfast, Fairbairn-Naylor in Leeds, and Urquhart Lindsay & Robertson Orchar Ltd in Dundee 
came to dominate the manufacture of winding and preparing, spinning, and weaving 
machinery respectively – which may have shifted negotiating terms in the favour of the sellers 
of machinery. In 1922, these firms merged into a combine.19 
As outlined in the previous two sections, the industry’s costs were rising due to the increasing 
price of raw jute but fixed capital costs were static. The next section examines the profitability 
of the industry. 
  
                                                          
19
 ‘Abridged Prospectus. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Limited with which is associated Urquhart 
Lindsay & Robertson Orchar Ltd.”, Scotsman, 9 Feb 1922, p. 4. 
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Profitability 
Most accounts which refer to the profitability of the industry during this period are based on 
rather impressionistic evidence derived from dividend payments. In this section, a precise 
measure of the long-term trend in profitability is developed from firm-level data, aggregated 
and deflated, as detailed in the appendix. 
 
Figure 1.13: Gross profit, gross profit after interest, net profit after depreciation - per loom, 
(Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: Statesman (Friend of India), Dundee Advertiser, IIYB, Capital (Calcutta). 
 
Figure 1.13 depicts the long term trend in the Calcutta jute industry’s profitability. The long 
term trends are closely aligned for different measures of profit taking into account interest 
payments on loans and depreciation. There was considerable volatility in profitability from the 
1870s to the 1890s as the infant jute industry sought to establish itself in India. Increases in 
loom capacity coincided with weak demand in domestic and export markets in the late 1870s 
and mid 1880s to produce crises. The industry responded to the latter crisis by establishing the 
Indian Jute Manufacturers Association. Short time working, and agreed restrictions on 
investment in new capacity helped to stabilise the industry in the late 1880s by managing the 
growth of supply to correlate more closely to the growth in demand. The industry secured a 
rapidly increasing mass of profits although the long term trend in real profit per loom was 
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declining up until the wartime boom, suggesting that increased competition and the tendency 
of supply to outstrip demand offset advantages gained from the introduction of more 
advanced production techniques embodied in new investment in fixed capital. An alternative 
measure of profitability in the industry is to take the real returns, in constant prices, of profits 
relative to investment in fixed capital.20  
 
Figure 1.14: Profitability, returns to gross expenditure on fixed capital, (constant prices, 1873 = 
1), 1874-1921. 
 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
Table 1.9: Profitability, (gross profits, gross profits after interest and net profits), return to 
gross expenditure on fixed capital, %, (all constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Gross profit     10.6% 24.3% 
Gross profit after interest 11.6% 7.3% 7.2% 17.1% 
Net profit after depreciation 7.2% 5.1% 4.8% 13.8% 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
Whichever measure of fixed capital is employed (see appendix), the long term trend in 
profitability from the 1880s is one of decline from the 1880s to the 1890s despite the 
prolonged crisis of the mid-1880s, followed by stagnation from the 1890s to the 1900s. The 
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 See Appendix _ for alternative measures, which follow a similar trend. 
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downward trend was interrupted in the following decade with the explosion of wartime 
demand coupled with declining raw jute prices. 
 
Managing agents’ commissions - a charge on profits? 
The figures above may understate the level of the industry’s profitability depending on how 
commissions paid to the mill companies’ managing agents are conceptualised. The jute mill 
companies’ annual reports, on which the industry data above for profitability are calculated, 
presented the income paid to their managing agents as a cost item in their working accounts. 
Exact figures for commissions were not published in company reports. 
Combining the data about the rates of commission charged with industry-level data for sales 
and gross profits, the trend in total industry commissions is estimated below by aggregating 
estimates of individual firms’ commissions based on profits with those based on sales. The 
estimates below assume that the rate of commission charged by agents remained unchanged 
from 1904 to 1919, although the evidence suggests it probably fell slightly.21 
  
                                                          
21
 This seems a reasonable assumption. The evidence from Thomas Duff & Co. suggests that 
commissions as a percentage of sales may have reduced slightly across the industry, meaning that my 
calculation is an overestimate. On the other hand, the overestimate for sales based commissions from 
1904 may well be balanced over time by a rising level at which incomes were fixed for those agents paid 
commissions based on profits. 
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Figure 1.15: Total commissions earned by managing agents of Calcutta jute mills, relative to 
gross profits, (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. Trends in commissions estimated from comparison of surveys in 
Anon., Jute Mills in Bengal (Dundee, 1880), pp. 91-2, Capital, 3 Mar 1904, p. 368, “Managing Agents of 
Jute Mills.”, also references to level of commission of individual mill companies in half-yearly reports 
and in UDA MS 86, Samnuggur Co, Victoria Co, Titaghur Co, Thomas Duff & Co, GUA MSS UGD 91 James 
Finlay & Co, Finlay, Muir & Co, Champdany Co. 
 
From 1876 to 1919, total commissions paid to managing agents of the Calcutta mills increased 
from approximately Rs 350,000 to Rs 150,00,000 in 1919. For the two years in which rates of 
commission were surveyed, 1879 and 1903, it can be stated with greater confidence that 
agency commissions rose from Rs 4,70,000 to Rs 25,00,000. Figure 1.16 below shows 
graphically the relative stability of the estimated commission income earned by managing 
agents of jute mills compared to dividends paid to shareholders, which were much more 
volatile and correlated more closely to sharp fluctuations in industry profitability over time. 
Across the industry, sales-based commission remained an important form of agency income 
while the level at which the minimum and fixed income elements of profits-based agency 
commissions were set insulated agents from the volatility experienced by shareholders. 
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Figure 1.16: Managing agency commissions, ordinary dividends - per loom (Rs, constant prices, 
1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: As above, Figure 1.15. 
 
Taking the trends depicted in Figures 1.15-1.16 for the whole period 1876-1914, commission 
per loom remained stable while dividends and profits proved much more volatile. Over time, 
profits and ordinary dividends per loom declined while commissions remained relatively 
stable, although this was reversed during the war. Over time, managing agents receiving 
commissions were insulated from the volatility facing shareholders. Table 1.10 gives a more 
differentiated picture by taking decadal averages up to 1919 and includes data for 
commissions as a percentage of sales. In years were profits were relatively low – 1884-6, 1897, 
1911 - agency commissions exceeded dividends paid to shareholders. 
 
Table 1.10: Managing agency commissions, relative to sales, profits and dividends, %, 
(constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
% total sales 2.8% 2.6% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 
% gross profits 19% 21% 21% 18% 14% 
% ordinary dividends 40% 48% 70% 82% 60% 
Sources: As above, Figure 1.15. 
 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
r
u
p
e
e
s
 (
1
8
7
3
 
p
r
i
c
e
s)
 
Agency commission per loom Ordinary dividends per loom 
73 
 
Comparison of Figure 1.16 and Table 1.10 shows that managing agency commission per loom 
was stable or rising slightly while declining as a proportion of industry sales. This is explained 
by the trend to rising sales per loom depicted in Figure 1.6. The fact that the managing agents 
were insulated from the volatility of the market could be disguised by rising sales and the 
reduction of commissions as a percentage of sales over time. Total commissions paid to 
agents, (ignoring whether they were calculated on the basis of sales or profits), declined nearly 
30% measured as a proportion of sales. Commissions were quite stable as a proportion of 
decadal profits but declined in the 1910s when exceptional profits were earned during the 
war. It is striking that agency commission doubled as a proportion of dividends up to 1910, 
then declined in the exceptional decade of the war. 
The industry rate of profit on sales was 15% during the same period. If we assume that all 
agents’ profit on jute mill commissions above 15% represented a form of rent, the conclusion 
would be that 39% of commission income constituted rent based on the Thomas Duff & Co. 
example. For the sake of argument, how would the relative levels of industry profits, 
dividends, and commissions have been affected if managing agents had charged a “market” 
mark up on the services they provided based on the industry rate of profit relative to income, 
and their rents redistributed to shareholders? Based on these crude figures, reported gross 
profits would have been on average 5% higher from 1877-1919, or 32.2% instead of 30.7% 
return on the net expenditure on fixed capital, including reserves, all measured in constant 
prices. Ordinary dividends would have been 22% higher, representing a 13.4% rate of return 
on the ordinary share capital measured in constant prices, rather than 11%. 
A question arises about why shareholders, the principals in these companies, allowed their 
agents to continue to charge such high fees. Conceptually, it is debateable whether these 
commissions represented a payment for a service as opposed to a claim on profits. Only a 
small portion of agency commissions went to cover the costs of the services provided by the 
managing agents, the remainder being profit to the agent. It is possible to posit the 
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counterfactual that, in the absence of managing agencies which duplicated many of the 
functions of a board of directors, the jute mill companies’ reported profits and returns to fixed 
capital would have been substantially higher. For example, the firm of managing agents, 
Thomas Duff & Co., whose directors also sat on the boards of the Samnuggur, Titaghur and 
Victoria mill companies and were paid directors’ fees for their trouble. For the period 1883-
1921, the directors of Thomas Duff & Co. were paid dividends by the agency equivalent to 54% 
of the total commission income paid by the mills they managed.22 If this case is representative, 
only 46% of commissions were required to cover agents’ costs, which suggests that they were 
very successful at commanding large rents based on their power to manipulate market 
“imperfections” to their advantage. Effective control of jute mill companies was vested in the 
hands of the managing agents or boards of directors appointed by the shareholders to oversee 
the day to day running of the firm’s operations even if the nominal, juridical constitution of the 
public limited company formally conferred control on the shareholders. Formally, the 
companies’ articles of association enshrined the sovereignty of the shareholders as the legal 
owners of the firms to have the final say over fundamental issues of firm strategy – such as the 
new issues of share capital to finance expansion – through a system of voting in proportion to 
shares held at annual or emergency general meetings. In practice, strategic decisions were 
made where the directors or agents negotiated with shareholders at the interface between 
effective and formal control. The functioning of these asymmetrical power relationships is 
explored more fully in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
  
                                                          
22
 MS 86/5/1, Thomas Duff & Co, Minutes of Annual General Meetings (AGMs). 
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Ownership, investment capital structure and competing claims on profits 
This section considers the changing share capital structure of the Calcutta jute industry. Jute 
mill companies were able to finance the investment in additions to fixed capital more cheaply 
over time by diversifying their sources of investment funds away from ordinary share capital 
by issuing a mix of preference share capital and debenture capital which commanded a lower 
rate of return. Nominal rates of return to investors in different categories of investment capital 
are contrasted with real rates of return. Finally, an aggregated share price index of the 
ordinary shares of jute mills listed on the Calcutta stock exchange is constructed in order to 
examine how closely investors’ expectations of the jute mills’ dividend payments aligned with 
actual performance. Table 1.11 shows the changing composition of investment funds raised by 
the industry to finance expansion. 
 
Table 1.11: Distribution of categories of invested capital including debentures, decadal 
averages. 
 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Ordinary shares 98% 91% 67% 48% 45% 
Preference shares 0% 0% 14% 27% 30% 
Debentures 2% 9% 19% 26% 26% 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
As the leading industry in Eastern India, the jute mills commanded an important position as a 
destination for investment funds raised on the Calcutta stock exchange. Therefore, Table 1.11 
serves as an index of the burgeoning complexity of the Calcutta capital market and the 
differentiation of investment funds by different levels of risk relative to expected returns. 
Ordinary shares served as the sole form of equity in which shareholders could take a stake in 
the ownership of jute mills until the introduction of preference shares at the beginning of the 
1890s. This was the most risky form of investment as no return was guaranteed to the ordinary 
shareholder. Ordinary shares therefore correlated most closely to profitability, with high 
dividends paid in years of high profits and no dividend paid in years of low profits. From the 
76 
 
point of view of the managers of the jute mill companies – the board of directors appointed by 
the shareholders or the managing agents – the obverse was true of ordinary shares. Raising 
investment funds through issuing ordinary shares was the least risky option but the most 
costly as ordinary shareholders had a legal right to share fully in the profits of the company 
once it had met its other financial obligations.  
In relation to the specific question of the changing capital structure of the industry, it is 
sufficient to note that the need to attract investment funds into the nascent industry of the 
1870s – and thus for managing agents and other parties to obtain income streams from the 
associated rents and capital gains generated – could sometimes generate a contradiction 
between the short term imperative to generate high dividend payments and the longer term 
strategic goals of financial prudence in order to set aside sufficient funds for depreciation in 
order to secure long term returns through growth. 
While ordinary shares dominated as the main form of funding for investment in the industry 
during the 1870s and 1890s, (91-98% of invested funds), their share fell sharply in the 1890s, 
to 67%, and by the 1910s, to 45%. The decline of the 1890s coincided with the consolidation of 
the industry and the concentration of effective control in the hands of those managing agents 
which had survived the crises of the early- and mid-1880s and had established a reputation for 
relative financial probity, which restored shareholders confidence in the ability of the industry 
to deliver high but stable returns. As the worst effects of the Long Depression eased, a wave of 
investment in new capacity was embarked on in the early 1890s, mainly by managing agents 
who were already established in the industry.23 This led to the introduction of a new form of 
equity share capital, preference shares, with less risk to the shareholder. Preference shares 
offered a fixed rate of annual return, whereby dividend payments would be made in 
preference to dividends on ordinary shares. In years where profitability did not permit the 
                                                          
23
 Leng, Letters from India, p. 89. 
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payment of any dividend on preference or ordinary shares, the outstanding balance owing on 
the preference shares would be paid in future years, reducing the funds available for payment 
of ordinary dividends. Since this category of equity offered a fixed rate of return below the 
average rate of return paid out in previous years to ordinary shareholders, they represented a 
relatively cheap way of raising investment funds to managers. On the other hand, preference 
shares entailed a higher risk of non-payment with knock-on effects on firms’ ability to pay 
ordinary dividends and maintain their share price, especially for those firms with a below-
average performance. 
Clearly, the issue of preference shares had a significant impact on firms’ future capacity to pay 
ordinary dividends. Therefore, legally, they could only be issued in tandem with new issues of 
ordinary capital offered to the existing shareholders of the companies. Once issued, however, 
these shares were also publicly traded and their share price listed on the Calcutta stock 
exchange, which raises a priori the possibility of differentiation over time in the ownership of 
preference shares and in the ownership of ordinary shares. In the 1890s, preference shares 
made up 14% of the value of invested funds in the industry, rising to 30% by the 1910s, or 40% 
of total equity. 
The trend towards financing expansion through raising fixed-income investment funds poses a 
question about the ownership and effective control of the companies and the obligations of 
the directors or agents to safeguard the interests of the shareholders or principals by 
maximising returns. This consideration is linked to the analytical question of measuring firm 
performance, as it is theoretically possible to conceive of a firm paying relatively high 
dividends on ordinary shares – with a share price to match – on the basis of raising most of its 
investment funds by other means. Thus, the share price might be misleading as an indicator of 
the firm’s profitability relative to its competitors, as a high dividend rate might be paid on a 
relatively small mass of ordinary dividends relative to total dividends and payments of 
debenture interest. In practice, the ability of firms to leverage themselves through external 
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borrowing on debentures was restricted to a proportion of the firm’s nominal capital in the 
articles of association, although firms’ frequently operated with a large subscribed but 
uncalled share capital relative to called-up share capital to circumvent this restriction.  
The third category of investment funding derived from the issue of debentures, which did not 
confer any ownership rights on the holder – but was a form of raising funds on the stock 
market in the form of long-term loans from individual savers at a fixed rate of interest slightly 
above bank rate. Debentures were issued with a date for redemption of the principal, typically 
for a period of 15-20 years, at the conclusion of which new debentures might be issued at the 
prevailing rate of interest. This was the cheapest way of raising investment funds but the most 
risky as debenture debt represented an external obligation and cost on working account and 
non-payment would leave the firm in default. The share of investment funds in the industry 
raised in this way rose steadily from a negligible proportion in the 1870s to 26% by the 1910s. 
The share of debentures in total invested funds started to decline during the period of war-
time prosperity. This suggests that the improved financial position of the mills led them to a 
reorientation towards securing higher returns to their equity shareholders, (or to benefit from 
the capital gains associated with a booming share price), while being less concerned about the 
cost of raising new investment capital. Debentures declined from a peak of 31% of funds 
invested in the jute industry in 1915 to 17% in 1921.24 Clearly, the character of debentures 
made them more attractive to risk-averse investors willing to accept a lower guaranteed rate 
of return than on equity, and the constituencies for holding jute mill debentures may have 
been significantly different to holders of jute mill equity. What returns did the investors in 
Calcutta jute mill companies receive? Table 1.12 contrasts the aggregate payments of ordinary 
                                                          
24
 Calculated from IIYB. 
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& preference dividends, together with debenture interest, relative to the total funds invested 
in ordinary and preference shares, and in debentures, measured in nominal and real terms.25 
 
Table 1.12: Nominal and real returns (constant prices, 1873 = 1) to total invested capital – 
ordinary and preference dividends and debenture interest, decadal averages. 
 
1870-1921 1870-1913 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Nominal 11.6% 7.9% 10.8% 7.3% 7.2% 6.7% 23.8% 
Real 9.2% 7.3% 10.7% 7.2% 6.4% 5.8% 14.3% 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
The nominal return is ‘significantly’ above the real return in all decades and the discrepancy 
becomes very marked in the inflationary decade of the 1910s. The measure of real returns 
clearly indicates a long term trend of declining payments to shareholders and debenture 
holders relative to total invested capital which was interrupted by the war. Table 1.13 
compares real rates of return on ordinary shares, preference shares and debentures over time, 
expressing all values in constant 1873 prices. 
 
Table 1.13: Real % rates of return on dividends and debenture payments, decadal averages 
(nominal rate in brackets) 
 
1870-1921 1870-1913 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Ordinary 12.1 
(16.6) 
7.7 
(8.5) 
10.6 
(10.7) 
7.4 
(7.4) 
6.7 
(7.7) 
6.5 
(7.9) 
25.1 
(43.7) 
Preference 5.9 
(6.7) 
6.6 
(6.7) 
  
7.3 
(7.0) 
5.8 
(6.4) 
5.1 
(6.5) 
Debentures 5.2 
(5.9) 
5.6 
(6.0) 
7.9 
(9.1) 
6.8 
(6.8) 
4.7 
(5.2) 
4.4 
(5.0) 
4.0 
(5.3) 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
                                                          
25
 In calculating the returns to investors in jute mills, nominal returns given in constant prices are 
misleading for the purpose of considering changes over time, due to price inflation associated with the 
depreciation of rupee and war-time supply-side constraints. Moreover, the real value of returns was 
also influenced by the time lag between funds being invested and the income generated in later time 
periods. In order to calculate changes in the real value of dividend payments and debenture interest 
paid out over time, the stock of different categories of invested funds has been calculated by 
aggregating the value of funds invested in constant prices in the time period when the investment was 
made. The stock of invested funds measured in constant prices is then compared with the income 
generated as dividends or debenture interest measured in constant prices. 
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For the whole period 1870-1913, real returns to ordinary shareholders averaged 7.7%, only 
marginally above the 6.6% return to preference shareholders. Taking the period 1870-1921, 
ordinary shareholders earned on average 12.1%, demonstrating the windfall earned over a 
short period during the war. In the 1890s, dividends to ordinary shareholders lagged behind 
dividends paid to preference shareholders, indicating the squeeze on dividend payments as a 
corollary of increased competition and lower profitability. The declining rate of fixed income 
offered to owners of debentures and preference shares over time indicates the increasing 
influence of general trends of declining profitability and a more plentiful supply of savings 
seeking a profitable return in the world economy making themselves felt in the Indian market 
for share capital. The trend is shown graphically to 1914 in Figure 1.17 below. 
 
Figure 1.17: Real returns on different categories of invested capital, 1870-1914, %, (constant 
prices, 1873 = 1). 
 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
While the graph indicates that the long term trend in the level of ordinary dividend payments 
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much more stable from the 1890s up to the eve of the wartime boom, and less risky for 
investors with the increasing share of preference capital and debentures in total invested 
capital. Jute mill companies achieving an average level of profitability and paying average 
dividends had little difficulty in attracting subscribers to expand their invested capital to 
finance expansion. Despite the declining real-terms trend from the 1870s and 1880s, dividend 
payments were paid at a level that remained attractive to shareholders despite the increased 
supply of alternative investment opportunities with the rapid pace of diversification of Eastern 
Indian industry during the period26. The jute mills’ ability to finance expansion through the 
issue of less costly preference shares and debentures also suggests that there was a process of 
deepening capital markets through the primary medium of the Calcutta stock exchange, 
facilitated by improved sources of information to investors in publications such as the Calcutta 
weekly financial newspaper Capital and the annual Investors India Year Book. 
It should be noted that the increasing use of preference shares and debentures in the industry 
meant that dividends paid on ordinary shares over time are not a good indicator over time of 
the total returns to investors. Higher returns on ordinary shares were maintained at the 
expense of a narrowing base of ordinary share capital relative to total capital over time. 
In order to attract investors to finance expansion as the scale of the industry increased, jute 
mill companies and their managing agents could not rely solely on informal personalised 
exchanges with their inner circle of business confidantes – managing agency partners, their 
lawyers, share brokers, trading partners, creditors, family members and skilled employees. 
These certainly comprised the “inside shareholders” of the firms who could be safely relied on 
to vote with the agents in all important decisions affecting the firms’ strategic direction and 
their presence is clearly demonstrated by the roster of attendees and the half-yearly meetings 
of the shareholders reported in the pages of Capital. However, formal, public exchange 
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 As delineated in the summary histories of different industries in Investors India Year Book, passim. 
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between the firms and a wider shareholding public was also required. Thus, with the exception 
of Birkmyre Brothers’ privately owned Hastings mill, (and for a period from the 1870s up to 
1894, when it went public, the Clive mill concern), all mills were public companies with a share 
listing on the Calcutta stock exchange. The Sterling companies were listed on the Dundee and 
Glasgow stock exchanges, and later in London.27 The Sterling companies had a secondary 
listing in Calcutta and most had converted to rupee companies by 1918.28 The evidence is 
overwhelming from the pages of the English language newspapers in Calcutta (and Dundee), 
that jute mill shares were by far the most actively traded species of shareholding in Calcutta 
for most of the period, with regular listings of transactions in ordinary shares for most 
companies appearing on a weekly basis. The declining denomination of rupee shares listed on 
the Calcutta stock exchange shows that they attracted a more popular class of shareholder 
over time – from the thousand rupee share denomination of the Gourepore Company in the 
1870s to the typical hundred rupee denomination throughout most of the period up to the 
war, when the great majority of firms commenced the process of redesignating their share 
capital in ten rupee denominations.29 Another indication is the development over time of 
active secondary markets in shares and a network of agents assigned by the jute mill 
companies as brokers who supervised these markets, as witnessed by the increasing 
prominence of Marwari share brokers dealing in jute mill equity futures.30 As public limited 
companies, the firms’ long term share price played an important signalling function in 
attracting future shareholders to finance expansion, making it a strategic imperative that 
ordinary dividends should be paid at a (sustainably) high level if the firm was to expand 
                                                          
27
 The Barnagore Co was listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1875: ‘Money and Commerce’, 
Scotsman, 15 Jun 1875, p. 7. 
28
 The Barnagore Co was listed in Calcutta by 1892, and the remaining five Sterling companies by 1904: 
Capital, 13 Jan 1892; Capital, 7 Jan 1904, p. 42. 
29
 “The Calcutta Stock and Share List” published in Friend of India, 3 Jun 1875, p. 8; Rs 10 denominated 
jute mill shares appear in Investors India Year Book from 1917. 
30
 Thomas A. Timberg, The Marwaris; from Traders to Industrialists (Delhi, 1978), Chapter 7; ‘Calcutta 
Jute Market’, Dundee Courier, 2 Apr 1900, p. 4. 
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successfully. How did the long term trend in ordinary share prices compare with actual 
dividend performance? Nominal dividends and share prices are compared in Figures 1.18-1.19 
and in Table 1.14. The Figures take the sub-periods 1873-1914 and 1910-21, measured on 
altogether different scales. 
 
Figure 1.18: End of year share price relative to annual ordinary share dividends, (current 
prices), index numbers, 1873-1913. 
 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
Figure 1.19: End of year share price relative to annual ordinary share dividends, (current 
prices), index numbers, 1910-1921. 
 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
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Table 1.14: Industry average ordinary share price relative to dividends (current prices), decadal 
averages, index numbers, base = 100. 
 
1873-1913 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Share price 102 90 85 110 119 259 
Dividends 109 112 107 108 108 144 
Sources: Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
For the sub-period to 1913, the short-term trend in Figure 1.18 demonstrates considerable 
volatility while the long-term trend indicates that shares underperformed relative to dividends 
across the industry. There was a negative hangover effect from the volatility and bankruptcies 
of the crises of 1879-81 and 1884-86 that threatened the long-term prospects of the industry 
to finance expansion through issuing new equity. This helps to explain the decision of the 
survivors of the crises to form the IJMA and to adopt short-time working and a freeze on 
investment until the 1890s. For the whole period 1873-1913, the two indices are closely 
correlated, share prices registering a score of 108 compared to 102. If this is extended to 1921, 
the scores diverge sharply, share prices registering 140 compared to 117, reflecting the fact 
that the mania to acquire jute mill shares to obtain the income or the capital gain deriving 
from high wartime dividend payouts exceeded the actual level of dividend payment. Thus in 
the 1910s, the share price index registers 259 compared to 144 for dividends. One feature of 
the high dividends paid during the war is that this frequently took the form, not of a cash 
payment, but of a bonus dividend where existing shareholders were issued with new equity. 
The effect was that the share price would receive a one-off boost before falling again as one 
share was divided into several shares for the purpose of calculating future share prices. This 
may well have had the effect of widening the base of share ownership by encouraging new 
shareholders to enter the market on the basis of an artificially inflated headline share price, 
giving existing shareholders a strong incentive to realise a short term capital gain by selling 
their bonus shares. This process took the specific form of a significant transfer of equity from 
British to Indian shareholders. European jute mill managers and mill assistants received a big 
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increase in performance-related pay during the war, which they invested in jute mill shares 
seeking capital gains. Edward Benthall, who would become senior partner of Bird & Co, the 
managing agent with the largest market share in jute mills, wrote in his diary: 
Flotations of every kind were proceeding apace [...] and the share of any flotation jumped to an 
immediate premium; partners, assistants and friends of the firm who were given allotments were 
able to sell at a profit and did so without delay[...] The general spirit of the times is illustrated by the 
head of a technical department who, when engaging a man, said to him, ‘Don’t worry about the pay, 
son. You can make far more on the Stock Exchange and any time you like you can walk across [from 
the managing agents’ office] and double your salary.’ [...] In the easy days of profit making during the 
war anything seemed possible.
31
 
Uncertainty over India’s colonial future on the part of Bengal’s settler colonists increased 
supply, while rising incomes for those Indians engaged in trade or industry in conditions of 
wartime boom boosted demand.32 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence for share prices and dividends is in keeping with the preceding discussion relating 
to profitability and depreciation. The speculative character of much investment in the 
management of jute mill companies in the 1870s and 1880s led many firms to pay 
unsustainably high dividends while failing to invest in creating or maintaining a fixed capital 
stock that could permit firms to compete at the average level of industry efficiency. A 
prolonged hangover ensued as a number of firms listed on the Calcutta stock exchange 
languished near bankruptcy or were eventually taken over by more efficient entrants to the 
industry as it consolidated in the crisis conditions of the 1880s before a renewed wave of 
investment was embarked on in the 1890s and investor confidence was restored. 
                                                          
31
 Godfrey Harrison, Bird and Company of Calcutta, 1864-1964 (Calcutta, 1964), pp. 133-4. 
32
 Goswami, “Then came the Marwaris: Some aspects of the changes in the pattern of industrial control 
in Eastern India”, IESHR, September 1985, 22.3, pp. 231-2. 
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The impressive evidence of rapid growth, coupled with very high wartime profits and returns 
to investors in the form of dividends and capital gains, do not provide a good indicator of the 
industry’s long-term performance. In the period 1870-1913, growth was extensive on the basis 
of static technology, although there is some evidence of improved productivity at the margin. 
While there was reduced volatility in the industry’s performance from the 1890s, the long-
term trend was to declining profitability and dividends in real terms. The effects of rapid 
growth were to increase competition for the raw material, the dominant element in the 
industry’s cost structure, which increased 50% in price in real terms. The managing agents in 
the industry, taken as a whole, succeeded in protecting their income despite these 
disadvantages. The following chapter examines how successful different managing agents 
were in achieving profitability and growth for the jute mill companies they managed. 
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Chapter 2. Variations in the Performance of Jute Mill 
Companies and their Managing Agencies to 1921. 
 
The preceding discussion of the industry’s performance suggested that the industry was 
successful at overcoming the volatility experienced during the depression years and that it 
experienced a more stable period of growth through cooperation between firms and managing 
agents under the auspices of the Indian Jute Manufacturers Association from the late 1880s 
onwards. However, the impression of generalised growth and prosperity should not obscure 
significant differences in performance between firms and managing agents. The variation in 
performance is worthy of exploration because it permits a more differentiated and nuanced 
analysis of the different strategies and motivations of different actors within the industry. 
Strategic and operational decision-making in the industry occurred at the level of the 
managing agency, with outside directors on the boards of the managed mill companies playing 
a passive role. Therefore, the managing agent is taken as the basic unit of analysis for exploring 
variations in performance. All the data in this chapter take a weighted average of the 
performance of the mill companies under the control of each managing agent. 
In analysing these questions in the course of this chapter, the focus, as with the previous 
chapter, remains largely on the quantitative data provided by individual firms’ half-yearly 
accounts, cross-referenced with industry-level data from Government of India and IJMA 
sources, and supplemented by qualitative data from newspaper sources, company histories 
and some journalistic monographs. The motivations of actors making decisions about firm 
behaviour generally have to be inferred externally from results. In this sense, the firm, whether 
the jute mill company or the managing agents, remains a ‘black box’. 
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Market Entry and Firm Growth 
It was established in the previous chapter that the industry’s growth was rapid from during the 
1870s up to the crisis at the end of the decade, then slowed in the following decade, before 
accelerating throughout the 1890s and 1900s, then stagnated during the 1910-11 recession 
and the years of the war. The growth of loom capacity was mirrored by changes in other 
variables such as capital and labour employed. How was this growth distributed between firms 
and what does this tell us about the nature of barriers to entry? 
Table 2.1 shows changes in the market share of the managing agents, measured by productive 
capacity, or looms, and the year in which the agents entered the industry, taken in descending 
order by market share in at the end of the period. (The tables presented throughout this 
chapter present the ordering of managing agents according to market share, as in the table 
below, unless stated). 
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Table 2.1: Managing agents, year of entering industry, and market share by loom capacity, 
decadal averages, in descending order by share, 1910-19. 
Managing Agent (“£” 
denotes Sterling companies 
to 1914) 
Year of 
entry 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Bird 1881 
 
5.3% 3.8% 10.8% 14.9% 
Thomas Duff £ *1881 5.4% 8.3% 12.7% 11.5% 10.8% 
Andrew Yule 1874 7.9% 5.6% 10.9% 16.7% 9.4% 
Jardine Skinner 1864 3.7% 5.9% 7.2% 6.7% 7.8% 
Ernsthausen 1874 6.6% 5.5% 5.4% 3.9% 6.7% 
Geo. Henderson £ 1858 19.5% 10.1% 7.8% 5.4% 5.4% 
Kettlewell Bullen 1880 8.5% 3.8% 3.5% 3.5% 4.8% 
Duncan Bros £ 1896 
  
2.2% 2.8% 5.3% 
FW Heilgers 1899 
   
2.9% 3.9% 
Begg Dunlop 1895 
  
2.0% 3.0% 3.6% 
Anderson Wright 1895 
  
2.0% 3.0% 3.6% 
McLeod 1907 
   
1.0% 2.6% 
Barry *1877 8.0% 4.2% 3.8% 4.6% 3.3% 
Macneill £ 1875 4.3% 5.4% 4.2% 2.5% 3.2% 
Finlay Muir/James Finlay £ 1874 9.2% 8.9% 6.3% 3.3% 2.5% 
Birkmyre 1875 4.0% 6.1% 4.9% 2.6% 2.4% 
Mackinnon Mackenzie £ 1868 7.6% 4.4% 2.9% 2.3% 2.7% 
Bemis $ 1913 
    
1.6% 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 1883 
 
4.0% 7.8% 5.4% 2.5% 
Apcar 1872 4.8% 4.0% 4.5% 3.7% 
 
*Schoene Kilburn & Co acted from 1874-1880 as agents for the Dundee directors of Samnuggur Co. who 
then constituted themselves as Thomas Duff & Co, in 1881. Jardine Skinner acted as agents for the 
Barrys, the London directors of the Gourepore mill from 1864-1877, when the Barrys constituted 
themselves as a Calcutta agency. 
Sources: See Figure 1.2. 
Note. The tables presented throughout this chapter present the ordering of managing agents 
according to market share in 1910-19, as in the table above, unless stated. Percentages shown may 
not sum to 100% due to patterns of entry and exit at the margin of some of the more shortlived mill 
companies, and because accounts data are unavailable for the privately owned Hastings mill of 
Birkmyres. 
 
The information about trends in the share of productive capacity measured by looms as a 
proxy for market share suggests a few general observations. Those managing agents who 
initially entered the market in the 1860s and 1870s did not tend to maintain or increase their 
market share, (Hendersons and James Finlay, managers respectively of the Barnagore and 
Champdany mills are notable for their declining market share). These were mostly established 
trading firms with offices in London, Glasgow and Calcutta. The three leading firms in the 
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industry in 1919 – Bird, Andrew Yule and Thomas Duff1 – were all relatively new managing 
agencies whose main locus of operations was Calcutta. Bird and Yule’s position as substantial 
jute mill agents was mirrored by their rise to prominence in other high growth industrial 
sectors of the Bengal economy, notably tea and coal, while Thomas Duff remained specialised 
in jute. Yule and Duff expanded most aggressively in the 1890s at the end of the Long 
Depression, then maintained their market share. Bird followed in the 1900s. As the growth of 
the industry slowed in the war decade, growth was much more evenly distributed across all 
firms. A number of new firms entered the industry from the 1890s but their entry was too 
belated to challenge the position of the leading firms.  
 
Table 2.2: Relative scales of ownership and productive units. 
Year Agents 
Companies 
managed 
per agent 
*Mills 
managed 
per agent 
Mills per 
company 
Looms 
per mill 
Looms 
per 
company 
Looms 
per agent 
Spindles 
per loom 
1880 19 1.0 1.2 1.2 225 260 260 14.3 
1890 16 1.4 1.6 1.2 296 350 482 20.4 
1900 19 1.5 1.8 1.2 415 487 743 20.9 
1910 20 2.0 3.0 1.5 524 785 1571 20.6 
1920 25 2.2 3.0 1.4 540 733 1642 20.9 
Sources: Statistics of British India, Vol 1, Commercial Statistics, "Progress of the jute mill industry in 
India"; number of agents from Jute Mills in Bengal, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
Companies sometimes encompassed more than one mill, sometimes situated adjacent to each other on 
the same site or sometimes on different sites, and is taken as an indicator of the technical scale of the 
productive unit. 
 
Table 2.2 above indicates that the industry became steadily more centralised and 
concentrated in terms of management, ownership and the scale of the productive unit. At the 
same time, both the impulse to centralisation through mergers and acquisitions and the 
tendency for new agents to enter the industry were relatively weaker than the tendency 
towards concentration until the very end of the period. Most of the growth that took place 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this chapter, references are to the firm rather than the founding partner the firm was 
named after. 
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occurred in one of three ways – by existing companies extending existing mills, by existing 
companies investing in additional mills, or by existing agents floating new companies. 
 
Table 2.3: Managing agents’ share of productive capacity, 1919, in descending order. 
Agents 
Total 
looms 
Managed 
Companies 
Looms per 
company 
Mills 
Looms 
per mill* 
Bird 5906 8 738 10 591 
Thomas Duff £ 4343 3 1448 7 620 
Andrew Yule 4062 8 508 9 451 
Jardine Skinner 3231 2 1616 4 808 
Geo. Henderson £ 2910 2 1455 4 728 
Ernsthausen 2663 2 1332 5 533 
Kettlewell Bullen 2250 2 1125 4 563 
Duncan Bros & Co £ 2000 1 2000 4 500 
FW Heilgers 1661 2 831 2 831 
Anderson Wright 1370 1 1370 2 685 
Macneill £ 1294 1 1294 2 647 
Begg Dunlop 1257 2 629 3 419 
Barry 1255 1 1255 2 628 
McLeod 1175 3 392 3 392 
Finlay Muir £ 1071 1 1071 2 536 
Birkmyre (private) 1052 1 1052 2 526 
Mackinnon Mackenzie £ 1033 1 1033 3 344 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 808 2 404 2 404 
Bemis $ 660 1 660 1 660 
Average, Rupee+ 2331 3.0 927 4.2 573 
Average, Sterling+ 2109 1.5 1384 3.7 563 
Average 2105 2.3 1064 3.7 572 
Sources: Statistics of British India, Vol 1, Commercial Statistics, "Progress of the jute mill industry in 
India"; number of agents from Jute Mills in Bengal, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
*This is a measure of the scale of production units within a mill company. Most companies 
encompassed more than one mill, and expanded through adding larger mills over time as well as adding 
capacity to existing mill companies. 
+Birkmyre, which managed the Hastings mill, and Bemis, which managed the Angus mill, are excluded 
from the respective averages for managing agencies running Rupee and Sterling mill companies. 
 
Table 2.3 reveals a wide variation in the scale of looms employed within a mill and of the 
looms employed by a single company. For example, Bird & Co had managing agency rights 
controlling eight jute mill companies, which encompassed 10 mills, (i.e. two of their companies 
had two mills and the rest one). As shown in the previous table, the scale of the average 
productive unit increased two and a half times from 225 looms to 540 looms between 1880 
and 1920. This suggests that firms were able to benefit from economies of scale in the 
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arrangement of mill machinery and in the employment of more efficient engines over time. 
However, the variation between firms in 1919 is indicative of the way that increases in scale 
were adopted piecemeal as and when firms found it opportune to raise the funds required for 
investment in fixed capital, rather than any fundamental change in techniques leading to 
newer mills being constructed on a larger scale than previously. Indeed, many of the smaller 
mills were those of more recent construction. Taking the size of the mill unit as an indicator of 
scale is a somewhat arbitrary classification in any case. It does not strictly correlate with 
engine power as mills within the same company were frequently located adjacent to each 
other on the same site and might share sources of power. Moreover, the division of labour was 
not necessarily a discrete process from mill to mill; adjacent mills might permit the use of 
differing ratios of sacking and hessian looms to be employed in different mills being supplied 
with different grades of raw jute from the same source on site. On the other hand, some mill 
companies comprised mills located on different sites which did operate as discrete units. The 
Champdany Co comprised Champdany and Wellington mills some twenty miles apart; Bird’s 
Union Mill Co. and Henderson’s Barnagore Co. similarly operated across more than one 
geographical site. 
The data for the number of looms employed by individual companies under the control of 
different managing agents in 1919 suggest that the growth of the different agents’ interest in 
the industry could be accomplished by different means. Expansion was achieved either by 
existing firms issuing new equity or by managing agents floating new companies. While the 
average number of looms employed per company in 1919 was 1064, 12 agents employed 
more than the average while 6 employed less, with a high degree of variation and of clustering 
either above or below the average. While data identifying shareholders and the number of 
shares held is scarce, the qualitative data seems to confirm the hypothesis that those agents 
which grew through issuing new equity in existing companies were more internationalised at 
the beginning of the period in terms of their operations and had a UK head office which either 
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gave a strategic lead or had parity with its Calcutta branch.2 They would have had substantial 
numbers of major shareholders who were UK residents, whether the shares were 
denominated in sterling or rupees. All of the Sterling companies expanded by this route.3 On 
the other hand, two of the leading firms, Bird and Yule, whose diverse operations were 
focused geographically in Bengal, (and in India more generally), tended to float more new 
companies in order to expand. Their reputation as leading Indian firms gave them an 
advantage in entering Indian capital markets to raise equity from a more ethnically and socially 
diverse range of investors than their competitors while retaining control through am inner 
circle of loyal major shareholders. At the same time, the agents themselves could charge 
lucrative fees to the floated companies for underwriting new issues of shares and debentures. 
The costs of floating a new jute mill company were widely reported to be substantially higher 
in the UK than in Calcutta, while Calcutta managing agents could charge commissions on 
promoting new companies, a specialist activity in London.4 
A less common route for managing agents to expand which has not been discussed so far was 
through the acquisition of bankrupt or struggling mill companies to form a new company or 
through the transfer of the agency rights in a company where the existing agents had lost the 
confidence of the shareholders, as shown in Table 2.4 below: 
  
                                                          
2
 Barry & Co, managing agents of the Gourepore mill were an example of a managing agency controlling 
a rupee mill company where the senior partner resided in London; Champdany Co, MOTD, 19 May 1885. 
Ernsthausen was another; Thacker’s Directory, various years. The reasons are conceptualised in Casson, 
'Institutional diversity in overseas enterprise; explaining the free-standing company', Business History, 
36.4, pp. 95–108, 1994. 
3
 MS UGD 91/7, Champdany Co; J. Forbes Munro, Maritime Enterprise; Sir William Mackinnon and his 
Business Network (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2003); TB Nimmo, The Duncan Group; being a short history of 
Duncan Brothers & Co. Ltd., Calcutta, and Walter Duncan & Goodricke Ltd., London, 1859-1959 (London, 
1959), p9, pp28-29 
4
 R.C. Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in 
Nineteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1981); Bagchi, Private Investment in India, p. 270. 
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Table 2.4 - Acquisition or transfer of agency rights of bankrupt or poorly performing mills: 
Year Acquired by Mill Company 
Former company 
(if name changed) 
Transfer of agency 
from 
Reason 
1872 Borrodaile Schiller Calcutta Rishra Acland Debt 
1872 Henderson Barnagore   Borneo Co Reconstructed 
1877 Gillanders Balliaghatta Bengal Jute Schoene Kilburn Bankruptcy 
1877 McIntosh Calcutta 
 
Borrodaile Schiller Poor results 
1877 JB Barry Gourepore   Jardine Skinner Agency transfer 
1879 Kettlewell Bullen Fort Gloster   Macallister Bankruptcy 
1879 Henry S Cox Oriental   Macallister Bankruptcy 
1880 Bird Union Oriental Henry S Cox Bankruptcy 
1880 Reinhold Goosery Rustomjee Rustomjee Bankruptcy 
1881 Thomas Duff Samnuggur   Schoene Kilburn Agency transfer 
1881 James Finlay 
Champdany 
(Wellington) 
Calcutta McIntosh Bankruptcy 
1881 Henderson Barnagore Balliaghatta Robinson, Morrison Bankruptcy 
1888 Thomas Duff Victoria   Victoria Co directors Poor results 
1890 Andrew Yule Central Goosery Reinhold Bankruptcy 
1895 Kettlewell Bullen Fort Gloster Gordon Gordon Stewart Bankruptcy 
1899 Andrew Yule Delta Serajgunge Hoare Miller Natural disaster 
1900 Bird Clive   Gladstone Wyllie Poor results 
1904 Bird Lansdowne Arathoon Arathoon Poor results 
1907 McLeod Soorah   Ram Prashad Poor results 
1909 Begg Dunlop Alexandra   M Sarkies Poor results 
1911 Kettlewell Bullen Fort William Seebpore Apcar Bankruptcy 
1912 Bird Union Lower (Hooghly) Gillanders Arbuthnot Poor results 
1912 Duncan Anglo-India Gordon (Ft 
Gloster) 
Kettlewell Bullen Bankruptcy 
1918 Henderson Bally (Barnagore) N/a Reconstructed 
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, The Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, Dundee Courier, 
IIYB. 
 
Table 2.4 presents a comprehensive list of cases of bankruptcy and of transfers of agency 
control from the birth of the industry up to 1921. It excludes cases where firms restructured 
their equity but continued under the management of the same agency, which became a 
frequent occurrence in the period 1914-19 when all the Sterling companies except those 
managed by Duff were refloated as rupee companies to reduce their tax liabilities and to take 
advantage of the boom in jute share listings in Calcutta. Of the ten cases in which mill 
companies entered into liquidation, seven were concentrated in the period 1877-81 with the 
bursting of the first bubble in jute mill shares. With the consolidation of the industry under the 
auspices of the IJMA, centralisation occurred through more efficient companies taking over 
less efficient companies. Sometimes, this involved the acquisition of old mills which were 
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refloated as new companies - as in the cases of Seebpore-Fort William, Arathoon-Lansdowne – 
or the incorporation of a branch mill into an existing company – as with Lower Hooghly-Union, 
Gordon-Fort Gloster (later sold to Anglo-India). More frequently, there was a transfer of the 
managing agency to a new firm of agents to restore shareholder confidence in the mill 
company’s future profitability. In a minority of cases, the mill company’s directors constituted 
their own agency and displaced the original agents - after a period of profitable working had 
established the mill’s viability - in order to capture the agency rents. The most striking 
observation to be made of the information presented in the table is that it demonstrates the 
frequency with which Andrew Yule and Bird used acquisitions as a method of expanding 
market share, which seems logically consistent with their being relatively more active than 
other firms in floating new companies. Both reveal a facility for operating in the Calcutta stock 
market and the possession of an associated cluster of competencies – an established 
reputation with shareholders, access to finance, underwriting and legal services, etc. 
Moreover, these competencies seem to have been perceived by investors to outweigh the real 
disadvantages associated with the acquisition of failed or failing mills – their small scale, 
accumulated debts, their antiquated capital or the inefficient arrangement of machinery and 
buildings requiring considerable investment. On the other hand, Thomas Duff & Co. preferred 
to expand by investing in new plant. Their reasons for acquiring the Victoria Mill Company 
agency had more to do with eliminating competition in the Dundee capital market for jute mill 
investment in Calcutta. 
The table also draws attention to the number of agents forced to exit the industry. Those 
agents who lost their agency from 1877-81 exited the industry permanently and the decline in 
their fortunes in jute tended to mirror their eclipse generally in the mercantile world of 
Calcutta, (although the Kilburn element of the Schoene-Kilburn partnership enjoyed later 
success in coal.) A feature of those exiting the industry runs somewhat counter to the 
accepted wisdom in the historiography that Indian proprietors only became active in 
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manufacturing in the inter-war years after diversifying from a focus on raw jute dealing, baling 
and pressing operations.5 In fact, the shortlived Rustomjee twine mill in the 1880s was an 
earlier instance. Ram Prasad’s Soorah mill represented a pioneering - though small scale - 
examples of Indian ownership from 1892 until its acquisition by the McLeod agency in 1907.6 
Also notable is the eclipse of an intermediary layer in the racial hierarchy of the Calcutta 
mercantile community, all three firms representing the Armenian diaspora exited the industry 
between 1904 and 1911 – the Arathoon mill, Sarkies’ Alexandra mill, and Apcar’s Seebpore 
mill.7 
In the period 1912-18, jute manufacturing had become the exclusive preserve of European 
“settler colonial” capital but this would prove to be the apogee of its power and influence. The 
accumulated capital in a rapidly growing industry had become markedly more concentrated 
and somewhat more centralised over time. The pattern of entry and exit to the industry 
suggests that there were some barriers to entry and that these became more significant over 
time. The mania for jute mill shares of the 1870s had permitted fraudulent operators such as 
the former American bus conductor Macallister to embezzle a sizable fortune.8 The crisis of 
1877-81 brought this period decisively to a close. Those managing agents which entered the 
industry from the 1880s tended to be European firms of good repute who enjoyed success in 
entering other high growth sectors such as raw jute pressing and baling, coal and tea, and 
services such as shipping and insurance – and in diversifying out of declining sectors such as 
opium and indigo (Jardine Skinner, Begg Dunlop respectively). Crucially, their diverse portfolios 
and links to the Bank of Bengal and the City of London gave them the collateral and 
                                                          
5
 Goswami, “Then came the Marwaris” IESHR, September 1985, 22.3. 
6
 ‘Calcutta Jute Market’, Dundee Courier, 25 Oct 1894, p. 7. 
7
 Amiya Bagchi, The Evolution of the State Bank of India, vol. II; the Era of the Presidency Banks, 1876-
1920 (London, 1997), pp. 89-91; India Office Records, MSS Eur F308, GH Sutherland, Begg Dunlop & Co, 
correspondence and accounts, letter from Charles W Tosh, Calcutta manager, to GH Sutherland, 24 Jun 
1909. 
8
 Anon., Jute Mills in Bengal, pp. 28-33. 
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creditworthiness to finance the increasing scale of investments in fixed and working capital 
required by the evolution of the industry. 
There was also variation in the speed at which more profitable hessian looms were introduced, 
as shown in the table below. 
Table 2.5: Hessian looms, proportion of total productive capacity, decadal average. 
Managing agents Rank 
1870-
1913 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Bird 3 44%   21% 29% 52% 59% 
Thomas Duff £ 4 44% 27% 16% 41% 61% 66% 
Andrew Yule 12 32% 25% 24% 18% 36% 40% 
Jardine Skinner 8 41%   28% 34% 55% 68% 
Ernsthausen 1 48% 49% 44% 39% 54% 65% 
Geo. Henderson £ 5 43% 39% 37% 40% 50% 46% 
Kettlewell Bullen 14 19% 4% 4% 24% 30% 50% 
Duncan Bros & Co £ 
 
        63% 62% 
FW Heilgers 
 
        46% 49% 
Begg Dunlop 
 
        70% 70% 
Anderson Wright 
 
        55% 62% 
McLeod 
 
        19% 35% 
Barry 11 36% 2% 18% 35% 73% 74% 
Macneill £ 10 36% 15% 23% 37% 51% 51% 
Finlay Muir £ 6 42% 31% 29% 46% 51% 59% 
Birkmyre (private) 7 41% 11% 39% 42% 50% 51% 
Mackinnon Mackenzie £ 13 28% 1% 13% 19% 49% 65% 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 9 37%   26% 41% 45% 50% 
Apcar 2 46% 45% 37% 36% 64%   
Industry average   41% 24% 27% 33% 52% 58% 
St dev as % of average   20% 72% 40% 26% 25% 19% 
Sources: Figures for individual firms 1870-95 from company annual reports published in Friend of India 
& Statesman, 1879-83, Dundee Courier and Dundee Advertiser, 1879-95; annual series ‘Jute Mills in 
India’ giving breakdown of sacking and hessian looms published by Calcutta firms of jute brokers, Poppe, 
Delius & Co 1895-99, continued by JA Dykes & Co 1900-09, Moran & Co, 1910-21, reproduced in Dundee 
Advertiser, 1895-1905, Indian Jute Mills Association, Annual Report of the Committee, 1905-19. 
 
For those agents that invested in new capacity, the table indicates a long term trend for 
hessians looms employed to converge at around two hessian looms to each sacking loom, 
which appears to have been a technical limit imposed by the exigencies of efficiently 
processing assortments of different qualities of raw material, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. The standard deviation to measure the variation between managing agents decreased 
over time, converging on the industry average. The Barnagore mill managed by Hendersons 
expanded slowly, which explains its low average. A notable exception to this trend was Andrew 
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Yule, which only employed 40% of its looms on hessian production despite growing rapidly. 
This proved a boon during the war years when sacking demand surged and Andrew Yule’s mills 
achieved higher profitability than any other group of managing agents. It is not clear why they 
were reluctant to adopt hessians. The ranking of managing agents by the long-term average 
proportion of hessian looms does not appear to be closely correlated to relative performance 
in terms of profitability. The decadal averages for individual managing agents show no clear 
trend in terms of a group of managing agents enjoying a clear advantage in hessian looms over 
time. Different agents employed more or less hessian looms than the decadal industry 
averages in different decades. This suggest that the ability to take advantage of the greater 
long-term profitability of hessians relative to sacking can only be part of an explanation of the 
variation in managing agents’ performance. Marketing and information advantages in catering 
to different markets with different types of output – with rapid change and the emergence of 
new markets over time - may have been just as important. 
 
The cost structures of managing agents in the jute industry 
 In the previous chapter, several trends were detected regarding costs and sales over time 
within the industry. The value of output was highly correlated to fluctuations in the cost of raw 
jute. The long term trend was of a rise in the price of raw jute in real terms from approximately 
100 rupees per ton to 175 rupees per ton in the period 1877-1920. Conversely, competition 
eroded the real terms prices obtained for sacking and hessian outputs, putting pressure on 
profit margins. Some improvement in productivity was observed, measured in terms of hourly 
input and output per loom. The weight of raw jute consumed per loom declined relative to 
output per loom, reflecting reduced wastage and the shift to less bulky hessian production. 
Volumes of sacking output per loom increased marginally over time while hessian output per 
loom increased markedly as new capacity was introduced in the 1890s. In this chapter, 
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variations between firms are considered. How successful were different firms in minimising 
costs while marketing their output at profitable prices? 
 
Table 2.6: Mills, costs per loom, sales per loom, profits per loom – average Rs/ standard 
deviation as % of annual average, (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
Mills 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 
Average 
1879-88 
Costs, average 3385 3245 4622 4111 4054 3285 3175 3073 3542 3871 3780 
Sales, average 3534 3450 5333 5138 4907 3258 3123 3083 4204 5711 4318 
Profits, average 149 205 711 1027 853 -27 -52 10 663 1840 538 
Costs, st dev as 
% of average 
18% 18% 15% 26% 12% 18% 23% 17% 17% 31% 19% 
Sales, st dev as 
% of average 
18% 11% 18% 19% 17% 23% 26% 20% 15% 15% 18% 
Profits, st dev as 
% of average 
204% 156% 43% 89% 61% 
1248
% 
323% 
1872
% 
36% 51% 94% 
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, half-yearly reports in Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser. 
 
Given the dominance of raw jute costs in the cost structure of jute manufacturing, the 
variation in costs between firms and over time for each firm may be explained by their relative 
aptitude for judging movements in the raw jute market at a time of increasing demand with 
the entry of new firms. The variation over time for the value of output indicates the trend of 
falling output prices caused by increasing competition and depressed trading conditions until 
the trade picked up in 1888. Those firms which succeeded in marketing a greater proportion of 
their output at the margin in growing export markets for woolpacks and cornsacks in 
Australasia and hessian wheatbags in California, rather than rely on more local demand, were 
better cushioned from the impact of these negative trading conditions.9  
                                                          
9
 Conceptually, it is difficult to evaluate whether the amount of variation observed between firms in a 
given year or for an individual firm over time was “small” or “large”. Taken together, the variation 
between firms in given years was sufficient to produce substantial differences in profitability. The 
average of the standard deviation between firms relative to the average in each year for the whole 
period 1879-1888 was 19% for costs and 18% for sales income. The standard deviations measured as a 
percentage of the decadal average 1879-1888 were less marked, at 14% for costs and 9% for output. 
The latter figures may give a more reliable measure of dispersion as decadal averages smooth some of 
the variation produced in the annual figures, which is simply an artefact of the introduction of new 
looms or of differences in the start and end points of accounting years. The per loom measures are all 
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The difficulty of constructing quantitative data series for individual firms’ costs and sales in 
order to interpret variation between firms can be surmounted in a number of ways. 
Quantitative data for a smaller sample of firms over a longer time period can also be examined 
and taken as indicative of the wider variation between firms. More specifically, the 
disaggregated data that exists for individual firms’ cost structures can be analysed. Qualitative 
data from company records and newspapers can also be examined. Finally, the more detailed 
data available on the profit and loss account for the outcomes achieved by individual firms can 
be taken as sufficient indication of the existence of variation in performance in controlling 
costs and marketing output. The analysis then shifts to focus on different strategies pursued by 
firms in order to improve or maintain profitability. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below calculate costs and output value per loom for the period 1890-1921 
using accounts data that have survived for seven companies, managed by four managing 
agents.10 The managing agents are a representative sample of the range of performance 
discussed in relation to other indicators below. The figures show the volatility over time of 
costs and sales. The trend over time is similar across firms but small variations could lead to 
significant variation in profitability. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
based on looms working at the beginning of the year, which introduces some imprecision in measuring 
the actual average of looms working throughout the year when new capacity was introduced. 
10
 These series are not afflicted by the same issues of missing data recorded for 1879-1888. Data for the 
series for Alexandra and Alliance are available only from 1910; Angus commenced work in 1914. 
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Figure 2.1. Total costs per loom (Rs, constant prices, 1873=1), 1890-1921: 
 
British Library, India Office Records, MSS Eur F308, GH Sutherland, Begg Dunlop correspondence & 
accounts for Alliance and Alexandra Cos; Glasgow University Archive, MSS UGD 91/7/1/2/1/1-2, 
Champdany Co, General Meeting Minutes, MSS UGD 91/7/1/5/1-3, Champdany Co, Annual Reports and 
Accounts, MSS UGD 91/7/3/1/2, Champdany Co, Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Accounts; UDA MS 
86/1/5/5, Samnuggur Co, Directors' reports and accounts; MS 86/2/5/5, Victoria Co, Directors' reports 
and accounts; MS 86/3/5/1-5, Titaghur Co, Half-yearly balance sheets, Reports of the directors, balance 
sheet, working account and profit and loss account; MS 86/4/5/1/1-9, Angus Co, Directors reports and 
accounts 1913-;  
 
Figure 2.2. Output value per loom (Rs, constant prices, 1873=1), 1890-1921: 
 
Sources: As for Figure 2.1 above. 
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Table 2.7. Total costs per loom (constant rupees 1873=1), 1890-1921, and decadal averages: 
 
1890s 1900s 1910s 1890-1921 
Champdany 3,726 4,484 4,306 4,101 
Titaghur 4,315 4,923 4,323 4,461 
Samnuggur   4,679 4,254 4,403 
Victoria 3,742 3,676 4,284 3,944 
Angus     4,693 4,507 
Alliance     4,707 4,667 
Alexandra     4,122 4,164 
Average 3,928 4,684 4,366 4,282 
Average of St dev as % of average for years 14% 9% 10% 11% 
Sources: As for Figure 2.1 above. 
 
Table 2.8. Output value per loom (constant rupees 1873=1), 1890-1921, and decadal averages: 
 
1890s 1900s 1910s 1890-1921 
Champdany 4,149 5,158 5,690 5,040 
Titaghur 5,048 5,702 5,785 5,489 
Samnuggur   5,379 5,816 5,507 
Victoria 4,320 4,101 5,737 4,962 
Angus     6,848 6,295 
Alliance     5,862 5,823 
Alexandra     5,171 5,240 
Average 4,506 5,392 5,739 5,201 
Average of St dev as % of average for years 15% 10% 12% 13% 
Sources: As for Figure 2.1 above. 
 
The firm trends in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are strikingly similar. Given the dominance of the price of 
the raw material in the cost structure, the trajectory follows that of the price of the raw 
material until the war and dominates any variation caused by other factors. The two measures 
of standard deviation relative to the average during the period 1890-21 of 11% for costs and 
13% for sales income given in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 suggest a slight decline in variation across the 
sampled firms relative to that shown in Table 2.6 for the firms sampled in 1879-1888. 
Samnuggur, Titaghur, Victoria and Angus mills were among the most profitable mills during the 
period 1890-1921. Alliance performed around the average. Champdany and Alexandra were 
two of the least profitable although both improved their performance during the last of the 
three decades. If, from this, the sample can be taken to be roughly representative, the 
hypothesis advanced in the previous chapter that the formation of the Indian Jute Mills 
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Association stabilised the industry around a regime that mitigated competitive pressures 
cannot be discounted. The role of the IJMA is explored in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Jute Stocks and Strategy. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the jute mill companies developed a strategy of purchasing large 
jute stocks over time in order to control costs and reduce the risk of fluctuations in the price of 
the raw material. The table below shows the level of stocks held by individual firms who 
reported their accounts at the end of June and December.  
Table 2.9: Managing agents, value of jute stocks per loom in constant rupees at June 30th and 
December 31st 
June 30th 
Managing agents 
December 31
st
 
1880-
1919 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
1880-
1919 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
979 419 1267 1080 1076 Bird 1628 950 1972 1815 1789 
1063   1070 1085 1037 Thomas Duff 1804 774 1892 2422 1756 
878   742 748 1091 Andrew Yule 1228   1244 1047 1591 
746 690 749 687 849 Jardine Skinner 1420 925 1353 1680 1883 
797 428 936 833 975 Ernsthausen 1372 941 1558 1650 1748 
        812 FW Heilgers         1595 
1014       880 Begg Dunlop         1832 
1119     1136 872 Anderson Wright       2571 2201 
        993 McLeod       1597 1597 
766 527 830 901 838 Barry 1556 1181 1530 1965 1755 
909 515 1099 1168 1083 Finlay Muir 1553     1465 1579 
          Bemis         3149 
695 367 918 792 584 Gillanders Arbuthnot 1423 1091 1897 1451 916 
849 374 968 1215   Apcar 1535 856 1705 2230   
820 486 952 907 970 
Weighted 
Average 
1503 960 1647 1892 1812 
31% 35% 33% 34% 27% 
Standard dev as 
% of average 
29% 33% 30% 35% 31% 
Sources: Individual mill company half-yearly reports to 1913 reported in Jute Mills in Bengal, Friend of 
India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, Investors India Year Book, 1913-21. Some values from regular 
half-yearly series in Capital (Calcutta), “Local Jute Mill Stocks”. 
 
 
The end of June represented a point in the year when firms required sufficient stocks to carry 
them over to the beginning of the following jute season, commencing in August. The end of 
December represented the culmination of the busy period from October to December, when 
the bulk of jute supplies came on to the market and represented the high point at which jute 
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stocks were accumulated. From January, the quality and quantity of jute available in the 
market became unreliable. Changes in the industry average over time reveal a marked shift 
from the 1880s to the 1890s, when firms moved away from a reliance on open market 
operations in the Calcutta bazaar throughout the year. Instead, the mill companies developed 
networked relationships with raw jute dealers in the mofussil to concentrate their purchases. 
From the 1890s to the 1900s, the industry average increased slightly, then fell again during the 
war decade. 
In terms of the variation between firms, it seems that most firms deployed a similar strategy. 
The standard deviation from the decadal average measured as a percentage of the average 
was relatively stable from decade to decade, in a range from 21%-29% in June, and from 17-
28% in December. Some of this variation may be explained by differential access to working 
capital finance. For example, the mills managed by Thomas Duff & Co held stocks considerably 
below the December average in the 1880s, and considerably above the December average in 
the 1910s. In the 1880s, as a small managing agent specialising in jute, they had limited 
financial reserves for working capital as they pursued the rapid expansion of productive 
capacity with the addition of Titaghur mill, 70% of the equity of which took the form of bonus 
shares.11 Thomas Duff & Co took out bank loans to finance their working capital requirements, 
which were secured personally against the signatures of the directors. Joseph Barrie, one of 
the directors, also lent £10,000 at 5% interest to each of the Samnuggur and Titaghur mill 
companies. Thomas Duff also lent large sums.12 There were also considerable risks attached to 
a Sterling company conducting money market operations and arranging cover to finance raw 
jute purchases with the volatile rupee exchange rate experienced during the 1880s and 
                                                          
11
 UDA, MS 86/1/6/1, Samnuggur Co, Memorandum and Articles of Association, amendment of 27 June 
1883, p. 47. 
12
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 4 Feb 1878, p. 116; MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 30 Apr 
1884, p. 347. 
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1890s.13 By the 1910s, the financial position of Thomas Duff & Co had eased and they appear 
to have pursued a more aggressive strategy to secure larger stocks. On the other hand, mills 
run by some of the more diversified managing agents could finance their working capital 
requirements by a process of the agents themselves profitably lending money to their mill 
companies during the jute season.14 As Bagchi and Ray have outlined, both the Bank of Bengal 
interest rate for Europeans, and the bazaar rate for hundis, fluctuated sharply to finance the 
seasonal requirements of commercial intermediaries in financing the exchange of agricultural 
commodities for sale in Calcutta or for export, providing arbitrage opportunities for the 
European managing agents who dominated the boards of the Bank of Bengal and other 
merchant banks such as the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, and the Agra Bank, 
becoming quasi-banks themselves in the process.15 
 
Working capital 
The table below estimates decadal averages for working capital for the jute mill companies, 
aggregated by managing agent. Working capital was presented in individual jute mill company 
accounts as a measure of the residual after current liabilities were subtracted from liquid 
assets. Taking the standard deviation was not found to be a meaningful measure of dispersion 
in this case, relative to an average that tends to zero. The estimates were constructed by 
calculating the balance of the individual firms’ liquid assets, relative to their current liabilities 
in a given year. As discussed in chapter 1, it is not straightforward to determine what was a 
desirable level of working capital, given the short-term seasonal requirements of financing 
purchases of raw jute. The trend over time, as the agents which remained in the industry 
                                                          
13
 MS 86/1/1/3, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 30 Apr 1890, p. 163. 
14
 See, for instance, criticism of Finlay Muir by Champdany shareholders... 
15
 Amiya Bagchi, The Presidency Banks and the Indian Economy, 1876-1914 (Oxford, 1989); Rajat Kanta 
Ray, “Asian Capital in the Age of European Domination: the Rise of the Bazaar, 1800-1914”; Modern 
Asian Studies Vol 29.3, pp 449-554. 
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prospered, was towards accumulating some working capital, although in many cases 
insufficient to cover the cost of raw jute stocks per loom held at the height of the season. 
 
Table 2.11, estimated working capital per loom (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1) of mills under 
individual managing agents: 
Managing agents 
Average 
1880-
1921 
Average 
1880s 
Average 
1890s 
Average 
1900s 
Average 
1910s 
Bird 682 416 614 469 1736 
Thomas Duff -312 -602 59 364 -900 
Andrew Yule 454 377 659 441 1175 
Jardine Skinner 475 -652 -1 1417 1752 
Ernsthausen 750 420 345 1486 1537 
Geo. Henderson -730 -683 -475 -993 -618 
Kettlewell Bullen 920 425 684 1215 1724 
Duncan Bros & Co -469   -1344 -328 254 
FW Heilgers -231     315 117 
Begg Dunlop 2107   -580 1740 3378 
Anderson Wright 863   -519 512 2630 
McLeod 400     395 1133 
Barry 867 798 1132 1401 1290 
Macneill -278   36 -301 -479 
Finlay Muir -1457 -1192 -2342 -1285 -936 
Birkmyre -21   -11 -16 -44 
Mackinnon Mackenzie -449 -155 749 217 -1866 
Bemis -394       -327 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 64 -206 39 970 -134 
Apcar 543 534 -245 1429   
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
Another feature of the trends over time was the accumulation of working capital during the 
war decade, which conforms to the large profits earned, leading to an accumulation of 
reserves while investment opportunities were deferred. George Henderson and Finlay Muir 
stand out as managing agents which managed mills – Barnagore and Champdany – with 
persistently negative working capital, which may reflect problems with the valuation and 
expense of their capital stock, leaving them under-capitalised, and difficulties in raising new 
equity. 
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Cost of fixed capital 
Table 2.12 measures the real net cost of investment in fixed capital over time. The calculation 
is made by taking the total amount invested in the “block” after depreciation of the mill 
companies managed by each managing agent, then dividing by the number of looms. The 
“block” in the accounts data measured total fixed capital investment in land, buildings, 
machinery, and transportation equipment. 
Table 2.12: Net cost of fixed capital per loom after depreciation, and inclusive of reserve funds, 
(Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
Agents (£ = Sterling co) 
1870-
1913 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Bird 2608   3181 2098 3865 2638 
Thomas Duff £ 4838 
 
3613 5323 3899 2749 
Andrew Yule 2818 2552 2764 3710 2619 1850 
Jardine Skinner 3157   3057 2840 3568 2066 
Ernsthausen 3396 3500 3682 3366 3710 2998 
Geo. Henderson £ 4028 5725 4196 3528 4250 2950 
Kettlewell Bullen 3476 3911 3996 3438 3023 2309 
Duncan Bros & Co £ 4156       4357 3264 
FW Heilgers 3542       3812 1888 
Begg Dunlop 4190       4333 2963 
Anderson Wright 3229       2991 2346 
McLeod           2937 
Barry 2565 3324 2349 2785 2506 1355 
Macneill £       5323 4331   
Finlay Muir £ 4318 5302 3795 4484 4397 2212 
MackinnonMackenzie £       4702 3769   
Gillanders Arbuthnot 4634   3930 5012 4229 3162 
Apcar 3647 7737 3236 3108 2780   
Weighted average 3951 5534 3548 3990 3696 2425 
St dev as % of average 17% 30% 16% 26% 18% 31% 
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. This measure 
aggregates additions to fixed capital in constant prices in the year the investment was made, then 
subtracting depreciation funds and reserves. 
 
One feature of the variation between firms is the consistently higher cost of the net fixed 
capital of the sterling companies measured by the long-term averages. This is to be expected 
as the rupee value of the Sterling companies was inflated by the declining rupee from the 
1870s to the 1890s.16 Only the mills managed by Thomas Duff & Co remained as Sterling 
companies by 1919, the others having been reconstructed and floated on the Calcutta stock 
                                                          
16
 Conceptually, it makes sense to make the calculation on this basis as this method captures the 
declining value in sterling of remitted profits relative to capital invested over time. 
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exchange. The other notable feature explaining the variation between firms is that the net cost 
of fixed capital rose in the short-term with investment in new capacity. Birds, Andrew Yule and 
Anderson Wright appear to have succeeded at expanding while controlling for the cost of their 
investment in fixed capital – by acquiring fixed capital cheaply through purchasing the 
devalued capital of bankrupt firms and by writing off the cost of capital to depreciation funds 
and reserves more aggressively than other firms. Barry’s low capital costs are explained by its 
more leisurely expansion over a long time period. Thomas Duff & Co’s competitive advantage 
does not appear to have been based on their ability to depreciate their stock of fixed capital 
more rapidly than competitors. 
This chapter has so far examined variation between firms in terms of their cost structure, 
access to the raw material, combination of the physical factors of production, and the resulting 
output and sales. In summary, the results described demonstrate a limited degree of variation 
between firms and managing agents over time that is logically to be expected. Weaker firms 
went to the wall. Weaker managing agents lost their agency rights to stronger ones. The 
results are consistent with processes whereby industrial and commercial knowledge was 
diffused from the market-leading firms that remained in the industry, facilitated by formal 
cooperation embodied in the IJMA, and by other, more informal processes.  
 
Profitability 
The industry trend in profitability discussed in the previous chapter was described as one of 
superprofits earned by some market-leading firms in the 1870s, a period of crisis in the 1880s, 
then a stabilisation – coupled with a long run tendency to declining profits caused by 
competitive pressures - up to the First World War, when superprofits were generalised across 
the industry. Given that marginal differences in costs and sales between individual firms could 
lead to bigger variations in profitability, how did individual firms perform relative to each 
other? The data presented below aggregate jute mill companies by managing agent. Table 2.13 
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shows the variation in profits per loom which allows differences in the underlying cost of fixed 
capital to be stripped out of the analysis, and is thus a better measure of productive efficiency. 
It also strips out the effect of the declining rupee exchange rate on the valuation of profits to 
be remitted relative to the cost of fixed capital for Sterling companies. 
 
Table 2.13: Gross profit after interest per loom (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1), decadal 
averages. 
Managing Agents 
Rank 
1880-
1913 
1870-
1913 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Bird 3 579   670 615 549 804 
Thomas Duff £ 1 728 1291 857 640 560 842 
Andrew Yule 8 487 449 601 503 391 1234 
Jardine Skinner 7 505   703 400 434 933 
Ernsthausen 6 526 407 690 477 573 578 
Geo. Henderson £ 5 531 1131 519 287 480 428 
Kettlewell Bullen 9 480 33 442 766 479 724 
FW Heilgers 11 437       410 1037 
Begg Dunlop 10 465       441 1082 
Anderson Wright 2 584       680 885 
McLeod 12 332         900 
Barry 4 560 496 800 521 444 910 
Finlay Muir £ 14 262 295 338 82 252 852 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 13 323   451 319 295 978 
Apcar 12 423   406 480 318   
Weighted Industry Average  474 374 574 469 458 617 
St dev as % of average  24% 122% 30% 40% 26% 33% 
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
The second column measures the long term peace-time trend up to 1913. When contrasted 
with the long term trend to 1919, it gives a clear indication of the large profits made during the 
war. Thomas Duff & Co were the most profitable managing agents in jute manufacturing to 
1913. On average, they earned nearly three times the profits per loom of the worst performing 
managing agents, Finlay, Muir & Co, which managed the Champdany Co. These two agents 
were outliers. The decadal averages show that Thomas Duff & Co earned exceptional profits in 
the 1870s and 1880s but continued to perform well thereafter. Most of the other managing 
agents’ profits per loom cluster close to the average. In terms of variation between the 
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decadal averages for individual agents, the wide dispersion of profitability shows the ability of 
Henderson’s Barnagore mill and Duff’s Samnuggur mill to exploit and monopolise information 
advantages in applying techniques of power loom weaving to Indian conditions, and in their 
access to lucrative foreign markets. The contrast in their fortunes over time is instructive. Duff 
maintained their advantage through expansion over time while Henderson’s restructuring and 
floatation of Barnagore as a public limited company at an uneconomic price made windfall 
profits for the original partners, but saddled its new shareholders with a cost structure from 
which the company never recovered. It is ironic that the eponymous founder of Thomas Duff & 
Co was one of these original partners. The decline in the decadal standard deviations relative 
to the 1880s confirms the hypothesis of a stabilisation of profitability with a relative lack of 
dispersion around the industry average. 
An alternative measure of profitability takes the real return on fixed capital, after accounting 
for depreciation and reserve funds. The measures of investment in fixed capital and of profits 
are all taken in constant prices. 
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Table 2.14: Gross Profit after interest - "real" % return on gross block after depreciation incl 
reserves – decadal averages (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
Managing Agents 
Rank 
1880-
1913 
1880-
1913+ 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s+ 
Bird 1 33%   50% 47% 14% 45% 
Thomas Duff £ 3 26% 17% 57% 12% 14% 32% 
Andrew Yule 4 20% 20% 29% 17% 16% 113% 
Jardine Skinner 7 13%   13% 14% 13% 82% 
Ernsthausen 5 17% 12% 26% 14% 17% 23% 
Geo. Henderson £ 8 10% 8% 11% 8% 11% 16% 
Kettlewell Bullen 6 16% -4% 12% 24% 16% 42% 
FW Heilgers          11% 110% 
Begg Dunlop  
 
    6% 11% 44% 
Anderson Wright  
 
      24% 54% 
McLeod            41% 
Barry 2 26% 15% 43% 21% 19% 204% 
Finlay Muir £ 10 7% 5% 10% 2% 6% 30% 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 9 7%   8% 6% 8% 45% 
Apcar  15%   12% 16%     
Average  17% 10% 25% 16% 14% 62% 
St dev as % of average  46% 79% 72% 75% 35% 79% 
+By the end of the war, deferred investment plans entailed the accumulation of large reserves, 
decreasing the denominator for net block, distorting the results. I have taken the long-term average 
1880-1913 to avoid this, while excluding the 1870s in order to obtain a sufficiently large sample for 
comparison. 
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
The long term average return on investment in fixed capital has Bird & Co as the best 
performing managing agent. This result is partly due to the results of the Union mill, their only 
mill up to the mid-1890s, which was purchased from the bankrupt Orient mill very cheaply. 
Bird & Co were able finance their expansion out of Union’s profits to become the biggest 
agents in the industry measured by share of total looms, and maintained above average 
profitability in the process. Thomas Duff & Co retains its strong position using this measure of 
profitability despite the disadvantage of being a Sterling company caused by the depreciation 
of the rupee exchange rate. In terms of the decadal averages and the measure of dispersion, 
there is a notable difference with the previous table. There is a much more marked 
improvement in industry profitability, which was presumably associated with the adoption of 
much more careful methods of setting aside funds to cover depreciation by those agents 
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which survived the crises of the 1870s and 1880s. While it is impractical to present the data for 
all the individual managed firms under the different managing agents, scrutiny of this data 
reveals no systematic edge in profitability accruing to newer mills. Partly, this may be because 
existing mills also introduced new capacity. That said, this evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the level of technique was stagnant, or that any advances in technique 
embodied in new plant were offset in higher prices caused by bottlenecks and inflation in the 
costs of equipping mills. 
 
Managing agents’ commissions 
The terms of commission paid to the managing agents are set out in Table 2.15. 
Table 2.15: Managing agents’ commission terms, 1879 and 1903, (“pl” = Rupees per loom, “[]” 
= guaranteed annual minimum rupees in square brackets). 
Managing agents 1879 (Jute Mills in Bengal) 1903 (Capital) 
Paraphrasing 1903 
comment in Capital 
Bird 5% profits + 35 pl 5% profits + 75 pl very reasonable 
Andrew Yule 5% profits + 20 pl [20,000] 2% sales + 100 pl [42,000] minimum paid past year 
Ernsthausen 5% profits + 20 pl [20,000] 5% profits [36,000] pay agents' office costs 
Kettlewell-Bullen 5% profits + 40 pl 2.5% sales   
Mcintosh 5% profits + 20 pl [12,000]  *   
FW Heilgers  - 10% profits + 50 pl   
Begg-Dunlop  - 5% profits + 15 pl inadequate 
Anderson Wright  - 40 pl most moderate 
Barry 2.5% sales 2.5% sales + 4 pl 
 Thomas Duff £ 3% sales 3% sales  
Duncan £  - 2.5% sales + 67 pl rather liberal  
Macneill £ 5% sales 5% sales affected dividends 
Finlay Muir £ 5% sales 5% sales 
 Mackinnon £ 5% sales 5% sales affected dividends 
Jardine Skinner 2.5% sales + 10 pl 2.5% sales + 10 pl heavy interest on advances 
Gillanders  - 2.5% sales bank rate on advances 
Apcar 3% sales 3% sales   
Macallister 3% sales  *   
Rushton Bros 3% sales  *   
- denotes firm not yet formed. * denotes firm ceased operating. Mills are ordered, first by the market 
share of managing agents in 1919, then by the year in which the mill commenced operations.  
Sources: 1879 figures from Jute Mills in Bengal, (Dundee, 1880), pp91-92; 1903 figures from Capital, 3 
Mar, 1904, p368; Thomas Duff and Finlay, Muir managed mills, figures from company records. 
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The evidence is fragmentary as levels of managing agency commission were a closely guarded 
secret. However, it appears that there was a general move by the rupee companies after 1903 
to a profits-based commission that was considerably less remunerative in years of average 
profits than the sales-based commission maintained by the Sterling companies.17 This is borne 
out by the evidence of lower commissions paid to new entrants such as Anderson, Wright & Co 
and Begg, Dunlop & Co seeking to win agency business, also to Ernsthausen, faced with the 
threat of losing their agency of the Howrah mill in 1894.18 This is further evidenced by the 
concession of a lower profit-based commission by Thomas Duff & Co to the Victoria mill from 
1913.19 
As was also discussed in the previous chapter, Tables 2.14 and 2.15 confirm that there was a 
gradual process of reducing sales-based commissions – charged as a cost on working account 
before profits were declared – or to replacing them altogether with a minimum floor on 
agents’ income combined with profit-based commissions to incentivise performance. This 
finding accords with the picture of increasing competition between agents to capture the rents 
available from setting up new mill companies, and to be seen to offer more reasonable terms 
to attract shareholders. To what extent did differences in the contractual terms – whether 
based on profits or sales – translate into different levels of remuneration for the agents? Table 
2.16 gives estimates of the commissions earned per loom. 
  
                                                          
17
 P. S. Lokanathan, Industrial Organisation in India (London, 1935), p. 335, Report of the Indian Tariff 
Board (Cotton Textile Industry Enquiry), Vol III, Evidence (Bombay, 1927), p. 323. 
18
 “Commercial Markets; from our Calcutta Correspondent”, 17 Jul 1894, Dundee Advertiser, 9 Aug 1894, 
p. 4.; “Calcutta Jute Market; from our own Correspondent”, 8 Oct 1894, Dundee Courier, 9 Oct 1894, p. 
4; “Calcutta Jute Market; from our own Correspondent”, 26 Sep 1894, Dundee Courier, 15 Oct 1894, p. 
4. 
19
 MS 86/5/1/3, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, p. 225, 22 Apr 1913. 
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Table 2.16: Estimate of managing agents’ commissions per loom, (Rs, constant prices, 1873 = 
1), ranked in ascending order by 1870-1919 average: 
Agents 
1870-
1919 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Anderson Wright 24     27 22 
Ernsthausen 49 69 43 40 45 
Begg Dunlop 55     37 68 
Bemis 56       56 
Andrew Yule 66 56 51 72 91 
McLeod 71       71 
Bird 97 116 128 76 70 
Kettlewell Bullen 113 108 108 116 126 
Geo. Henderson £ 114 126 108 116 126 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 118 125 108 117 126 
Barry 119 130 113 119 127 
Jardine Skinner 121 116 115 122 130 
Finlay, Muir £ 123 115 140 127 127 
FW Heilgers 126     86 153 
Thomas Duff £ 138 86 129 136 136 
Apcar 142 155 130 136   
Duncan Bros & Co £ 143     150 132 
Mackinnon Mackenzie £ 222 214 216 232 251 
Macneill £ 225 214 216 232 251 
Weighted average of all mills 113 118 121 109 105 
Sources: As above, Table 2.15. Sales-based commission estimated by allocating estimated industry sales 
to individual mills on basis of their share of industry loom capacity. Rebates on commission reported in 
any given year have also been taken into account. 
 
The industry average for commission income per loom only rose slightly in the 1890s 
compared to the 1880s despite the abandonment of short-time working which had reduced 
output – and by extension commissions - by a third in the later years of the 1880s. The huge 
profits of the 1910s translated into a modest increase in average commissions per loom in the 
industry. Andrew Yule and Ernsthausen adopted more competitive terms at an early stage. In 
Ernsthausen’s case, they were in a weak position relative to their shareholders after their 
European corresponding firm went bankrupt in the crisis of 1894 and they had to reform as a 
limited company.20 Newer entrants like Begg, Dunlop, Mcleod and Heilgers offered more 
competitive terms to gain a foothold in the market. Anderson, Wright & Co, a relative minnow 
amongst the other agents, offered the best terms of all. However, the trend is belied by the 
                                                          
20
 ‘Calcutta Jute Market’, Dundee Courier, 8 Oct, 1894, p. 4; 15 Oct, 1894, p. 4. 
115 
 
commissions earned by the managing agents of Sterling mills, suggesting that they were 
relatively insulated from these competitive pressures. The power relationships which 
influenced distributional conflict between shareholders and managing agents are considered in 
more detail in the next chapter. How did commissions compare to dividends to shareholders? 
The table below includes averages for commissions and dividends paid relative to total equity 
to give a sense of their relative movement. The calculation for dividends includes all payments 
to shareholders in the equity of the mill companies, whether holders of ordinary shares or of 
preference shares. 
 
Table 2.17: Estimates of managing agents’ commissions, expressed as a percentage of total 
dividends on equity, (ordinary and preference share capital), paid to shareholders. (The order 
is the same as the previous table for average commissions per loom.) 
Agents Rank 
1870-
1919 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Anderson Wright  
 
    17% 4% 
Ernsthausen 1 17% 22% 15% 13% 15% 
Begg Dunlop  
 
    21% 15% 
Bemis  
 
      6% 
Andrew Yule 2 19% 16% 19% 41% 15% 
McLeod          18% 
Bird 3 27% 31% 34% 33% 16% 
Kettlewell Bullen 8 51% 98% 35% 52% 43% 
Geo. Henderson £ 7 39% 33% 49% 67% 81% 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 9 55% 102% 73% 111% 29% 
Barry 5 31% 39% 41% 71% 34% 
Jardine Skinner 6 38% 86% 31% 57% 23% 
Finlay, Muir £ 11 68% 55% 297% 174% 33% 
FW Heilgers  
 
    65% 32% 
Thomas Duff £ 4 29% 14% 32% 49% 34% 
Apcar 13 88% 81% 90% 151%   
Duncan Bros & Co £  
 
    65% 92% 
Mackinnon Mackenzie £ 10 62% 61% 71% 128% 42% 
Macneill £ 12 84% 95% 149% 138% 48% 
Weighted average   29% 36% 43% 65% 28% 
Sources: As for Table 2.15 above. Dividend figures from Jute Mills in Bengal, Friend of India and 
Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
Most of the change in the magnitude of commission payments relative to dividend payments 
on equity is explained by changes in the latter variable. Commissions were stable relative to 
dividends or, in other words, managing agents were more insulated from the risks of poor 
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performance than shareholders in the jute mill companies. The table indicates a bifurcation 
between two different groups within the group with above average commission income per 
loom. The managing agents Thomas Duff & Co, Jardine, Skinner & Co and Barry & Co were 
sufficiently profitable to be able to capture rents without it being detrimental to their capacity 
to maintain a high level of dividend payments to their shareholders. The next chapter will 
explain this evidence of a competitive advantage possessed by Thomas Duff & Co. On the 
other hand, it becomes clear that, in the case of less profitable mills with directorates in 
Glasgow - Champdany, Ganges and the India Jute Co – their managing agents found 
themselves in a zero-sum distributional conflict with shareholders.21  
 
Ownership, investment capital structure and competing claims on profits  
Chapter 1 described the process whereby the investment capital of the jute mill companies 
was restructured over time to include a bigger element of guaranteed income in the form of 
debentures and preference dividends in the form of preference shares in exchange for a lower 
rate of return relative to ordinary shareholders. Mill companies created a mixed portfolio of 
different categories of equity with different risks and obligations.  
  
                                                          
21
 The case of the Champdany Co, managed by James Finlay’s Indian subsidiary Finlay, Muir is discussed 
in detail in Ross Stewart, ‘Scottish Company Accounting, 1870-1920’, unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of Glasgow, 1986, pp. 256-62, 268-79. 
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Table 2.18: Relative % proportions of ordinary shares, preference shares and debentures, 
decadal averages. 
 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Agents o p d o p d o p d o p d 
Bird 97 0 3 80 7 13 43 34 24 35 33 32 
Thomas Duff £ 92 0 8 82 4 14 54 22 24 56 27 17 
Andrew Yule 100 0 0 65 12 24 46 28 26 50 29 21 
Jardine Skinner 69 0 31 40 25 34 50 23 27 50 25 25 
Ernsthausen 78 0 22 77 20 4 38 36 26 26 38 36 
Geo. Henderson £ 100 0 0 75 17 8 51 30 19 53 26 21 
Kettlewell B 87 0 13 37 38 25 38 38 25 37 30 32 
Duncan £       89 11 0 67 22 11 45 24 31 
FW Heilgers             39 27 34 34 32 34 
Begg Dunlop       40 37 24 33 27 41 31 34 35 
Anderson Wright       64 0 36 29 26 45 59 15 26 
McLeod             88 0 12 35 39 26 
Barry 100 0 0 64 8 28 25 42 33 22 49 29 
Macneill £ 64 16 20 62 17 21 61 17 22 71 19 11 
Finlay Muir £ 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 
Mackinnon £ 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 
Gillanders 64 0 36 50 22 28 47 28 25 37 28 35 
Apcar 100 0 0 24 26 50 30 70 0       
Weighted average 91 0 9 67 14 19 47 27 26 45 29 26 
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
The implications of a changing structure of equity on shareholders and managing 
agents/directors was elaborated in the previous chapter. In terms of the variation between 
firms, the notable feature of Table 2.18 is the convergence of different groups of firms under 
each agent on the industry average distribution of equity capital amongst debentures, 
preference and ordinary shares. This is perhaps explained by the fact that the imperative to 
raise new investment funds to finance expansion meant that the jute mill companies could no 
longer rely solely on personal networks. The growing use by the jute mill companies of an 
increasingly sophisticated Calcutta share capital market allowed investment funds to be raised 
relatively cheaply without threatening loss of control so long as a sufficient number of ordinary 
shareholders with voting powers remained loyal to the goals of the companies’ directors and 
managing agents. On the other hand, the decline in the relative proportion of ordinary shares 
diluted their dividend-earning power. In terms of the lack of variation among firms and their 
convergence to a similar investment capital structure, the main exception shown in the table 
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applies to the Champdany and India mills managed by Finlay, Muir & Co and Mackinnon, 
Mackenzie & Co which retained all of their equity in the form of ordinary shares. This is 
explained by the slow growth of these firms, which meant there was less need to raise 
alternative sources of investment funds. Also, these were two of the larger managing agents 
with very substantial interests in tea and shipping and large financial resources, which meant 
that shares in their managed companies were held by a narrow coterie of wealthy partners 
and managers working for the agents.22 
 
Ownership 
Table 2.19 below records the relative holdings of ordinary shares, preference shares and 
debentures of a sample of 97 investors in Calcutta jute mills who died between 1874 and 1925, 
drawn from inventories of moveable assets at death preserved in Scottish probate records.23 
Given their historic over-representation in Calcutta’s commercial community in the colonial 
period, many Scots were also directors of Rupee jute mill companies and partners of managing 
agents associated with the industry. Therefore, a subset of the sample does record holdings of 
shares and debentures in rupee mills listed in Calcutta. The sample contains 44 directors and 
partners in managing agencies directing the affairs of Sterling jute mill companies, 12 directors 
and partners in managing agencies directing the affairs of Rupee jute mill companies, five 
Dundee merchants and manufacturers with no direct interest as a manager or employee of a 
Calcutta jute mill, eight Calcutta merchants and jute dealers with no direct interest as a 
manager or employee of a Calcutta jute mill, and 28 Calcutta commercial assistants and mill 
managers in the jute mill companies, who were mostly natives of Dundee. Table 2.19 below 
                                                          
22
 MS UGD 91/7/1/2/2, Champdany Co, MOTD, shareholder lists, 22 Jul 1873, 15 Jan 1890, 17 Aug 1893, 
20 Apr 1900, 27 Sep 1921; Forbes Munro, Maritime Enterprise, pp. 93-4. 
23
 National Archive of Scotland, Probate Records. 
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depicts the pattern over time of relative holdings of ordinary shares, preference shares and 
debentures in the sample for the purpose of comparison with Table 2.18 above. 
 
Table 2.19: Sample of 97 investors over time - relative % proportions of ordinary shares, 
preference shares and debentures, decadal averages. 
  
Ordinary 
O 
Preference Debentures 
No Years Sample Industry Sample Industry Sample Industry 
7 1870-1890 99% 91% 1% 0% 0% 9% 
17 1890-1900 90% 67% 6% 14% 5% 19% 
24 1900-1910 67% 47% 27% 27% 6% 26% 
49 1910-1925 61% 45% 28% 29% 10% 26% 
97 Unweighted average 79% 63% 16% 18% 5% 20% 
Sources: National Archive of Scotland, Probate Records, Wills and Inventories. 
 
The table establishes that the sample of investors disproportionately preferred to hold 
ordinary shares and were averse to holding debentures relative to industry averages over time. 
They tended to hold preference shares in proportion to the industry average, suggesting that 
the investors in the sample were relatively active in making purchases of ordinary shares in 
secondary markets. Consulting individuals’ inventories of moveable estate, there are 
numerous instances in the sample of investors holding only one category of investment in a 
particular mill, which also suggests that both ordinary and preference shares were traded quite 
actively in secondary markets. This finding is supported by the frequency with which changing 
prices were recorded for all categories of equity in the pages listing daily share prices of 
individual mill companies in the weekly Calcutta financial newspaper, Capital, from the 1890s, 
with ordinary shares, preference shares and debentures in jute mills each occupying a page of 
each weekly issue. Impressionistically, it was rare that a market price was not recorded at 
which a buyer would meet a seller’s price.24 Table 2.20 below shows the pattern of investment 
in the sample - relative to the industry average - when investors are categorized by their 
relationship to the industry. 
                                                          
24
 Capital, ‘The Share Market. Stocks and Shares, reported Transactions’. 
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Table 2.20: Sample of 97 investors categorized by relationship to industry - relative % 
proportions of ordinary shares (O), preference shares (P), and debentures (D). 
No Category of investor O P D Total 
44 Sterling directors/ managing agents 86% 11% 2% 100% 
12 Rupee directors/ managing agents 67% 28% 4% 100% 
5 Dundee merchants & manufacturers 77% 23% 0% 100% 
8 Calcutta merchants & jute dealers 38% 29% 34% 100% 
28 Commercial assistants & mill managers 46% 39% 16% 100% 
97 Unweighted sample average 63% 26% 11% 100% 
  Industry average 63% 18% 20% 100% 
Sources: National Archive of Scotland, Probate Records, Wills and Inventories. The categorisation of 
investors is based on detailed biographical research. 
 
The small size of subsample for the categories “Rupee directors”, “Dundee merchants and 
manufacturers” and “Calcutta merchants & jute dealers” may mean that the results above are 
not representative. Bearing in mind this caveat, the categorisation into subsamples provides 
striking confirmation of differences in investment patterns across different types of 
shareholder. The first three categories of shareholder were generally very wealthy, all 
revealing a preference for ordinary shares, with higher risk and higher returns. Comparison of 
Sterling and Rupee directors reveals a pattern of shareholding that reflects the relative 
proportion of types of investment capital utilised by their respective jute mill companies. 
Sterling directors held more ordinary shares relative to preference shares compared to Rupee 
directors, which partly reflects the fact that two of the seven Sterling mill companies – those 
managed by Finlay, Muir and Mackinnon, Mackenzie - did not issue preference shares during 
this period. Neither tended to hold debentures. On the other hand, investors in the categories 
“Calcutta merchants & jute dealers” and “Commercial assistants & mill managers” were 
relatively risk averse – or had more difficulty obtaining ordinary shares. The former held 
preference shares in proportion to other types of investment at a rate well above the industry 
average while the latter held both preference shares and debentures well above the industry 
average. 
An unweighted sample average is used in Table 2.21 for comparison with the industry average 
because the weighted average is distorted by the over-representation of Sterling directors in 
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the sample relative to the population of investors in the industry. It is striking that debentures 
are under-represented in the sample. This finding is consistent with the evidence that the 
market for debentures functioned in a more impersonal fashion in comparison to equity. 
Debentures were much more likely to be held by institutional investors, particularly banks, 
explaining the discrepancy in the sample and industry averages.25 There is also evidence that 
Marwari financiers and jute dealers took up large blocks of debentures, as well as other shares, 
in the jute mill companies towards the end of the war.26 
The data in Table 2.21 and 2.22 below provides evidence of other types of divergence in the 
pattern of shareholding by different categories of investor. Table 2.21 shows the average 
number of ordinary shares, preference shares and debentures held, while Table 2.22 shows 
the average number of blocks of shares and debentures held in different mill companies. 
 
Table 2.21: Average no of standardised £10 shares or debentures held. 
No Category of investor O P D Total 
44 Sterling directors/ managing agents 994 131 25 1,150 
12 Rupee directors/ managing agents 858 362 57 1,278 
5 Dundee merchants & manufacturers 781 230 0 1,012 
8 Calcutta merchants, jute dealers 212 161 188 560 
28 Calcutta commercial assistants & mill managers 159 134 55 348 
97 Unweighted average 601 204 65 870 
Sources: National Archive of Scotland, Probate Records, Wills and Inventories. 
Number of 100 Rupee shares standardised to £10 par value at £1 = Rs15, the prevailing exchange rate 
throughout the period. 
 
Directors and managing agents of both Sterling and Rupee jute mill companies held a greater 
number of shares on average than the assorted Calcutta merchants, jute dealers, commercial 
assistants and mill managers lower down the social scale, as was to be expected. The wealth 
                                                          
25
 See Amiya Bagchi, The Presidency Banks and the Indian Economy, 1876-1914 (Oxford, 1989); Bagchi, 
The Evolution of the State Bank of India, vol. II; the Era of the Presidency Banks, 1876-1920 (London, 
1997). 
26
 Omkar Goswami, “Then came the Marwaris: Some aspects of the changes in the pattern of 
industrial control in Eastern India”, Indian Economic and Social History Review, September 1985, 
22.3, pp. 231-2. 
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profile of Rupee and Sterling directors and managing agents was similar. The Rupee directors 
had an average moveable estate at death in the UK of £179,000, compared to £167,000 for the 
Sterling directors. The market valuation of the Rupee directors’ investments in Calcutta jute 
mills was on average £22,000 compared to £19,000 for Sterling directors, or 12% of moveable 
estate in both cases. Investments in jute mills comprised similar proportions of total Indian 
investments, 50% for Rupee directors and 46% for Sterling directors. Assuming the small 
sample of Rupee directors is representative, part of the explanation for their greater 
propensity to hold preference shares was due to the less frequent use of preference shares by 
the Sterling companies. The sample is unrepresentative in the sense that 42% of the Rupee 
sample comprises directors who died in or after 1918, but only 18% of Sterling directors. The 
greater use of preference shares over time is therefore reflected in the subsamples.  
 
Table 2.22: Average number of shareholdings in different jute mill companies in each category. 
No Category of investor O P D 
44 Sterling directors/ managing agents 2.0 1.4 1.3 
12 Rupee directors/ managing agents 3.1 5.2 4.5 
5 Dundee merchants & manufacturers 1.5 3.0 0.0 
8 Calcutta merchants, jute dealers 2.3 2.4 4.0 
28 Calcutta commercial assistants & mill managers 2.3 2.4 2.5 
97 Unweighted average 2.2 2.9 2.5 
Sources: National Archive of Scotland, Probate Records, Wills and Inventories. 
 
The relative preponderance of Rupee directors who died after 1918 compared to Sterling 
directors is also part of the explanation for the greater number of blocks of shares or 
debentures held in different companies. More companies were created over time to invest in. 
However, the discrepancy also reflects the fact that the managing agents of Sterling mills 
tended to expand productive capacity through additional investment in existing mill 
companies, while the managing agents of Rupee mills floated new companies to expand. Table 
2.3 above showed that managing agents of Rupee and Sterling mill companies on average 
managed respectively 3.0 and 1.5 mill companies, with an average productive capacity 
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respectively of 927 looms and 1384 looms. Directors of Rupee mills tended to spread their 
investments over a greater number of jute mill companies under their own management. 
Although Calcutta merchants, jute dealers, commercial assistants and mill managers held less 
shares overall, the average number of blocks of shares held in each investment category and 
the relative stability across categories suggests an element of conscious diversification to 
spread risk. 
The increasing scale of the investment funds required to finance growth had to be balanced by 
managing agents against the imperative to maintain control of the managed companies and 
the associated agency rents while tying down a minimum amount of their own capital in the 
process. The activity in liquid secondary markets permitted less wealthy or other types of more 
risk-averse shareholders to enter the share market. One of the two investors in the sample 
who held solely debentures, Thomas Spalding, was a commercial assistant working for various 
managing agents for 20 years prior to his death, and his debenture holdings comprised half his 
recorded estate of £13,574 (in 1870 prices). This was small beer compared to the average jute 
shareholding of a typical director or partner in a managing agency running a Calcutta jute mill 
in the sample, which was £26,000 (expressed in constant 1870 prices). This sample of 56 
Rupee and Sterling directors reported an average moveable estate at death in the United 
Kingdom of £170,000, (also constant prices). Their investments in jute on average represented 
only about 12% of their moveable assets at death, although earnings from the jute industry 
were generally the initial and primary source of wealth for this group. 
The process of issuing preference shares or debentures to dilute ordinary share capital could 
be particularly attractive to some of the less profitable jute mill companies and managing 
agents as a way to raise finance more cheaply while attempting to bolster their share price for 
ordinary shares. However, it was attended with serious risks. In the case of two mill companies 
managed by Armenian managing agents, Sarkies’ Alexandra mill and Apcar’s Seebpore mill, 
new investment financed by preference shares and debentures did not address their below-
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average profitability. Payments on debentures and arrears of payments on preference shares 
became a heavy burden, depressing their capacity to pay dividends on the ordinary shares. 
Under threat of default on their debenture payments, Sarkies were forced to turn over the 
managing agency rights to Begg, Dunlop & Co in 1909.27 Apcar & Co’s Seebpore mill ceased 
trading prior to being taken over by Kettlewell, Bullen & Co to re-emerge as Fort William mill.28 
The original directors who had invested in Seebpore then took substantial holdings in jute mills 
managed by Bird and Andrew Yule but they had lost the lucrative rents derived from acting as 
managing agents.29 
  
                                                          
27
 India Office Records, MSS Eur F308, GH Sutherland, Begg Dunlop & Co, correspondence and accounts, 
letter from Charles W Tosh, Calcutta manager, to GH Sutherland, 24 Jun 1909; Bagchi, The Evolution of 
the State Bank of India, vol. II, pp. 89-91. 
28
 Bagchi, The Evolution of the State Bank of India, vol. II, pp. 89-91. 
29
 See listings of Apcars as directors in Bird and Yule managed mills in IIYB. 
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Rates of dividends on ordinary and preference shares and debenture interest. 
 
The variation in rates of dividends paid to ordinary shareholders is shown in Table 2.23 below. 
Table 2.23: Real rate of dividend on ordinary shares, (constant prices, 1873 = 1), rank given in 
descending order.  
Managing Agents Rank 
1870-
1913 
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Bird 2 13.1%   17.3% 16.0% 9.0% 30.9% 
Thomas Duff £ 5 10.9% 12.2% 18.1% 7.5% 7.5% 15.7% 
Andrew Yule 6 8.5% 8.8% 8.1% 9.3% 8.0% 31.9% 
Jardine Skinner 1 13.2% 0.0% 10.8% 23.5% 9.2% 42.9% 
Ernsthausen 8 7.0% 3.0% 7.9% 7.6% 9.4% 26.1% 
Geo. Henderson £ 12 5.0% 8.4% 6.4% 3.3% 3.2% 7.0% 
Kettlewell Bullen 10 5.5% 4.0% 2.0% 7.0% 8.5% 23.6% 
Duncan Bros & Co £ 11 5.5%     0.0% 8.2% 6.6% 
FW Heilgers 7 8.3%       8.1% 47.4% 
Begg Dunlop 9 6.2%     2.5% 7.1% 36.0% 
Anderson Wright 3 13.0%     11.2% 15.1% 31.0% 
McLeod 18 2.2%       2.5% 26.2% 
Barry 4 11.2% 20.0% 8.0% 9.6% 7.9% 33.2% 
Macneill £ 17 2.3%     1.3% 3.4% 41.6% 
Finlay Muir £ 15 3.2% 5.2% 4.8% 1.3% 2.3% 14.8% 
Mackinnon Mackenzie £ 13 4.5%   0.0% 5.9% 4.8% 30.9% 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 16 2.7%   3.7% 4.2% 1.8% 18.6% 
Apcar 14 3.9% 2.8% 3.7% 4.6% 4.2%   
Average all firms   7.7% 10.6% 7.4% 6.7% 6.5% 25.1% 
St Dev as % of average   50% 57% 76% 90% 52% 47% 
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
The real rate of return is calculated by deflating the value of dividends, as well as the value of ordinary 
share capital in the denominator by year of issue. The issue of bonus shares is included in the calculation 
as a one-off payment. Sterling dividends were converted into rupees at the prevailing exchange rate in 
any given year. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the long-term trend was for declining real terms return on 
dividends, reflecting the declining long-term profitability of the industry, a trend interrupted 
by exceptionally profitable conditions in wartime from 1914. It is notable that the standard 
deviation relative to the average shows the attraction of entering the industry in the 1890s as 
demand conditions improved, bringing an end to short-time working and renewed investment 
in productive capacity, then declines thereafter. This supports the hypothesis of a convergence 
of firm performance after the 1890s, as profits were competed away over time, with the 
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steady but controlled entry of new managing agents into the industry under oligopolistic 
conditions. 
However, the trend to convergence around a more competitive equilibrium should not 
obscure the persistence of significant differences in how well mill firms under different 
managing agents performed to remunerate their shareholders. The ranking of managing 
agents in paying ordinary dividends is highly correlated to profitability and market share over 
time. The big four managing agents in 1919 – Bird, Thomas Duff, Andrew Yule and Jardine, 
Skinner – succeeded in retaining or increasing their market share from the 1880s to the end of 
the period. They also ranked in the top six managing agents in terms of paying dividends, 
paying 11% in real terms on average. Above-average profitability permitted a sustainable 
policy of paying high dividends, creating a virtuous circle for attracting new investors to 
finance expansion. However, while Thomas Duff ranked first and third in terms of profitability 
relative to loom capacity and relative to investment in fixed capital respectively, they ranked 
fifth in terms of dividends on ordinary shares, suggesting a degree of insulation from the 
competitive discipline that exerted itself on rupee companies listed on the Calcutta stock 
exchange. On the other hand, the five managing agents which performed worst in terms of 
paying ordinary dividends to 1913, (excluding the newcomer McLeod), acted as agents to mills 
established in the period 1868-1883 and all failed to retain market share, paying only 3% in 
real terms. These differences were significant. In terms of the three Glasgow-based Sterling 
companies amongst the worst performers, this hamstrung their ability to expand throughout 
the period, and led to criticism that the high level of managing agency fee they commanded – 
5% on sales – was pitting them against shareholders in a short-sighted zero-sum distributional 
conflict.30 Ultimately, all three agents would relaunch their mills as Rupee companies, riding 
the post-war wave of investment euphoria. 
                                                          
30
 Stewart, “Scottish Company Accounting, 1870-1920”, pp. 256-62, 268-79. 
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Preference shares 
As discussed in the previous chapter, preference shares were a hybrid form of equity with 
some of the fixed-income characteristics of external debt such as debentures that became 
widely used in the industry from the 1890s to finance expansion. The rate of return was fixed 
and they paid dividend in preference to the dividend on ordinary shares in any given year, or 
were paid in arrears in subsequent years. Their hybrid quality and lower risk relative to 
ordinary shares was reflected in much less variation in the rates obtaining between different 
managing agents.31 
 
  
                                                          
31
 Further work would be required to isolate the degree to which discrepancies between mills were 
based on bank interest rates in the year of issue. Lower interest rates in the UK explain in large part the 
lower rates obtained by Thomas Duff & Co for issuing preference share capital. The residual discrepancy 
was based on shareholders’ assessment of risk in capital markets. It is striking that another Sterling 
company, Macneill & Co, managers of the Ganges jute mill, were forced to issue preference shares at 8% 
in 1891, a 60% premium on the rate obtained by Duff, after many years of sub-average performance in 
paying a dividend on ordinary shares while charging the highest rate of managing agency fee in the 
industry – a 5% commission on sales. 
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Table 2.24: Real rate of dividend on preference shares, (constant prices, 1873 = 1), rank given 
in ascending order.  
Managing agents Rank 
1890-
1913 
1890s 1900s 1910s 
Bird 7 5.6% 4.9% 6.0% 5.8% 
Thomas Duff £ 1 4.5% 4.5% 4.7% 3.7% 
Andrew Yule 13 6.3% 6.6% 6.5% 5.4% 
Jardine Skinner 2 4.8% 3.2% 5.2% 4.2% 
Ernsthausen 8 5.8% 5.9% 5.7% 5.3% 
Geo. Henderson £ 12 6.0% 4.4% 6.9% 5.8% 
Kettlewell Bullen 9 5.9% 6.4% 6.0% 5.1% 
Duncan Bros & Co £ 4 5.3% 5.7% 5.1% 5.3% 
FW Heilgers 10 6.0%   6.0% 5.8% 
Begg Dunlop 3 5.2% 6.8% 5.4% 4.9% 
Anderson Wright 5 5.4% 5.2% 5.5% 4.7% 
McLeod 14 6.6%   2.2% 7.4% 
Barry 6 5.5% 6.0% 5.5% 4.1% 
Macneill £ 15 6.7% 7.1% 6.7% 3.2% 
Finlay Muir £ 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Mackinnon Mackenzie £ 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Gillanders Arbuthnot 11 6.0% 5.5% 6.4% 5.5% 
Apcar 16 7.2% 7.6% 7.4%   
Weighted industry average   6.5% 6.4% 5.8% 5.1% 
St Dev as % of average   11% 19% 20% 20% 
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser, IIYB. 
 
Failure to pay a preference dividend was exceptional in the industry during the period to 1921. 
Both Sarkies’ Alexandra mill and Apcar’s Seebpore mill went bankrupt and changed hands after 
failing to pay preference dividends in two consecutive years. Henderson’s Barnagore mill had 
to make good four years of arrears in 1896 after a restructuring of the company. Otherwise, 
the crisis of 1910 was reflected by 10 mill companies deferring payment of the preference 
dividend, while a further 6 companies failed to pay the preference dividend in 1914. 
 
Debentures 
Debentures were also a popular financial instrument for raising finance at low interest. Given 
the undeveloped nature of the banking system and deposit accounts, holdings of jute mill 
debentures in jute mills – a growing and profitable industry - were a popular alternative form 
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of low risk investment to deposit accounts or Government of India paper.32 The Sterling mills 
that availed themselves of the facility were able to take advantage of deeper financial markets 
in the UK to raise long-term external debt relatively cheaply. As with preference shares, there 
was little variation between managing agents. 
Judging the relative performance of different managing agents in securing returns to their 
principals, the shareholders, requires consideration of the relative gearing of different types of 
financing over the long-term. In some cases high dividends were paid on a relatively narrow 
base of ordinary shares relative to the total share capital including debentures. There might 
also be a high level of external debt on which to pay interest. The mills managed by Jardine, 
Skinner & Co appear to have been more reliant on external loans than normal. Jardine, Skinner 
earned a high level of commission on these loans.33 
 
  
                                                          
32
 For Indian banking and deposit accounts, see Bagchi, The Presidency Banks; Bagchi, Evolution of the 
State Bank of India, Vol II. 
33
 Capital, 3 Mar 1904, p. 368, “Managing Agents of Jute Mills.” 
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Conclusion 
This chapter developed a quantitative assessment of the variations in the performance of 
different firms within the industry. It can be seen that some managing agents to expand 
rapidly and increase market share at the expense of others whose market share declined or 
who were forced out of the industry. Thomas Duff & Co were exceptional amongst the 
managing agents of Sterling mill companies in achieving the profits and dividends necessary to 
do this. A series of quantitative indicators showed that the degree of variation in managing 
agents narrowed in the long-run up to the war.  
The quantitative evidence of variation in managing agents’ performance poses questions 
about the nature of the competitive advantage that firms internalized. The following chapters 
explore the nature of the competitive advantage possessed by Thomas Duff & Co, one of the 
most successful managing agents. 
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Chapter 3. The Origins and Growth of Foreign Direct 
Investment in the Calcutta Jute Industry by a 
Dundonian Multinational Enterprise – a Case Study of 
the Thomas Duff & Co managing agency, 1872-1921. 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a detailed case study of the network of jute mill companies in Calcutta 
under the auspices of the managing agents, Thomas Duff & Co. As the only managing agent 
interested in jute manufacturing in Calcutta which had a Dundee headquarters, this firm 
represents a very specific case. The firm also specialised in jute manufacture and consciously 
avoided exploiting opportunities to diversify into unrelated industries to achieve the 
economies of scope that were a characteristic feature of the development of the Calcutta 
managing agencies. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that, typically, Calcutta firms which 
invested in jute manufacturing did so as part of a process of diversification away from 
mercantile activities in Calcutta in the pursuit of more profitable productive investment in 
manufacturing, food processing, mining and services in India with an export orientation. 
Where they had strategic direction by a parent firm in the UK, the parent tended to be located 
in London or Glasgow, and the capital accumulated by these parents at their birth was often 
from Glasgow and derived from investment in cotton manufacture or merchanting. The 
analytical and heuristic value of selecting such an atypical case for a detailed study cannot then 
be based on its being the most apt case for the purpose of making inferences about the 
132 
 
generality of firms in the industry. The study of Thomas Duff & Co serves rather different 
purposes. 
The first purpose is to consider precisely why Thomas Duff & Co took the path from investment 
in jute manufacturing in Dundee to jute manufacturing in Calcutta. This was not followed by 
other Dundee firms. Instead, exploration of the Dundonian context in which Thomas Duff & Co 
originated reveals a pronounced antipathy on the part of the most successful jute 
manufacturers to follow this path. The reasons for this are considered in the next section. 
On the other hand, the history of Thomas Duff also reveals that there was a constituency In 
Dundee for investing in jute manufacturing to exploit location-specific knowledge of jute 
manufacturing processes and marketing generated in Dundee that could be translated into a 
competitive advantage in Calcutta. In the process, it is demonstrated that this constituency 
existed for reasons that were very much bound up with the antipathy of Dundee’s leading 
manufacturers. The leading tier of Dundee jute manufacturers created vehicles to direct 
surplus capital generated in jute manufacturing into foreign investments in North America as a 
means, simultaneously, to extend their marketing network, to generate new sources of 
demand and to secure superior, less risky, returns on their surplus capital than could be 
generated by ploughing all of it back into investment in new capacity in Dundee.1 The same 
process of declining profitability of jute manufacturing in Dundee led a second tier of investors 
who were less successful in Dundee and were excluded from the reaping the full benefits of 
investments in North America to create an alternative vehicle to diversify away from jute 
manufacturing in Dundee. Thomas Duff represented one such vehicle. This chapter explores 
what made Thomas Duff & Co a successful vehicle for this task by exploring what were the 
competitive advantages embodied in the pooled knowledge of its directorate, its employees, 
                                                          
1
 UDA, MS 66/2/2 Cox Bros Ltd, Private Letter Books; W. Turrentine Jackson, The Enterprising Scot; 
Investors in the American West after 1873 (Edinburgh, 1968); Charles Munn, Investing for Generations: A 
History of Alliance Trust (Edinburgh, 2013). 
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its broader networks, paying particular attention to the innovative institutional form of the 
firm in terms of its ownership structure. In the process, it is demonstrated how location-
specific knowledge generated in Dundee could be embodied in the form taken by this 
multinational firm and exported successfully to Calcutta to become an important source of 
competitive advantage there. Indeed, it was a necessary condition of their success that all the 
Calcutta jute manufacturers did this to some extent. However, this was a necessary but 
insufficient condition for success. The examination of Thomas Duff’s history brings to light the 
existence of another Dundee firm, the Victoria Co, which sought to replicate its success and 
failed, ultimately being absorbed by Thomas Duff & Co. This negative case is analysed in detail 
in order to demonstrate how success in Calcutta depended crucially on synthesising location 
specific knowledge of jute manufacturing deriving from Dundee with location specific 
knowledge of operating a manufacturing concern in Calcutta markets. Only on the basis  of this 
synthesis could sufficient conditions be created for ultimate success. The study of the Victoria 
Co and its relations with Thomas Duff & Co also throws up important insights into the nature 
and limits of the Dundee share capital market and competition for investible funds within it, 
and how Thomas Duff & Co was able to both cultivate a shareholder constituency in Dundee 
and to transform it in line with its requirements to extend its capital base as the scale of 
investments in Calcutta grew. This is explained through a detailed exploration of the social and 
occupational characteristics of the firm’s shareholders and how they evolved over time. This 
goes beyond simple description by cracking the surface appearance of juridical ownership 
through operationalising the concept of effective control within the bounds of the firm, which 
requires consideration of the hybrid character of a firm which adapted the most advanced 
institutional firm structures of limited liability and public ownership to the purposes of 
substantive family control. Thus, one encounters the contradiction of the public limited 
company which embodies apparently impersonal transactions in capital markets disguising the 
substantive reality of highly personalised pooled transactions of a coterie of several controlling 
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family networks consciously engaged in their own reproduction.
2
 Extending this mode of 
analysis, this hybrid of family-public firm applies also to the reproduction of strategic direction 
over time in the management of the firm mediated by the marriage market. In other words, 
the strategic goal of reproducing the influence of the founding family networks pooled 
together within the firm’s management and ownership structures required them to 
demonstrate an adaptability to meet the changing demands of the industry over time as it 
evolved, which required the internalisation of new types of knowledge within the firm that 
were beyond the capacities of the original family network to fulfil, specifically the need for the 
firm to introduce new professionalised skills such as knowledge of modern accounting and 
management practices. The strategic goal was met, paradoxically, through the decision to 
subordinate the nepotitistic requirements of reproducing the family network to the 
requirement to recruit these skills through a tactical retreat which involved recruiting a new 
layer of professional managers on the basis of merit from beyond the ranks of the founding 
families, by recourse to broader Dundee networks through personalised knowledge of the new 
recruits who came from the ranks of founders business associates and fellow shareholders. 
Crucially, the new recruits were able to maintain the firm’s Dundee identity which was a 
defining feature of its ownership structure, and which was maintained despite adverse 
changes in corporate taxation which led the Glasgow-based firms to reinvent themselves as 
rupee companies. 
Having considered the salience and persistence of the firm’s Dundee identity, the analysis 
shifts focus to a conceptualisation of differentiation between the interests of the shareholders 
and the directorate of the firm, which was institutionalised through the creation of Thomas 
Duff & Co in the early 1880s as a managing agency to undertake the management of the mill 
companies, Samnuggur and Titaghur, and later Victoria. Uniquely, Thomas Duff & Co 
                                                          
2
 Geoffrey Jones and Mary Rose, introductory chapter in Jones and Rose (eds), Family Capitalism 
(Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-16. 
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originated as a private limited company in contrast to the partnership form that characterised 
the other managing agencies in Calcutta in their evolution from mercantile partnerships. 
Moreover, as a jute manufacturing specialist, this particular instantiation of the managing 
agency structure stripped out the other functions which tended to be referred to justify their 
existence – i.e. as a parent firm responsible for promoting and coordinating the activities of a 
diverse group of subsidiaries. Thus, paradoxically, the very uniqueness of Thomas Duff & Co – 
narrowly defined as managing agents
3
 – serves as a particularly useful case for isolating and 
studying what was qualitatively new and distinctive about the managing agency system in 
Eastern India, their function as a rent extraction mechanism in the interests of an inner group 
of directors or partners. This is illustrated by analysing the relationships between Thomas Duff 
& Co and its managed mills, and then proceeding to a close study of instances when the 
reproduction of this rent extraction mechanism came under threat, with particular reference 
to three legal disputes which led the directors to reformulate the managing agency’s articles of 
association in order to retain control. Having identified the specific characteristics of the firm 
conditioning strategic decision making, the penultimate section of the chapter explores the 
firm’s relationships with other managing agents in the industry through the mediation of the 
Indian Jute Mills Association, and their motivation for assuming a prominent role within it. 
In conclusion, the analysis elaborates on what the implications are of conceptualising the 
institutional characteristics of this specific firm in evaluating the heuristic value of different 
approaches in the existing historiography of the firm in business history, which are concerned 
with merchants and multinationals, “family capitalism”, foreign investment and “free-standing 
companies”. 
 
                                                          
3
 Note on terminology. Unless stated, I refer to “Thomas Duff & Co” or “the firm” or “the group” 
interchangeably to represent the group of three companies whose directorates were more or less 
identical – Thomas Duff & Co, the managing agents, and the two mill companies they managed, the 
Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos, distinguished from the Victoria Co with its independent board of directors. 
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3.1 Overview, 1874-1921. 
 
Chapter 2 presented a comparative analysis of the performance of the different Calcutta 
managing agents in the jute industry. To recap, the evidence presented there established that 
Thomas Duff was consistently one of the most profitable managing agents and was able to 
achieve and maintain a large market share in a rapidly growing industry. 
The Samnuggur Co was launched in Dundee in 1874 with a share capital of £120,000 to 
construct a jute mill at Samnuggur 17 miles to the north of Calcutta.4 The mill initially had 200 
looms - 150 sacking looms and 50 hessian looms, growing incrementally to 458 looms - 260 
sacking looms and 198 hessian looms – on the eve of the first short time agreement of the 
Indian Jute Mills Association in 1885. Chakrabarty, citing Wallace, says of the Samnuggur 
Co’s directors that they possessed ‘contacts in the already-established world market 
for finished products of jute’: 
There is an element of irony in the fact that the eventual supremacy of the Calcutta mills (over their 
Dundee counterparts) owed a great deal, initially at least, to their Dundee connections. The 
Samnugger Jute Factory Company Limited (1874), which is credited [by Wallace] with having done 
for the Calcutta industry “more than all the other companies put together” in their search for new 
markets, was floated by four businessmen in Dundee: Thomas Duff, J.J.Barrie, and “the brothers 
Nicoll of A. and J.Nicoll.”
5
  
Wallace provides evidence of the initial breakthrough made by Thomas Duff in export markets 
in Australia, whereas existing mills had been limited to servicing demand in local and coastal 
markets: 
They got an opening into the Australian and New Zealand markets for cornsacks, woolpacks and 
hessian bran bags, the mill agents, without any organised combine, nursed this outlet by turning out 
                                                          
4
 See map locating Calcutta jute mills in D.R. Wallace, Romance of Jute (2
nd
 revised ed, 1928), p. 130. 
5
 Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working Class History, p. 24. 
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and stocking bigger and bigger quantities of goods in anticipation of the seasonal orders… The ‘Frisco 
central hessian wheat pocket demand was fostered in like manner.
6
 
Wallace also notes the transfer of technical expertise from Dundee embodied in the firm of 
Thomas Duff: 
They were particularly fortunate in their selection of an expert to conduct their business in the 
agents’…office. This gentleman, Mr.W.Smith, had forged his way from office boy in Messrs Cox 
Brothers, Lochee, to a confidential position with the firm. He was endowed with indomitable 
assurance and when he came to Calcutta had nothing to learn in the devious ways of jute. Backed by 
the practical experience and business connections of the home board in foreign markets, this 
company did more than all the companies put together to invade foreign markets.
7
 
James Robertson, the Samnuggur mill manager, also played a prominent role in the new firm 
and supervised the construction of the new Titaghur mill in 1883. In its first seven years of 
operating from 1876 to 1882, the Samnuggur Co made £175,000 in net profits after allowing 
for depreciation and £145,000 paid out in dividends, repaying the initial investment.8 In 
addition, £150,000 was accumulated in depreciation and reserve funds, which permitted the 
launch of the Titaghur Co in 1883 on the basis the issue of £105,000 of bonus shares to the 
existing shareholders of the Samnuggur Co.9  
Wallace states: 
In this crisis, which had been building since 1875 – when “the other mills languished or went to the 
wall” – the Samnugger Jute Mill with its overseas markets paid a steady dividend of 10 per cent per 
annum, besides building up a huge reserve fund, enabling them to present their shareholders with 
                                                          
6
 Wallace, Romance of Jute, (2
nd
 revised ed, 1928), pp. 43-44. 
7
 Wallace, Romance of Jute, pp. 36-37. 
8
 UDA, MS 86/1/1/1, MOTD, Annual Reports to the shareholders. 
9
 UDA, MS 86/1/6/1, Samnuggur Co, Memorandum and Articles of Association, amendment of 27 June 
1883, p. 47. 
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40 per cent bonus shares in a baby mill, the Titaghur, floated in 1883, which has grown to rive its 
father’s bonnet.
10
 
The formation of the Titaghur Co coincided with the launching of Thomas Duff & Co as a 
Calcutta managing agency, replacing Schoene, Kilburn & Co, which had acted as agents for the 
Samnuggur Co in Calcutta.11 Thomas Duff & Co’s was formed as a private limited company in 
Dundee, with a directorate composed of the senior directors of the Samnuggur Co. During this 
period, the directors of Samnuggur Co lost a protracted legal battle to prevent the 
construction of the Victoria Co in the same vicinity. The Victoria Co had been set up by a rival 
group of shareholders from Dundee but their legal victory was a pyrrhic one; in 1888, they 
concluded an agreement handing over the management of Victoria to Thomas Duff & Co.12 In 
the 1880s, Thomas Duff & Co became enthusiastic supporters of the short-time agreements 
organised by the IJMA, and played a prominent role within the Association. 
As trading conditions improved at the beginning of the 1890s, short time working was 
jettisoned and a renewed period of the expansion of productive capacity ensued, which was 
sustained, more or less, up to the beginning of the First World War. The loom capacity of the 
mills managed by Thomas Duff & Co increased from 200 in 1876 to nearly 5,000 by 1920, five 
times that of Cox Brothers in Dundee.13 Thomas Duff & Co were particularly effective amongst 
the Calcutta mills in developing new markets which permitted them to pioneer a higher 
gearing towards hessian production, constituting 60% of looms by 1905.14 
  
                                                          
10
 Wallace, The Romance of Jute, p. 37. 
11
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 22 May 1883, p. 256. 
12
 MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, 31 Oct 1888, p. 47. 
13
 For Cox Brothers, see Mark Watson, “Jute Manufacturing: A Study of Camperdown Works, Dundee”, 
Industrial Archaeology Review, 10.2, Spring 1988, pp. 175-192, and in Mark Watson, Jute and Flax Mills 
in Dundee (Tayport, 1990), pp. 139-143. 
14
 Watson, ibid. 
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Table 3.1: Thomas Duff & Co, Growth of Productive Capacity, Total Looms. 
Year Samnuggur Titaghur Victoria Total Hessian % 
1876 200     200 0% 
1880 313     313 45% 
1885 415 250   665 29% 
1890 458 260 168 886 22% 
1895 560 425 374 1,359 37% 
1900 560 779 600 1,939 49% 
1905 922 780 937 2,639 60% 
1910 943 1,718 1,053 3,714 64% 
1915 1,572 1,718 1,053 4,343 66% 
1920 1,952 1,718 1,053 4,723 68% 
Sources: Statements of Calcutta looms, Dundee Yearbook; IJMA Annual Reports from 1905. 
 
The structure of the group of companies remained formally unchanged from 1883 with the 
inception of Thomas Duff & Co up to 1918, although this masked important incremental trends 
in the content of the principal-agent relationships, and in the distribution of shareholdings. 
These quantitative changes assumed a critical mass which led to the qualitative transformation 
of the relationship with the Victoria Co in 1918 with the signing of a new agency agreement, 
and changes in its directorate, which formally absorbed it into the Thomas Duff & Co group 
and did away with its remaining autonomy, as embodied by the different personnel of its 
Dundee directors up to that point.15 
Therefore, the evolution of the firm ensured that the firm’s Dundonian identity was preserved. 
The career track from general manager in Calcutta to a seat on the board in the Dundee 
ensured that the managerial hierarchy that was developed became highly functional to 
reproducing strategic direction from Dundee, with periodic infusions of new blood from 
Calcutta. The promotion of general managers from Calcutta was supplemented by the 
incorporation into the directorate of the founders of R Sim & Co, of Naraingunge, the firm’s 
principal suppliers of raw jute, Robert Sim and John Smith, William Smith’s brother.16 This 
                                                          
15
 UDA, MS 86/5/1/3, Thomas Duff & Co, p. 357, MOTD, 5 Feb, 1918; MS 86/2/1/4, Victoria Co, p. 18, 
MOTD, Shareholders’ AGM, 10 May 1918. 
16
 MS 86/1/1/6, Samnuggur Co, p. 64, Minute of AGM, 8 Mar 1899; MS 86/1/1/8, Samnuggur Co, p. 141, 
Minute of AGM, 5 Mar 1902. 
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managerial hierarchy was important because it was compatible with the firm’s success at 
developing a stable base of shareholders in Dundee, whose loyalty and passivity was secured 
by the payment of consistently high returns. This was demonstrated by the attachment of the 
directors to retaining their Dundee headquarters in the face of adverse changes in corporate 
taxation, which saw the firm become subjected first to double taxation in India and the UK in 
1902, then to excess profits duty during wartime that the Calcutta mills escaped for several 
years.
17
 These changes in taxation drove most of the London- and Glasgow-based Sterling mills 
to relist as rupee companies with a significant realignment of their shareholding base to the 
Calcutta capital market.
18
 
While Chapter 2 considered the comparative performance of the Calcutta mills, it is salient 
here to consider the performance of the Thomas Duff & Co group of firms compared to rival 
firms seeking investment funds in the Dundee capital market. Table 3.2 compares the 
performance of the Samnuggur & Titaghur Cos with two of the biggest jute manufacturers in 
Dundee, Cox Brothers and Gilroy, Sons & Co Ltd. Cox Brothers transformed itself from a family 
partnership to a private limited liability company in 1894 and was not really a competitor in 
the Dundee capital market until the floatation of the Jute Industries combine in 1920 but 
serves as a proxy representing the best returns available to jute manufacturers in Dundee 
during the period from 1875. Gilroy, Sons & Co Ltd was publicly listed as early as 1891. 
  
                                                          
17
 MS 86/5/1/2, Thomas Duff & Co, p. 194, 5 Nov 1902, p. 198, 23 Dec 1902; MS 86/1/1/15, Samnuggur 
Co, p. 479, 30 Nov 1915. 
18
 Investor’s India Year-Book, 1922 (Calcutta, 1922), Chapter on Jute, pp. 153-190. 
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Table 3.2: Comparison of capital* invested, net profits and long term profitability of Thomas 
Duff mills, (Samnuggur & Titaghur), relative to leading Dundee manufacturers, Cox Bros and 
Gilroy, Sons & Co Ltd (current prices), 1876-1913. – denotes missing data. 
Year 
*Estimates of capital 
invested, £, 000s 
Net profits, £, 000s 
Profitability, net profits, 
% return on capital 
invested 
Total 
dividends, % 
  Cox Gilroy Duff Cox Gilroy Duff Cox Gilroy Duff Gilroy Duff 
1876 693 
 
- 84 24 - 16 3% - 19% - 15% 
1877 693 
 
- 121 8 - 30 1% - 25% - 15% 
1878 693 
 
- 150 36 - 31 5% - 21% - 15% 
1879 693 
 
- 150 12 - 22 2% - 15% - 10% 
1880 693 
 
- 150 54 - 37 8% - 25% - 15% 
1881 693 
 
- 150 66 - 60 10% - 40% - 15% 
1882 693 - 150 45 - 71 7% - 47% - 20% 
1883 693 
 
- 150 62 - 37 9% - 24% - 15% 
1884 693 
 
- 298 93 - -1 13% - 0% - 0% 
1885 693 
 
- 305 43 - -3 6% - -1% - 0% 
1886 693 
 
- 305 29 - 1 4% - 0% - 0% 
1887 693 
 
- 317 42 - 42 6% - 13% - 8% 
1888 693 
 
- 324 55 - 70 8% - 22% - 14% 
1889 693 
 
- 328 90 - 53 13% - 16% - 10% 
1890 693 
 
- 328 70 - 48 10% - 15% - 10% 
1891 693 
 
325 349 12 25 68 2% 8% 19% 8% 12% 
1892 693 
 
325 363 58 38 46 8% 12% 13% 8% 9% 
1893 693 
 
325 391 15 -9 42 2% -3% 11% 3% 7% 
1894 693 
 
325 397 38 -18 35 5% -5% 9% 2% 6% 
1895 - 325 472 - 6 70 - 2% 15% 1% 11% 
1896 - 325 553 - 25 37 - 8% 7% 3% 5% 
1897 - 325 532 - 4 48 - 1% 9% 3% 6% 
1898 - 325 591 - 7 80 - 2% 14% 3% 9% 
1899 - 325 594 - 10 84 - 3% 14% 3% 9% 
1900 - 325 610 - 96 86 - 29% 14% 23% 9% 
1901 - 325 612 - 7 109 - 2% 18% 4% 9% 
1902 - 325 733 - 3 99 - 1% 14% 3% 9% 
1903 - 325 739 - 3 73 - 1% 10% 3% 7% 
1904 - 325 743 - -12 104 - -4% 14% 1% 9% 
1905 - 325 927 - 1 111 - 0% 12% 1% 8% 
1906 - 325 1,101 - 16 121 - 5% 11% 5% 8% 
1907 - 325 1,155 - 15 196 - 5% 17% 5% 9% 
1908 - 325 1,180 - -6 197 - -2% 17% 1% 9% 
1909 - 325 1,186 - -6 147 - -2% 12% 1% 9% 
1910 - 325 1,190 - -6 101 - -2% 9% 1% 9% 
1911 - 325 1,196 - -6 85 - -2% 7% 1% 9% 
1912 - 325 1,199 - 14 207 - 4% 17% 1% 10% 
1913 - 325 1,421 - 17 272 - 5% 19% 5% 12% 
Sources: * Estimate of Cox Bros’ capital is based on 1893 figure for the partners’ combined capital. This 
seems a reasonable approximation as loom capacity was virtually unchanged in the period 1876-93, 
according to Mark Watson, Jute and Flax Mills in Dundee (Tayport, 1990), Chapter 7. The figures for 
Gilroy and Duff are based on total capital invested in the form of equity and debentures, which 
approximates well to investment in fixed capital or “block” – land, buildings and machinery. 
UDA, MS 66/2/2/1, p.369; letter from Cox Brothers, Dundee, Letter book, 1869-94; UDA, MS 134-1-138, 
Lennox, p 138, Balance Sheet of Gilroy, Sons & Co Ltd, 1891-1905, MS 95-12-3 (5c), Gilroy Sons & Co Ltd, 
Directors’ Report 1913; MS 95-12-3 (8a), Gilroy Sons & Co Ltd, Report 1915; MS 86/1/1 Samnuggur Co 
and MS 86/3/1 Titaghur Co, MOTD, also MS 86/1/1/9, MS 86/1/5/1-18 Samnuggur Co and MS 
86/3/5/5/1-23 Titaghur Co, Annual Reports & Balance Sheets. 
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The table demonstrates that the Thomas Duff & Co mills were much more profitable than the 
two Dundee firms. For the period 1876-94, Cox Brothers’ averaged net profits relative to 
capital invested of 6%, or a third of the combined result of 17% for the Samnuggur Co and 
Titaghur Co. Coxes’ profits averaged £44,000 - compared to £37,000 for Samnuggur and 
Titaghur on a much smaller invested capital. For the period 1891-1913, Gilroy, Sons & Co Ltd 
average profitability was 3%, compared to 14% for Samnuggur and Titaghur. This was reflected 
in the rate of return to shareholders, 4% for Gilroys, compared to 9% for Samnuggur and 
Titaghur. Thus, Gilroys was frequently in arrears in meeting the dividend on their 6% 
preference shares and only paid out an ordinary dividend in three years during this period, 
while their investment in fixed capital stagnated. Meanwhile, Samnuggur and Titaghur were 
able to secure a stable and high return to their shareholders on a capital that had increased 
from being approximately the same size as Gilroys in 1891 to one over four times as large in 
1913. 
 
The Samnuggur Co - Pioneer of Export Markets? 
Data detailing the distribution of sales amongst the Calcutta mills in different markets could 
not be obtained for this early period of the industry’s development.19 What evidence exists to 
support Wallace’s contention that the Samnuggur directors pioneered the industry’s 
breakthrough into key export markets such as the trades for Australian cornsacks and 
                                                          
19
 The available annual Report of the Committee of the Indian Jute Mills Association from 1904 were 
consulted by the author at the Bengal Chamber of Commerce in December 2011. From 1908, these 
reports republish a series collated by the gunny broker HC Bose, “Actual Clearances of Jute Fabrics to all 
places during 12 months ending December” that details the shippers’ share contracted for in the 
Calcutta market, which gives an indirect indication of the share of different managing agents in various 
markets. It is unclear whether earlier IJMA reports published similar data. However, even the later data 
appear to exclude direct sales made overseas. Thomas Duff & Co only appears as a shipper during the 
war years, presumably due to the exigencies of booking freight, which was rationed between producers 
at this time. 
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Californian wheatbags?20 As has been detailed above, Joseph Barrie brought to the Samnuggur 
directorate a family tie to Charles Barrie and William Ovenstone, ships’ captains with extensive 
knowledge of the Calcutta trade and of the shipping business pioneered by Gilroys as an 
extension of its jute manufacturing operations in Dundee, which encompassed the routes 
linking Calcutta, Dundee, Australia, New York and San Francisco. Table 3.3 below collates 
information given in the minutes of the directors about trading relationships established from 
Dundee during the first few years of the firm’s operations. The year given indicates the first 
instance of a trading relationship being established with a particular merchant. 
Table 3.3: Transactions arranged by the Dundee directors of Samnuggur with merchants in 
export markets, 1875-80. 
Year Firm UK Branch Market Product Lines 
1875 John Blyth  London Melbourne Cornsacks 
1876 James Duncan  Dundee New York Hessians 
1876 R&D Lamb Dundee New York Hessians 
1877 James F White  Dundee New York Hessians 
1877 John L Lowson Dundee New York Hessians 
1877 D&J Fowler London Adelaide Cornsacks, bran bags 
1877 Pearson    Adelaide   
1878 Learmonth, Dickinson    Sydney Cornsacks 
1879 Thomas Anderson London Melbourne Woolpacks 
1879 A&J Nicoll Dundee Dundee   
1879 John A Lowson Arbroath Adelaide Woolpacks 
1880 James Duncan  Dundee New York Hessians 
1880 J & AD Grimond Dundee New York Hessians 
1880 D&W Murray London Adelaide Woolpacks 
1880 A&J Nicoll Dundee Australia? Woolpacks 
Source: MS 86/1/1/1 Samnuggur Co, MOTD. 
 
Once a trading relationship was established, this generally led to repeat transactions, although 
D&J Fowler & Co in Adelaide and Duncan, White and Lamb in New York appear to have been 
by far the most important trading partners. San Francisco is notable for its absence as a 
destination market that was established from Dundee. This is unsurprising as the orders 
arranged by the Dundee directors functioned to supplement sales made by the firm’s Calcutta 
agents, Schoene, Kilburn & Co. As San Francisco was a new market and shipments there from 
                                                          
20
 Wallace, The Romance of Jute, pp. 26-37. 
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Calcutta traversed the Pacific - rather than the Atlantic as was the case for Dundee shipments 
– this trade would have to be established from Calcutta. What is interesting about the trading 
relationships listed in Table 3.3 is that they demonstrate the way in which the Dundee 
directors were able to capture and utilise location specific commercial knowledge generated in 
Dundee to develop their Calcutta business. Nearly all of the merchants listed had established 
their operations in Australia and New York from a base in Dundee or the surrounding area. The 
only exceptions are Pearson, whose principals could not be identified and the Learmonths, 
who were large landowners in Australia, England and Scotland, who came from Stirlingshire. 
Moreover, in most cases, their business as merchants in the destination market dwarfed any 
residual link to manufacturing in Dundee. The exceptions were John A Lowson, whose business 
was obtained through Andrew Lowson, an Arbroath manufacturer, and Grimonds, who were 
large manufacturers at the Maxwelltown Works in Dundee. This meant that most of the 
trading partners were unconstrained by loyalty to Dundee – or a formal trading relationship as 
a subsidiary to a Dundee business - and were ready to do business that would undercut 
Dundee. 
The most important trading relationship in Table 3.3 was with D&J Fowler of Adelaide in the 
product line for Australian cornsacks which would become a perennial staple of Calcutta’s 
export business.21 The closeness of the relationship that developed was attested to both by its 
longevity, and by the fact that they were later given the formal appellation of “friends” – 
reserved for networked firms – when referred to in the minutes of the directors.22 By 1879, the 
frequency of transacting had led to the relationship being formalised in a joint venture, 
although this was not a typical mode of conducting business.23 
                                                          
21
 See IJMA, Report of the Committee, 1913, (Calcutta, 1914), p. 254, Statement XX, which shows that 
cornsacks and woolpacks remained the dominant product lines in sacking right up to 1913 - and 
Australia the dominant source of demand in these lines. 
22
 MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, p. 224, 8 Dec 1897. 
23
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 161, 30 Jun 1879. 
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The recent sales of cornsacks to Messrs D & J Fowler i.e. 1000 bales for “Star of Albion” [...], 
1000 bales for later ship [...], was unanimously approved of and it was decided to confirm the 
joint interest of the company in the business, 5% being the minimum charge for commission 
and guarantee in the event of the venture resulting in a loss. 
The importance to the firm of developing the Australian business is indicated by frequent 
references in their minutes to this area of work under the dedicated heading “Australian 
correspondence”, which also suggests that they employed Fowlers or other merchants as 
agents to look for opportunities to expand the business.24 In 1887, the deputy general 
manager in Calcutta, George Nairn made a special visit to Australia, with limited success: 
Nairn’s trip so far has been very disappointing. I have long been wondering why there were no 
telegrams from him asking quotations, and am surprised this morning to have a message from 
Colombo. He must have left Australia earlier than he at one time intended.
25
 
The discussion of transactions with New York is rather different in character. While trade to 
Australia seems to have become a core part of the business at an early stage, the New York 
market was Dundee’s most important established market, where the Dundee manufacturers 
enjoyed a substantial competitive advantage in freight costs relative to Calcutta. The 
transactions to New York referred to include completed sales of goods but also refer to 
frequent shipments on a consignment basis - "in the event of [the Calcutta agents] being short 
of orders" - to the New York merchants, who acted as agents on Samnuggur’s behalf in seeking 
to make sales in order to establish a reputation on the basis of price and quality for Calcutta 
goods there.26 The trading relationship with James Duncan – later renowned in Dundee for his 
wealth and the bequest of the Duncan of Jordanstone institution for technical education – was 
                                                          
24
 MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, p. 221, 10 Nov 1897. 
25
 MS 86/V/7/1a, Letters from William Smith, Calcutta, to Dundee, 23 Apr 1887. A further trip was made 
by Nairn in 1889; “It was also agreed to refund Mr Nairn the sum of £118-5, being the amount of his 
expenses in connection with his visit to Australia.” MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, p. 65, 24 Sep 
1889. 
26
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 101, 9 Oct 1877. 
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a close and lasting one. Duncan became a substantial shareholder in the Samnuggur and 
Titaghur Cos.27 The New York transactions refer to “hessians” generally but it is not clear 
whether this referred mainly to the hessian cloth that was the main product line sold to the 
Eastern Seaboard throughout the period of study. It is possible that these orders included San 
Francisco wheatbags and that the trade in this product line commenced as an extension of the 
New York trade before San Francisco established direct shipping connections with Calcutta and 
Dundee. The lack of references to San Francisco in the Dundee directors’ minutes does not 
discount Wallace’s hypothesis about the importance of Samnuggur in developing this vital 
product line for the Calcutta industry.28 A minute from May, 1876, states “Mr W[illiam] Smith 
presently with the Messrs. Cox Brothers here was engaged as commercial assistant to the 
managing agents at Calcutta for three years” on a competitive basic salary of Rs700 a month 
and an additional performance-based “commission of 2½ % on the dividends paid to the 
shareholders, with free quarters at Samnuggur”.29 Thus, the terms of the Samnuggur Co’s 
agreement with Schoene, Kilburn & Co to act as their managing agents in Calcutta permitted 
them to recruit their own agent to work in the managing agents’ office there. Smith’s obituary 
observes that he “served his apprenticeship in the offices of Messrs Cox Brothers, and, by dint 
of special aptitude and ability, rose to the important position of confidential assistant to the 
late Mr Thomas H Cox.”30 Smith would certainly have learnt about the American market in this 
role; Thomas H Cox’s letters frequently refer to such matters during the period that Smith 
worked for him.31 It is therefore plausible that he was in a position to use this knowledge to 
                                                          
27
 Lists of share issues in MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, Minute of Emergency Special General Meeting, 
pp. 261-6, 27 Jun 1883; MS 86/3/1/4, Titaghur Co, MOTD, pp. 416-21, 19 May 1897. 
28
 The first specific reference to “Friscos” appears only in 1885 in the Dundee minutes, MS 86/1/1/2, 
Samnuggur Co, p. 61 4 Nov 1885 
29
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, p. 35. 16 May 1876. 
30
 Thomas H Cox was the senior partner of the firm. “Death of Calcutta Jute Manager”, Dundee Courier, 
8 Jul 1893. 
31
 The personal connection is confirmed by a private letter of Smith from Calcutta: “I met Mr Thomas 
[Cox] and Mr Sharp at – don’t start – the races on Saturday afternoon and had a long chat with them. 
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develop a connection between Calcutta and San Francisco, possibly using Charles Barrie’s and 
William Ovenstone’s shipping connections with that port. 
Some of William Smith’s correspondence concerning commercial matters in Calcutta to the 
directors in Dundee has survived from the period from 1887 to 1890 – particularly for a few 
months in 1890 – when there was intense price competition between Calcutta mills in 
obtaining export orders. His observations corroborate the argument that Thomas & Duff & 
Co’s mills had developed an advantage in export markets relative to the other Calcutta mills. In 
August, 1890, he refers to the fact that “Fowlers have evidently bought their 1000 bales past 
us”, referring to the erosion of the established relationship with D&J Fowler, and went on to 
observe: 
Please bear in mind that it is an absolute necessity for us to retain our Australian connection, and not 
lose one. As I have said buyers here naturally discriminate against us, being their strongest 
opponents, and we must in a manner be independent of local Australian orders [i.e. purchases in 
Calcutta for export]. I don’t say but that we shall get a big share, as our influence with brokers is very 
strong, but we must not allow ourselves to be cut out in Australia and be reduced to the position of 
depending on local orders alone. This would never do.
32
 
As well as indicating the position of Thomas Duff & Co’s mills in export markets, this quotation 
is interesting because it indicates that the firm was making direct sales in competition with 
orders placed in Calcutta. Evidence is scarce to demonstrate how the mechanism for direct 
sales operated, but data collected in relation to Charles Barrie’s activities as a shipping agent in 
Dundee suggests that this would have been the most plausible route by which direct sales 
were made. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
They visit us tomorrow. Mr Thomas is turning very old in appearance. He was most cordial, and seemed 
pleased & delighted to see me.” MS 86/V/7/1a, Thomas Duff & Co, Private official letters from Calcutta, 
1888-1890; private letter from William Smith to David Stewart, Secretary of Thomas Duff & Co., Dundee, 
27
th
 December, 1887. 
32
 MS 86/V/7/1a, Letters from William Smith, Calcutta, to Dundee, 10
 
Aug 1890. 
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Table 3.4 below demonstrates that Barrie developed a substantial business as an agent earning 
commission on shipments of raw jute from Calcutta to Dundee from 1883. The table is broken 
down by purchaser, ranked in descending order by the size of the average order of jute in 
bales. The biggest 12 purchasers are given, followed by selected purchasers - Luke, Nicoll, 
Wybrants, Barrie, Robertson, Smith of Alyth - who were also directors of Samnuggur, Titaghur 
and Victoria, indicating the existence of informal networking relationships. The rank order is 
also given for total purchases and for the frequency of transactions. It is notable that Joseph 
Barrie, (in bold in the table), ranked seventh in terms of frequency of transactions, out of all 
proportion to his market share. This suggests that there was an informal networked 
relationship between the brothers, which is supported by the information presented about his 
later shareholdings in Barrie’s own ships. 
 
Table 3.4: Charles Barrie agency ships, transactions with Dundee jute merchants & 
manufacturers, 1883-1900, selected, in descending order by average bales purchased. 
Name 
Ave 
bales 
No of 
trans-
actions 
Total 
bales 
Ave 
bales 
rank 
No of 
trans-
actions 
rank 
Total 
bales 
rank 
Ralli Bros agency 2,548 9 22,936 1 46 7 
Gilroy, Sons & Co Ltd 2,298 17 39,074 2 18 3 
Cox Bros Ltd 2,087 22 45,904 3 11 1 
J & AD Grimond 1,863 24 44,706 4 8 2 
Baxter Bros & Co Ltd 1,731 16 27,692 5 22 5 
Alexander Gibson Morgan 1,454 5 7,268 6 67 39 
John Sharp & Sons 1,423 13 18,499 7 32 11 
TS Ross & Co 1,299 14 18,183 8 29 13 
Henry Smith & Co 1,244 18 22,398 9 16 8 
Kinmond, Luke & Co 1,167 10 11,673 10 42 23 
Fleming, Douglas & Co 1,157 26 30,080 11 4 4 
JA Luke 1,150 3 3,450 12 78 61 
A&J Nicoll 817 10 8,167 25 43 32 
DW Wybrants & Co 790 14 11,064 28 31 24 
JJ Barrie & Co 665 25 16,631 37 7 14 
James Robertson & Co Ltd 533 6 3,198 47 63 63 
David Smith & Sons, Alyth 411 11 4,525 68 41 53 
Source; “Goods entered at Custom House Yesterday”, Dundee Courier. 
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By the late 1890s, Barrie’s agency business comprised a significant proportion of the jute 
imported into Dundee, as shown in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5: Charles Barrie, agency business for jute imported to Dundee from Calcutta. 
Season Ships 
Barrie- 
owned 
Ships 
Total 
bales 
% total 
jute 
exports 
to UK 
1893-94 4 
 
57,012 3.7% 
1894-95 3 
 
59,080 3.3% 
1895-96 5 1 104,695 5.2% 
1896-97 9 
 
178,260 10.0% 
1897-98 11 1 228,008 10.8% 
1898-99 5 1 84,950 6.1% 
Source; “Latest Movements of Dundee Jute Fleet”, Dundee Courier. Figures for jute exports calculated 
from IJMA, Report of the Committee, 1908, Statement X, "Exports of Jute... " collated by HC Bose , p172. 
Barrie’s agency business would have generated information beyond the raw jute market, as 
ships in the Calcutta trade did not simply make a round trip between Dundee and Calcutta, but 
also traded with Calcutta’s export markets. The infrequency with which his own fleet of ships 
traded in raw jute may indicate that he was also trading in jute manufactures. There is also 
more direct evidence of Barrie’s and other shippers’ connection to Thomas Duff & Co. 
A letter from Smith in 1890 seeks to develop the shipping connection in Calcutta with respect 
to agency business that must have been a spin off from connections established through direct 
sales of manufactures: 
“Loch Line”. You will see we have their third steamer fixed, and very probably will have the fourth 
before the season closes. Now this business pays, and at same time is easy and light for our staff, 
and also gives us a good position in the market. Could you not increase this line of business? And 
could Mr Barrie not be influenced to send all his ships consigned to us, or rather make us agents for 
his ships exactly the same way as the Loch Line people are doing, and evidently they are very well 
pleased with our services.
33
 
                                                          
33
 MS 86/V/7/1a, Letters from William Smith, Calcutta, to Dundee, 27 Oct 1890. 
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An informal relationship developed later with Charles Barrie to provide credit facilities to his 
Den line of steamers in Calcutta: “[The] Calcutta office had paid about £1250 on behalf of the 
steamer “Den of Ogil” belonging to this firm [Charles Barrie & Son], and it was reported that 
they [Charles Barrie & Son] had refunded this amount at the office here.34 Charles Barrie was 
one of the most frequent attendees at Annual General Meetings of the shareholders of the 
Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos from 1895 and he was given a stake as a shareholder in Thomas 
Duff & Co from 1901.
35
 
Another example of the importance of the Barrie-Ovenstone shipping network to Thomas Duff 
& Co as a source of commercial information was the introduction they received to John Darling 
& Co, who became their most important Australian trading partner, in the late 1880s. The 
introduction was made through the Barries’ brother-in-law William Ovenstone; “It was agreed 
to pay Captain Ovenstone a further sum of £150 in full of honorarium for having been the 
means of introducing the business of Messrs John Darling & Sons to the Company.”36 
A final observation relating to the information in the table above is that the Nicolls placed two 
orders during this period. This is suggestive in that Thomas Duff & Co were later quite 
successful at using their Dundee contacts to enter the UK market, according to HC Bose’s data 
in the annual reports of the IJMA.37 However, sales to the UK were not systematic in this 
earlier period and the 1880 order was specifically for “Australian woolpacks”.
38
 It is therefore 
more likely that the Nicolls occasionally drew on their Samnuggur connection to make up 
shortfalls in their own output to meet orders. Later references to purchases by JJ Barrie & Co 
                                                          
34
 MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, p. 198, 23 Dec 1902. 
35
 MS 86/5/1/2, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, 27 Mar 1901, p. 121. 
36
 MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, p. 65, 24 Sep 1889. 
37
 Thomas Duff & Co ranked second only to Bird, with a 11% share of exports to the UK market in 1917, 
when the circumstances of the war entailed them shipping goods on their own account, H.C. Bose & Co, 
“Actual Clearances of Jute Fabrics to all Places in the Six Months to End of June 1917”, published in 
IJMA, Report of the Committee, 1917, p. 283. 
38
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 3 Jun 1880, p. 188. 
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were probably initially of a similar nature. In terms of new markets not referred to by Wallace, 
a flurry of correspondence around 1883 indicates that Thomas Duff & Co made an early entry 
into the Egyptian market using merchant intermediaries with a Dundee branch office such as 
Moore & Weinberg.
39
 
 
 
 
3.2 The Making of a Managing Agency; From the Samnuggur Co to 
Thomas Duff & Co, 1874-88. 
 
As indicated above, the firm structure only assumed its mature form in 1888 when, Thomas 
Duff & Co gained the agency business of the Victoria Co. The firm structure from 1888 
remained essentially unchanged up to 1918, when the Victoria Co was effectively absorbed as 
an independent entity into the Thomas Duff group, as their directorates, managerial hierarchy 
and shareholders became indistinguishable. In the period from 1874 to 1888, on the other 
hand, substantial changes were made in the firm structure. A new mill company, the Titaghur 
Co, was formed in 1883 and the learning process of the Samnuggur directors from 1874 
culminated in their decision to jettison the agency agreement with Schoene, Kilburn & Co, in 
order to manager Samnuggur and Titaghur themselves through their own managing agency, 
Thomas Duff & Co. The latter gained its first external business in 1888 when the directors of its 
Dundee rival, the Victoria Co, handed over the agency for running the business in Calcutta. 
Although it is not intended to pre-empt the more detailed discussion of the long term 
evolution of the firm’s capital structure and the composition of the firm’s shareholders that 
follows, it is pertinent here to examine who the original shareholders of the Samnuggur Co 
                                                          
39
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 5 Nov 1884, p. 403. 
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were. Shares of a nominal value of £121,200 were issued in 1874, which was increased to 
£150,000 at the end of 1876, and fully paid up by 1878. 
Table 3.6: Original shareholders of the Samnuggur Co, 1876. 
Shareholders 
£100 
shares 
Share 
“British Register” 
  Thomas Duff 495 33%
Alexander Nicoll 332 22% 
Joseph J Barrie 173 12% 
James Nicoll 62 4% 
William Mair 50 3% 
William Moir  37 2% 
Andrew Hendry 25 2% 
John Whytock 25 2% 
David Halley 12 1% 
Peter Will 6 0.4% 
William Milne 6 0.4% 
Charles Kilburn & Henry Ward Kilburn 5 0.3% 
Edward Dunbar Kilburn & Francis Kilburn 4 0.3% 
Reverend James Mackay 4 0.3% 
John Alexander 2 0.1% 
“Indian Register”     
Edward Dunbar Kilburn 45 3% 
Charles Kilburn 27 2% 
Henry Francis Brown 25 2% 
Executors Walter R Brown 25 2% 
James Robertson 50 3% 
Alexander Mair 35 2% 
G[eorge] J[ameson] Scott 19 1% 
John Alexander 20 1% 
George Alexander 11 1% 
Robert Frain 2 0.1% 
Mr [William] Doig 2 0.1% 
Alexander Cook 1 0.1% 
British Register 1238 83% 
Indian Register 262 17% 
Total 1500 100% 
Source: MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 19 Dec 1876, p 60. 
 
Samnuggur remained in essence a private company despite taking the form of a public limited 
company - nearly all of the firm’s 27 shareholders were “insiders” with a direct business 
relationship to the company. The four directors Duff, Barrie and the Nicolls together controlled 
73% of the equity. 9% were taken up by the Kilburns and the Browns, partners in the managing 
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agents Schoene, Kilburn & Co.40 A further 9% were held by employees of the firm. William Moir 
was the firm’s banker as Dundee agent of the Bank of Scotland and later joined the 
directorate. Andrew Hendry was the firm’s solicitor. John Whytock was a Dundee jeweller and 
Alex Nicoll’s brother-in-law.41 David Halley was a former business partner of Joseph Barrie and, 
as the founder of the Dundee stock exchange from 1879, probably acted as a broker in share 
transfers as a market developed for them.42 Peter Will’s occupation is given in the Dundee 
Directory as “clerk, Ward Works”, the Nicolls’ Dundee mill. William Milne worked as a 
commercial assistant to Joseph Barrie, who acted as Secretary as well as a director of the new 
firm.43 The Reverend Mackay was a Minister of St Clements – the “Steeple” Church - on the 
Nethergate, and the uncle of William Smith, the Calcutta general manager.44 George Jameson 
Scott was a ship’s captain in Calcutta, the secretary of the India General Steam Navigation Co, 
and an intimate of the Bird brothers who formed Bird & Co, later becoming the first Chairman 
of their Union Jute Co.45 He probably had a business connection with Duff from the latter’s 
time at Barnagore in the early 1860s. William Doig, the brothers William and Alex Mair, John 
                                                          
40
 At its formation, the Samnuggur Co listed Charles Kilburn as a director, which is interesting in that it 
suggests that the principals in Dundee commenced the venture with an open mind as to the firm’s 
Dundonian or Indian identity and may have envisaged a more expansive role in the firm for the 
managing agents in Calcutta. In the event, Kilburn never attended a meeting of the directors and his 
directorship lapsed under the articles of association when he wasn’t issued with sufficient shares to 
qualify as a director. Another indication of this strategic openness is given by the presentation of the 
shareholder register with a distinctive classification for the Indian shareholders. This was rapidly 
dropped as the shareholder base of the firm expanded with Dundee providing the core of shareholders. 
On Kilburn’s directorship, see MS 86/1/1/1 Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 43, 2 Aug 1876. 
41
 John and Isabella Whytock, 1861 Census, Household Enumerator, Dundee Parish, ED 24, p. 7, Roll 
CSSCT1861_39. John Whytock, Inventory, SC 45/31/57, pp. 405-409, registered at Dundee Sheriff Court, 
26 Sep 1905, lists Alex Nicoll as his executor. 
42
 David Halley was listed in the Dundee Directory 1874-75 as a stockbroker in the firm of Halley & 
Yeaman, and , from 1876-77 onwards as a stockbroker working on his own account with a business 
address at 3 Royal Exchange Place. For the Dundee Stock Exchange, see R.C. Michie, Money, Mania and 
Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1981) 
43
 Dundee Directory 1874-75 (Dundee, 1874), p. 269. 
44
 Reverend James Mackay, 1871 Census, Household Enumerator, St Andrew Parish, ED 35, p. 39; Roll 
CSSCT1871_53; Dundee Directory 1871-72, individual listing, p. 151; “Marriages”, Dundee Courier, 8 Aug 
1889. 
45
 Harrison, Bird & Co, pp. 30-31. 
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Alexander and his son George were all skilled engineers or jute mill managers who had worked 
or continued to work in Calcutta and were connected to Duff through employment erecting 
and operating the Barnagore jute mill under his management.46 Similarly, Robert Frain, James 
Robertson and Alex Cook were recruited from Dundee to manage the new mill.47 Although no 
definitive list of the Samnuggur’s assistants from the time was obtainable, the placing of Doig 
and the Alexanders on the Indian register suggests that Duff was able to call on his old Calcutta 
connections to obtain the skills required to construct the new mill and to train the labour force 
in its first years of operation.48 
Most of the initial shareholders remained interested in the company and, as the equity grew to 
finance growth, their family members also took substantial shareholdings. It can be inferred 
that the hybrid nature of Samnuggur’s origins, understood in institutional terms, provided a 
stable structure. The Samnuggur Co was innovative in the Dundee business environment in the 
sense that it was one of the earliest jute manufacturers to adopt the ‘plc’ form of company 
structure. However, this was the typical structure adopted for a whole class of foreign 
investments emanating from Dundee at this time, both in shipping and in the investment 
trusts operating in North America. In the case of Samnuggur, the plc form served the function 
of pooling the surplus investment funds required to construct a jute mill to a minimum 
efficient scale in Calcutta. The scale of investment required was too large to be met by any one 
individual or family. On the other hand, the content of the business relationships embodied in 
Samnuggur as a public limited company still bore all the hallmarks of the “family capitalism” 
which was the typical company form in the Dundee business environment from which it 
emerged. The original investors in Samnuggur all had close family ties – or ties of loyalty and 
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“Letter to the editor. A Worthy Dundonian.”, 25 Aug 1896, p. 4; “Births, Marriages and Deaths”, 
Dundee Advertiser, 6 Apr 1864, p. 5; “Gilfillan Testimonial, Second Subscription List”, Dundee Evening 
Telegraph, 5 Oct 1877, p. 1; “Births, Marriages and Deaths”, Dundee Courier, 18 Nov 1907, p. 8. 
47
 MS 86/1/1/1, p. 7, p. 11, 16. 
48
 MS 86/1/1/1, p. 60. 
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trust based on employment relationships or repeated contracting. The social class and 
occupational background of a minority the shareholders is distinctive in its plebeian character, 
involving engineers and supervisory grades with an expertise in jute manufacturing. As 
discussed in more detail below, this became more pronounced over time. 
By the time the Titaghur Co was formed in 1883 by the issue of 70% bonus shares to the 
Samnuggur shareholders, the number of shareholders in the latter had only expanded from 27 
in 1876 to 46. The Titaghur bonus shares were issued in £10 denominations, and Samnuggur 
shares were reclassified from £100 to £10 when additional share capital was called up in 
1891.49 
The additional shareholders are shown in the Table 3.7 below. 
 
Table 3.7: Samnuggur shareholders in 1883 and bonus shares issued in Titaghur Co. 
New shareholder 
Samnuggur 
£100 
shares 
Titaghur 
£10 bonus 
shares 
% of 
company 
equity 
Robert Lowson Watson 45 315 3% 
William Smith 36 252 2% 
Ann McNab Robertson or Lindsay 15 105 1% 
James William Kibble 13 91 1% 
William Banks 10 70 1% 
James Brody Brechin executors 8 56 1% 
Isabella Whytock or Nicoll 8 56 1% 
Walter William Duff 5 35 0.3% 
Alexander Lindsay 5 35 0.3% 
Eleanor Whytock 4 28 0.3% 
William Mackie 4 28 0.3% 
John B[owman] Young 4 28 0.3% 
John Macfadyen 3 21 0.2% 
Helen Bennet Lennox 3 21 0.2% 
Jessie Bennet Lennox 3 21 0.2% 
David Mclaren Morrison 2 14 0.1% 
Robert Bower Ritchie 2 14 0.1% 
Ann Low Barrie 2 14 0.1% 
Elizabeth Dargie Barrie 2 14 0.1% 
Charles Barrie Ovenstone 2 14 0.1% 
Agnes Millar 2 14 0.1% 
John Henderson 2 14 0.1% 
Alexander Cochrane Scott 1 7 0.1% 
Total 181 1267 12% 
Source: MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p274, 1 Aug 1883. 
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 MS 86/1/1/3, Samnuggur Co, p. 339 24/7/91 
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In the period since 1876, none of the surviving shareholders had divested. Many of the new 
shareholders were family members of the existing shareholders, who had had shares 
transferred to them by their relatives. Ann McNab Lindsay was the sister of the Samnuggur mill 
manager, James Robertson, who had married the Dundee wholesale confectioner, William 
Lindsay, of the firm Lindsay & Low.50 Alex Nicoll’s wife and sister-in-law, Isabella and Eleanor, 
took shareholdings, as did his brother-in-law, James Brody Brechin.51 The Lennoxes had a 
brother who was married to the sister of Nicoll’s wife.52 Joseph Barrie transferred shares to his 
sisters, and to his nephew, who was his business partner in JJ Barrie & Co. New shareholders 
since the 1876 issue amongst the Samnuggur’s employees were William Smith, the newly 
promoted general manager, and Walter William Duff, the son of Thomas Duff, who had been 
sent out to the Calcutta office to learn the business.53 William Mackie was employed by the 
firm as a consulting engineer in Dundee.54 James William Kibble, David Mclaren Morrison and 
John Macfadyen, commercial assistants handling the Samnuggur’s business in Schoene, 
Kilburn’s Calcutta office, took shares, conforming to a pattern of cross-shareholding to cement 
business relationships.55 Robert Bower Ritchie’s shareholding seems not to have been 
construed as a conflict of interest with his role auditing the firm’s sterling accounts.56 
Alexander Cochrane Scott was a mill furnisher with business in India, who later became a 
director and Chairman of the mill companies. It is unclear whether there was any contracting 
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 See inventory and will of James Robertson Sr, SC 45/31/30, registered at Dundee Sheriff Court, 24 Mar 
1881, pp. 548-555, in which William Lindsay was named an executor. The “Alexander Lindsay” holding 5 
shares may have been his father. After his return from Calcutta, James Robertson replaced Lindsay on 
the board of directors of Lindsay & Low Ltd when he died in 1898; “Lindsay & Low Ltd”, Dundee Courier, 
2 Jun 1898. 
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 See reference to Brechin in inventory of David Nicoll, op cit. 
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 Dundee Census Records, 1871, household enumerators. 
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 Walter William Duff is referred to as “of Calcutta, British India, merchant” in the 1883 Articles of 
Association of Thomas Duff & Co, MS 86/5/6, 9 Aug 1883. 
54
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 238, 12 Jul 82, recounts a visit by Mackie with the directors 
Alex Nicoll and Thomas Duff to Pearce Brothers “to review progress of engine.” 
55
 Thacker’s Directory, 1879, (Calcutta, 1879), Schoene, Kilburn & Co listing, p. 302. 
56
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, p. 5, Minute of Annual General Meeting, 17 Sep 1874. 
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relationship between the firm and John Henderson, clerk to the Dundee jute merchant, Peter 
Matthew, or with Alexander Lindsay, a Dundee merchant.57 The shares held by Robert Lowson 
Watson, a wealthy distiller, and William Banks, a wholesale grocer, both local to Dundee, 
represent the embryo of a local base of shareholders with no direct relationship to the 
business through contracting or family ties that would ramify very rapidly in the following 
decade.58 
It is evident that the ownership of the firm rested on a narrow base during the first years of 
the firm’s existence but that the plc form left open the possibility of canvassing more widely 
for investible funds in capital markets in the future. However, it should be emphasized that the 
Articles of Association were drawn up in such a way that the directors had an effective veto on 
share transfers, preventing the possibility of a challenge to their control occurring through the 
transfer of shares between non-directors. This is embodied in Article 42: 
The board may decline to register any transfer of shares or stock upon which the company has a lien, 
and in case of shares, not fully paid up, may decline to register a transfer to any person of whom 
they do not approve, or who in their opinion is not shown to be a responsible person and that 
without stating any reason for such declinature.
59
 
In order to ensure that this provision was watertight, further Articles were drawn up relating 
to transfers through marriage. Article 51 stated “Provisions of 42 may apply to male 
shareholders attempting to acquire effective transfer through marriage”. A similar provision 
applied in article 59 to transfers through inheritance; “Directors have same right to refuse 
shares acquired through inheritance as with transfers.”60 
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 Dundee Directory, 1884, p. 193, p. 218. 
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 Ibid, p. 109, pp. 335-6. 
59
 MS 86/1/6/1, Memorandum and articles of association 1874 with special resolutions, 1883-1919. 
60
 Ibid. 
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The Formation of Thomas Duff & Co. 
The launch of Titaghur coincided with the formation of Thomas Duff & Co to replace Schoene, 
Kilburn & Co as the managing agents responsible for marketing the mills’ output in Calcutta. 
Thomas Duff & Co was formed as a limited liability company with a nominal share capital of 
£50,000 but was effectively a private company.61 The company’s address was given as 10 
Panmure St, Joseph Barrie’s business premises in the centre of Dundee, the same as for 
Samnuggur and Titaghur. The directorate was identical with that of Samnuggur and Titaghur – 
still the founding directors Duff, Barrie and the Nicolls. Shareholdings were allocated to the 
firm’s chief agents in Calcutta, the general manager William Smith, the mill manager James 
Robertson, and Thomas Duff’s son Walter William. 200 shares of £100 were allocated broadly 
in proportion with the directors existing stakes in Samnuggur and Titaghur: 
 
Table 3.8: Original shareholders of Thomas Duff & Co, 1883. 
Shareholders Shares 
Thomas Duff 70 
Alexander Nicoll 48 
Joseph Johnston Barrie 30 
William Smith 20 
James Nicoll 12 
James Robertson 10 
Walter William Duff 10 
Total 200 
Source: MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, 30 Aug 1883, p2. 
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 MS 86/V/6, Thomas Duff & Co, Memoranda and Articles of Association, p. 26A. A special resolution of 
25 June 1908 amended the Articles in the light of changes in British company law to opt out of the 
provisions for public limited companies of the Board of Trade order of 30 June 1906 for table A in First 
Schedule of Companies Act 1862 and stated: “The company is hereby declared to be a private company, 
the number of members of the company (exclusive of persons who are in the employment of the 
company) shall not at any time exceed fifty.” 
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The new firm’s Articles of Association embodied a 20 year managing agency agreement with 
Samnuggur and Titaghur, Thomas Duff & Co to be paid a 3% commission on the invoiced sales 
of the managed mills.62 
How did Schoene, Kilburn & Co come to be replaced by Thomas Duff & Co? Clearly, it was 
desirable, from the point of view of the Samnuggur’s original directors, that they should 
capture the income stream being paid to Schoene, Kilburn & Co. Their close attention to the 
recruitment of William Smith as their agent in Calcutta was consistent with this goal – 
permitting Smith to acquire the knowledge and contacts over a period of time working in 
Schoene, Kilburn’s Calcutta office that would be necessary to set up a new agency. It appears 
that Thomas Duff’s knowledge of the Calcutta market was insufficient to do this from the 
outset of the Samnuggur Co’s existence. Duff, as manager of the Barnagore mill and the 
Borneo Co’s agent, had been able to rely on the merchanting infrastructure of Hendersons in 
Calcutta, Glasgow and London. In any case, his knowledge of Calcutta would have been out of 
date by 1874 in a rapidly changing market. 
References in the Samnuggur Co’s Minutes of the Directors to the content of the agency 
agreement with Schoene, Kilburn & Co are rare. Neither the rate of commission paid nor the 
duration of the agreement was recorded. The Samnuggur Co directors superior knowledge of 
jute manufacturing was indicated by their close attention to directing their Calcutta agents: 
It was resolved to request the Calcutta agents to give their opinion of the engines after they had 
been tested etc as a guide as to the ordering of the machinery required for the remaining half of the 
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 For the rate of commission, see MS 86/1/1/7, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 124 17 Oct 1900; MS 
86/1/1/7, Samnuggur Co, minute of AGM, p. 215, 6 Mar 1901. MS 86/V/6, Thomas Duff & Co, 
Memoranda and Articles of Association, Article 3, p. 4: “The company hereby adopts a contract and 
agreement entered into, of date the 4
th
 day of June 1883, between William Smith, of Calcutta, 
merchant, on behalf of this then proposed new company on the first part, The Samnuggur Jute Factory 
Company, Limited, on the second part, and Alexander Nicoll, of Dundee, merchant, on behalf of a then 
proposed new company to be called the Titaghur Jute Factory Company, Limited, on the third part, 
whereby this company is appointed managing agents in Calcutta of the said two other companies on the 
terms stated in the said contract and agreement, which has been or is to be filed along with these 
articles with the registrar of joint stock companies.” 
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work. It was also decided to suggest to them what class of goods should be made at the 
commencement[.]
63
 
The Samnuggur directors’ apparent dissatisfaction with their agents’ handling of a land 
purchase to extend the mill compound was used as a pretext to end the agreement.64 A year’s 
notice was given by the Samnuggur directors to Schoene, Kilburn & Co, of their intention to 
terminate the agreement in August, 1881.65 William Smith assumed power of attorney on 
behalf of Samnuggur in Calcutta.66 Schoene, Kilburn’s attempts to retain the agency, 
presumably by offering improved terms, were unsuccessful.67 This decision was initially 
justified in terms of economy: “the directors have effected a considerable saving by now 
having the business of the company conducted at 15 Clive Row by their own staff under the 
superintendence of Mr William Smith as general manager.”68 It is possible that the terms of the 
agreement with Schoene, Kilburn & Co were more onerous than the 3% agreed with Thomas 
Duff & Co. On the other hand, the duplication of the managerial hierarchy entailed in the 
formation of Thomas Duff & Co may have been hard to justify to prospective shareholders of 
the Samnuggur Co. This may explain the motivation for the decision to form Titaghur Co as a 
separate company from Samnuggur although their shareholders and directorate were identical 
and they were, to all intents and purposes, the same company. By forming two mill companies, 
it created the illusion of a new managing agency managing multiple mill companies, and a 
brand identity for Thomas Duff & Co to position itself to take over or create new mill 
companies in Calcutta in the future. 
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 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 21, 24 Aug 1875. 
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 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 117, 25 Mar 1878; “The directors have no hesitation in saying 
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The final aspect of the formalisation of a more differentiated managerial hierarchy under the 
Thomas Duff & Co banner lay in the creation of a separate role for the Company Secretary 
managing the firm’s Dundee office, which Joseph Barrie had combined with his director’s 
responsibilities up to this point. David Stewart, a banker and accountant, had gained seven 
years experience as assistant to William Mackenzie, Secretary of the Alliance Trust.69 He acted 
simultaneously as Secretary to Thomas Duff & Co, the Samnuggur Co and the Titaghur Co, 
handling all the firm’s correspondence with Calcutta with a small team of clerks from the firm’s 
office at 84 Commercial St.70 While the general manager and his staff in Calcutta became 
salaried employees of Thomas Duff & Co, the duplication of function in the Dundee office was 
made apparent through the periodic renegotiation of the distribution of the costs of 
maintaining it between the three firms. Thomas Duff & Co initially paid the whole costs of 
maintaining the office but by 1885, the Samnuggur Co had agreed to pay half of “the salaries 
and general office expenses”, Titaghur paying 30%, and Thomas Duff & Co 20%.71 In 1887, 
Thomas Duff & Co were at pains to reduce the burden on the managed mills, which had failed 
to pay a dividend for three years running from 1884-1886. At the Samnuggur AGM, it was 
noted: 
The commission paid to the managing agents for the past year barely covers the expenses for the 
management of the mill but as there was a small surplus over from the previous years they have 
rebated a sum sufficient to allow the directors the minimum fee to which they are entitled under the 
company’s articles for the past year.
72
 
Consider what is being said here. The “expenses for the management” would be considered as 
a normal cost in a more typical firm structure where these would be internalised within the 
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 “Monifieth Ex-Provost. Death of Mr David Stewart.”, obituary, Scotsman, 9 Dec 1931, p. 8. 
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firm. It is implied that the rebate referred to was a generous gesture on the part of Thomas 
Duff & Co to the Samnuggur directors. In effect, because the directorates were identical, this 
generosity amounted simply to a reclassification of an income stream to the same individuals. 
The example is suggestive because it points to the duplicative aspect of the managing agency 
structure. Nominally, Indian managing agencies were paid by the companies that appointed 
them to provide a service – management. However, in the case of Thomas Duff & Co, as with 
many other Calcutta managing agents, the duplication of personnel represented both amongst 
the directors or partners in the managing agency, as well as in the directorates of the managed 
firms, entailed a multiplication of income streams claimed by those individuals. Thus, from 
1883, Duff, Barrie and the Nicolls were receiving a dividend and a director’s fee from each of 
Thomas Duff & Co, the Samnuggur Co and the Titaghur Co when the work performed for each 
was more or less identical. This logic needs to be pursued further, though, to explain the 
function of a managing agency. The logic was more than a duplication of perquisites. The 
income streams from the managing agency commissions were in fact large income streams 
comparable in scale to that paid to the shareholders in the form of dividends – “a good 
dividend in themselves”73 – and more stable than dividends because they were based on sales 
revenue. In most cases in Calcutta, the historical sequencing of firm entry into the jute industry 
ran from a pre-existing mercantile firm of managing agents promoting a new mill company. 
The reversal of this sequencing in the case of Thomas Duff & Co vis a vis the Samnuggur Co –– 
throws into relief the essence of the managing agency form lying behind the appearance of 
equal exchange and a firm choosing to buy a service, management, from another firm through 
contracting instead of internalising it within the firm. 74 It is notable that the Samnuggur Co 
was effectively managed without any managing agency from 1881-1883. After the managing 
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 Lamb Collection, Dundee City Library, “The Victoria Jute Company Limited; Prospectus. 1883.” 
(Printed for Private Circulation), p. 2, 31 Jan 1883. 
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 Casson, ‘Institutional Diversity in overseas enterprise; explaining the free-standing company'. 
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agency contract with Schoene, Kilburn was terminated, the role of marketing the Samnuggur’s 
output devolved on the commercial manager in Calcutta, William Smith. The essence of 
Thomas Duff & Co was that it embodied the monopoly of scarce information held by the 
collective of Duff, Barrie, the Nicolls, Smith and Robertson required to manufacture jute 
profitably in Calcutta. Their privileged access to this information was concretised into a 
privileged income stream. Table 3.9 below demonstrates the scale of the privilege involved – 
comparing the total return on the directors’ investment in the mill companies to the shares 
they held with the return as directors of the managing agency. 
 
Table 3.9: Comparison of Samnuggur Co and Thomas Duff & Co, average annual dividends on 
paid up share capital to shareholders, (includes Samnuggur preference dividend from 1900). 
Decade 
Samnuggur 
Co 
Thomas Duff 
& Co 
1883-1890 7% 56% 
1891-1900 9% 192% 
1901-1910 9% 176% 
1911-1920 20% 106% 
Source: MS 86/1/1/1-18, Samnuggur Co, reports to AGMs; MS 86/5/1-4, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, 
reports to AGMs. 
 
To appreciate the scale of the returns to Thomas Duff & Co – and the capital requirements of 
their actual rather than their fictitious “expenses” - it should be noted that by 1899, only 
£5,000 had been paid up on a nominal share capital of £50,000. This rose to a mere £12,500 in 
1911. The share capital was only fully paid up in 1915, presumably because of the credit 
conditions pertaining during wartime forced the firm to start shipping goods on their own 
account.75 Table 3.9 compares the average annual rate of dividend on a decadal basis of the 
Samnuggur Co with Thomas Duff & Co. The rate of return was an order of magnitude larger for 
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 According to records published in IJMA annual reports Thomas Duff & Co started appearing as 
significant shippers of jute fabrics during this period but had withdrawn again after the war. See H.C. 
Bose & Co, “Actual Clearances of Jute Fabrics to all Places in the Six Months to End of June 1917”, 
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Thomas Duff & Co than for Samnuggur Co throughout. Low profits in the 1880s meant that 
initially the Thomas Duff & Co directors exercised restraint in paying a dividend. Throughout 
the 1890s and 1900s, the rate of return was twenty times larger on a very small paid up share 
capital. High dividends paid out by the mill companies in the wartime decade of the 1910s, 
(combined with an increase in the paid up capital of the managing agency), reduced the 
differential during this period. 
Table 3.10 below demonstrates how the actual dividends paid to named directors compared 
between one or other of the mill companies and the managing agency. From 1895 onwards, all 
the directors were earning considerably more income from their shareholdings in the 
managing agency, Thomas Duff & Co, than from their much larger investment in the equity of 
the Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos. 
 
Table 3.10: Directors’ incomes, £, managing agency compared with mill company, (includes 
dividends on ordinary & preference shares and directors’ fees).  
 
Companies: “TDC” = Thomas Duff & Co, “T” = Titaghur Co, “S” = Samnuggur Co. 
Financial Year 1888 1895 1901 1913 1919 
Company T TDC T TDC S TDC S TDC T TDC 
Paid-up capital, 
(£000s) 
114 4 157 4 300 10 200 34 600 50 
Dividend 20% 100% 13% 200% 9% 124% 11% 166% 45% 45% 
Thomas Duff 5,472 1,400 2,026 3,320       
 
    
James Nicoll 973 240 393 480 237 1,765 457 2,015
  CB Ovenstone     412 480 260 1,765 470 2,015 5,117 6,433
George Nairn*     204 720 333 1,765 543 2,015 2,985 6,433 
Walter W Duff     393 560 426 1,765 423 2,015 3,241 6,433 
* General manager in 1895, became director 1899. 
Dividend % given as weighted average of ordinary & preference combined. All values current prices. 
Dividends for 1919 after deduction for income tax. Shareholdings based on shareholder lists for new 
issue shares during financial year preceding annual report. 
Sources: Allocation of new issue capital, shareholder lists, MS 86/3/1/2, Titaghur Co, pp 21-23, 28 Nov 
1888; MS 86/3/1/4, Titaghur Co, MOTD, pp 79-83, 11 Sep 1895; MS 86/1/1/7, Samnuggur Co, pp 242-9, 
13 Mar 1901; Sam MS 86/1/1/14, MOTD, pp275-287, 14 Jan 1913; MS 86/3/2/9, Titaghur Co, Share 
Allotment Book, 1919-69, pp 1-23; MS 86/5/1/1-4, Thomas Duff & Co, passim. MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas 
Duff & Co, MOTD, p2, 30 Aug 1883, p147 17 Oct 1894, MS 86/5/1/2, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, p80 4 
Sep 1900, MS 86/5/1/3, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, p184 29 Apr 1912. 
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The income stream from directors’ fees followed a similar pattern over time. The value of 
directors’ fees in real terms increased considerably in the case of the mill companies but 
exponentially in the case of the managing agency. 
 
Table 3.11: Estimates of Directors’ Fees, (£, constant prices, 1870 = 1). 
Financial 
Year 
Directors’ fees, £ Fee to individual director, £ 
Samnu-
ggur Co 
Titaghur 
Co 
Thomas 
Duff & 
Co 
Total 
Samnu-
ggur Co 
Titaghur 
Co 
Thomas 
Duff & 
Co 
Total 
1883-1889 820 635 0 1,265 190 123 0 276 
1890-1899 1,130 1,527 1,399 4,056 204 278 228 710 
1900-1909 1,474 1,658 3,848 6,979 246 276 641 1,163 
1910-1916 1,648 2,546 5,476 9,670 275 424 913 1,612 
Sources: MS 86/1/1/1-18, Samnuggur Co; MS 86/3/1/1-18, Titaghur Co; MS 86/5/1-4, Thomas Duff & 
Co, MOTD, reports to AGMs; MS 86/1/5/5/1-18, Samnuggur Co; MS 86/3/5/5/1-23, Titaghur Co; Reports 
of the directors, balance sheet, working account and profit and loss account. 
 
The directors may have viewed the increased fees as an appropriate reward for the greater 
responsibilities falling of managing a rapidly expanding capital.76 However, the directors’ 
meetings of the mill companies and managing agency typically took place consecutively at the 
company offices on the same day, entailing no additional expense in terms of time or travelling 
and little additional time commitment – the annual meeting of the Samnuggur Co just prior to 
that of the Titaghur Co of 1902 lasted just 15 minutes.77 Moreover, the creation of a full time 
secretariat in Dundee from 1883 and the devolution of responsibility to the general manager in 
Calcutta, together with the growth in the size of the directorate from the four founders to six 
by the 1890s, meant that each individual director was probably performing less work over time 
                                                          
76
 The increase in costs paid by the mill companies for the upkeep of the Dundee office was justified in 
these terms. The Company Acts of the turn of the century appear to have entailed a closer relationship 
between directors’ fees and profits. The directors referred to the “desirability of bringing the [firms’ 
Articles of Association] into conformity with the provisions of the Companies’ Act of 1900 and also in 
view of recent decisions in the law courts. [...] A fair and proper basis [on which to pay directors fees] 
would be a commission of 2 ½ % to each director on the amounts of the dividends, interim and final, 
paid during each year.” MS 86/5/1/2, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, 7 Feb 1906, p. 351. 
77
 MS 86/1/1/8, Samnuggur Co, Minute of AGM, 5 Mar 1902, 12.00 pm, p. 141; MS 86/3/1/7, Titaghur 
Co, Minute of AGM, 5 Mar 1902, 12.15 pm, p. 136. 
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while earning a growing combined income across the two mill companies and the managing 
agency in the form of directors’ fees. Any idea that the directors’ fees represented a payment 
for services rendered was purely notional. In reality, these were rents established by custom 
over time, which the directors were able to ratchet up as a windfall that was tolerated by the 
shareholders without a family connection to the directors in exchange for maintaining the 
dividend-paying capacity of the mill companies at a satisfactory level. Given the variation in the 
size of shareholdings held by different directors demonstrated in Table 3.10 above, it is not 
possible to draw an inference about the size of directors’ incomes from dividends relative to 
income from directors’ fees from the data presented. Table 3.12 below estimates the dividend 
income earned by an “average director” holding a 5% stake in the mill companies’ equity 
tapering to 2.5% around 1900 in line with the observed trends in the shareholding registers. 
The dividend income of an “average director” remained fairly stable as a multiple 
approximately four times larger than the income earned from directors’ fees as the invested 
capital of the mills expanded. 
 
Table 3.12: Average annual director’s fees compared with dividend earned by an “average 
director”, (£, constant prices, 1870 = 1) – all aggregated across 3 companies. 
Decade 
Fee to 
individual 
director  
Dividends to 
an "average 
director" 
Fees/ 
dividends 
multiple 
1880-1889 276 1,438 5 
1890-1899 710 3,028 4 
1900-1909 1,163 4,686 4 
1910-1916 1,612 6,931 4 
Sources: Ibid, Table 3.11. 
 
It should be noted that an ordinary shareholder of Samnuggur or Titaghur lacking insider 
knowledge would have had little information regarding the managing agency’s remuneration. 
The motion to the special general meeting ratifying the agency agreement for 20 years with 
Thomas Duff & Co made no reference to the level of commission payments and was only 
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attended by 5 non-employee shareholders, all with close ties to the directors.78 Until 1900, 
when a printed annual report with a balance sheet started to be circulated to the shareholders 
in advance of the shareholders’ AGM, there was no source of information which a shareholder 
might have consulted to discover the value of the annual sales revenue – from which the 
managing agency’s commission could be calculated.79  
The condition for the directors of the managing agency, Thomas Duff & Co, to capture and 
retain the lucrative rental income described was their ability to maintain the dividend paying 
capacity of the managed mill companies at a level above other opportunities to invest in the 
Dundee capital market. High profitability and dividends enabled the directors to retain control 
through a more indirect causal chain. It ensured that there was sufficient demand for the mill 
companies’ shares to permit the directors to exercise selectivity and close supervision of who 
obtained a shareholding, under the provisions of the firms’ Articles of Association. In the next 
section, the nature of the threat posed by a rival Dundee firm constructing a jute mill in 
Calcutta is considered.80 
 
The Formation of the Victoria Jute Co. 
In 1883, the Victoria Jute Co was launched to construct a jute mill in Calcutta by a group of 
Dundee entrepreneurs whose composition was almost entirely separate from that of the 
Thomas Duff & Co group. Their prospectus suggests that they wished to emulate Samnuggur’s 
example: 
                                                          
78
 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, Minute of Emergency Special General Meeting, pp. 261-6, 27 Jun 1883. 
79
 From 1900, see MS 86/1/5/5/1-18, Samnuggur Co; MS 86/3/5/5/1-23, Titaghur Co; Reports of the 
directors, balance sheet, working account and profit and loss account. 
80
 See Chapter 5’s account of Finlay, Muir & Co’s Champdany mill for the opposite case – where low 
profitability led to the involution of the firm’s shareholder base and the stagnation of the firm’s 
productive capacity. 
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It is also well known that much larger profits than the [rupee mill companies listed] above have been 
made by some of the other Companies, which do not publish their balance sheets, and which are 
managed on the same lines as the proposed Company will be carried on.
81
 
The firm was launched with a £2 call on an initial share capital of £50,850, denominated in £10 
shares.82 The shareholders encompassed a much wider cross-section of the great and the good 
amongst Dundee’s textile manufacturers and merchants than was the case for Samnuggur. 
Table 3.13 shows the initial subscribers. 
  
                                                          
81
 Lamb Collection, Dundee City Library, “The Victoria Jute Company Limited; Prospectus. 1883.” 
(Printed for Private Circulation), p. 2, 31 Jan 1883. 
82
 Lamb, ibid. 
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Table 3.13: Shareholders of Victoria Jute Co, 1883. 
Directors/employees £10 Shares % 
tota
l 
Occupation, Address [Dundee unless stated] 
Angus Macintyre 500 10% “Merchant, Home Bank, West Ferry” 
John Smith 500 10% “Manufacturer, Airlie Mount Alyth” 
James Luke 200 4% “Spinner, Dundee” 
John Adamson 260 5% Proprietor, Careston, Brechin 
Alexander Gilroy 200 4% “Merchant, Dundee” 
William Bruce Thompson 200 4% “Engineer & Shipbuilder, Dundee” 
John Watson Shepherd 110 2% Merchant, 6 Panmure St 
James Luke Jr 100 2% “General Manager, Victoria Jute Co Ltd” 
Michael Ferrier 20 0.4
% 
Mill manager, 27 Isles Lane 
Ordinary shareholders 
   
Alexander Anderson 400 8% Merchant, 11 King St 
Thomas Lawson 400 8% “Hope Foundry, Leeds” 
Joseph Lindsay 350 7% “Engineer, 4 Somerville Place” 
James Duncan 200 4% Merchant, 33 Cowgate 
William Edgar Allen 200 4% Manufacturer, Hill Meadow Steel Works, Sheffield 
Thomas Bell & Sons 125 2% Manufacturers, Belmont Works 
William Hunter 100 2% Draper, 19 Wellgate 
William Hynd Norrie 100 2% Merchant 
William Don Gillis 80 2% Iron merchant, 96 Miller St, Glasgow 
Henry Gourlay 60 1% Engineer & shipbuilder, Dundee foundry 
George Stevenson 60 1% Dyer, 1 Woodville Place 
Alexander Cook 50 1% “Manager of Wellington Jute Co., Calcutta” 
John Samuel Bradford 50 1% Merchant, The Sycamores, Albany Terrace 
William Briggs 50 1% Manufacturing chemist, 3 Springfield Terrace, 
Arbroath Bridget Jones Burke, 
widow 
50 1% 61 Reform St 
Peter Miln Duncan 50 1% Steam ship owner 
Alexander Gourlay 50 1% Dundee 
Thomas Keenan 50 1% Retired merchant, Gowan Bank Cottage, West 
Newport John Leng 50 1% “Newspaper Proprietor, 7 Bank St” 
William Moir 50 1% “Bank of Scotland” 
George Worrall 50 1% Hacklemaker, Dundee 
David Mcfarlane 40 0.8
% 
Manufacturer, Coupar, Angus 
George Shleselman 30 0.6
% 
Merchant and manufacturer. 
John Nicoll 25 0.5
% 
Merchant, 27 St Andrews St 
Alexander Thomson 25 0.5
% 
Shipowner, Bon Accord Villa 
Alexander Black 20 0.4
% 
Manufacturer, Alyth 
Rev William Elder 20 0.4
% 
Parish minister, Manse, Tealing 
William Mcfarlan 20 0.4
% 
Grazier, Cupar, Fife 
Rev John Calder 20 0.4
% 
Parish minister, New Manse, Old Aberdeen 
Thomas Fleming 20 0.4
% 
Todhillbank, Newton Mearns, by Glasgow 
James Sievwright Reid 10 0.2
% 
Warehouseman, 7 Hill St 
William Westland Sharp 10 0.2
% 
Coal merchant, 23b Victoria St, Forfar 
Thomas Keay 10 0.2
% 
Banker, Fernbank, Bishopbriggs, Glasgow 
Source: MS 86/2/2/7, Victoria Co, Lists of shareholders, 1883-1906; information about occupation and 
address supplemented by reference to Dundee Directory, Dundee Courier and Censuses, household 
enumerators. 
 
The original directors included the merchant-manufacturer James Luke, of Kinmond, Luke & 
Co, one of the largest traders in raw jute and the owner of the Pleasance Works in Dundee, 
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and the Erichtside Linen Works in Blairgowrie.83 Luke’s knowledge of Calcutta had seen him 
appointed a director of two other Calcutta mills with headquarters in Glasgow, the Champdany 
Co from 1873 and the India Jute Co from 1881.84 Another director was the merchant Angus 
Macintyre, of Macveigh, Macintyre & Co, who owned the Baluniefield Bleachfield.85 The third 
director was John Smith, senior partner of David Smith & Sons, Alyth, the owner of the Alyth 
linen and jute works “employing 135 Men, 30 Boys [and] 290 Girls” in 1881.86 James Luke’s 
son, James Luke Jr was employed as the firm’s general manager in Calcutta87 and Michael 
Ferrier, previously manager at James Paterson’s Coldside Works in Dundee, as mill manager.88 
John Watson Shepherd, merchant and insurance agent for the Liverpool & London Fire & Life, 
was appointed Secretary.89 John Adamson, William Bruce Thompson and Alex Gilroy joined the 
directorate subsequently in 1884, 1888 and 1893.90 
The ordinary shareholders included Dundee textile manufacturers such as Thomas Bell & Sons, 
as well as prominent merchants in the New York trade such as James Duncan of Jordanstone, 
who shared Smith’s Alyth roots. There was also a network of textile machinery, engineering, 
shipbuilding and steel manufacturers, including Joseph Lindsay, senior partner of Urquhart, 
Lindsay, Dundee, and Thomas Lawson, partner of Samuel Lawson & Sons, Leeds, which 
specialised in the manufacture of machinery for jute spinning and weaving. As a collective, the 
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 Obituary, Scotsman, 16 Dec 1903, p. 9. 
84
 Glasgow University Archive, MS 7/1/2/1/1, Champdany Co, General Meeting minute book, 19 Sep 
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shareholders of the new firm represented a more broadly based set of complimentary 
competences than Samnuggur’s and a potential source of competitive advantage. However, 
the firm’s early years showed that it was crucially lacking in location-specific knowledge of the 
Calcutta market that was a necessary condition for the firm to succeed. They also lacked a 
comparable figure to Thomas Duff as Chairman of Samnuggur, who was unencumbered by 
other business commitments in Dundee. Further, the choice of a Calcutta agent with family 
links to a director rather than on the basis of merit did not serve the firm’s interests. 
 
The Victoria Jute Co as a “Free Standing Company”, 1883-88. 
The Victoria Co’s prospectus refers to some of their Calcutta competitors being “severely 
handicapped with very costly and not very well appointed works, besides having to pay heavy 
commissions on their gross sales (a good dividend in themselves) to their managing firms in 
Calcutta.” It goes on to state;  
The business of the company will be managed by a board of Dundee gentlemen of long practical 
experience in the trade, and it is not too much to expect that by careful and efficient oversight of the 
company’s affairs, both here and in Calcutta, a satisfactory result should be given to the 
shareholders.
91
 
The implication was that the firm would be more profitable than competitor mills in Calcutta 
by drawing on manufacturing expertise and management skills from Dundee while eliminating 
costly agency commissions. (In this sense, the Victoria Jute Co, for a short period, conformed 
to Wilkins’ notion of a “free standing company”: to paraphrase, a firm formed in the UK to 
make a direct foreign investment in a specific business project without clear links to a pre-
existing business group.92) The coincidence of Victoria’s formation on a free standing basis just 
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(Printed for Private Circulation), p. 2, 31 Jan 1883. 
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as Thomas Duff & Co was being formed in Dundee as a managing agency to run the Samnuggur 
and Titaghur Cos, is striking. This must surely have been a significant factor influencing the 
hostile attitude of Thomas Duff & Co the construction of the Victoria mill just across the river 
Hooghly from the Samnuggur mill. The existence of another mill company managed by a 
different group of Dundee entrepreneurs was a threat to the Thomas Duff & Co group because 
it had the potential to lead investors in the Dundee capital market to draw comparisons of 
their performance and to scrutinise the differences in their institutional setup. In the long run, 
the Victoria Co might have become a competitor for funds in the Dundee capital market. 
The existing historiography on the dispute between Samnuggur and Victoria has focused on 
the threat the Victoria Co posed to Samnuggur’s labour supply, while neglecting the Dundee 
dimension conditioning the firms’ mutual antipathy. Wallace writes that “it was considered by 
the mills a matter of life and death to prevent a rival company settling down in proximity to 
their labour supply.”93 In order to forestall this eventuality, the Samnuggur Co had purchased 
several small plots of land within the bounds of the Victoria site, using Indian proxies, and had 
then taken the Victoria Co to court to obtain an injunction against them proceeding with 
construction of the new mill:94 
But the manager sent out by the Dundee board of the Victoria Company, Mr James Luke Junior (the 
gentle [columnist] ‘Max’ of [the Calcutta newspaper] ‘Capital’), with Galstaunian* pluck and 
obstinacy defied the repeated orders of the lower courts and went on building gaily, till the walls 
were up to beam level, when an injunction was issued by the District judge of Hooghly. Further 
progress was suspended for about a year, when the case was transferred to a Calcutta High Court 
Bench, who awarded nominal damages as compensation to the Samnuggur Company.
95
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 Wallace, Romance (London, 1928, 2
nd
 edition), p. 46. 
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 MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 300, 3 Jan 1884. 
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 Wallace, Romance of Jute, p. 46. *Presumably a reference to Johannes Galstaun, an Armenian 
property magnate who built extensively in Central and South Calcutta at the beginning of the 20
th
 
Century, the preferred residential areas of wealthy Europeans. See Susmita Bhattacharya, “The 
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Wallace’s generous assessment of James Luke Jr’s role as Victoria’s agent may have been 
informed by a sensitivity to the respect that Luke enjoyed in European society in Calcutta at 
the time that the first edition of The Romance of Jute was written.96 Luke had well known as an 
editor and regular columnist commenting on business matters for the newspaper Capital.97 
However, whether it was a wise decision for the Victoria Co to appoint the son of one of their 
directors as their Calcutta agent is open to question. Luke Jr’s attempts to trade as a jute 
merchant on his own account had led to his sequestration in Dundee in 1875, and to the 
bankruptcy of his firm, Luke & Co, in London in 1882, the year before the Victoria venture.98 
Certainly, Luke would not have been privy to the location-specific knowledge of the niceties of 
the Calcutta legal system and of the wider business environment that might have facilitated 
the prosecution of the dispute with the Samnuggur Co. A contemporary report in the Dundee 
Advertiser brought out – in typically Orientalist99 discourse - the complexity of the legal 
dispute, involving questions of priority within the convoluted hierarchy of the Bengali system 
of tenurial relations, involving multiple gradations of sub-tenure100: 
There seems, in fact, to have been some slumbering feud between the Dundee jute clans or their 
friends which led to the digging up of the hatchet, the donning of the war paint, and the subsequent 
lively passages in the Law Courts involving questions of Mouzahs, Mehals, Putnidar and Zenundar, 
Churs, Hookamaamahs and Dakhillas, and other appurtenances of legal warfare, and generally an 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Armenians in Calcutta”, Chapter in Banerji, Gupta and Mukherjee (eds), Calcutta Mosaic: Essays and 
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unedifying exhibition of Bengali unscrupulousness [sic] as opposed to Dundee energy [sic] and 
enterprise.
101
 
In the event, the press coverage in the pages of the Advertiser was overwhelmingly favourable 
to the Victoria Co. Undoubtedly, the liberal sensibilities of Dundee opinion would have been 
offended by the blatant restraint of trade involved in the Samnuggur Co’s legal manoeuvres. 
The Advertiser piece goes on to quote approvingly the judge’s comments, in ruling against 
Samnuggur, about the conduct of their general manager, William Smith: 
The proved conduct of Mr Smith on the part of the Samnugger Company seems to point to 
consciousness on his part that the transactions were not justifiable by law. [...] I lay no stress on the 
‘Benami’ (in another’s name) character of the ultimate transactions. These were perhaps 
precautions prudently dictated by considerations of expense. But the extraordinary fact admitted by 
the business manager of the company that not a penny of all the numerous and large payments 
made on account of land and in connection with these transactions had been entered in the 
plaintiff company’s accounts is remarkably significant. [my emphasis]
102
 
The article concludes with the prescient comment that, in conditions of trade depression, “it 
may be doubtful as to whether it would be more fitting to congratulate the Victoria Company 
as successful litigants or to condole with them as prospective jute manufacturers.”103 The 
Advertiser’s later analysis of the exceptional items recorded on the Samnuggur’s balance sheet 
suggested that the overall costs of the dispute may have been as much as £6,000.104 In the 
final analysis, this appears to have been money well spent. The Samnuggur Co drew out the 
dispute by exhausting the process of Appeals open to them in higher courts up to August 1886, 
when they indicated a “willingness to consider any reasonable settlement to end the whole 
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matter, provided any rights of way or other facilities which are useful or of value to the 
company are safeguarded and reserved”.105 On the same date they approved a transfer of 10 
ordinary shares by the Victoria Co’s Dundee lawyer John P Kyd to James Luke Sr, a director of 
the latter firm, presumably as a signal of good will.106 At the height of the legal dispute the 
previous year, the minutes had recorded possibly the only instance of the directorate 
preventing a share transfer up to 1921: 
A transfer of 20 second issue shares by James B Crichton to John P Kyd, solicitor, Dundee, was 
submitted to the board, and the directors, in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by 
section 16 of the company’s articles of association, declined to approve of same.107 
By the end of 1886 financial year, nearly five years after the firm had been launched, the 
Victoria Co had only succeeded in putting in 80 sacking looms, securing a paltry £1,000 net 
profit on the £50,000 share capital called up.108 While the media coverage may have favoured 
Victoria, the verdict of the shareholders on the management in Dundee and Calcutta was 
made clear at the AGM of 1888: 
On account of the heavy overdraft with the bankers, the directors resolved in March last to issue 
2,415 [£10] shares on the capital of the company upon which £2 per share should be called up, and 
to offer them to the present shareholders in proportion to the existing shares held by them – 
circulars to this effect were issued to the members of the company but only a portion of the shares 
so offered were accepted. Those not applied for can now be allotted by the directors as they deem 
proper.
109
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585 new shares were then allocated to the directors and shareholders of the Thomas Duff & 
Co group as the hostilities between the firms were drawn to a conclusion, and negotiations 
entered into to transfer the managing agency to Thomas Duff & Co.110 
With regard to the agency of the company abroad the directors have become greatly dissatisfied 
with the management of Mr James Luke Junior and after long and anxious deliberation came to the 
conclusion that the interests of the company demanded change. Accordingly on 31
st
 July last they 
resolved to dispense with Mr Luke’s services and since then he has ceased to be in the company’s 
employ. [...] An engagement has been entered into with Messrs Thomas Duff & Company Limited, a 
firm of large experience and already having charge of two mills in India, whereby they undertake the 
management of the company’s business for a period of 3 years from 1
st
 January last. The directors 
believe this appointment to be in the best interests of the company and that the shareholders will 
approve of their action.
111
 
The report also detailed how “[a]ccounts received do not bear out the strong assurances given 
by the late manager in Calcutta” that a £4,000 debt owed by the gunny broker Chatterjee for 
goods sent him on consignment would be recovered. James Luke Sr resigned from the board in 
the wake of his son’s dismissal and was replaced by Alexander Nicoll, representing Thomas 
Duff & Co, who had acquired 800 shares, or a 9% stake, in the firm.112 The debt owed by 
Chatterjee is significant because the goods he received were on consignment. This indicates 
the failure of Luke Jr or the Dundee board to find an outlet for their production using European 
intermediaries of good repute and creditworthiness, with whom established mills such as 
Samnuggur preferred to transact. Scrutiny of the Victoria Co’s ledger for 1886-88 confirms 
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their heavy reliance on transactions with NP Chatterjee and other Indian intermediaries.113 
Under Luke’s management, they had been unable to exploit the shared Alyth connection of 
director John Smith with shareholder James Duncan’s hessian marketing operation in New 
York. 
The terms of the managing agency agreement were remarkable for their succinctness: 
Thomas Duff and Company Limited shall have general and implied authority in their discretion to 
transact all business for the said jute company which they may consider proper: But where 
opportunity occurs and time permits they shall in all matters relating to the business of the said 
Victoria Jute Company Limited act upon and carry out the instructions of the directors of the said 
Victoria Jute Company Limited.
114
 
The agreed terms went on to state that the Victoria Co would pay the salaries of a 
“commercial assistant and a staff of native clerks” under the direction of Thomas Duff & Co in 
the latter’s Calcutta office. “Calcutta orders” and “export orders” for manufactured goods 
were to be divided between the Victoria, Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos in “such a proportion 
[...] as is fair to them and the other Companies”, presumably in proportion to their productive 
capacity, the orders “to be invoiced to the said Thomas Duff and Company Limited as the only 
known and disclosed buyers.” This suggests that in exchange for finding a market for Victoria’s 
goods, Thomas Duff & Co were under no obligation to disclose information about their 
marketing network. Thomas Duff & Co were not to be held “personally responsible” for any 
decisions made “in the ordinary course of business” but would be liable for any action 
contravening an explicit order of the Victoria’s directors. The autonomy of the Victoria Co’s 
management was carefully delineated: 
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In no case shall the said Thomas Duff and Company Limited have any concern with or control over 
the Dundee management or office of the said Victoria Jute Company Limited which shall always [my 
emphasis] be and remain as at present under the direct control of the directors of the company.
115
 
Any disputes between principal and agent were to be submitted to the arbitration of David 
Myles, the auditor of the Victoria Co’s accounts.116 
Thomas Duff & Co were to be paid a 1.5% commission on sales revenue for a period of 3 years 
to September, 1891. It appeared to be the implicit discipline of the short time-period of the 
contract and ties of mutual trust based on cross-shareholdings that would guarantee the 
agent’s good conduct rather than any great precision in the contractual terms. The following 
year, Thomas Duff & Co accepted a proposal to change the terms. In return for a 3% 
commission, the agents agreed to assume “the entire cost of the Victoria Co’s Calcutta staff”, 
to pay a rebate of £300 “slump abatement” and to “give [the Victoria Co] its assistance when 
required in their financial operations [in Calcutta].”117 
The subsequent history of Victoria’s subsumption under the management of Thomas Duff & Co 
neutralised the threat of an independent competitor for investment funds in the Dundee 
capital market for the purpose of jute manufacturing in Calcutta, although it’s consolidation 
into the Thomas Duff group was an incremental process over the next 30 years, during which 
its relative autonomy was eroded. 
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3.3 The Evolution of the Thomas Duff & Co Group Structure, 1888-
1918. 
 
Having gained the Victoria agency, the Thomas Duff & Co group structure had assumed its 
mature form. Breaking off from the narrative of the firm’s development, Diagram 3.1 below 
represents the boundaries of the Thomas Duff & Co group of firms and their spatial 
organisation between Dundee, Calcutta and the jute growing districts in the mofussil. The 
locus of strategic direction in the collective entrepreneurial judgement of the Thomas Duff & 
Co directors is depicted and contrasted with flows of information and operational decision-
making. The structure served as the basis for monitoring and the enforcement of a managerial 
hierarchy, although they also correspond to some extent to monetary flows. Information flows 
and operational decision-making were densely concentrated on the Calcutta office of Thomas 
Duff & Co and in the person of the general commercial manager there, making this the crucial 
principal-agent relationship within the managerial hierarchy permitting the functioning of a 
multinational managing agency operating with the asset-specific knowledge required of a 
manufacturing enterprise. 
The organisation chart captures the increasing spatial and hierarchical complexity of the group 
structure relative to its original incarnation as the ‘free-standing’ company, the Samnuggur Co. 
Subsidiary flows of information passed between the mill managers of the three mill companies 
communicating with their respective directorates through the company secretaries in Dundee, 
which served as a check on the activities of the Calcutta general manager by which the Dundee 
directors could hold him accountable. The Victoria directors in Dundee communicated directly 
with the general manager of Thomas Duff & Co “in the ordinary course of business”. The 
capacity of the growing firm to extend its operations vertically along the value chain is 
illustrated by the informal vertical integration with Robert Sim & Co, the raw jute dealers at 
Naraingunge in the mofussil. A similar process is depicted in the other direction for the 
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marketing of jute manufactures through the networked relationships with the shipper, Charles 
Barrie & Sons, and the firm’s Australian correspondents. While Thomas Duff & Co were 
responsible for jute purchases to supply all three mills, the relative autonomy of the Victoria 
 
Diagram 3.1: Thomas Duff & Co Group, 1888-1918 - Organisation Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: MS 86/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD; MS 86/2/1, Victoria Co, MOTD; MS 86/3/1 Titaghur Co; MS 
86/5/1 Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD. 
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 Co is indicated by the fact that its directors cultivated networked relationships with the raw 
jute dealers Landale, Clark & Co and with the Calcutta gunny brokers Perman & Hynd. Their 
senior partners, respectively John B Clark118 and David Hynd119 joined the Victoria directorate 
on their retirement from India. 
The spatial and temporal dimensions of the information flows depicted in the organisation 
chart require more careful specification in order to grasp the nature and complexity of 
managing a multinational manufacturing concern. Wilkins studies of the institutional forms 
taken by foreign investment during the period of the “first globalisation”120 found that foreign 
direct investment in manufacturing concerns were extremely rare by comparison with 
investment in mercantile enterprises and industry engaged in the extraction of raw 
materials.121 Her finding points to the distinctive technical quality of the information flows 
required to monitor a manufacturing process at a distance rather than in situ, which put a 
premium on the careful selection of agents at the point of production. While mercantile 
enterprise conducted across territorial borders had existed for millennia, multinational 
manufacturing was a historically novel phenomenon premised on the cluster of technical 
innovations associated with the age of imperialism which compressed space and time – the 
Suez canal, the steamship and the telegraph. A further historically specific enabling condition 
for the functioning of firms like the Thomas Duff & Co group was the existence of external 
economies associated with the institutional apparatus of British imperialism, which permitted 
the clustering of a critical mass of commercial and technical personnel of Dundee origin with 
knowledge of the jute industry in Calcutta operating under the permissive legal and financial 
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framework of the Government of India but considerations of space do not permit this aspect 
to be considered here in detail. 
The nature of the spatial and temporal compression enabled by these new technologies is 
indicated by the spatial integration of Dundee with Calcutta and the Mofussil into the business 
network depicted in the organisation chart. The introduction of river steamers and the 
extension of the railway network to the Goalundo terminus122 in East Bengal, in proximity to 
the main jute marts, had also compressed the spatial and temporal aspects of communication 
and interchange between Calcutta and the mofussil into days rather than weeks. Basic 
communication between all locations in the chart began to operate on the same temporal 
plain of more or less instantaneous communication with the introduction of the telegraph. For 
managerial purposes, the innovation of steamships and the opening of the Suez canal to 
commercial traffic in 1869123, were not only significant for bringing final markets closer and 
eroding the cost of freight and eroding the competitive advantage in pricing Dundee enjoyed 
in markets such as New York. Just as significant, was the reduction in time for mail services and 
the exchange of personnel to operate between Calcutta and Dundee – from about 6 weeks in 
1857 when the Barnagore was formed, to 3 weeks by 1890.124 
In the case of Thomas Duff & Co, these technologies were embraced to introduce a system of 
monitoring between the principals in Dundee and their agents in Calcutta. The general 
manager of the Calcutta offices of Thomas Duff & Co sent a detailed weekly letter to the 
company secretary in Dundee for the directors of the mill companies to approve at their 
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weekly board meetings. In their role as directors of Thomas Duff & Co, the same directors met 
less regularly and less frequently, as the nature of their decision-making role was more 
strategic. The general manager’s weekly report was supplemented by a weekly report from 
each of the mill managers to their respective directorates.125 A process of refinement over 
time took place, formalising the types of information the directors expected to receive from 
Calcutta in the form of pro forma letters on headed paper. Refinements included specifying 
magnitudes in the working accounts in more disaggregated form, such as the different 
categories of warp, weft and hessian jute purchased for stock, their quantity and price, or 
differentiating hessian and sacking goods and the price, quantity and timescale on which they 
had been sold forward.126 More sensitive information might be communicated by the general 
manager under the rubric “semi-official” or “private”.127 Mill managers also exchanged 
detailed technical correspondence facilitated by photography of machine parts with both 
directors and machinery suppliers, for instance when trying to fix engine breakdowns.128  
The information contained in the managers’ reports was supplemented by the systematic 
reporting of a series of summary accounting entities from the working accounts on a monthly 
basis which allowed the Dundee directors to monitor performance: 
It was decided to request the Calcutta agents to be more prompt in forwarding their monthly 
statements and accounts and also to ask them for a note of their probable outlay on plant as from 1
st
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November and to furnish a monthly statement showing the stock of goods on hand and orders 
unexecuted.”129 
The monthly results were harmonised in rupee terms on a half-yearly basis by the Calcutta 
auditors Lovelock, Lewes & Co130, then sent to the Dundee auditor Robert B Ritchie131 for final 
presentation in the annual report on a sterling basis after accounting for fluctuations in 
exchange. The evolution of the mode of presenting the monthly accounting entities in the 
minutes of the directors demonstrates the increasing sophistication of financial monitoring 
within the firm. As indicated above, the information became more disaggregated and complex 
in distinguishing types of input and output – permitting more detailed inferences to be drawn 
about the relative efficiency of different manufacturing processes - and also the timescale of 
sales to inform selling strategy.132 This information also permitted the directors to institute 
automatic disciplinary control mechanisms in Calcutta through the creation in Dundee of 
measures of individual mills’ and their managers’ performance.133 For example, in 1902, the 
margin permitted in measuring jute in process and wastage was altered: 
Basis of monthly estimates:- In their letter the managing agents refer to the suggestion of the board 
that the monthly estimates should be cast on different lines so as, within the limits of safety, to 
approximate more closely to the actual profits, and they suggest that the following changes should 
be made, viz: 1. Gunny surplus to be reckoned at 1/2" instead of 1" per bag. 2. Jute batch to be 
debited at the actual worked during month. 3. Jute surplus to be reduced from 8% to 5%. 4. The 
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other factors to be computed as near the actual as possible. The board approved of these 
suggestions, the new method to be put in operation for July and onwards.
134
 
A crucial aspect of this approach was the creation of reliable accounting measures which 
permitted the comparison of performance, first between Samnuggur, Titaghur and Victoria, 
and later between older and newer mills within and across the different companies. The 
systematic reporting of monthly performance for the purposes of monitoring had to be 
balanced against a contrary imperative to obfuscate the recording of the firm’s performance in 
any medium that might be submissible in a court of law, and therefore was perceived as 
potentially detrimental in that it could lead to the disclosure of sensitive commercial 
information to shareholders or competitors. From 1904, this goal was facilitated by recording 
only the changes in the accounting entities recorded. Occasionally, a monthly result was 
omitted from the minutes. Whether intentional or accidental, this introduced discontinuities in 
the data, making it difficult to trace the firm’s performance consistently over time.135 
In addition to communication by letter, the steamship permitted the more frequent 
interchange of visits of managerial personnel from Calcutta to Dundee and of directors from 
Dundee to Calcutta. A system of annual performance monitoring was instituted whereby a 
director would be present at the annual stocktaking, a crucial measure of performance given 
the preponderance of the raw material on the asset side of the balance sheet.136 This would 
have been impossible in the era of sailing vessels taking the route around the Cape. During the 
latter part of the 1880s, the promotion of William Smith to act simultaneously as a director of 
Thomas Duff & Co as well as its general manager, meant that the system of directors’ visits fell 
into disuse and was only intermittent from his death in 1893 up to 1900. The system was then 
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resurrected and formalised into a system of annual visits on a rotating basis by the incoming 
Chairman of the board of directors of the mill companies – which was itself also instituted as a 
rotating position in order to ensure that no director monopolised information about Calcutta 
in the way that Alexander Scott had from 1893-1900, which precipitated a major episode of 
dissent amongst the directors leading to Scott’s resignation. As illustrated in Table 3.15 below, 
regular visits in the other direction by commercial and production managers returning to 
Dundee on furlough were also systematised on a rotating basis so that the personal exchange 
of information on at least an annual basis could provide the opportunity to supplement the 
feedback received by means of official reports, while ensuring that the Calcutta office and the 
mills were not understaffed. 
The careful selection of agents and the creation of detailed monitoring and communication 
systems by letter were a vital aspect of the transfer of technical knowledge and information 
between Dundee and Calcutta specific to a manufacturing multinational. In other respects, this 
was an inadequate medium of communication on its own. Jute manufacturing required a level 
of technical knowledge but it was also an industry that epitomised the creation of a global 
market in certain commodities and a parallel market for credit to finance the monetary flows 
required to permit these commodities to circulate. Just as the ramification of the railway 
network had connected the mofussil to the commercial nodes of urban trading centres in India 
to form a national market, the steamship connected these urban centres to a global trading 
network. And Naraingunge was connected to Dundee, Hamburg and New York, just as it was to 
Calcutta, in a system of embryonic global price formation via the medium of the telegraph.137 A 
sale of 100,000 wheatbags to San Francisco three months forward can be taken as a typical 
transaction. Such a transaction involved a set of related calculations about price movements in 
a number of different markets – for raw jute, the value of the rupee against the dollar and 
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government policies that could affect it, the likely movement of freight rates and of the price 
and seasonal yield of Californian wheat, and the likely course of relative prices between 
present sales and future sales. Prices could be volatile in all of these markets and therefore any 
selling strategy required the use of the telegraph for the commercial manager to verify a 
selling decision with the Dundee directors. Communication by letter could only set the broad 
parameters of a selling strategy. 
There remained an irresolvable contradiction between the dual use of the mails and the 
telegraph as complimentary media for communicating different types of information – there 
still remained a lag of several weeks between the receipt of summary information by telegraph 
and of detailed information by post which entailed that directors had to devolve authority and 
discretion for certain types of decision-making to the Calcutta managers. 
Periods in which the directors requested additional information by telegram were succeeded 
by retrenchment in order to control costs: 
Telegrams:- The directors remarked on the unnecessary detail given in recent telegrams, and it was 
agreed to ask the managing agents in future to send only one telegram weekly to be despatched 
from Calcutta not later than 2pm on Wednesday of each week unless when there is anything special 
to communicate worth writing about.
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Change and Renewal on the Board of Directors. 
Table 3.14 below summarises changes in the managerial hierarchy of Thomas Duff & Co and 
the Samnuggur and Titaghur mill companies over time, listing periods of service on the 
directorate and as chairman or secretary of the companies. It lists those instances where 
periods of service as a director of Thomas Duff & Co, the managing agents, were different to 
those on the directorates of the mill companies, indicating an attempt to preserve the 
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exclusivity of the managing agents. Table 3.15 shows periods of service as the commercial 
manager of Thomas Duff & Co in Calcutta and the exchange of information through visits of 
the Dundee directors to Calcutta and of the Calcutta commercial managers to Dundee. Taken 
together, the tables indicate the creation over time of a career path where a commercial 
assistant would gain successive promotions - to become commercial manager in Calcutta, 
followed by a period of service as the companies’ secretary in Dundee prior to promotion to 
the directorate in Dundee. 
 
Table 3.14: Periods served on the directorate of the Thomas Duff & Co group, 1874-1921. 
Director/ manager 
Director, 
Samnuggur & 
Titagur 
Director, 
Thomas 
Duff & Co, 
(if different) 
Chairman of Thomas 
Duff Group* 
Secretary, 
Thomas Duff 
Group, at 
Dundee HQ 
Thomas Duff 1874-1896 
 
1874-96   
Alex Nicoll 1874-1893 
 
    
Joseph J Barrie 1874-1894 
 
  1874-1883 
James Nicoll 1874-1915 
 
1897-98, 1903   
Charles Kilburn 1874-1876 n/a     
William Moir 1886-1898 1895-98     
James Robertson1+ 1886-1887  n/a     
William Smith 1892-1893 1886-93     
Alex C Scott 1893-1901 
 
1899-1900   
Charles Barrie Ovenstone 1894-[1931] 
 
1901-02, 07, 11 ,15, 20   
John Smith2+ 1899-1909 
 
1904   
George N Nairn 1899-[1932] 
 
1905, 09, 14, 19   
Robert Sim 1902-1912 
 
1906, 10   
David Stewart 1908-[1931] 
 
1912, 17 1883-1908 
Walter W Duff 1893-[1933] 
 
1908, 13, 18   
John Nicoll 1913-[1926] 
 
1916, 21   
Alex Wighton 1916-[1949] 
 
  1908-1916 
James Robertson2+  [1926-1954]    1916-1926 
Sir Alex R Murray KBIE CBE  [1933-1954]     
 
*Chairmen and secretaries served the same role simultaneously for Thomas Duff & Co and the mill 
companies. + James Robertson 1 & 2 were unrelated. John Smith2 was a different individual to the 
director of the Victoria Co.  
Sources: MS 86/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD; MS 86/3/1, Titaghgur Co, MOTD; MS 86/5/1, Thomas Duff & 
Co, MOTD. 
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Table 3.15: Visits of the directors to Calcutta, periods served as commercial manager of 
Thomas Duff & Co in Calcutta and visits to the directorate in Dundee, 1874-1921. 
Director/ manager Visit to Calcutta 
Commercial 
Manager 
Visit to Dundee 
Thomas Duff 1875     
Alex Nicoll 1875, 77     
Joseph J Barrie 1879     
James Nicoll  n/a 
 
    
Charles Kilburn [1874-76]*     
William Moir  n/a 
 
    
James Robertson1  1874-87* 1878, 85, 86 
William Smith [1886-93]* 1874-93 1881, 83, 87, 89, 92 
Alex C Scott 1894, 97, 99     
Charles Barrie Ovenstone 1895, 1901, 06, 10, 21     
John Smith2 1903, 07     
George N Nairn 1900, 05, 09 1887-99 1882, 87, 93, 98 
Robert Sim 1904, 08     
David Stewart 1895,1911     
Walter W Duff 1902, 12     
John Nicoll 1919 1899-06 1890, 97, 01, 04 
Alex Wighton 1920 1906-08 1898, 1901, 05, 08 
James Robertson2   1908-16 1903, 10 
Sir Alex R Murray KBIE CBE   1916-21 1903 
*James Robertson was a mill manager at Samnuggur and Titaghur. Other mill managers visited the 
directorate in Dundee but have been excluded as none of them were promoted to the directorate. 
Sources: Ibid., Table 3.14. 
 
Tables 3.14 and Table 3.15 demonstrate that there was a considerable degree of continuity 
and stability in the personnel of the directorate of the Thomas Duff & Co group. From four 
directors in 1874, with Joseph Barrie also acting as Secretary, the board expanded to six by the 
1880s, the maximum permitted by the articles of association, with a full time secretary. The 
board was represented by just 18 directors over the course of 50 years. Only two directors 
resigned due to a disagreement on the board. Kilburn resigned due to ‘inactivity’, Alex Nicoll 
due to financial difficulties, and James Nicoll due to ill health. A further five died in office. 
James Nicoll served as a director for 41 years from the firm’s inception but never recorded to 
have visited Calcutta. Of the 13 directors promoted to the board, eight were promoted 
internally from positions in the managerial hierarchy and four from networked firms. Of the 
latter, William Moir was the manager of the Royal Bank of Scotland in Dundee, the companies’ 
British banker, Alex C Scott was a mill furnisher from Dundee who worked as a contractor in 
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Calcutta, and both Robert Sim and John Smith were the directors of the Naraingunge jute 
dealers R Sim & Co.. The first five general managers of Thomas Duff & Co in Calcutta were all 
promoted to the board. 
The long term stability of the directorate came under pressure during the 1890s when three of 
the original directors and the Calcutta general manager died or resigned within a few years, 
leaving James Nicoll as the sole remaining founder. This raised the question of how the 
directorate renewed itself. The hybrid nature of the firm, combining the form of a public 
limited company with aspects of “family capitalism”, is attested to by the way in which some 
of the new directors ‘inherited’ their positions. When bankruptcy forced Alex Nicoll, to 
relinquish his shareholdings in 1892, he sold his shareholding to William Smith, the general 
manager and a director, who was also his son-in-law, and to Smith’s brother John, a partner in 
the networked firm Robert Sim & Co. John Smith was appointed a director in 1899 when he 
retired from India. On Joseph Barrie’s death in 1894, he was succeeded as a director by his 
nephew and business partner in JJ Barrie & Co, Charles Barrie Ovenstone. Walter W Duff 
assumed a seat on the board in 1893, a few years before the death of his father, the Chairman, 
Thomas Duff, after serving a short apprenticeship as a commercial assistant in Calcutta at the 
beginning of the 1880s. However, Walter W Duff did not inherit the whole of his father’s very 
large shareholding. Thomas Duff also transferred a sufficiently large shareholding to Alex C 
Scott before his death for Scott to join the board. Scott’s credentials were rather more 
meritocratic – based on his business links to Calcutta as a mill furnisher. 
The examples of inheritance given above are not intended to suggest that the directorate of 
the firm operated as a nepotistic clique. Indeed, Walter W Duff was the only immediate kin 
member to be appointed in this way. All the other appointees to the board mentioned had 
significant business experience to justify their appointment in addition to a family connection 
in most cases. 
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The element of familial heredity characterising promotions to the directorate during the 1890s 
became much less pronounced as the capital base of the firm became broader from around 
the turn of the century. This is demonstrated by the career path taken by many of the sons of 
the founder directors entering business at around this time, as illustrated in Table 4.1 in the 
following chapter, which presents data showing the large proportion of sons of the Thomas 
Duff & Co directors recruited by the networked firm, R Sim & Co, and also by some of the other 
jute and gunny brokers in Calcutta. This cohort of sons was too young to be considered for the 
promotions described during the 1890s. Two of Alex Nicoll’s sons, three of James Nicoll’s, and 
one of David Stewart’s found positions in Calcutta in this way, of whom at least three served 
an apprenticeship as a mill clerk in one of the Thomas Duff & Co group’s mills. Two died 
prematurely from tropical diseases. None of them appears to have had the ability or the 
patience to seek promotion to the board through the managerial hierarchy in Calcutta, which 
became the sole means of promotion to the Dundee board after Robert Sim’s appointment in 
1902. The pitfalls of relying on family ties to select competent agents in Calcutta by Dundee 
firms organised as private family partnerships – as described above in the cases of Luke family 
– were better avoided by Thomas Duff & Co.139 Family connections were important in the 
reproduction of ownership and control by family networks interested in the Thomas Duff & Co 
group, but family ties were increasingly subordinated to an impersonal, professional 
managerial hierarchy based on merit and experience. As the study of shareholdings below 
makes clear, this is not to suggest that the families of the founder directors meekly 
relinquished their interest in the firm, but their interest was increasingly retained on a rentier 
basis as large shareholders rather than through active participation in the direction of the firm. 
Thus, in some ways, Thomas Duff & Co’s evolution, combining the adoption of public 
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ownership with a professional managerial hierarchy preceded its Dundee competitors by 
decades. While limited liability was widely adopted by Dundee jute firms from the 1890s, 
shareholdings remained tightly controlled until the restructuring of the industry with the 
formation of the Jute Industries combine in 1919.140 
 
The Incorporation of the Victoria Co into the Thomas Duff & Co group, 1888-1918. 
Table 3.16 depicts the directorate and managerial hierarchy of the semi-autonomous Victoria 
Co until its effective consolidation into the group in 1918, when the Victoria directorate ceased 
to be distinguishable from those of the other firms.  
 
Table 3.16: Management of the Victoria Co, 1874-1921, (those with a prior affiliation to 
Thomas Duff & Co (TD) in bold).  
Director/ secretary Chairman Visit to Calcutta 
John Smith1, 1883-1910 1883-1903 1894 
Angus MacIntyre, 1883-1884     
James Luke, 1883-1888    1880s 
John Adamson, 1884-1893     
William B Thompson, 1884-1892   1891 
Alex Nicoll (TD), 1888-1909     
John W Shepherd, (Sec 1883-1918)     
William Smith (TD), 1892-1893     
David W Wybrants, 1893-1921   1895, 1905, 1907 
Alex B Gilroy, 1893-1918 1903-15   
John B Clark, 1909-1919 1916 1910, 1912 
David Hynd, 1910-[1931] 1917-18, 1921   
Chas Barrie Ovenstone (TD), 1919-[1931] 1919 1921 
Alex Wighton (TD), 1919-[1949] 1920 1920 
George N Nairn (TD), 1920-[1932]     
Jas Robertson2 (TD) (Sec, 1917-[1926])     
Sources: MS 86/2/1, Victoria Co, MOTD; MS 86/5/1, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD. 
 
How did the Victoria Co lose its autonomy despite its initial commitment that the company 
“shall always be and remain as at present under the direct control of the directors”?141 As 
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outlined above, the departure of the Lukes from the management of the Victoria Co in 1888 
smoothed the way for the agency agreement with their rivals, Thomas Duff & Co. Alex Nicoll 
joining the board of the Victoria to represent the new managing agents’ interest in the firm. As 
a gesture of goodwill that the managing agents were safeguarding the interests of the Victoria 
Co, the Titaghur Co provided the Victoria Co directors with a copy of their confidential balance 
sheet for the purpose of comparison in 1890.142 The gesture was reciprocated by the Victoria 
Co making a loan to the Titaghur Co of £2,500 at 4.5% to help them reduce their overdraft.143 
The renewal of the agency agreement for a further five years appears to have been a 
straightforward matter, as it was not referred to in the minutes of Thomas Duff & Co.144 
William Smith, the Calcutta general manager of Thomas Duff & Co, joined the board of the 
Victoria Co, as well as the Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos, when he retired from Calcutta in 1892, 
although directors with no affiliation to Thomas Duff & Co remained a majority on the Victoria 
board. However, the relationship was not without tension. WB Thompson, owner of Dundee ‘s 
Lilybank foundry which was engaged in shipbuilding and marine engine manufacture, probably 
joined the board of the Victoria Co in order to seek a source of demand to diversify into the 
manufacture of engines for jute mills. At a meeting of the Victoria board of directors in 1893 
attended by Thompson, as well as William Smith and Alex Nicoll, (the Thomas Duff affiliated 
directors), the minutes record that Thompson’s tender for a new engine contract was rejected 
in favour of Carmichael, a favoured supplier of Samnuggur and Titaghur. Thompson resigned 
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 MS 86/3/1/2, Titaghur Co, minute of AGM, p. p162, 26 Feb 1890. 
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 MS 86/3/1/3, Titaghur Co, MOTD, p. 58, 19 Oct 1892. 
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 The first minute book of the Victoria Co up to 1892 has not survived, which would have made 
reference to the renewal of the agreement. The period of this agreement is referred to in the minute of 
1896 renewing the agreement for a second time, MS 86/2/1/1/1, Victoria Co, MOTD, pp. 163-5, 1896. 
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on the spot.145 His replacement was a figure of equal power and influence in Dundee, Alex 
Gilroy, who could be relied on to be a counterweight to the influence of Nicoll and Smith.146  
Shortly after Thompson’s resignation, Alex Nicoll resigned his positions as a directors of the 
Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos and Thomas Duff & Co after having to sell all his shares to pay his 
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings.147 The Courier commented that “Mr Nicoll’s 
embarrassments are understood to result from other business than the local industry in which 
he was so largely engaged.”148 This may have referred to speculative trading in raw jute; 
unpredictable price movements combined with the lack of bank liquidity to tide over 
merchants in difficulty, cut a swathe through the ranks of Dundee’s merchants during this 
period, including well known traders such as Lipman & Co149, and James Luke of Kinmond, Luke 
& Co.150 After liquidating his interest in the Barrow Jute Co151 as well as his shareholdings, he 
was only able to raise £18,000 of the £90,000 owed to his creditors, repaying 4 shillings to 
every pound of debt owing.152 Nicoll was probably already in difficulty a year previously when, 
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 Alexander Gilroy of Ballumbie was the son of Robert Easson Gilroy, founding partner of Gilroy Bros, 
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 “Difficulties of a Dundee Manufacturer”, Dundee Courier, 24 Apr 1893. Nicoll also had at least 
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until its liquidation in 1889, “List of Shareholders”, Dundee Courier, 8 Mar 1889, p. 5, “Oregonian 
Railway. Meeting of Bondholders.”, Dundee Courier, 13 Mar 1889. 
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 Lipman failed owing £250,000, “Heavy Failure in the Jute Trade”, Times of India, p. 5, 15 Dec 1892. 
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 “The announcement today that the old-established and much respected firm, Messrs Kinmond, Luke 
& Co, had been compelled to suspend payment, quite paralysed the market” in “Dundee Trade Report”, 
Dundee Courier, p. 4, 12 May 1894.  
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 Dissolution of partnership with Robert Peter, London Gazette, p. 4726, 18 Aug 1893. 
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 “A Dundee Manufacturer’s Difficulties”, Dundee Courier, 26 Apr 1893. The partnership in the Dundee 
firm A & J Nicoll, owners of the South Ward Works, was also dissolved, James Nicoll remaining as sole 
partner, “Notice”, Dundee Courier, p. 1, 2 Jun 1893. 
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in an extremely rare case of disagreement on the board being put to a vote, the Titaghur Co 
voted to make a voluntary call on uncalled capital supported by Thomas Duff, Joseph Barrie 
and William Moir, with Nicoll and his brother opposed.153 It was unclear whether Nicoll’s 
departure was acrimonious. The evidence suggests otherwise as he was permitted to retain a 
substantial shareholding to access the lucrative rental income of Thomas Duff & Co, the 
managing agents. Having sold his individual shares to the other directors, they transferred 
back a number shares to be held jointly with his wife.154 Nicoll continued to hold sufficient 
shares to remain a director of the Victoria Co with a continued interest in the prosperity of 
Thomas Duff & Co.155 
References to sales in the minute books confirm that Thomas Duff & Co made sales from the 
pooled output of the three mill companies.156 An example of the financial facilities afforded to 
the Victoria Co by the agency agreement of 1888 and subsequent agreements was outlined in 
1893, when £5,000 was remitted from Thomas Duff & Co in Calcutta to the Victoria Co 
Dundee, the former specifying that the “facilities to be accorded to them [the Victoria Co] by 
way of finance are not to exceed £15,000 and to be applied only for the purchase of jute or for 
the holding of goods which may be in stock.”157 The views of the Victoria directors did not 
always accord with those of the other mill companies. When the directors of Samnuggur and 
Titaghur found themselves in disagreement with their Calcutta agents in advocating a 
continuation of short time working, the Victoria directors followed the advice received from 
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Calcutta in advocating a return to full time working, (although the Samnuggur and Titaghur 
directors fell into line a couple of weeks later).158  
Over time, the establishment of trust between the Victoria Co and Thomas Duff & Co served as 
the basis for a flexible approach to the occasional renegotiation of the terms of existing 
managing agency agreements. In 1896, the Victoria Co directors sought an increase in the 
rebate from Thomas Duff & Co on their commission payment from £300 to £500 annually as a 
concession to the larger volume of business being done that had increased the agents’ 
remuneration. Thomas Duff & Co declined to increase the rebate on the basis that the 
increased volume of business done on Victoria’s behalf had increased their costs. However, 
they agreed to increase the Victoria Co’s credit facilities to £17,000 a couple of weeks later.159 
It was no accident that this request was made as the firms entered the final year before the 
agreement was to be renewed, putting the agents on notice that the independent board of the 
Victoria Co could make the credible threat implicitly of taking their business elsewhere. No 
such representations could be made by the Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos as their boards were 
identical with that of Thomas Duff & Co160. In the event, a third agreement was made for a 
further seven years from the beginning of 1897. The incremental lengthening of the duration 
of the agreements – three years, then five, then seven – indicated the deepening of trust 
between the parties. A 3% commission would continue to be paid but the rebate was 
increased to £700 annually. Thomas Duff & Co also agreed to commit themselves further 
financially in obtaining the Victoria Co’s stock of jute. The Victoria directors wrote to Thomas 
Duff & Co: 
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It is understood that during the currency of the agreement you will grant us whatever facilities are 
required for the purchase of jute or the holding of goods over which you will of course have a lieu, 
and that you make us the usual abatement for the year now current. 
It is also part of the agreement that you will furnish us regularly and promptly with copies of all 
telegrams from Calcutta except in so far as they refer to your own private business, and we in turn 
will keep you regularly and promptly posted up as to what we are doing. 
We have been perfectly satisfied with the manner in which our business has been conducted in the 
past by your Calcutta friends and have every confidence that it will continue to command their best 
attention.
161
 
The Dundee directors continued to maintain a careful demarcation of the boundaries of the 
principal-agent relationship, and the sovereignty of the Calcutta office to make decisions “in 
the normal course of business” in the absence of explicit instructions to the contrary by the 
Victoria directors: 
It appears from the correspondence between the Victoria Company and the Calcutta office that the 
former have been reflecting on the action of the Calcutta office both as to buying jute and selling 
goods, and it appeared to the directors that there was no good cause for such reflections. It was 
agreed to advise the Calcutta office to make a point of wiring direct to the Victoria Company in every 
case where they have the slightest doubt as to their wishes either as to buying jute or selling goods, 
and thus obviate any such reflections for the future.
162
 
Thomas Duff & Co stood to benefit from the steady upswing in trade that led the Victoria Co to 
commit to issuing £100,000 worth of preference shares to finance “an additional mill and 
factory capable of containing 200 hessian looms with corresponding preparing and spinning 
machinery.”163 The decision led to a rare display of dissent by the Victoria Co’s shareholders. At 
the emergency general meeting called to ratify the decision, William Brownlee, a substantial 
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Dundee builder and former Provost of Dundee164, proposed an amendment - ‘That the whole 
matter be delayed for six months.’, seconded by the jute manufacturer Alexander Henderson. 
18 shareholders were present representing 2310 votes, with a further 4515 proxy votes 
registered in advance in favour of the directors’ proposal. The amendment only mustered 543 
votes.165 The minute does not record what the basis was for the dissent. It may have been 
based on a disinclination to take up preference shares without ordinary shares being issued in 
tandem. On the other hand, some of the Victoria shareholders were prominent personalities in 
Dundee and may have been concerned about the reputational effects of voting for extensions 
in Calcutta at the time when a debate was raging in Dundee about the negative impact of the 
growth of Calcutta competition.166 What the episode does illustrate is the increasing 
coincidence of long-term planning between Thomas Duff & Co and the Victoria Co, £100,000 of 
additional capital being raised by the Titaghur at the same time.167 Furthermore, Thomas Duff 
& Co benefited from the reluctance of the Victoria shareholders to take up the new shares. A 
minute of the Victoria Co stated: 
The secretary intimated that after consultation with Mr Gilroy [the Chairman], he had wired to Mr 
AC Scott [the Chairman of Thomas Duff & Co, then visiting Calcutta] as follows, viz:- ‘May we allot 
shares as many as possible to outsiders’. To which the following reply had been received, viz:- ‘It is 
impossible, we are committed already here.
168
 
This may be a reference to Scott promoting the Titaghur Co’s new shares issue in Calcutta. In 
the event, Thomas Duff & Co’s directors were able to increase their own shareholding in the 
Victoria Co to 13% of the total compared to 21% held by the Victoria directors.169 
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The appointment of mill supervisors to staff the Victoria mill was one aspect of the Victoria 
Co’s operations which fell within their remit under the managing agency agreement. This was a 
critical power they retained if they were to safeguard their ability to monitor the mill’s 
performance independently of the managing agents. However, with this power came the 
responsibility to judiciously select competent agents involved directly in the oversight of the 
manufacturing process in Calcutta. The location specific knowledge of the manufacturing 
process in Calcutta became qualitatively differentiated from that in Dundee, which meant that 
these skills were not necessarily transferrable from Dundee. The boards of Samnuggur and 
Titaghur had an advantage over Victoria in being able to draw on information from their 
Calcutta managers to select competent production managers for internal promotion. Thomas 
Duff & Co were not slow to draw this to the Victoria directors’ attention in 1898, when they 
were seeking a replacement for their experienced mill manager, George Duncan, due to 
chronic illness. They minuted receipt of a: 
[…] private message from Mr [John] Nicoll, [general manager of Thomas Duff & Co], asking if the 
Victoria Company had referred here [in Dundee] as to a temporary arrangement for the 
management in consequence of Mr Duncan’s continued serious illness. [The Dundee directors had 
not been consulted.] A further informal meeting was held on 1
st
 current at which it was agreed to 
wire Mr Nicoll privately that the directors are strongly of opinion that it will be better to avoid 
recommending any of the staff of the other mills[, i.e. Samnuggur and Titaghur,] to the Victoria 
Company.
170
 
The Thomas Duff & Co had made their point to the Victoria directors that their independence 
did not come without costs. After the third renewal of the managing agency agreement in 
1900 – for a further period of 13 years – confirmed that the Victoria Co’s affairs would remain 
within the ambit of Thomas Duff & Co’s management for the foreseeable future, the managing 
agents adopted a more conciliatory approach. The Samnuggur assistant manager Fettes was 
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permitted to take a promotion as the new manager at the Victoria mill - “the directors [of 
Samnuggur] consider it a good policy that capable assistants should not be barred from 
promotion where the opportunity occurs.”171 The firms also agreed that contractual terms for 
mill assistants should be harmonised across the three mill companies: 
[The Chairman of Thomas Duff & Co, Charles B Ovenstone, and the Secretary, David Stewart, called 
on the Victoria Co] for [the] purpose of ascertaining their views, it being desirable that all the three 
mills for which this company acts as managing agents should co-operate on similar lines. He stated 
that the Victoria Company had already written to Calcutta authorising the same arrangements to be 
made for their assistants as may be adopted by the other two companies.
172
 
During the decade from 1901-10, the Victoria mill paid an average 7.5% dividend, lagging 
behind Samnuggur and Titaghur, which paid 10% every year, (except 1903 when Samnuggur 
paid 6%).173 In 1906, the Chairman of Thomas Duff & Co , George Nairn, wrote to his fellow 
directors in Dundee after visiting the Calcutta mills that “notwithstanding the extra and special 
help which the Calcutta office was giving them”, he attributed “the trouble [with the Victoria 
mill] mainly to the works management not being equal to the size of the place.”174 A further 
letter from Nairn stated that there was: 
[…] still no prospect of a permanent improvement in the working of the Victoria mill, and [...] that 
the whole trouble was due to the present works management, and that there was no indication of 
the present manager being able to run the place successfully. [... The Victoria Co directors] had 
advertised as requested for a new manager, but [...] all the applicants were mediocre with no 
previous experience of management and none of them so suitable as James Shepherd, presently 
preparing overseer at Titaghur, who keenly solicited promotion.
175
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Shepherd was appointed by the Victoria directors to manage the mill on their agents’ 
recommendation. The Thomas Duff & Co directorate impressed on their Calcutta managers 
that the correspondence on the matter from the Victoria Co: 
[…] inferred a responsibility on the managing agents not covered by the terms of the agreement 
inasmuch as the appointment of the works staff rests with the Victoria board and all appointments 
are made by them. The secretary was instructed to point this out to the Calcutta office, and to ask 
them to put very strongly before the Victoria Company the efforts that are made to safeguard their 
interests.
176
 
Shepherd was able to bring the Victoria mill’s results into line with the other mills177, and 
gained a further promotion to manage the Titaghur mill in 1914, and then was sent to the new 
Samnuggur North mill in 1915 to resolve problems of underperformance there.178 After 
Shepherd’s appointment in 1906, transfers of mill managers and assistants between 
Samnuggur, Titaghur and Victoria became routine, eroding further the independence of the 
Victoria directorate.179 
The third renewal of the managing agency agreement between the Victoria Co and Thomas 
Duff & Co was referred to at the latter’s Annual General Meeting of 3rd April, 1901. The 
renewal occurred only three years into the previous agreement for seven years due to “special 
circumstances”. The “circumstances” involved the resignation the previous week of Alex C 
Scott as Chairman of Thomas Duff & Co and of Samnuggur and Titaghur. This was glossed over 
in the minute, which referred in anodyne terms to the fact that a “considerable extension of 
the producing power of the companies for which this company acts as managing agents has 
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recently taken place, and a further extension of same is in progress”, as the cause of the 
renegotiated terms of the agreement.180 Scott’s departure is considered in more detail below 
but a plausible explanation of the coincidence of Scott’s resignation and the hasty 
renegotiation of concessionary terms for the Victoria agency on a reduced commission was 
that it was intended to pre-empt the possibility of Scott forming his own managing agency 
with the intention of poaching the business of the Victoria Co from Thomas Duff & Co. The 
new agreement was “for a currency of thirteen years from 1st January last, also at a 
commission of 2½% on the net value of the manufactured productions of the company”, 
reduced from 3%. New agreements with Samnuggur and Titaghur were concluded 
simultaneously at the same reduced rate, but with a currency of 20 years.181 
The increased time horizon of the agreements reflected the renewed upswing in the fortunes 
of the Calcutta industry from the mid-1890s, which led to a sustained boom in mill extensions 
and the formation of new mill companies there that continued until the beginning of the 
1920s.182 As a residue of the legal dispute of the 1880s between the Samnuggur and Victoria 
Cos, the Samnuggur now projected extending their works to a new compound at Bhudressur 
on the opposite side of the river adjacent to the Victoria mill, next to the Grand Trunk Road, on 
plots of land acquired to stymie the original construction of the Victoria mill. However, this 
conflicted with the Victoria mill’s own expansion plans. Evidently, the urgency with which 
Thomas Duff & Co had sought to commit the Victoria directors to a new agreement had 
prevented them from negotiating a compromise over land for extending the mills. Instead, as 
part of the new agreement’s terms, they had conceded to the Victoria Co on behalf of the 
Samnuggur Co a clause: 
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[…] stipulating that this company should undertake to hold the properties of Bhudressur and 
Bablaband and not to dispose of them without the Victoria Company’s consent. An undertaking has 
already been given the Victoria Company per letter of 24
th
 September that in the event of this 
company building another mill without the consent of the Victoria Company the agency agreement 
will be null and void in the option of the Victoria Company.
183
 
By 1902, Thomas Duff & Co were seeking to have this stipulation removed to permit 
Samnuggur to extend, arguing that external economies in relation to the labour supply would 
benefit the Victoria Co: 
The directors had some conversation as to the expediency of arranging to erect a new mill on this 
site provided the Victoria Company consent to remove the bar under the current agreement with 
them. In view of the unsatisfactory state of the labour both at Samnuggur and Victoria and the 
experience obtained at Titaghur where labour has continued highly satisfactory since the erection of 
several mills in the proximity made it an important labour centre, the board felt that it might 
improve the labour supply both of Samnuggur and Victoria if the labour employment of the district 
were increased. The chairman and the secretary were asked to confer with [the Victoria Co 
Chairman] Mr Gilroy as to this.
184
 
Predictably, Gilroy was “averse” to conceding the leverage Victoria had over Thomas Duff & Co 
in the matter.185 The following month, the Victoria Co countered with a proposal that Thomas 
Duff & Co should “sell them the Bhudressur property cheap” for their own extension but this 
was deemed “inexpedient” and the Calcutta general manager John Nicoll, was instructed to 
“recommend the Victoria Company to build on their own compound.”186 When Walter Duff 
visited Calcutta at the end of the year, he further advised Nicoll not to borrow money from the 
Victoria Co, presumably to avoid weakening Thomas Duff & Co’s negotiating position. The 
same minute went on to state “it appears likely that the Victoria Company will not for some 
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time agree to remove the bar under the present agency agreement as to utilising the 
Bablaband and Bhudressur properties for the erection of a new mill” and that Duff’s pursuit of 
sites such as the Government of India’s disused rifle range at nearby “Ichapur” had so far 
proved fruitless, while an alternative site in the neighbourhood at Walter’s Court ran the risk 
of further erosion of the river bank, leading him to look as far afield as Titaghur.187 The matter 
was concluded for the time being when the Victoria Co sought a further rebate on their 
commission in return for extending Victoria on its existing compound “on lines somewhat 
similar to the recent enlargement of Samnuggur”. Thomas Duff & Co offered a further rebate 
of £500 annually in return for dropping the bar on Samnuggur erecting a mill on the 
Bablaband/Bhudressur site, to which the Victoria Co responded with “regret that the directors 
[of Thomas Duff & Co] had not seen their way to make them a more liberal offer. It was agreed 
to let the matter rest for the present.”188 
Finally, in 1908, the bar was removed on the recommendation of a Victoria director on a visit 
to Calcutta: 
Mr Wybrants, after examining into the matter and investigating the labour question at centres 
where there are several mills, was convinced that it would be an advantage to the Victoria Company 
if there were more mills in the vicinity, and that he was agreeable to the bar, which, under the 
present agency agreement applies to this property, being removed.
189
 
While Thomas Duff & Co’s directors argued that the Victoria Co should remove the bar “in 
their own interests”, they ultimately agreed to pay them a consideration of £500 annually.190 It 
cannot have harmed Thomas Duff & Co’s cause that Wybrants’ independence had been 
compromised in 1901 when he was offered and accepted a 4% shareholding in Thomas Duff & 
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Co just as the land negotiations were being anticipated, although, presumably, he declared the 
conflict of interest.191 
A footnote to this episode illustrates the sleight of hand in which managing agents could 
engage when the same personnel occupied the boards of the managed companies. Thomas 
Duff & Co had purchased the Bhudressur/Bablaband site from Samnuggur in 1901 pending the 
negotiations with the Victoria Co.192 When construction of the Samnuggur North mill finally 
commenced in 1913, “neutral arbiters” were appointed to assess the market valuation of the 
site. Land values had considerably appreciated in the meantime due to the demand for new 
sites for mill construction and the property was sold back to the Samnuggur Co for “£22,622-
18-8, representing an appreciation on the book value of £11,262-5-8”, a 99% windfall for the 
Thomas Duff & Co directors!193 
The fourth renewal of the Victoria agency agreement was concluded six months before the 
existing 13 year agreement expired at the end of 1913. It marked a significant departure from 
the terms of previous agreements, reflecting the keen competition in the Calcutta market for 
agency contracts as the industry boomed. Thomas Duff & Co’s management was extended for 
only a further five years and the lucrative sales commission was dispensed with in favour of 
the type of profit-based remuneration that had become the norm amongst the rupee mills: 
a fixed sum of £6000 per annum from the Victoria Company, less a rebate of £1000 per 
annum, payable monthly in Calcutta at 1-4d exchange, and also a commission of 5% on the net 
profit shown by their working account, this commission to be payable in Dundee when the 
accounts have been made up. The form of working account to be adhered to by the Victoria 
Company is as shown by their printed accounts for the year 1911, while it is also stipulated 
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that in the event of the Victoria Company increasing their looms at any time the fixed sum of 
£5000 net per annum will be increased in proportion.194 
As Table 3.16 below illustrates, Thomas Duff & Co’s remuneration from the Victoria Co was 
approximately halved relative to Samnuggur and Titaghur as a result of the adoption of the 
profit-based commission.195 This would have served as an added incentive to complete the 
effective takeover of the Victoria Co that transpired in 1918. 
 
Table 3.17: Comparison of managing agency remuneration of Thomas Duff & Co managed 
mills, 1911-21, rupees per loom, (constant prices, 1873 = 1). 
Year 
Samnuggur 
/Titaghur 
average 
Victoria 
Ratio 
Victoria: 
others 
1911 108 128 119% 
1912 124 152 123% 
1913 145 177 122% 
1914 105 50 47% 
1915 148 80 54% 
1916 193 96 50% 
1917 156 83 53% 
1918 228 132 58% 
1919 132 72 55% 
1920 163 171 105% 
1921 94 88 94% 
Sources: Calculated from MS 86/1/5/5/1-18, Samnuggur Co; MS 86/2/5/5/1-18, Victoria Co; MS 
86/3/5/5/1-23, Titaghur Co; Reports of the directors, balance sheet, working account and profit and loss 
account. 
 
The consolidation of the Victoria Co occurred abruptly over the course of 1917-18. The change 
can be explained by attrition on the Victoria board as a result of old age. During the course of 
1916, Alex Gilroy, by far the largest shareholder196, had given up the Chairmanship of the 
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 MS 86/5/1/3, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, p. 225, 22 Apr 1913. 
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 Caution is required in drawing inferences about the variation between mills on the sales commission 
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Sep 1919, pp. 453-70. 
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Victoria Co which he had occupied since 1903.197 By 1917, when he retired, he was 75.198 His 
replacement as a director was the longstanding Secretary of the company, John Watson 
Shepherd, who was himself 72.199 Watson retired during the same year.200 The very substantial 
honorarium of £3,500 that he was voted upon retiring from the board, (of which Thomas Duff 
& Co paid £1,500), no doubt served as an inducement.201 Of the remaining directors, 
Wybrants’ allegiance was divided. Despite being appointees under Gilroy’s chairmanship, 
David Hynd and John Brown Clark’s backgrounds in the Calcutta business world may have 
meant that they did not share the departing directors’ commitment to maintaining the Victoria 
Co’s independence. Both had acquired shares in the Titaghur mill prior to its new share issue in 
1919.202 Charles Barrie Ovenstone, the most senior of the Thomas Duff & Co directors, was 
elected to the board of the Victoria Co on Shepherd’s departure, and James Robertson became 
Secretary of all three mill companies as well as Thomas Duff & Co.203 Upon the death of John B 
Clark the following year, another Thomas Duff & Co director, Alex Wighton, also joined the 
Victoria board.204 In 1918, a new managing agency agreement was concluded on notably more 
generous terms to Thomas Duff & Co than the preceding one, with a return to a sales-based 
commission of “two per cent on the net invoice amounts of the manufactured products of the 
Victoria Company” for a further 10 years, with an increase in the notice period required before 
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the early termination of an agreement to 12 months from six.205 The firm’s Articles of 
Association were changed subsequently in 1919 in relation to directors’ votes, the minimum 
shareholding qualification for directors and the rate of preference shares to bring the firm into 
line with the Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos. The directors’ motion effecting these changes at 
the Emergency General Meeting of that year did not pass unanimously, but the pill was 
sweetened by the capitalisation of the reserve fund accumulated during the war to fund the 
issue of £300,000 in bonus shares on a pro rata basis to the existing shareholders.206  
By the time the bonus shares were issued in 1919, a comparison of the shareholders in the 
Victoria Co and the Titaghur Co of that year indicates that the convergence in the management 
of the firms was mirrored by a convergence in ownership. In 1883, only one shareholder in the 
Victoria Co had also held share in Samnuggur or Titaghur. By 1919, 131 individuals held shares 
in both Victoria and Titaghur, comprising a majority of the shares in each company. 
 
Table 3.18: Convergence of ownership in 1919, 131 individuals holding shares in both Titaghur 
and Victoria Cos. 
Mill Company Titaghur Victoria 
Shares held 22,101 19,373 
% of total 51% 62% 
Average shareholding 169 148 
Source: MS 86/3/2/9, Titaghur Co, Share Allotment Book, 1919-69, pp 1-23; MS 86/2/1/4 Victoria Co, 
pp. 194-203, 16 Oct 1919. 
 
Conclusion 
The content of the family relationships and the ownership structure discussed in this chapter 
have been demonstrated to possess an economic rationale. The company forms adopted were 
a specific way of internalising different types of competitive advantage. These included the 
pooling of resources and different types of information by a group of families in Dundee who 
were in the second tier of jute manufacturers and merchants looking for more profitable 
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opportunities after the Dundee industry had passed its peak. Thomas Duff brought location 
specific knowledge of Calcutta to the firm, Barrie his knowledge of shipping and export 
markets, the Nicolls with their knowledge of contemporary manufacturing processes in 
Dundee. This structure was capable of replicating itself on an increasing scale, for example, 
through incorporation of Victoria. The group of companies’ structure was the consequence of 
these evolutionary developments and once the company emerged in its mature form it was 
able to sustain itself using family connections and incorporating high calibre managers over 
time. 
This chapter has focused on the internal development of the firm. The next chapter will 
address how the firm dealt with its external environment 
. 
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Chapter 4. Thomas Duff & Co: Control and Managing 
Competition. 
 
The previous chapter considered how Thomas Duff & Co was able to capture and retain 
lucrative rents from its managed mill companies. The agency was able to use these rents as a 
powerful incentive to motivate the performance of the managerial hierarchy in Calcutta by 
creating a career path for effective managers to gain promotion to the Dundee board of 
directors and a share of the rental income. The general manager in Calcutta was allocated a 
portion of the shares in addition to the directors.1 However, the model was dependent on 
maintaining the exclusivity of the group of insiders in the direction and ownership of the 
managing agency. At the same time, it was logical that there would be keen competition for a 
share of the spoils. In this chapter, the threats that emerged to the source of the rental income 
and to the exclusivity of the firm are delineated, and the firm’s response analysed. 
Section 4.1 considers the threat posed by challenges to the control and authority exercised by 
the existing directors on the board of Thomas Duff & Co, as competition emerged to access the 
rents the firm generated. 
Section 4.2 delineates the manner in which the managing agents were able to account for the 
increasing importance of raw jute prices and to internalise knowledge affecting vertical 
relationships in the supply chain and exercise control over their suppliers while minimising risk 
through informal backwards integration. 
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 The first general manager, William Smith was allocated 20 shares, or a 10 % stake, MS 86/5/1/1, 
Thomas Duff & Co, p. 2. 
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Section 4.3 then considers the aspect of horizontal relationships and the way in which the 
threat of volatility through competition between jute mills and their managing agents was 
managed through the creation of mechanisms of collusion in the form of the Indian Jute Mills 
Association. 
 
4.1 Countering Threats to the Managing Agents’ Control 
 
When James Robertson, one of the firm founders, departed the directorate of the mill 
companies in 1888 after a dispute about his remuneration, it was reported that he was 
threatening to build competitor mill at Samnuggur in the local press:  
We understand an influential firm in Calcutta who own suitable building ground at Samnuggur 
contemplate building a large mill, and negotiations are now going on with the view to have the 
building commenced at an early date. We learn your townsman, Mr Robertson, late manager of the 
Samnuggur Jute Company, is to take a considerable interest in the mill, and is likewise to 
superintend the erection and afterwards undertake the management.
2
 
In the event, Robertson’s participation in the project did not materialise and he returned to 
Dundee to purchase the Logie jute works. Despite his exit from the directorate, Robertson was 
permitted to retain his shareholding in Thomas Duff & Co. It seems reasonable to infer that he 
retained a desire to see Thomas Duff & Co prosper commercially in the Indian market. Perhaps 
more significant threats to the objectives of the directors emerged with the cases of Moir and 
Scott. 
 
Moir versus Thomas Duff & Co. 
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 “Calcutta Jute Market; from our own Correspondent”, 20 Mar 1888, Dundee Courier, 10 Apr 1888, p. 2. 
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The first instance of a threat to the form of control and exclusivity exercised by the founding 
directors of the managing agents came from non-founding individual directors. The cases of 
Moir and Scott highlight this aspect. 
The discussion of the Articles of Association adopted by the Samnuggur and Titaghur mill 
companies in Chapter 3 demonstrated how the directors ensured their continued control 
through the insertion of clauses giving the directors discretion to decline a share transfer to an 
undesirable recipient – whether through a commercial transaction, marriage or inheritance. 
The threat of this power invested in the directors was sufficient to achieve its intended 
objective and the power to reject a transfer was only invoked by the directors on one occasion 
throughout the whole period from 1874 to 1921, when a transfer of Samnuggur shares to John 
N Kyd, the Victoria Co’s lawyer, was declined during the course of the two firms’ legal dispute. 
However, in the case of Thomas Duff & Co, similar Articles of Association were adopted that 
were enforced in order to reproduce the exclusivity of the firm. To complicate matters, this 
power was not invoked consistently. When directors of the managing agency died or resigned, 
their shares were redistributed amongst the remaining directors in proportion to their existing 
shareholding.3 However, it has been seen how some directors “inherited” their positions on 
the board of directors and new directors were issued with additional shares in the managing 
agency over time. Given the prominence of Thomas Duff’s role in the formation of the firm and 
as its largest shareholder, the directors appear to have permitted his executors to retain 15 
shares in Thomas Duff & Co, or a 7.5% stake of the total of 200 shares issued at the time.4 
When Alex Nicoll resigned as a director but remained on the board of the Victoria Co, it had 
been deemed strategic to allow him to retain shares in Thomas Duff & Co. However, when 
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 MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, p. 124, 4 Oct 1893, p. 147, 17 Oct 1894; p. 200, 9 Dec 1896; 
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 Only 65 of Thomas Duff’s 80 shares were redistributed to the other directors, MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas 
Duff & Co, MOTD, p. 124, 4 Oct 1893, p. 147, 17 Oct 1894; p. 200, 9 Dec 1896. 
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William Moir died in 1898, there was no obvious candidate from his business or family 
network to “inherit” his position and shareholding of 22 shares. Instead, the general manager 
in Calcutta, George Nairn was promoted to the boards of the managing agents and the two 
mill companies.5 Moir’s widow, Margaret Erskine Moir, then applied to take possession of the 
shares: 
Mr Moir’s shares:- A letter from Messrs Shield & Kyd [...] was submitted, enclosing confirmation of 
Mr Moir’s Estate in favour of his widow Mrs Moir, as his Executrix, and requesting the 22 shares 
standing in name of the late Mr Moir to be transferred to Mrs Moir as such Executrix. The board 
unanimously declined to register the confirmation and Mrs Moir as Executrix foresaid, and the 
secretary was instructed to intimate accordingly. 
They also refused to pay Moir’s widow the outstanding dividend on his shares, “there being no 
legal and registered owner entitled to require payment of and competent to give a valid 
receipt for the same”, presumably because by doing so they would have validated her claim to 
be the legal owner of the shares.6 In the legal action that followed, the judges hearing the case 
found in favour of Thomas Duff & Co’s right to enforce the Articles of Association in relation to 
transfers but in favour of Moir’s executors to be remunerated for Moir’s outstanding dividends 
with interest.7 Fearing the uncertain outcome in the event that Mrs Moir exercised her right to 
appeal to the House of Lords after a further two years elapsed, Thomas Duff & Co settled the 
case by paying the outstanding dividend with interest and an additional amount equivalent to 
purchasing the shares at a premium of their “market valuation”. The total settlement was 
£6,000 or 150% of the paid up capital of the company.8 The “market valuation” was itself a 
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 MS 86/1/1/6, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 215 25/1/99; MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, Minute of AGM, 
p. 345. 
6
 MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff & Co, p. 264, 27 Dec 1898. 
7
 “Question about Dundee Shares.”, Dundee Courier, 28 Jun 1899; “Court of Session.”, Glasgow Herald, 
24 Jan 1900; “Dundee Lady’s Claim to Shares.”, Dundee Courier, 16 Jul 1900; MS 86/5/1/1, Thomas Duff 
& Co, p. 264, 27 Dec 1898, MS 86/5/1/2, Thomas Duff & Co, p. 32, 11 Jan 1900, p. 35, 24 Jan 1900, p. 63, 
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fictional quantity determined by the directors themselves on an annual basis for setting the 
price at which new shareholders had to purchase the shares – which was set considerably 
below a valuation based on the actual rate of return on the shares.9 Another factor influencing 
the directors’ to settle the case was the desire to avoid having to disclose information in the 
law courts shedding light on the opaque workings of the firm that might then come to the 
attention of the mill shareholders through reports in the newspapers. This danger was 
illustrated by the fact that the directors were compelled to give Mrs Moir’s legal counsel 
access to confidential balance sheets of the firm for the previous two years to be viewed by 
appointment at the company’s offices.10 
While the legal dispute was ongoing, the directors moved swiftly to insure themselves against 
future disputes. They hurriedly issued the remaining 60% of the shares which had not been 
allocated to date amongst the existing shareholders.11 They also consulted a QC with a view to 
amending the Articles of Association: 
The expediency of revising the company’s articles of association, in view of the extensive additions to 
the Acts of Parliament affecting Joint Stock Companies and also the decisions of the courts of law on 
points in connection with former Acts, was informally discussed with the company’s solicitors some 
time ago.
12
 
The second case of a threat to the founding directors’ control to consider is that of Alex C 
Scott. Scott was the son of an Irish-born ironmonger and mill furnisher, Thomas Scott, and 
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served as an apprentice in his father’s firm from the age of 13.13 By 1884, Alex C Scott had set 
up in business on his own account at his Ward Road premises neighbouring the Nicoll brothers’ 
mill, as a “mill and factory furnisher, tinsmith, and gasfitter.”14 Although there is no record in 
the minutes, it seems plausible that Scott’s interest in the Thomas Duff group developed as a 
result of transactions to provide the firm with mill furnishing services and supplies in Calcutta. 
From 1884 to 1893, he incrementally increased his shareholdings in the Samnuggur and 
Titaghur Cos, culminating in the Chairman, Thomas Duff, transferring 200 shares to him.15 He 
was also a shareholder in the Victoria Co, and was one of a handful of regular non-director 
attendees at Annual General Meetings of the mill companies, mostly individuals with regular 
contracting relationships to the firms.16 Scott was coopted on to the board of the mill 
companies in October to replace William Smith after his death in July 1893 at the age of 43, 
who had only retired from Calcutta the previous year.17 Scott joined the board of Thomas Duff 
& Co the following year, replacing Joseph Barrie after his death.18 Circumstantial evidence of 
Scott’s prior connection with Calcutta is provided by his appointment as an executor of William 
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Smith’s will.19 In 1894, he “mentioned that he was willing to pay a visit to India for the purpose 
chiefly of examining into and acquainting himself with the company’s business there. The 
chairman [James Nicoll] stated that he was greatly pleased that Mr Scott was agreeable to do 
this and other members of the board concurred.”20 The statement is interesting in two 
respects. The inclusion of the qualifier “chiefly” hints that Scott had other business interests in 
India to attend to, probably in seeking mill furnishing contracts from other firms. It also draws 
attention to the energy and initiative that Scott brought to the ageing board in a period when 
its personnel was in the process of being renewed. The board had not had a Dundee-based 
director willing to visit Calcutta since Joseph Barrie in 1879, which became a pressing matter 
after Smith’s retirement as general manager – cum – permanent “visiting director in 
Calcutta”.21 Scott made further visits to Calcutta in 1897 and in 1899.22 His 1897 visit was in 
place of Charles Barrie Ovenstone, “whose turn it is”23, suggesting that the directors 
recognised the need to renew their knowledge of Calcutta and intercourse with the managerial 
hierarchy in principle by a system of rotating visits. However, this was not carried out in 
practice. Other than Scott, the Secretary David Stewart’s visit was the only one by a Dundee 
based director from 1879 to the end of the century.24 The confidence of the other members of 
the board in Scott was demonstrated when, in 1899, James Nicoll was the sole remaining 
founder director of the firm and had served for two years as the Chairman of the companies 
after Thomas Duff’s death when he decided to resign the position. The directors “accepted his 
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19 Feb 1896. 
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resignation with regret” but unanimously elected Scott, one of their most junior members to 
replace him. Scott protested modestly that “he would very much rather not be asked to 
occupy the chair”.25 
The period of Scott’s Chairmanship coincided with a flurry of proposals sent from the general 
manager in Calcutta to the the Dundee board of the managing agency suggesting opportunities 
to invest and diversify, which it is fair to assume were made on Scott’s initiative. 
Such proposals had been rare up to that point. In 1883, at the time of the firm’s formation, 
James Watson – of the Dundee distilling dynasty and a shareholder – had proposed the 
promotion of an investment trust in Dundee, which was not pursued.26 William Smith’s 
correspondence from 1887-90 during a period of slump in the jute industry also drew the 
attention of the directors to opportunities for new business. One proposal he presented was 
to take over the struggling commission agents, Mitchell, Reid & Co in order to diversify into 
commission business to exploit the potential economies of scope associated with the 
commercial side of the business.27 Another proposal was to bid to take over the bankrupt 
Chunda Ramjee jute mill, which feel into the hands of Andrew Yule & Co.28 Negotiations to 
take over the agency of the Manchester Fire Assurance Co were aborted in 1895 when the 
insurance company’s representative also entered into discussion with a Calcutta rival, Jardine, 
Skinner & Co.29 Thomas Duff & Co do appear to have obtained the agency for the Queen 
Insurance Co of America in 1898 but the listing only appeared in Thacker’s for one year.30 The 
reluctance of the board of directors in Dundee to pursue any of these proposals seriously 
testified to their strong sense of identity as a specialist jute manufacturer and their aversion to 
                                                          
25
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taking any risk that involved a shift from focusing on their core competence. There were good 
strategic reasons to consider taking over the Chunda Ramjee mills to prevent it falling into the 
hands of a competitor but this consideration seems to have been outweighed by the directors’ 
preference to expand through investing in new plant rather than acquiring existing concerns. 
A minute of 1899 seemed to mark a change of policy under Scott’s influence: 
Mr Nicoll reported that the opportunity of acquiring further agencies was likely to turn up, and it was 
agreed to authorise Mr Nicoll to undertake agencies for jute mills, coal companies, insurance and 
other kindred business, subject to confirmation by the board.
31
 
This change was confirmed by a decision to increase the paid up capital of the managing 
agency “seeing that all the paid up capital of the company has been invested in land, and 
having in view the probable extension of the agency business of the company”.32 In the 
following year, a further four proposals were presented. The first was an investment in 
Bengal’s Raniganj coalfield, which was rejected. There followed a further proposal for Thomas 
Duff & Co to become managing agents of another coal concern: 
Mr Nicoll reports that he had undertaken a coal agency from Kumar Dakshineswar Malia of Searsole 
on commission at the rate of two annas six pie per ton which is about the usual rate. Mr Nicoll 
reports that this coal owner is a wealthy and highly respected native and that his coalfield yields a 
satisfactory quality. The board approved of Mr Nicoll’s action.
33
 
On the same day that they approved the coal agency in their role as managing agents, meeting 
later in their role as mill company directors, they “placed a year’s contract with Dakshineswar 
Malia for Jerria quality of coal at R6-7-6 per ton landed, having, after several experiments and 
a thorough trial, found that this quality suits best.”34 The agency appears to have been short 
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lived as it is not mentioned again in the directors’ minutes and the mill companies were 
contracting instead with the Bengal Coal Co by the following year.35 
A second proposal appeared to have been to supply yarn to the US market: 
Mr Nicoll and [the company secretary] had had an interview with Mr Jacob Elysas, the President of 
three large bag manufacturing companies in the United States, who had called with the view of 
ascertaining whether a direct business could not be done to mutual advantage. After fully discussing 
matters with Mr Elysas, it did not seem that such could be worked to any advantage to the mills, and 
it was agreed to let the matter drop.
36
 
Although specialist spinning firms were a staple of the Dundee trade, the evolution of the 
spatial geography of the Calcutta industry on the basis of relatively large scale integrated 
spinning and weaving plants dispersed along the river Hooghly did not lend itself to this kind of 
venture.37 
The third proposal to take over the management of a jute press was rejected out of hand on 
economic and racial grounds. The general manager John Nicoll had been: 
[…] approached by influential natives having the control of the affairs of this concern offering the 
agency and management of their business. This concern has had a very unsatisfactory career for 
some time as shown by the copy of accounts forwarded by Mr Nicoll, and there being strong 
objections on account of the class [sic] of the majority of the proprietary, the board were clearly of 
the opinion that it would be quite unsuitable to accept the agency.
38
 
Finally, there was a proposal to contruct godowns at the firm’s principal jute mart 
Naraingunge: 
[…] as large quantities of fine jute have often to be stored there in cutcha sheds awaiting transport 
which was more or less dangerous, and in the event of destruction by fire might cause serious loss 
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and inconvenience. The directors saw very grave objections to the company carrying out any such 
scheme, and were of opinion that any such accommodation should be provided by the jute 
merchants at the principal centres; indeed, it is understood that Messrs R Sim & Co are at present 
contemplating erecting large and substantial godowns.
39
 
The proposal ran counter to the developing ties with the networked firm R Sim & Co 
considered below. Further proposals to diversify were presented by Landale, Clark & Co for 
coal agencies in 1903 and 190740, and to expand the firm’s jute manufacturing capacity in 1904 
through taking over the Arathoon jute mills or the Dunbar cotton mill, but received short 
shrift.41 
It seems that for a time under Scott’s chairmanship – influenced by the time he had spent in 
Calcutta and his network of contacts there – Thomas Duff & Co seriously considered 
transforming itself into a diversified managing agency using profits made in jute manufacturing 
as a springboard to enter other industries, following the model pioneered by the two other 
prominent newcomers who dominated the jute industry, Andrew Yule & Co and Bird & Co. 
However, the initiative floundered against the conservatism of his fellow directors, who 
appeared to be more concerned to preserve the managing agency’s identity as a jute specialist 
focusing on its core competence in jute manufacturing, which aligned with the knowledge of 
its predominantly Dundonian shareholder base. 
Further evidence that suggests that Scott was adept at cultivating a network of business 
contacts connected to India, probably through mill furnishing contracts, is provided by a 
minute of 1901 after his resignation: 
Heretofore the Calcutta office has been in the habit ex gratia of collecting bills sent them by Mr Scott 
for goods shipped by him to native dealers and attending to finance for same. The secretary stated 
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that Mr MacDonald, who has recently acquired Mr Scott’s mill furnishing business, had called and 
enquired as to whether the same facilities would be continued to him, but the board decided to 
instruct the Calcutta office to discontinue doing so, and in the event of any such business passing on 
to them to intimate from their end, both to Mr Scott and Mr MacDonald, that it should be stopped 
for the future.
42
 
Scott also had a business relationship with the Dundee agents of Calcutta jute mills managed 
by the competitors of Thomas Duff & Co. These relationships are inferred from Scott being 
named as executor of the wills of John and George Alexander, and of John Balfour Thomson, 
who died in the period 1896-1902.43 John Alexander, formerly connected with Thomas Duff at 
Barking, was the agent of the Mackinnon, Mackenzie’s India Jute Co in Dundee from 1882 until 
his death in 1896.44 George Alexander, his son, was the mill manager of the India Jute Co from 
1883-1900.45 John Balfour Thomson was the manager of the Bird & Co’s Union Jute Co from 
1881-97 and then Bird & Co’s agent in Dundee until his suicide in 1901.46 Another speculative 
piece of circumstantial evidence was an article from the Calcutta correspondent of the Courier 
that appeared in 1899 stating that “[i]t is rumoured here [in Calcutta] that Mr JA Kinnison [...] 
has found subscribers in your neighbourhood to provide funds for the erection of a jute mill of 
300 looms.”47 Scott’s inventory of 1918 suggests that he had a business relationship with the 
Kinnison mill, showing a debt outstanding to him for “commission on contracts arranged [...] 
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for the Kinnison Jute Mills”. The inventory also listed a large shareholding of 300 shares worth 
£20,000 in the Kinnison mill.48 
Taking all this circumstantial evidence together, the most plausible explanation for Scott’s 
abrupt resignation as the Chairman and a director on the boards of Thomas Duff & Co, and the 
Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos was that he was thwarted in an attempt to poach the firm’s 
managing agency business in the Victoria Co through secret negotiations with its board, and 
possibly in the other two mill companies as well through a shareholder revolt. It is difficult to 
discern an alternative explanation as to why the managing agency agreements of all three mills 
were all abruptly renegotiated in October 1900, when the current agreements had years left to 
run. All the portents were favourable for Scott to undertake such a scheme. He had emerged 
as the dominant force of a weakened directorate with the departure of Alex Nicoll and the 
deaths of William Smith, Joseph Barrie, and Thomas Duff – and one that had grown out of 
touch with its own managerial hierarchy in Calcutta while Scott had cultivated it with the 
promise of a diversified agency business offering more opportunities for managers to be 
promoted. Scott’s position as Chairman also put him in a strategic position to negotiate 
directly with the board of the Victoria Co and to offer them improved terms under new 
management. The Calcutta market was booming, with new opportunities, such as the agency 
business of the Kinnison mill, in the offing. Scott appeared to have accumulated significant 
assets of his own, as shown by his private purchase of the medium sized North Dudhope mill, 
which employed 500 workers49, from David Wybrants, a Victoria Co director, in December 
1900, after Thomas Duff & Co had rushed through the new agency agreements.50 The Victoria 
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agency agreement was finally signed on 14th November.51 In this scenario, the purchase of the 
Dundee mill would have marked the point at which Scott recognised that the prospects of 
setting up in Calcutta were no longer viable once Thomas Duff & Co had secured its agency 
business for the foreseeable future. It is intriguing what Wybrants’ role might have been in the 
affair leading to Scott’s resignation and exit from Thomas Duff & Co. Certainly, the remaining 
directors of Thomas Duff & Co were on sufficiently good terms with him to permit him to take 
a share in their managing agency the following year.52 The evidence suggests that the Thomas 
Duff directors got wind of some scheme to which they were forced to react in June, 1900. 
How was Scott’s abrupt resignation reported in the firm’s own records? The first indication of a 
division on the board of directors appeared on 12th June, 1900, when the board agreed “that 
copies of all telegrams received and despatched should be sent to any director who may be 
from home”, suggesting an anxiety that a small but quorate board meeting might be called at 
short notice to push through measures unwelcome to other board members.53 On 20th June, 
two new directors, George Nairn and John Smith, were brought on to the board of Thomas 
Duff & Co, having been elected to the boards of the mill companies the previous year. This was 
unusual, as board members were normally elected to replace a deceased director or at the 
time of an annual general meeting, but it may have served the purpose of obtaining a majority 
to oppose Scott.54 By the 21st August, Scott had resigned as Chairman of the firms. The minutes 
of the meeting of the directors of Thomas Duff & Co record that Scott was absent from the 
meeting and that Charles Barrie Ovenstone had replaced him as Chairman and as the director 
overseeing the legal case with Mrs Moir.55 The Moir case was settled by Ovenstone the 
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following week.56 At the board meeting of the 21st, the minutes noted the board’s acceptance 
of Scott’s resignation as Chairman. The Secretary was instructed to: 
inform [Scott] that the directors took exception to the grounds stated in his letter as the reason of 
his resignation, the discussion of the questions affecting the company’s business to which it is 
understood he refers having taken place at a regularly called and properly constituted meeting of the 
board.
57
 
These questions presumably included the decision to renegotiate the managing agency 
contracts and it suggests that this decision was taken in his absence at a board meeting he may 
not have been aware of or one called at short notice. This impression is reinforced by the 
following week’s minute, once the crisis had passed, “to resume circulating to the directors 
individually copies of all telegrams received and sent”, the implication being that, at some 
point, the instruction of 12th June to circulate all telegrams had been withdrawn, enabling an 
orderly coup d’etat to be pushed through.58 On 4th September, the board of Thomas Duff & Co 
voted to transfer Scott’s shares in the managing agency to “shareholders who are taking the 
active management of the company’s business, to equalize their shareholdings with that of the 
late Chairman of the company.”59 
Scott was present at the board meeting of 26 September where Charles Barrie Ovenstone and 
the newly appointed John Smith, retired partner of R Sim & Co, were empowered to carry 
through the renegotiation of the Victoria Co’s managing agency contract on behalf of the 
board, explicitly removing him from any say in the process. The same meeting referred to the 
conclusion of the new 20 year agreements with Samnuggur and Titaghur: 
Mr Scott, who was present at the meeting of 17
th
 curt [when the new agreement was discussed], 
now stated that he had taken independent legal advice, and, while he further stated that he 
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considered the agreement a very good one so far as this company was concerned, he asked his 
dissent to the execution of the agreement to be recorded as he was not satisfied with the course 
proposed to be followed for its adoption. The board took exception to his action in having on his 
own account taken outside legal advice on the point, as they were quite prepared, if they had felt 
any difficulty in the matter, to have consulted counsel in a proper and regular way, and Mr Hendry 
was instructed, if he thought it expedient, still to take the advice of counsel.
60
 
After 14th November, Scott did not attend another board meeting of any of the companies 
until the 22nd February, 1901, which may suggest that he had been away in India, or had simply 
been marginalised. At the meetings of the Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos of 22nd February,  
A proof of the directors’ report was submitted to and considered by the meeting clause by 
clause. The same was approved of by the meeting, but Mr Scott entered his dissent against the 
clause referring to him under the heading “Directorate”. After some discussion the Secretary 
was instructed to note same.61 
The implication was that Scott was determined that the shareholders would be informed of his 
dissent in advance of the annual general meeting, where he might muster sufficient support to 
overturn the majority of the board of directors. Further meetings of the mill companies took 
place a few days later with Andrew Hendry, the firm’s solicitor, in attendance where Scott 
“intimated that he was to resign office as a director at the general meeting on 6th prox., but 
declined to give written intimation to that effect, and in view of this it was determined to issue 
the notices in the form submitted to the [annual general] meeting.”62 Hendry had received 
written notice of Scott’s resignation by the time further board meetings were called two days 
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later, leading to what was presumably an unflattering clause referring to Scott being removed 
from the notice of the meeting, and an amended notice sent out to the shareholders.63 
The contentious nature of the annual general meetings of Samnuggur and Titaghur was clear 
from the fact that the minutes record that the directors had canvassed the proxy votes of over 
100 shareholders: 
A letter of resignation as a director, of date 5
th
 current, by Mr Alexander Cochrane Scott was 
submitted to the meeting. The Chairman stated that this letter had been sent to the secretary after 
the directors had called upon Mr Scott to resign office and after they had given him notice that if he 
did not do so a resolution for his removal would be submitted to this meeting. On the motion of the 
chairman, seconded by Mr James Nicoll, it was unanimously agreed to accept Mr Scott’s resignation 
and resolved that he be removed from the office of director of this company, and this was done 
accordingly. 
The directors, in their anxiety to avoid criticism, had also enlisted the support of a shareholder 
and local grandee. “Ex-Lord Provost Matthewson expressed his strong approval of the financial 
policy which the directors were pursuing in conducting the affairs of the company.” The 
minutes recorded that the meetings approved the new managing agency agreements 
unanimously despite Scott himself being present, suggesting he had misjudged the loyalty of 
the inside shareholders’ family ties to the other directors and was unable to overcome the 
passivity of the outside shareholders.64 
Scott had still retained his seat on the board of the managing agents but was informed of their 
intention to call a special meeting to oust him. They received his resignation two days later.65 
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By this time, his interest in Calcutta seems to have ended as he sold the mill furnishing 
business around the same time as he purchased the North Dudhope works.66 
Although there was no record of the decision to transfer Scott’s shares in the managing 
agency67 being reversed, later events show this must have occurred. Perhaps he was allowed 
to retain a shareholding in exchange for his silence about the whole affair. Certainly there was 
no reference to it in the newspapers at the time while the reporting of the Moir versus Thomas 
Duff & Co case was going on. When Smith died in 1918, “[t]he board unanimously decided not 
to give their consent to the registration of [his son and executor], Mr T[homas] W[illiam] Scott 
as a member of the company” by transferring the 43 reinstated shares and instead to “to 
enforce the transfer of the whole of the shares which stand in the register in the name of the 
late Mr Alexander Cochrane Scott to a person or persons to be nominated by the directors.”68 
What followed was essentially a recapitulation of the Moir case. TW Scott’s lawyers informed 
Thomas Duff & Co that they did not recognised the legal basis of Article 51 of the revised 
Articles of Association, empowering the directors to transfer the shares of a deceased member 
if no application was received to transfer them within 14 days of their death. Furthermore, 
they did not accept the directors’ £300 valuation of the shares, which they valued at £500, 
stating that the “Estate Duty Office have declined to accept of that value”, and announced 
their intention to sue the transferers and recipients of the shares for damages.69 The board of 
Thomas Duff & Co “ultimately decided that it would not be desirable to have the details of the 
company’s business discussed in court in a proof” and settled the case by purchasing the 
shares and paying the legal costs of Scott’s executors.70 A “scheme presented to avoid 
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recurrence” of such cases included the appointment of an independent auditor to value the 
firm’s shares in future, who fixed a value of £375 per £100 share for that year.71 
The Scott affair had a salutary effect on the complacency of the board in relation to the 
monitoring of the managerial hierarchy in Calcutta. A system of rotating annual Chairmanships 
was instituted together with the rotation of annual visits to Calcutta by a Dundee director. As 
well as John Smith and George Nairn, Robert Sim was brought in to strengthen the numbers of 
those on the three boards with recent experience of doing business in Calcutta.72 
 
 
4.2 Networked Firms as a Method of Informal Vertical Integration – 
Thomas Duff & Co and R Sim & Co. 
 
Previous chapters have underlined the importance of raw jute in the cost structure of jute 
manufacturing enterprise in Calcutta and the forms of vertical integration undertaken by 
managing agents to ensure timely access to the raw material while controlling costs. The 
relationships in the supply chain proved crucial to the business model of Thomas Duff & Co. 
Vertical integration could be formal - through the creation of purchasing networks and 
godown facilities in the mofussil – and/or informal – through closer ties with networked firms 
of raw jute traders and the systematic use of credit to achieve the informal subordination of 
jute traders down the value chain.73 Unlike larger and more diversified managing agents such 
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as Bird74, Thomas Duff lacked the financial resources to take on the risk of formally 
internalising their supply of raw jute. How did the Thomas Duff & Co group secure its raw jute 
supplies? 
Once the group reached its mature form, the managing agents were responsible for arranging 
finance and for purchasing inputs of the raw material on behalf of the managed mills, in the 
same way that they were responsible for the marketing of their output. Initially, the managing 
agents’ limited reach and knowledge in the jute centres was reflected by the preponderance of 
purchases made through brokers from intermediaries in the Calcutta bazaar.75 By 1888, the 
general manager was attempting to dispense with brokers as intermediaries for bazaar 
purchases, at a saving that worked out to about 2%: 
Here I may mention that we intend in future to make all our own purchases from the bazaar direct. 
Mr Whytock has bought over 10,000 maunds since he joined us, and we are convinced, in fact we 
have proved it beyond doubt that direct purchases give a clear saving of _/1/_ [annas] to _/1/6 
[annas] p[er] maund as against commission purchases by brokers here, and besides we get the jute 
we want. The bazaar staff costs us nothing, and, if we have an assistant daily in the bazaar he can 
often pick up lots at extremely cheap prices for cash.
76
 
“Mr Smith had just returned from being round the jute districts, and the opinion [about the 
prospects for the jute season] above given has been formed after personal inspection.”77 
Smith’s visit led him to “expect the quality to fall off as the season advances.”78 
By 1894, the directors were writing “failed to see any good reason adduced why a trial should 
not be made of sending a man up to the districts seeing that the present is such a favourable 
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opportunity”, although the general manager objected that the Calcutta office was 
understaffed.79 In addition to purchases in the bazaar, Thomas Duff & Co transacted regularly 
with the larger jute merchants deemed to be creditworthy because of their links to European 
business circles. These firms had access to credit from the Presidency Banks and the Bank of 
Bengal which systematically discriminated against Indian traders.80 These included the 
dominant trader both in the domestic market and the export market, Ralli Brothers81, also 
Landale, Clark & Co, and Marcar David. David had a close trading relationship with the 
Barnagore mill, of which Thomas Duff was a director.82 In 1884, he purchased 250 Samnuggur 
shares from Chairman, Thomas Duff, possibly indicating an attempt to cement a closer trading 
relationship. The hostility of Thomas Duff & Co to conducting risky trades with non-Europeans 
was indicated by their preference for conducting “double business” to finance jute purchases, 
which involved a current purchase of rupees with sterling and a corresponding purchase of 
sterling with rupees at a later date to eliminate exchange risk: 
It appears from the weekly statement that 90 d[ay]s acceptances have been given to Messrs TM 
Thaddeus & Co and Mr MJ Michael for jute purchases. The board would have preferred not to have 
given acceptances to firm such as these [non-Europeans] and would have preferred double 
business.
83
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An alternative method of jute finance to issuing trade acceptances, when the European money 
market was tight, was to trade in Marwari hundis. These were short term loans of 3 months’ 
duration organised by networks of traders of Gujarati origin who had evolved a highly 
developed parallel banking system to the European one and frequently offered lower interest 
rates.84 The racial prejudice expressed towards firms like the Armenians Thaddeus and 
Michael, had an economic rationale in recognising the institutionalised discrimination in the 
banking system that affected their creditworthiness. The prejudice against the Marwaris 
lacked the same rationale and was gradually overcome until dealing in Hundis became a 
routine method of raising short-term finance for jute purchases.85 
The preceding discussion indicates that Thomas Duff & Co purchased raw jute from a diverse 
group of suppliers. They lacked the capacity to create their own jute trading operation, which 
might in any case not be cost effective given the highly seasonal nature of the trade. 
Relationships with firms such as Ralli were problematic given an asymmetry in market power 
which was not in favour of Thomas Duff & Co. While a relationship existed with Marcar David 
& Co, it lacked sufficient exclusivity given the Barnagore’s prior relationship. What was 
required was a smaller networked firm with which to transact regularly on a mutually non-
exclusive but sufficiently close basis to develop privileged access to a large portion of their jute 
supplies while also cementing trust over time to permit the transmission of market 
information about the condition of the jute market in the mofussil. This was the basis on which 
the relationship with R Sim & Co developed. 
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Robert Sim & Co was formed in 1880 by Robert Sim and John Smith.86 By 1907, it was 
described by one Bengali newspaper correspondent as one of the ‘”leading jute firms” along 
with Rallis, David, Landale Clark, Jardine, Skinner and Bird & Co.87 Smith was the younger 
brother of William Smith, the general manager of Thomas Duff & Co, who had gone out to 
India in 1876.88 Sim almost certainly knew the Smiths from employment in the firm of Cox Bros 
in Dundee. The 1871 household census enumerators records that the Smith brothers were 
employed as “clerks” and Sim as "mill overseer jute" resident in Lochee.89 It is known that the 
Smiths were employed at Coxes’ and Sim’s Lochee residence in the neighbourhood of the 
Coxes’ Camperdown Works in 1871, combined with his subsequent employment in Calcutta as 
the manager of Coxes’ Camperdown Pressing Co suggest that Sim sent for John Smith to join 
him in partnership in Calcutta, having learnt the jute business there working at the jute 
pressing and baling concern.90 The first reference to the young firm in the records of the 
Thomas Duff group was a hostile one, which suggests that the general manager William Smith 
had abused his position to give special favours to his brother’s firm without the knowledge of 
the directors in Dundee: 
Mr Alexander Nicoll laid on the table a private letter he had received from the general manager 
stating that he had accepted Bills to Messrs R Sim & Co. as an accommodation to them to the extent 
of Rs 75,000 in connection with their private business. The directors unanimously disapproved of Mr 
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Smith’s action in so doing – it being ultra vires of the Company’s Articles of Association, and outwith 
the power of attorney in Mr Smith’s favour, and otherwise inexpedient in their opinion; and the 
Secretary was instructed to inform Mr Smith accordingly.
91
 
However, the advantages of the personal tie to a firm which had set up in the rapidly growing 
jute market at Naraingunge must have been obvious to the directors and their attitude had 
softened by 1886, agreeing “to allow the managing agents to give Messrs R Sim & Co 
temporary accommodation to the extent of five thousand rupees if it should be applied for.”92 
By 1889, R Sim & Co had begun to establish itself as part of the informal Thomas Duff & Co 
network. Alex Nicoll transferred 25 shares of the Samnuggur Co to each of Robert Sim and 
John Smith and Thomas Duff 100 each of the Titaghur.93 Both partners steadily accumulated 
very large shareholdings until their respective appointments as directors in 1899 and 1902.94 
The most significant step to cementing the informal tie was the decision to grant John Smith 
16 allotted shares in Thomas Duff & Co, admitting him into the directors’ inner circle.95 
In that same year, the minutes refer to Alex Nicoll’s nephew Patrick Whytock “having, at his 
own request, been relieved of his appointment [as a commercial assistant in Thomas Duff & 
Co’s Calcutta office] in order to join Messrs R Sim & Co”.96 As Table 4.1 below indicates, from 
this point on, Thomas Duff & Co seems to have become the sole avenue for R Sim & Co to 
recruit its assistants and were effectively acting as their Dundee agents.97 This served as a 
mutually beneficial arrangement by cementing ties between the two firms based on tacit 
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knowledge of each other’s business. It provided R Sim & Co with a cost effective method of 
recruiting assistants who had attained the requisite skill, having been trained in the business of 
their biggest trading partner. It also served as a safety valve for Thomas Duff & Co to dispense 
with the services of assistants who lacked the patience or ability to wait for promotion through 
the firm’s internal hierarchy, including some of the directors’ own sons and nephews, (Table 
4.1 also includes information for the Nicoll directors’ sons employed by other intermediaries in 
the Calcutta jute trade.) 
 
Table 4.1: R Sim & Co managers, 1883-1921, and links to Thomas Duff & Co through family ties, 
past employment and shareholdings. 
TD = Thomas Duff & Co, S = Samnuggur Co, T = Titaghur Co, V = Victoria Co 
Name 
Relation of TD 
director 
Shares 
held in 
TD cos 
Previous job 
with TD firm 
Years and initial location 
employed by R Sim & Co 
Estate 
(1870 
prices) 
Robert Sim 
 
S, T, V 
 
Naraingunge 1883-1901 £92,716 
John Smith William Smith S, T, V 
 
Naraingunge 1891-1901 £145,909 
Patrick Whytock Alex Nicoll S, T TD 1884-89 Serajgunge 1889-90 £2,834 
Charles W Low 
 
T   Serajgunge 1897 £8,660 
Alex Nicoll Jr Alex Nicoll T, V   Naraingunge 1897-04 
 
William D Shaw 
 
T, V   Calcutta 1901 
 
Arthur W Baxter 
 
S, T TD 1897 Calcutta 1901-1921 £6,002 
Earle D Nicoll James Nicoll T, V S 1904-07 1907-09 
 
Leonard D Nicoll James Nicoll S, T, V   Chandpur 1908-1921 
 
David B Stewart David Stewart 
 
S 1905- Chandpur c1908 
 
George K Stein 
  
T 1897 1914 £1,385 
James WR Steven 
  
 T 1913-21 1921 
 
Employed by other Calcutta jute firms 
Fred J Nicoll James Nicoll T S 1895 David & Co, Calcutta 1897 £1,771 
Herbert W Nicoll James Nicoll S   Poppe Delius 1898-1902 
 
Thomas Nicoll Alex Nicoll S   King Bros Calcutta 1901-21 
 
Sources: Details of employment with Thomas Duff group from MS 86/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, MS 
86/3/1, Titaghur Co, MOTD, MS 86/5/1, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD; details of employment with R Sim & 
Co from Thacker’s Directory, Dundee Courier obituaries; shareholdings from Thomas Duff & Co 
shareholder lists (sources listed in Table 5.1 below) or from inventories, National Archive of Scotland; 
relationships to Thomas Duff & Co directors from cross-referencing censuses 1841-1911, household 
enumerators, with Dundee Directory. 
 
Table 4.1 demonstrates the density of informal ties between the two firms. While R Sim & Co 
remained nominally independent, their shareholdings in the Thomas Duff & Co mills gave them 
an economic incentive to be accommodating to the needs of one of their most substantial 
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customers. The final step marking the integration of R Sim & Co into the Thomas Duff & Co 
firm network was the election in 1899 and 1902 respectively of the firm’s partners to the 
directorates of the Thomas Duff group in Dundee on their retirement from India. In 1901, Sim 
and Smith appointed Alex Nicoll Jr to oversee the affairs of the firm in the mofussil and in 
Calcutta in preparation for their retirement to Dundee.98 It is very noticeable that the wealth 
of the managers who succeeded Sim and Smith was an order of magnitude smaller, as 
indicated by the size of the moveable estate they left after their deaths, given in the final 
column of Table 4.1. This suggests indirectly the subordination of the firm within the Thomas 
Duff group. The relative wealth of Sim and Smith cannot be explained solely by the 
remuneration they received after becoming directors of Thomas Duff & Co – they had already 
acquired large shareholdings in the mill companies at the time they joined the board.99 
Effectively, Thomas Duff & Co was able to capture the rents previously accrued by R Sim & Co 
due to their strategic position in the value chain. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that 
the timing of Sim and Smith’s retiring from India coincided with Thomas Duff & Co granting 
increasing financial facilities to R Sim & Co. 
The deepening of ties with R Sim & Co at Naraingunge did not entail any loss of independence 
in forming judgements of the likely course of jute markets as indicated by William Smith 
writing on the jute forecast for the 1890-91 season: 
I wired you to discredit those reports of Sim regarding the damage done to the crop. They take an 
absurdly exaggerated view of the position, as really all their opinions are influenced by what they see 
locally at Naraingunge and Chandpur, [and] we in Calcutta are in a much better position than they 
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are to advise you in respect to jute generally. [...] I still hold the outturn will be two annas over last 
year & at the end of the season (bar further accident), that this estimate will be very near correct.
100
 
A message of 1896 indicates that R Sim & Co did serve as a regular source of market 
intelligence: 
A message was received from R Sim & Co., Naraingunge, on 7
th
 inst. in which they say that prospects 
are rather worse since their last advices, and that they think the outturn will be 3 to 4 annas less 
than last year.
101
 
The sharing of market information was a reciprocal relationship between the two firms, 
demonstrating an unusual level of trust given Thomas Duff & Co’s assiduous protection of 
commercial secrecy. In 1906, “a copy of the [confidential Calcutta] market report [of the Indian 
Jute Mills Association] had been seen in the hands of a local jute merchant [in Dundee], and 
the directors individually stated that none of them had given a copy of the reports received by 
them to anyone.”102: 
With further reference to this matter, the board decided that the weekly lithographed market 
reports should be posted only to the directors of this company, and that the analysis of the monthly 
working and the sale chart should be sent to the office together with two copies of the litho report. 
It was mentioned that possibly Messrs Landale & Clark and Messrs R Sim & Co have been in the habit 
of receiving a copy of the weekly report, and it was agreed to continue giving them these reports if 
they have lately been getting them, but to stop the posting of these to all other private individuals, 
and to request Messrs Landale & Clark and Messrs R Sim & Co Ltd, if they get the reports, to hold 
them as private.
103
 
One of the advantages of the close trading relationship with R Sim & Co lay in the fact that one 
of the determinants of efficient working and cost control lay in purchasing different grades of 
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jute to be combined in certain proportions achieve the right balance between quality and cost 
in the spinning of yarn. This led all the major jute traders to develop their own “assortments” 
of different grades for sale to the jute mills, obviating the need for mills to make a separate 
transaction for each grade of jute. As the biggest purchaser of Sim’s assortment, this mark 
would have been tailored to meet the specific needs of the mills managed by Thomas Duff & 
Co.104 
Another aspect that affected the calculation involved in the relationship with R Sim & Co was 
the increasing scarcity of godown storage space for raw jute from the turn of the century. As 
the construction of new mills and the extension of existing mills boomed, it put a premium on 
using space in mill compounds for spinning and weaving, while the increasing size of the crop 
entering Calcutta from September to January led many mills to compete to hire rented 
godown space from Indian proprietors within the bounds of the city of Calcutta at inflated 
prices.105 The situation was compounded by increased government regulation of godown 
owners in the city to reduce the risk of fire to surrounding residences.106 This led John Nicoll to 
propose to construct godowns for the Samnuggur mill at Naraingunge, but the Dundee 
directors preferred to contract for the service with R Sim & Co: 
as large quantities of fine jute have often to be stored there [at Naraingunge] in cutcha sheds 
awaiting transport which was more or less dangerous, and in the event of destruction by fire might 
cause serious loss and inconvenience. The directors saw very grave objections to the company 
carrying out any such scheme, and were of opinion that any such accommodation should be 
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provided by the jute merchants at the principal centres; indeed, it is understood that Messrs R Sim & 
Co are at present contemplating erecting large and substantial godowns.
107
 
Fire destroyed R Sim & Co’s Mundamalla godowns at Naraingunge the following year, where 
the Samnuggur mill had 25,000 maunds of jute stored at the time. Although R Sim & Co’s fire 
insurance covered the cost of the jute, this caused disruption in arranging alternative supplies 
at the height of the season when prices were rising.108 It is fair to assume from the way in 
which orders of R Sim & Co jute were combined by the three mill companies that the figure for 
the weight of Samnuggur’s jute destroyed in the fire is representative of the amount of jute 
held by the Titaghur and Victoria mills as well.109 This would mean that well over half of the 
150,000 maunds of jute lost by R Sim & Co in the fire had been purchased by the Thomas Duff 
& Co mills, indicating the strength of the relationship between the firms.110 The godowns were 
reconstructed and the arrangement continued: 
In a special report from [visiting Dundee director] Mr Nairn, he advises that he had visited 
Naraingunge and made a very careful inspection of the jute belonging to the company stored there 
with Messrs R Sim & Co ltd. He states that he had found the quality excellent and better than he 
anticipated.
111
 
The financial facilities afforded to R Sim & Co by Thomas Duff & Co increased rapidly from 
1901 until it reached the very large sum of Rs26,00,000 in 1921, slightly more than 10% of the 
Rs220,00,000 spent on jute purchases by the three mill companies in that year.112 Credit 
extended to R Sim & Co took the form of a mixture of loans and trade acceptances – 
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permitting them to raise bank finance to make purchases. 6 months acceptances became the 
most typical form of credit. The increasing maturity length of the acceptances over time is 
another indication of trust. 
 
Table 4.2: Increasing Financial Accommodation by Thomas Duff & Co to R Sim & Co for Jute 
Purchase, ("acceptances" = A/ "temporary cash loan" = L). 
Month, year Type 
Amount, 
Rupees * 
Maturity - 
duration 
Interest 
paid by 
TDC 
Interest 
charged 
to RS 
Sep, 1897 a 150,000 90 days     
Jan, 1899 a   90 days 6-7%   
Dec, 1900 a 200,000   4.7%   
Jul, 1903 a 150,000       
Aug, 1904 l 150,000     4% 
May, 1905 a 150,000 6 months     
Aug, 1905 a +225,000       
Apr, 1911 a/l 800,000       
Aug, 1911 l 300,000 60 days   4% 
Sep, 1911 a/l *800,000 6 months     
Jun, 1912 a/l 1,000,000 6 months     
May, 1913 a/l 600,000       
Aug, 1916 a/l 900,000       
Sep, 1916 a/l 1,100,000       
Sep, 1918 a/l 1,400,000       
Jun, 1919 a/l 1,500,000       
1920 a/l 2,100,000       
Sep, 1921 a/l 2,600,000       
*“limit only to be exceeded with reference to Dundee directors [of Thomas Duff & Co]” from 1911 
onwards. + minimum. Sources: MS 86/5/1/1-2, Thomas Duff & Co, MOTD, 1897-1921. 
 
Informal ties based on joint shareholding, family ties and repeated transactions to establish 
trust proved a viable alternative to taking on the risk of formal backwards integration. 
 
 
  
240 
 
4.3 Regulating competition: Thomas Duff’s strategy in the Indian Jute 
Mills Association, 1884-1921.  
 
The Indian Jute Manufacturers Association113 came into existence after three years of the most 
severe crisis yet faced by the nascent industry in the form of an agreement to work short time. 
The working time was limited to four days a week, a reduction of a third from a normal 
working week of six days. By the end of the period, the IJMA was acknowledged as the most 
powerful industry lobby in Calcutta, and a key constituent of the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce ranking alongside the Indian Tea Association and Indian Mining Association, with 
whose members there was a considerable overlap. The IJMA returned two dedicated 
representatives to the Bengal Legislative Council after the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 
1919 with the passage of the Government of India Act.114 
This section, gives an overview of the functions of the IJMA, before considering arguments 
within the existing historiographical literature as to the efficacy of the IJMA. It proceeds to 
analyse the functioning of the IJMA from the point of view of perhaps its most enthusiastic 
advocate, Thomas Duff & Co. This approach draws out some of the tensions and 
disagreements between IJMA constituents and also between IJMA members and non-
associated mills. Drawing on the analysis of managing agencies from the previous chapter, 
which emphasized the heuristic importance of imperfect markets in the context of a specific 
form of colonial political economy, it is argued that analyses of the IJMA that focus on the 
irrational economic behaviour and decisions of its constituents in terms of mainstream 
economic theory obscure more than they explain. I will demonstrate that Thomas Duff & Co 
had good reason to advocate for the authority of the IJMA and that this had beneficial 
outcomes for them. This claim is then evaluated against the claims of other constituencies 
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interested in the industry and in terms of the industry’s long term evolution in competition 
with the UK and other centres of jute manufacturing industry. 
 
Overview of the IJMA, 1884-1921 
The IJMA was formally constituted in 1885 with the agreement that was subsequently 
implemented to work four days weekly from 15th February, 1886. Short time working 
agreements were renewed an annual basis for the next five years before the breakup of the 
agreement in 1891 as the world economy started to move uncertainly out of the Long 
Depression led to improved demand conditions. Short time agreements were briefly renewed 
for three months in 1894 and again for six months in 1899. Further agreements were instituted 
in 1906, 1908-12, 1914, and 1917-21, which became more complex in having to account for 
regulating the use of electric light and government regulation of working hours in the India 
Factory Act which came into effect in 1912. 
The regulation of working hours in order to manage the expansion of output in line with world 
demand and thus to maintain profitable output prices was the central element of IJMA 
strategy. This was buttressed by a number of subsidiary agreements. The regulation of working 
time logically entailed a ban on members extending their productive capacity for the duration 
of agreements in the pursuit of the objective of managing the growth of the industry’s output. 
Another element of the IJMA’s goal of securing profitable working was to differentiate 
between export markets where India manufacturers had an unassailable competitive 
advantage relative to Dundee, other established markets dominated by Dundee, such as the 
New York hessian market, and emerging markets such as Argentina, which the IJMA wished to 
break into. This objective was pursued through the use of a differential pricing mechanism, 
whereby members sold to “closed ports” at minimum prices according to an agreed price list 
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and to open ports at market rates. The price list dropped into disuse after 1901115 but agreed 
minimum prices remained in place for certain key product lines such as hessian wheat bags for 
the San Francisco market. The Association also played an important coordinating function in 
the negotiation of fixed prices for orders by Allied governments during the First World War 
that comprised something like a third of total industry output during this period. 
Other mechanisms were employed on a more occasional basis by the Association. During the 
initial period of short time from 1886, a concerted attempt was made to standardise wages 
across the industry in order to address the negative consequences of competition for labour 
between mills that would potentially be aggravated by the impact of shorter working hours on 
weekly take home pay. Mills also coordinated their activity in order to erode the wage 
differential that had emerged in preceding years of weavers relative to other less well 
remunerated sections of the workforce. One mechanism that was agreed between the mills to 
facilitate this process of wage standardization was a dispensation for mills affected by strike 
action by workers seeking to contest lower wages to make up time lost to strikes under the 
supervision of the Association. Permission was also granted on occasion for making up time 
lost due to engine breakdowns.116 Another mechanism occasionally resorted to was the 
impounding of sacking looms to address recurrent crises of profitability affecting sacking 
product lines relative to hessians, which enjoyed more buoyant demand and a faster growing 
market. 
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Information function – market prices and jute forecasts. 
One function typical of all employers’ federations is the necessity to represent the general 
interests of the industry apropos suppliers of raw materials and purchasers of finished goods, 
while lobbying political actors to influence the legal framework in which the industry operates. 
In the case of the IJMA, this involved representing the interests of the mills by negotiating the 
contracting arrangements for the purchasing of raw jute and the sale of finished goods by 
seeking the most advantageous framing of contract forms, and negotiating rates of 
commissions and rules governing the conduct of the plethora of Calcutta brokers who served 
as intermediaries in contracting for raw jute and manufactured output. Coordination between 
the mills through the IJMA vis-à-vis brokers permitted the mills to take advantage of the 
asymmetry in market power in terms of their size and financial resources to gain advantageous 
terms from brokers. Such asymmetries also applied to many raw jute dealers, especially 
Indians, but in the case of the dominant actor operating in the raw jute sector, Ralli, they had 
to negotiate on equal terms. Ralli was also a significant shipper of manufactured goods and the 
mills had to negotiate with firms of similar stature who acted as large shippers or purchasers of 
manufactures in Australian and American markets. Regulating relations with such large 
contractors involved devising effective contracting arrangements, particularly with regard to 
disputes over quality, and negotiating effective arbitration mechanisms overseen by third 
parties such as the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. The Calcutta mills were at pains to minimize 
disputes over quality in order to combat Dundee’s reputation for finer quality output which 
permitted Dundee to charge higher prices and exclude Calcutta from established markets. 
It should be noted that discussion of short time working has tended to focus on its efficacy at 
regulating the supply of manufactures in line with the demand and maintaining profitable 
prices. Perhaps of equal importance, was its function in regulating the growth of demand for 
raw jute in relation to the capacity of the Bengali ryot to increase supply to meet this demand. 
Chapter 1 demonstrated the trend for rising raw jute prices coupled with the perception of 
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deteriorating quality. The crisis that led to the negotiation of the first short time agreement 
was not only caused by weak demand for manufactures. It had as much to do with the 
unexpected rise in raw jute prices which eroded profit margins and disrupted the accumulation 
of jute stocks, leading mills to close for lack of raw material. In addition to working short time, 
the IJMA sought to combat rising raw jute prices by negotiating agreements to delay the 
timing of mills’ entry into the market at the beginning of the jute season to undercut the drift 
to higher prices from season to season. 
In order to avoid crises in the raw jute market, the IJMA assumed an important function as a 
source of information to its members. This involved disseminating information with respect to 
initial and final forecasts of the jute crop by the Government of India in May and July of each 
year, collated from the District Reports of ICS officials. This permitted the member mills to 
make more informed judgements about the likely course of prices in the coming season. This 
was supplemented by the regular publication in the IJMA’s annual reports of estimates of the 
carry over of raw jute from the previous season, and of the previous year’s sales of raw jute to 
Calcutta, Dundee and other jute manufacturing centres, together with the sales and prices of 
manufactures to different markets and the share of different shippers. 
The Association also acted to assert the growing economic power of the jute mills in seeking to 
influence policy making by the Government of India and the Secretary of State in London. 
Reciprocally, the Government of India became more interested in the industry as it came to 
occupy an increasingly important place in the Bengali economy as the source of demand for 
the most important cash crop of the Bengali peasantry and as the main source of employment 
for the emerging Calcutta working class. Both groups were subject to the influence of different 
strands of Indian political agency responding to the impact of colonialism and seeking to 
challenge it, such as Swadeshi, communalism, Khilafat and non-cooperation, which the 
Government of India were concerned to combat. The interface between the IJMA and the 
Government of India, as discussed by Gordon Stewart, involved articulating a response to 
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accusations emanating from Dundee that more liberal labour legislation governing the working 
hours of Bengali labour gave Calcutta an unfair competitive advantage in export markets while 
being detrimental to the workforce. Thus, the IJMA sought to coordinate between its members 
and government to eliminate Saturday afternoon working and to prevent the use of electric 
lighting for the purpose of mills working an additional nightshift. The IJMA also represented 
the interests of the industry to influence the legislation contained in the Indian Factory 
Commission of 1908 and to delay the implementation of a maximum working day of 12 hours 
for an individual male worker until 1912.117 
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246 
 
Table 4.3: IJMA Short Time agreements and actual working time of Samnuggur mill, 1885-
1921. 
Year 
Annual 
working 
days 
Daily 
Working 
Hours 
Annual 
working 
hours 
Weekly 
days 
during 
short 
time 
Duration 
(unless stated all figures are hours per week; 
percentages given where not all mills working 
same hours). 
 
1886 216 12 2592 4 1 year to 15 Feb 1887 
1887 243 12 2916 4.5 1 year to 15 Feb 1888 
1888 270 12 3240 5 1 year to 15 Feb 1889 
1889 270 12 3240 5 1 year to 15 Feb 1890 
1890 243 12 2916 4.5 1 year to 15 Feb 1891 
1891 270 12 3240     
1892 270 12 3240     
1893 270 12 3240     
1894 297 12 3564 5 1 Apr-1 Jul 
1895 305 12 3664     
1896 305 14 4280     
1897 305 14 4280     
1898 305 13.9 4248     
1899 307 14.0 4304 5 1 Apr-1 Oct (aborted 31 May) 
1900 304 13.9 4210     
1901 304 13.5 4104     
1902 305 14.3 4340     
1903 305 14.1 4301     
1904 307 14.2 4357     
1905 306 14.5 4436     
1906 307 13.4 4098 6 Jan-June no electric light 
1907 307 14.4 4426     
1908 269 15 3764 5 Jan-Jun 5 days, Jul-Dec 5 days of 15 hrs 
1909 270 15 3785 5 Jan-Sep 5 days of 15 hrs 
1910 288 15 4031 5 Sept-Dec 5 days of 15 hrs 
1911 240 15 3592 5, 4 Jan-Sep 75 hrs pw, Oct-Dec 80% 60 hrs, 20% 75 hrs 
1912 281 14.3 3980 5 Jan-Jun 80% 75 hrs, 20% 90 hrs, Jul-Dec 81 hrs. 
1913 307 13.5 4138   81 hrs pw 
1914 282 13.5 3800 5 Jan-Mar 81 hrs, Apr-Sep 67.5 hrs, Oct-Dec 81 hrs 
1915 308 13.5 4158   81 hrs pw 
1916 307 13.5 4144   81 hrs pw 
1917 270 13.5 3645 5 Jan-Mar 81 hrs pw, Apr-Dec 67.5 hrs. 
1918 293 13.5 3949 5 18 Jan-9 Nov 81 hrs, 25 Nov-31 Dec 54 hrs 
1919 219 13.5 2956 4, 5, 4 1 Jan-31 Mar 67.5 hrs, Apr-Dec 54 hrs 
1920 295 13.5 3982 5 Jan-Mar 67.5 hrs, Apr-Dec 81 hrs 
1921 216 13.5 2916 5, 4 Jan-Mar 67.5 hrs, Apr-Dec 54 hrs 
Average 282 13.4 3780     
Sources: details of IJMA agreements and annual working days to 1899 from Samnuggur Co, MOTD, MS 
86/1/1/1-18 passim, and MS 86/1/1/30, p166, Index of Working Hours; details of annual working days 
from 1900 and of daily and annual working hours from 1911 from Thomas Duff & Co, MS 86/5/13/9, Old 
plant and machinery book 1900-66, "Working Hours"; details of daily working hours 1898-1907 from 
East India Factory Labour Commission, 1908, vol II; Evidence (London, 1909), evidence of Alex Wighton, 
Thomas Duff & Co, p244. 
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The Historiographical Inefficacy of the IJMA 
The existing historical literature examining the role of the IJMA has tended to focus on the 
inter-war period. Profound structural changes that occurred in the economy from the First 
World War led to pressure on the Government of India to adopt a more interventionist 
industrial policy in response to the critique of Indian Nationalists calling for policies that would 
curb the power of the British managing agents and benefit indigenous capitalists, coupled with 
calls for trade and monetary policies that would redress imbalances between the periphery 
and the metropole. These calls were given added urgency by the devastating impact of the 
Great Depression on the terms of trade. 
While Bagchi’s account of Indian industrialization from 1900 had argued the power British 
managing agents invested in the jute industry derived from their colonial monopoly of large 
scale enterprise in Calcutta118, subsequent work has challenged its applicability. Gupta’s study 
of the breakdown of the IJMA’s oligopolistic agreements in the 1930s instead emphasized the 
strains on the Association created by its attempts to manufacture a sub-optimal market 
equilibrium, which created perverse incentives to cheat without the credible threat of 
punishment, particularly to newcomer mills started by Indians who needed to secure a return 
on recent investment.119 In a similar vein, Gordon Stewart has read back this mode of analysis 
into the earlier history of the IJMA in the late nineteenth century, citing evidence of cheating 
from its inception.120 
Table 4.4 shows the representation of the managing agents as Chairmen of the IJMA from its 
inception to 1921, and the Presidents of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce for the same 
period. 
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Table 4.4: Chairmen of the IJMA; Presidents of Bengal Chamber of Commerce elected from 
IJMA member firms. 
Year Chairman of IJMA Firm 
President of Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce 
Firm 
1884 JJJ Keswick Jardine, Skinner JJJ Keswick Jardine, Skinner 
1885 JJJ Keswick Jardine, Skinner JJJ Keswick Jardine, Skinner 
1886 James Henderson Henderson     
1887 Robert Williamson Finlay, Muir     
1888 Robert Williamson Finlay, Muir Sir Alex Wilson Jardine, Skinner 
1889 Robert Williamson Finlay, Muir Sir Alex Wilson Jardine, Skinner 
1890 George Cheetham Henderson James Mackay Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
1891 Allan Arthur Finlay, Muir Hon James Mackay CIE Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
1892 George Lyell Macneill Hon James Mackay CIE Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
1893 George Lyell Macneill Hon P Playfair Barry 
1894 George Lyell Macneill Allan Arthur Finlay, Muir 
1895 George N Nairn Thomas Duff Hon P Playfair Barry 
1896 George Lyell Macneill Hon P Playfair CIE Barry 
1897 WB Colville Bird Allan Arthur Finlay, Muir 
1898 WB Colville Bird     
1899 DC Blair Finlay, Muir Allan Arthur Finlay, Muir 
1900 John Nicoll Thomas Duff GH Sutherland Begg, Dunlop 
1901 John Nicoll Thomas Duff MC Turner Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
1902 WS Malcolm Henderson MC Turner Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
1903 John Nicoll Thomas Duff Sir E Cable Bird 
1904 Archy Birkmyre Birkmyre Bros Hon AA Apcar Apcar & Co 
1905 John Nicoll Thomas Duff Hon AA Apcar Apcar & Co 
1906 Archy Birkmyre Birkmyre Bros Hon AA Apcar CSI Apcar & Co 
1907 A Wighton Thomas Duff Hon AA Apcar CSI Apcar & Co 
1908 JB Strain Bird W Brown Finlay, Muir 
1909 Archy Birkmyre Birkmyre Bros     
1910 RHA Gresson Jardine, Skinner AM Monteath Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
1911 J Robertson Thomas Duff     
1912 J Mackenzie Macneill AM Monteath Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
1913 AR Murray Thomas Duff Hon AM Monteath Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
1914 FRS Charles Henderson RG Monteath Mackinnon, Mackenzie 
1915 W Ross Smith Bird Hon FH Stewart CIE Gladstone, Wylie 
1916 Hon Archy Birkmyre Birkmyre Bros Hon FH Stewart CIE Gladstone, Wylie 
1917 AR Murray Thomas Duff Hon EH Bray Gillanders, Arbuthnot 
1918 AR Murray Thomas Duff Hon W Ironside Bird 
1919 AR Murray Thomas Duff     
1920 GF Rose Andrew Yule AR Murray Thomas Duff 
1921 DP McKenzie MLC Duncan Bros     
Sources: Adapted from Wallace, The Romance of Jute (London, 1928), p107; Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce, Annual Report 2011-12, 
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Thomas Duff & Co and the IJMA, 1884-91 
What was the attitude of Thomas Duff to the IJMA during the period to 1921? Was it effective 
in achieving its objectives? 
Table 4.4 demonstrates the importance attached to the Indian Jute Mills Association through 
the participation of the British managing agents. Several of those serving as Chairman of the 
Association went on to become Presidents of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, the pinnacle 
of the European business establishment in India. On occasion, they served as members of the 
Bengal Legislative Council, of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, and on various Government of 
India Commissions affecting colonial policy.121 Amongst the British managing agents, Thomas 
Duff & Co wielded disproportionate influence relative to their market share in securing the 
chief representative role in the Association in eleven years out of thirty-nine to 1921.  
Other individual managing agents elected Chairmen for five years out of thirty-nine at most 
during this period. The governance of the IJMA consisted of a Chair supported by a Committee 
of four elected at the annual general meeting, with a full time Secretary delegated to handle 
the day to day business who often also served as Secretary of the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce.122 From 1904-21, Thomas Duff & Co were represented on the Committee or as 
Chairman in every year except 1912. The two other leading managing agents in the jute 
industry by market share, Bird and Yule, only assumed a similar prominence in the 
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 Examples include Robert Steel CSI, of the large raw jute dealers R Steel & Co, and a director of three 
of Andrew Yule’s mills from 1873-1900, who served on the Viceroy’s Council from 1886-90, and was 
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Special Tariff board in 1935. “Sir A. R. Murray”, Scotsman, 23 Jun 1936, p. 16. 
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representative positions on the Committee from 1906 and 1914 respectively.123 This suggests a 
level of commitment and a competence on the part of Thomas Duff from an early stage to 
furthering the goals of the Association, one which was acknowledged by its other members 
who consistently voted for them to be represented in its governance even to the detriment of 
their own representation. 
It should be noted that Thomas Duff & Co were not the first converts to the cause of 
combination. Embryonic efforts in this direction were made in 1878 by Finlay, Muir & Co in 
conjunction with Birkmyre Brothers and again in 1885.124 Once converted, the minute books of 
Thomas Duff & Co, and of their managed companies, Samnuggur and Titaghur mills, reveal an 
unwavering enthusiasm for the use of short time and other measures to control output and 
support prices that persisted into the 1930s when other established firms such as Bird & Co 
were losing faith in it.125 The directors of Samnuggur stated in their annual report of April 1886 
in relation to short time working that they were “satisfied the result has been greatly to the 
benefit of the trade, and they expect yet to see a greater improvement.”126 At the end of short 
time working in 1891, they reported: 
The directors are convinced that the association [for short time] has been a great help to the trade 
while it lasted, and they will be prepared to advocate and support the re-formation of it when they 
deem the time opportune and there is a reasonable prospect of arranging a sound and satisfactory 
agreement.
127
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The rise and fall of the short time agreements begs the question why Thomas Duff & Co were 
so committed to the IJMA despite all the evidence presented of the palpable strains resulting 
on its marketing network. But this is only half the picture. Smith’s correspondence only gives a 
snapshot of several months in which particular destination markets were in play: 
There was also a bedrock of relative productive efficiency, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
which permitted the mills managed by Thomas Duff & Co to continue paying 10% dividends 
apart from the exceptional years from 1884 to 1886 when the Union mill was about the only 
Calcutta mill to pay a dividend. The original shareholders of Samnuggur were well 
compensated for these lean years, since the issue of bonus shares in Titaghur in 1883 meant 
effectively they were receiving an average 20% dividend on their original investment. 
Meanwhile, the Dundee directors were also able to see off the threat represented by the 
Victoria Co and a rival constituency of shareholders competing in the Dundee capital market. 
The Victoria Co’s victory in the lawsuit over land rights proved to be a pyrrhic one as their 
directors ceded the agency in Calcutta to Thomas Duff & Co and permitted the latter’s 
directors to start the process of acquiring substantial shareholdings in Victoria.128 By the 
standards of the Dundee capital market, only the better performing investment trusts such as 
the Alliance could approach this level of performance in the long run.129  
Navigating by the standard of neoclassical optima, this view might draw the retort that the 
Dundee firm could have performed still better by working full time, reducing working costs, 
and undercutting its rivals. However, this abstracts from the institutional context of the 
industry. There were real dangers inherent in such an approach, especially for a specialist jute 
manufacturer lacking the financial power and the vertical and horizontal diversification into 
related and unrelated industries of its rivals. Short time working was a lower risk strategy 
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which provided a greater degree of certainty during a period of depressed markets which 
permitted Thomas Duff & Co to perform relatively well.  
Similarly, it can be argued that the Association was relatively successful up to 1921 in 
reconciling the interests of stronger and weaker mill companies. Stronger mills were able to 
continue paying an acceptable level of dividends while most of the weaker mills were able to 
weather poor trade conditions. Andrew Yule’s Central mill and Gillanders, Arbuthnot’s Hooghly 
mill both joined the Association during the 1890s while the other mill working outside the 
agreements from 1886-90, the Serajgunge, ceased operating.  
The Association’s effectiveness can be seen from the impact of the short time agreements on 
barriers to entry over time. New entrants to establish a position in the industry successfully 
between the IJMA’s formation in 1885 and 1918 were Anderson, Wright & Co (1895), Begg, 
Dunlop & Co (1895), Duncan Brothers (1896), FW Heilgers & Co (1899), Mcleod & Co (1907), 
and Bemis Brothers (1913). With the exception of the American Bemis Brothers, they all had 
established relationships with the managing agents already invested in jute as part of the 
British mercantile community in Calcutta, although the Jewish merchant Meyer was the real 
power behind the Khardah mill managed by Anderson, Wright. The Indian owned Soorah mill, 
the Armenian owned Alexandra and Arathoon mills, and British projects initiated by Gordon 
Stewart and James Luke Jr – respectively a defector from Bird & Co and a reject from the 
Victoria Co – all failed to get off the ground and were taken over by existing IJMA members. 
Certainly, none of the mills formed by new entrants were constructed during the currency of 
the short time agreement to 1891. The counterfactual that more of the new entrants could 
have been deterred by full time working and adherence to market determination of output 
prices is implausible, given the poor trading conditions during the currency of the agreement. 
In any case, the original members of the IJMA seem to have done relatively well at maintaining 
or increasing their market share in terms of investment in additional capacity during this 
period: 
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Table 4.5: Share of investment in additional capacity measured in looms in operation. 
  1890-99 1900-09 1910-19 
IJMA founders new capacity 7,487 9,567 7,440 
New entrants' new capacity 994 5,872 1,388 
Total new capacity 8,481 15,439 8,828 
IJMA founders’ share of new capacity 88% 62% 84% 
New entrants' share of new capacity 12% 38% 16% 
Source: IJMA annual Reports of the Committee; Statement of looms in Dundee Yearbook, 1890-; cross-
referenced against annual reports of mill companies published in Dundee Advertiser and Capital, 1890-
1919. 
 
As Table 4.5 above indicates, accelerating investment in new capacity took place for the next 
two and a half decades leading up to the war of 1914, accompanied by mills working full time 
for most of the period. The upswing in the world economy leading to the growth of demand 
for jute manufactures was punctuated by short crises where mills resorted to short time. Short 
time working of five days a week was resorted to for three months in 1894 owing to a crisis in 
the raw jute market caused by erroneous price expectations and speculation, and again for a 
month in 1899 in the context of the dislocation to markets caused by urban plague scares and 
Indian crop failures.130 The American financial crisis of 1906 led to the adoption of working 
without electric light for six months succeeded by five days working during the recession of 
1908-10.131 Dislocation to shipping, freights and money markets during the war were mitigated 
by a degree of short time combination, which was extended in the years after the war in the 
context of macroeconomic adjustment, exchange rate instability, inflation and monetary 
austerity.132 Thomas Duff & Co were generally amongst the first to advocate working time 
agreements in response to adverse economic circumstances and the last to abandon them in 
periods of recovery. 
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As the IJMA consolidated itself in the more typical form of a traditional employers’ federation, 
five successive general managers of Thomas Duff & Co’s Calcutta office were appointed to the 
IJMA Committee and served as Chairmen for 11 years from 1895-1921, all of them later 
returning to Dundee to take a seat on the board of directors. John Nicoll, Chairman in 1900-01 
and 1905, was appointed to sit on the East India Factory Labour Commission on his retirement 
in 1906.133 The appointment of Sir Alexander Murray in 1920 as President of the Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce representing Thomas Duff & Co, a jute specialist with no interest in the 
other major sectors of the Bengali economy, marked the recognition of the importance of jute 
manufacturing, and Thomas Duff’s role in the industry, by their peers amongst the British 
managing agents.134 
The minute books of Thomas Duff & Co and the annual reports of the Association indicate that 
Thomas Duff & Co were active in influencing IJMA policy during this period relating to a wide 
range of issues - municipal governance and sanitation, labour, European supervisors and 
Saturday working, vertical integration and relations with jute and gunny brokers and shippers, 
and the negotiation of government war orders. There remains one episode pertinent to the 
question of the efficacy and limits of combination considered in this section to be discussed. 
This concerns the failed proposal to qualitatively transform the Association into a formal 
industrial combine along American lines, in accordance with the recommendations of the 
American industrial consultant, John H Parks, which has been recounted in Gordon Stewart’s 
work Jute and Empire.135 The scheme was instigated through an introduction between Parks 
and Sir David Yule of Andrew Yule & Co, who convened a meeting of the larger managing 
agents, representing two thirds of the total looms in Calcutta, in London on 10th October, 1911. 
Birkmyre Brothers and Thomas Duff & Co declined to attend, and James Finlay & Co withdrew 
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their support for the scheme, which Stewart states was perceived as “a power grab by the big 
Managing Agency firms”.136 The proposal was formally presented to the IJMA prior to the 
general meeting of February 1912. It may not have been coincidental that this occurred just as 
James Robertson of Thomas Duff & Co was standing down as Chairman and one of the 
schemes promoters, J Mackenzie of Mackinnon, Mackenzie, was elected in his place to a 
committee with no Thomas Duff representative elected.137 In any event the scheme lapsed in 
the face of an upturn in the industry’s fortunes as demand absorbed the excess production 
caused by frenetic extensions in the preceding years. Stewart cites the impracticability of the 
scheme’s proposals for controlling raw jute prices given the large number of Indian 
intermediaries in this market, concerns about the consequences of forcing up output prices, 
and the conservatism of business in Calcutta with regard to institutional change.138 
The details of the scheme were leaked to Capital in March, 1912. It consisted of three pools for 
raw jute inputs, and hessian and sacking outputs which would regulate prices and a 
percentage paid out in profits based on a weighted average for each mill calculated on the 
basis of productive capacity, output and productivity in a previous production period adjusted 
for any extensions up to the point at which 90% of members signed up to the combine.139 The 
scheme also contained penalty clauses for overproduction of Rs100 per ton (approximately 
25% of the sales value per ton), while permitting the negotiation of “quota rights” to be 
exchanged between mills not fulfilling their quota.140 The perception that this would favour 
firms like Andrew Yule & Co and Bird & Co was therefore accurate in that the scheme 
effectively froze mills’ market share after a period in which these two firms had been the most 
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active in bringing new capacity into operation. It is therefore unsurprising that Thomas Duff & 
Co refused to entertain supporting it when they were in the process of planning to add 
significantly to the Samnuggur mill’s productive capacity. Curiously, the directors’ minutes in 
Dundee and the reports to shareholders of the mill companies in spring 1912 made no 
reference to the scheme while they were actively commenting on Association matters in 
relation to the introduction of the new Factory Act.141 This uncharacteristic reticence in 
relation to a matter affecting the Association may suggest that Thomas Duff & Co were not 
unduly concerned about the putative combine’s prospects of being put into effect. 
Thomas Duff & Co’s role in the IJMA demonstrates the importance they gave to managing 
market conditions. As the next chapter shows, this facilitated the retention of family control 
through high dividend payments. 
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Chapter 5. Shareholdings in the Thomas Duff & Co 
Group, 1874-1921. 
 
The chapter undertakes a detailed survey of how the Thomas Duff & Co directors were able to 
retain effective control of the firm while raising sufficient investment funds to maintain market 
share in an expanding industry through the creation of a more popular and dispersed base of 
shareholders. 
The analysis in this chapter is based on the population of 1162 shareholders listed as holding a 
share in one of the mill companies in any share issue listed in the minutes of the directors of 
the Samnuggur, Titaghur and Victoria Cos from 1874 to 1919. This may omit some 
shareholders who held shares for shorter periods in between share issues. The listings give 
very partial shareholder characteristics, such as profession or location in some cases, but have 
been supplemented by very extensive original biographical research drawing on a range of 
sources, such as census data and trade directories. 
The detailed analysis of the initial shareholdings in the Samnuggur, Titaghur and Victoria mills 
showed that they were dominated by personal ties, based on family or business relationships 
whose centre of gravity was in Dundee, and to a much lesser extent in Calcutta. However, the 
capital demands of the growing firms over time could not be sustained purely on the basis of 
personal ties. The directors of the firms were forced to seek a wider shareholding basis – in 
social and geographical terms. Over time, there would also be a greater role for the 
intermediation of brokers allocating shares on the basis of impersonal market transactions. 
Nevertheless, it will be argued that detailed analysis of new share issues up to 1921 show that 
the allocation of shares based on personal ties remained at the core of the firm and was 
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sufficiently pronounced to render any external challenge to the directors’ control unlikely. As 
the preceding analysis has shown, the shareholders were largely passive and instances of 
dissent were extremely rare. The only example of organized shareholder dissent that could be 
discerned was the objection of a minority of the Victoria Co shareholders to an issue of new 
preference shares in 1897.1 The attempt of Alex C Scott, the sometime Chairman of 
Samnuggur and Titaghur, to challenge the policies of the directorate and the managing agency 
was stillborn before matters reached the Annual General Meetings of the mill companies in 
1901.2 This passivity derived from the fact that shareholders were content to receive above 
average dividends consistently relative to alternative investment opportunities, and many of 
them had personal ties to at least one of the directors. 
In this section, detailed quantitative analysis of new share issues from internal firm records is 
combined with very extensive research into the biographical data of the mass of individual 
shareholders. The biographical data include information collected from a range of sources – 
household census enumerators, trade directories, newspaper reports and obituaries, 
inventories of estates registered in Scotland and probates registered more widely – in order to 
permit a detailed picture to emerge of the mass of shareholders. This biographical information 
is then collated to create a classification of the characteristics of the shareholders and change 
over time – in terms of the distribution of shareholders around certain key variables, such as 
income, occupation and gender, as well as whether they were “insiders” or “outsiders” 
according to their relationship to the directors of the firms. Throughout this section, for 
simplicity, data are considered only for holdings of ordinary share. Holdings of preference 
shares are excluded as they were issued pro rata on the basis of ordinary shares held. There is 
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insufficient data to consider how holdings of ordinary and preference shares diverged over 
time through differential trading in each category because of the relatively late appearance of 
preference shares during the period of study. The data provided to identify the holders of the 
companies’ debentures is also too scanty to permit them to be analysed and contrasted with 
holders of ordinary shares. 
 
Shareholders and directors’ control. 
One way to examine the relationship between the reproduction of directorial control and 
shareholder passivity is to consider what level of ownership the directors considered it 
necessary to retain in the equity of the firms they managed in order to retain effective control. 
A straightforward calculation based on the shareholdings of the individual directors would be 
misleading because of the proliferation of shareholdings amongst close family members. Table 
5.1 below estimates the percentage of shares controlled by individual directors by aggregating 
their individual shareholdings with shares held by close relatives – parents, siblings and 
children or by in-laws through the marriage of a sibling or child of a director. Table 5.1 also 
traces the degree of continuity of effective control by the five founders of the firm – the four 
directors Duff, Barrie, James and Alex Nicoll, and the mill manager of Samnuggur Robertson – 
and compares their holdings in the Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos with those of newcomer 
directors over time. 
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Table 5.1: Share of families and in-laws of four original directors and mill manager, percentage 
of total value of ordinary voting shares issued, (all values are nominal) 
S = Samnuggur, T = Titaghur. 
Year Co 
5 
founders, 
value of 
shares 
5 
founders 
share of 
total 
capital 
*New 
directors 
Thomas 
Duff/ 
Walter 
William 
Duff 
Alex 
Nicoll/ 
William & 
John 
Smith/ 
Whytocks 
Joseph 
Barrie/ 
Charles B 
Ovenstone/
Buists 
James 
Nicoll 
/Dow 
James 
Robertson 
Sr &Jr 
1874 S £92,000 76% 2% 33% 24% 12% 4% 3% 
1883 S £105,300 70% 2% 27% 23% 12% 4% 4% 
1883 T £83,410 79% 3% 27% 32% 12% 4% 4% 
1888 T £105,800 71% 2% 24% 24% 12% 4% 6% 
1895 T £80,920 40% 13% 13% 8% 13% 2% 4% 
1897 T £73,180 37% 13% 10% 7% 13% 3% 4% 
1901 S £61,970 31% 12% 7% 8% 12% 2% 2% 
1913 S £46,700 16% 13% 2% 0% 7% 6% 1% 
1919 T £97,570 22% 14% 5% 2% 8% 5% 2% 
* Includes shares held prior to promotion to the directorate. 
Sources for this and subsequent tables in Chapter 5: The family relationships identified and other 
information relating to residential location and occupation are based on extensive biographical research 
from obituaries and other articles in the Dundee Advertiser, Dundee Courier, Scotsman and The Times, 
from census data from 1841-1911, and from probates and inventories in the National Archives of 
Scotland. Information for occupation and residence in Calcutta and Dundee has been cross-referenced 
with Thacker’s Directory and the Dundee Directory respectively. The information for shareholdings is 
drawn from the following sources in the University of Dundee Archive, MS 86 relating to the Thomas 
Duff group of companies. Some of these shareholder lists also provide information for residence and 
occupation. 
Lists of share issues from MS 86/1/1/1, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, p. 1, 8 Sep 1874, p. 60, 19 Dec 1876, 
Minute of Emergency Special General Meeting, pp. 261-6, 27 Jun 1883; MS 86/1/1/7, Samnuggur Co, pp 
242-9, 13 Mar 1901; MS 86/3/1/2; MS 86/1/1/14, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, pp275-287, 14 Jan 1913; 
Titaghur Co, pp 21-23, 28 Nov 1888; MS 86/3/1/4, Titaghur Co, MOTD, pp 79-83, 11 Sep 1895; MS 
86/3/1/4, Titaghur Co, MOTD, pp. 416-21, 19 May 1897; MS 86/3/2/9, Titaghur Co, Share Allotment 
Book, 1919-69, pp 1-23; MS 86/2/2/7, Victoria Co, Lists of shareholders, 1883; MS 86/2/1/1, Victoria Co, 
p. 228, 28 Jan 1898; MS 86/2/1/4 Victoria Co, pp. 194-203, 16 Oct 1919. 
 
The table shows very clearly how the directors and their immediate families owned a declining 
proportion of the total value of the equity of the firms they managed and controlled. The 
decline in the founders’ share of the equity was not compensated by the proportion of shares 
held by promoted directors. In absolute terms, the value of Samnuggur shares held by the five 
founders and their immediate families declined from a high point of £105,300 in 1883 to 
£46,700 in 1913. The equivalent value for Titaghur declined from £105,800 in 1888 to £97,570 
in 1919. It should be recalled, however, that any decline in income from dividends in the mill 
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companies was more than compensated for by increased income from the managing agency, 
as illustrated in Table 5.1. 
Another notable feature of the data in the table is that some individual directors were much 
more successful at retaining their equity stakes through family networks than others. Thus, 
Thomas Duff was not very successful at passing on his stake in the firm - in which he was the 
largest shareholder, and of which he was the most import instigator - despite his son Walter 
joining him on the board of directors. From holding a third of the shares at the time of 
Samnuggur’s formation, the Duff family’s stake had declined to 2% and 5% respectively in the 
Samnuggur Co in 1913 and in the Titaghur Co in 1919. The elder Thomas HK Duff, (born in 
Calcutta in 18583 and named after Herbert Knowles, Duff’s Calcutta colleague and successor at 
the Barnagore mill), does not appear to have been interested in joining the family firm. He 
studied as a “farm pupil” at the Hall’s 700 acre estate at Oxnead, Norfolk.4 He then departed 
for the Katikati estate in New Zealand, settled by Orangemen in the 1870s, presumably to try 
his hand at some combination of land prospecting and farming, where he married the local 
preacher’s daughter.5 He died penniless with no fixed abode in Edinburgh in 1900 having 
abandoned his wife.6 He may have been disowned by his family as his inventory bears no 
record of the 400 shares that Thomas Duff transferred to the marriage trust held jointly with 
his wife.7 Duff’s second son also appears to have been a reluctant participant in the business. 
Educated at Trinity College, Glenalmond, and Jesus College, Cambridge, he went out to 
Calcutta in the early 1880s but appears to have taken no active role in the business on his 
                                                          
3
 1871 England Census household enumerator, Class: RG10; Piece: 1637; Folio: 192; Page: 5; GSU roll: 
829941. 
 
4
 1881 Engalnd Census household enumerator, Class: RG11; Piece: 1930; Folio: 101; Page: 10;GSU roll: 
1341465. 
5
 “Marriage. Duff – Johnston.” Bay Of Plenty Times, Volume XIII, Issue 1701, 21 Jun 1884, p. 2; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katikati. 
6
 Thomas Duff inventory SC 70/1/393 registered at Edinburgh Sheriff Court, 14 Sep 1900, pp. 1048-1054. 
7
 Ibid; MS 86/1/1/7; Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 13 Mar 1901, pp. 242-9. 
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return to the UK.8 His appointment to the directorate in the 1890s was probably motivated by 
his father’s increasing infirmity and his contribution to the directorate was notable chiefly for 
his reluctance to take up his responsibility to visit Calcutta, a paucity of any other business 
interests, and a preference for golf and participation in the St Andrews Conservative Club.9 
Thomas Duff Sr does not appear to have been particularly effective at using the “marriage 
market” as a means of securing business objectives. None of his eight daughters married into 
the jute industry but secured a healthy rentier income from their shareholdings in the 
Samnuggur and Titaghur Cos. In all, the Duff family network of 16 shareholders comprised Duff 
himself, his wife, his two sons and eight daughters, one son-in-law, one daughter-in-law, and 
two grandchildren. 
Alex Nicoll’s family network contrasts with Duff’s in the sense that it drew together a number 
of figures through marriage. His brother-in-law was the jeweller John Whytock, who held 
shares. His son-in-law was William Smith, the general manager in Calcutta until 1892. Alex 
Nicoll’s financial difficulties meant that he had divested his shares by 1893. William Smith’s 
children inherited a portion of his shares upon his death in the same year. Smith’s brother 
John also had a large shareholding but did not marry. The Alex Nicoll-Whytock-Smith family 
network comprised 13 shareholders. From 24% at the inception of the Samnuggur Co, the 
family’s stake dwindled to nothing at the time of the Samnuggur share issue of 1901 and 2% in 
the Titaghur issue of 1919. 
Joseph Barrie’s family network was rather more successful at maintaining its stake in the 
companies, despite the fact that Barrie himself did not marry. The network comprised 34 
members of the Barrie, Buist and Ovenstone families with his nephew, the director Charles 
Barrie Ovenstone, at its heart. Ovenstone’s brother-in-law, Andrew Buist, was from a well 
                                                          
8
 JA Venn, Alumni Cantabrigienses, (Cambridge, 1922); “Noted St Andrean’s Death. Dundee Business 
Man.” Dundee Advertiser, 1 Feb 1933.  
9
 Ibid., “Noted St Andrean’s Death.”. Walter Duff visited Calcutta twice, in 1902 and 1912, during his 29 
year tenure as a director to 1921. 
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known family of Dundee jute manufacturers and took a large shareholding. Barrie and Buist 
later went into business as the directors of the Dundee-based Buist Spinning Co. From a 12% 
stake initially the family network retained a 7% stake in Samnuggur in 1915 and 8% in Titaghur 
in 1919, which actually represented an absolute increase in the shareholdings compared to the 
initial holdings in each company. 
James Nicoll’s family network of 16 shareholders increased its stake from his own 4% stake in 
1874 to 6% and 5% respectively in Samnuggur in 1913 and Titaghur in 1919, mainly through his 
own longevity as a director. The network consisted of himself, his wife, seven children, his 
children’s nurse, a father-in-law, a sister-in-law, a son-in-law, and three siblings of his son-in-
law. 
How did the directors’ shareholdings in the managed mill companies compare with their 
shareholdings in the managing agency, as depicted in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Distribution of ordinary shares in Thomas Duff & Co, managing agents. 
Year 
Paid up 
capital 
Thomas 
Duff/ 
Walter 
William 
Duff 
Alex 
Nicoll/ 
Smith 
Barrie/ 
Ovensto
ne 
James 
Nicoll 
James 
Robertso
n 
5 
founders 
New 
directors 
1883 £4,000 40% 34% 15% 6% 5% 100% 0% 
1888 £4,000 40% 34% 15% 6% 5% 100% 0% 
1895 £5,000 50% 10% 6% 10% 8% 83% 18% 
1897 £5,000 16% 14% 11% 14% 9% 63% 38% 
1901 £12,500 13% 16% 14% 11% 8% 61% 39% 
1913 £25,000 15% 0% 16% 13% 8% 52% 48% 
1919 £50,000 14% 0% 15% 12% 7% 47% 53% 
 
The initial shareholdings of the five founders in the managing agency corresponded initially to 
their relative shareholdings in the mill companies. Over time, the shareholdings in the 
managing agency were equalised between the directors while family networks were of limited 
importance in the allocation of shares. After William Smith’s and Thomas Duff’s deaths in 1893 
and 1896, and Alex Nicoll’s resignation as a director in 1893, no family network was 
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represented by more than one director in the managing agency. The chief feature to note 
about the distribution of shares was the growing proportion of shares held by new directors 
promoted through the managerial hierarchy in Calcutta, and a majority by 1919. The old 
directors held 47% of the agency shares and 22% of Titaghur’s shares in 1919. By contrast, 
newcomer directors held 53% of the agency shares but only took up 14% of the Titaghur 
shares, indicating the increased importance of the managing agency as their chief source of 
income within the group which, in effect, signalled a widening gap between the ownership and 
the management of the mills. 
It is also informative to examine the integration of the Victoria Co into the Thomas Duff group 
with reference to its directors’ shareholdings relative to the shares held by Thomas Duff & Co 
directors. While the Victoria Co directors’ stake declined from 41% in 1883 to 22% in 1919, the 
stake of the Thomas Duff & Co directors increased from 1% to 19%, nearly equal to the Victoria 
directors. 
 
Table 5.3: Integration of ownership of Victoria Co into Thomas Duff & Co (TD) network, 
percentage holdings of ordinary shares of Victoria Co, (all values are nominal). 
Year 
Total ordinary 
share capital 
Victoria 
directors 
TD 
directors 
Victoria 
directors 
TD 
directors 
1883 £50,850 41% 1% £20,700 £750 
1899 £150,000 21% 13% £30,800 £22,480 
1919 £300,000 22% 19% £64,840 £61,660 
 
So far, this section has discussed individual directors’ shareholdings and the extent of their 
ownership in terms of family networks. While the latter measure is a better measure to 
compare their interest in the equity of the firms they managed relative to other directors, it is 
less satisfactory as a measure of the effective control of the directors. A more comprehensive 
measure is to distinguish between “insider” shareholders and “outsider” shareholders, 
classifying shareholders according to whether they had a personal tie to one of the directors or 
a tie based on employment or transacting with the firms. A comparison of the proportions of 
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shares held by insiders relative to outsiders according to this classification gives a better sense 
of the ability of the directorates of the firms to mobilise a majority of shareholders in any 
contested vote, as shown for the Titaghur Co, comparing the years 1883, 1897 and 1919, in 
Table 5.4. The classification is somewhat arbitrary in that it assumes an identification with the 
policies of the directors by those who were family members, or employees or regular 
transactors with the firm. Although the biographical research into the shareholders was able to 
identify details for occupation and geographical location for the great majority of 
shareholders, the classification probably overestimates the number of “outsiders” where it 
was not possible to identify a link with the firm and the individual shareholder in terms of the 
variables employed to assign shareholders to the “insider” category. 
 
Table 5.4: Titaghur Co Insider versus Outsider Shareholders, 1883-1919. 
 
1883 1897 1919 
Insiders 21 48 105 
Outsiders 20 145 367 
Insiders % of shares 84% 60% 45% 
Outsiders % of shares 16% 40% 55% 
Insiders average shareholding 420 244 193 
Outsiders average shareholding 84 54 67 
*Insiders includes institutional shareholders. Unidentified are assumed to be outsiders and are 
therefore probably overestimated. 
 
The comparison between the three years clearly identifies that the numerical proliferation of 
outsiders as shareholders was well established by 1897 and continued up to 1919, reflecting 
the deepening of the firm’s capital base as its equity grew larger. The value of shares held by 
outsiders constituted a large minority stake by 1897 and a slight majority by 1919. However, 
given that a greater motivation and propensity to activism can be reasonably assumed on the 
part of insiders, it is unlikely that this caused undue concern on the part of the directors that 
their control might be challenged. Insiders were much more likely to attend general meetings; 
outsiders were more likely to be resident at a distance from Dundee. In fact, the registration of 
shareholders to participate in proxy votes at annual meetings was exceptional, the meeting of 
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1901 prior to Alex C Scott’s exit from the firm being almost the only example, and in this case 
the proxies were only registered because of the activism of the majority of the board to secure 
proxies on their own behalf rather than due to any independent activism on the part of the 
shareholders themselves.10 Both insiders and outsiders held less shares on average over the 
whole time period, probably reflecting an aspect of the deepening of the capital base – the 
increased participation of shareholders from the popular classes. However, the average 
shareholdings of outsiders increased slightly in the sub-period 1897-1919, reflecting the 
satisfaction of an excess demand for shares by the 1919 share issue. Insiders on average held 
considerably more shares than outsiders in any given year, about five times as many in both 
1883 and 1897, but the gap narrowed in 1919 to three times as many, which may reflect a 
greater willingness on the part of insiders to take advantage of high share prices to realise a 
capital gain towards the end of the subperiod. 
Figure 5.1 shows the attendance of shareholders at Annual General Meetings of the 
Samnuggur Co from 1874-1911. The shareholders in attendance at the AGMs of the Titaghur 
Co, which were held immediately following those of the Samnuggur Co, were identical except 
for one individual in two years. 
  
                                                          
10
 MS 86/1/1/7, Samnuggur Co, 6 Mar 1901, p. 215. 
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Figure 5.1: Samnuggur and Titaghur* Cos Attendance of Shareholders at AGMs, 1874-1911. 
 
* Titaghur Co from 1883. Attendance was identical except in one or two rare cases.  
Source: MS 86/1/1/1-14, Samnuggur Co, Minutes of AGMs, 1874-1911. Missing years: 1905, 1907-08. 
 
The attendance of shareholders who were not directors or employees of the firm averaged 
about five until the end of the century then rose to about ten after the new share issues 
increased the number of shareholders. However, only a small proportion of shareholders 
attended meetings and that proportion declined, suggesting an increase in shareholder 
passivity as more outsiders took shareholdings. In all, only 65 individuals who were not 
employees or directors attended the meetings during the 35 years recorded, indicating that 
more or less the same insiders attended over a number of years. 
A similar classification is applied to the Victoria Co in Table 5.5 except, in this case, Thomas 
Duff & Co insiders are included as a separate category – or as a special category of outsider, at 
least until 1918 when the Victoria Co was consolidated into the Thomas Duff & Co group. 
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Table 5.5: Thomas Duff & Co directors’ increasing stake in Victoria Co. 
 
1883* 1899 1919 
Victoria insiders 33 39 28 
TDC insiders 4 37 67 
Outsiders 6 127 238 
Victoria insiders % of shares 91% 48% 34% 
TDC insiders % of shares 4% 16% +29% 
Outsiders % of shares 5% 36% 37% 
*Assumes jute, steel and shipping interests were business associates of Victoria directors; +upper 
estimate includes Alexander Nicoll’s 900 shares, who stood down as a director of Samnuggur and 
Titaghur to join the board of Victoria. ++Includes defector Wybrants. 
 
The patterns are similar to the Titaghur Co, except that most of the outsider shares taken up 
between 1897 and 1919 went to Thomas Duff & Co insiders while the share of other outsiders 
remained static. Probably, a large number of the shares acquired by Thomas Duff & Co insiders 
were acquired around the time the firm was consolidated into the group. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that, had the Victoria Co directorate not agreed to the consolidation of the firm into 
the group, their managing agents might have been in a position to organise sufficient 
shareholders to force it through without the directors’ agreement. 
 
Survey of Ordinary Shareholders. 
The previous section examined the relationship between ownership and the reproduction of 
the directors’ effective control of the firms they managed over time as the size of the firm’s 
equity increased and was distributed amongst a growing base of shareholders. This section 
analyses the characteristics of the growing base of shareholders over time with reference to 
variables which indicate the distribution of shares – such as location, class and gender.  
 
The Number of Shareholders and Average Holdings. 
Data showing the increase in the number of shareholders and changes in average, median and 
modal shareholdings in each firm within the Thomas Duff & Co group are tabulated below. 
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Table 5.6: Shareholdings in the Thomas Duff group, 1874-1913. 
Year Company 
Total 
shares 
No of 
share-
holders 
Average 
holding 
Median 
holding 
Modal 
holding 
1874 
Samnuggur 12,120 19 622 250 200 
Titaghur n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Victoria n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Thomas Duff n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1883 
Samnuggur 15,000 43 368 100 20 
Titaghur 10,500 41 250 84 10 
Victoria 5,085 48 110 50 50 
Thomas Duff 2,000 7 286     
1897-
1901 
Samnuggur (1901) 20,000 222 95 35 10 
Titaghur (1897) 20,000 192 101 37 10 
Victoria (1899) 15,000 203 72 29 10 
Thomas Duff (1901) 4,610 14 329     
1913-
1919 
Samnuggur (1913) 28,962 303 96 30 20 
Titaghur (1919) 45,000 473 91 30 20 
Victoria (1919) 30,000 331 94 30 20 
Thomas Duff (1919) 4,910 13 378     
The Samnuggur Co’s 1874 shares and Thomas Duff & Co shares were issued in £100 denominations and 
have been converted into £10 denominations for the purpose of comparability. 
 
In terms of shareholdings, the key turning point for the three mill companies in the Thomas 
Duff group appears to have come at the time of the share issues at the turn of the century. 
There was a marked convergence of all three firms in terms of average, median and modal 
shareholdings, which remained stable in the period 1913-19, except that the modal 
shareholding increased from 10 to 20 as a result of the increase in capital. Average 
shareholdings had converged in the range 91-96 and median shareholdings were all 30. 
Titaghur’s larger base of shareholders reflected the fact that this firm had issued 50% more 
ordinary capital by 1919 than the other two firms. Thomas Duff & Co, the managing agents, 
while taking the legal form of a private limited company, resembled the private partnerships 
that predominated amongst the Calcutta-based managing agents in its narrow shareholding 
base and limited capital. 
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Aggregated Shareholdings in the Thomas Duff Group over time. 
The preceding analysis of shareholdings in the individual mill companies does not permit 
inferences to be drawn about the total value of shareholdings held because it neglects the 
dimension of shareholders having an interest in more than one of the companies, and also 
excludes holdings of preference shares. Exact data is unavailable to show the aggregated 
shareholdings across the three mill companies because of the different timings of new share 
issues at the turn of the century – in 1897 in the case of Titaghur, 1899 in the case of Victoria, 
and 1901 in the case of Samnuggur. Moreover, no list was provided in the minutes of the 
directors of Samnuggur Co for the new issue shares of 1919. However, the aggregate values 
are estimated in Table 5.7 below. 
 
Table 5.7: Aggregated Shareholdings in Samnuggur, Titaghur, Victoria Cos, including 
Preference Shares. 
  1883 
1901 
estimate 
1919 
estimate 
Total shares 30,585 75,000 165,000 
No of shareholders 87 449 513 
Average shareholding 361 167 240 
+Median shareholding 90 50 80 
* The 1901 estimate aggregates the 1897 figure for Titaghur, the 1899 figure for Victoria and the 1901 
figure for Samnuggur based on the reasonably realistic assumption that Titaghur and Victoria 
shareholdings were retained from 1897 and 1899 respectively up to 1901; 1919 estimate assumes 
Samnuggur and Titaghur shareholders were identical. +to nearest 10 
 
The table demonstrates the convergence in the identity of the shareholders in the three 
companies. While the 1913-1919 figures for the individual companies give 1107 individual 
shareholders, once multiple shareholdings are accounted for, the shareholders in the three 
companies are estimated to comprise only 513 individuals. The convergence of shareholders in 
the Titaghur and Victoria Cos was demonstrated above and comparison of the 1897 and 1901 
shareholders lists for Titaghur Co and Samnuggur Co indicates that the two firms’ shares 
tended to be traded in tandem, which is confirmed by listings of individual share transfers in 
the minute books of the directors. Presumably, this convergence followed a similar logic to 
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portfolio investments. Shareholders demonstrated confidence in the management of Thomas 
Duff & Co by taking a share in one of the three mill companies but insured their investment 
against an accident to any one of the mill companies affecting their capacity to pay dividends 
by spreading their shareholdings across the three companies. 
 
Location 
The detailed analysis of the initial shareholdings in the three mill companies in the Thomas 
Duff & Co group demonstrated an overwhelming preponderance of shareholders located in 
Dundee. Some other shareholders were located in Calcutta; these were mainly employees of 
the firm who were of Dundee origin themselves. The coincidence of the initial location of 
shareholders in the firm with the locus of managerial control was to be expected, given that 
shares were overwhelmingly in the hands of “insiders” initially. How did this change over time 
as the proportion of outsiders holding shares increased? Table 5.8 shows the geographical 
residence of shareholders in the Titaghur Co over time. 
Table 5.8: Regional location of residence of Titaghur Co shareholders, 1883-1919: 
 
Number of 
shareholders 
% 
Year of share issue 1883 1897 1919 1883 1897 1919 
Total shareholders 41 189 453 
   
Dundee 28 88 221 68% 47% 49% 
Edinburgh 0 1 28   1% 6% 
Glasgow 0 7 23   4% 5% 
Aberdeen 0 1 4   1% 1% 
Rest of Scotland 0 1 11   1% 2% 
London & Home Counties 1 6 54 2% 3% 12% 
North of England 0 2 10   1% 2% 
Rest of England 0 4 10   2% 2% 
County Dublin 0 9 29   5% 6% 
Rest of Ireland 0 15 23   8% 5% 
Calcutta 12 24 25 29% 13% 6% 
Other 0 0 3     1% 
Unidentified 0 31 11 
 
16% 2% 
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The table demonstrates that Dundee remained decisively the location where shareholders 
were resident throughout the period of study. Although shareholders resident in Dundee 
declined from 68% to 47% in the sub-period 1883-97, it rose slightly to 49% in the sub-period 
1897-1919 when the number of shareholders was increasing more rapidly. Shares held by 
Calcutta residents declined as a proportion of the total in both sub-periods, probably indicating 
both that the Dundee directors did not actively seek a market for the shares in Calcutta and 
that Calcutta shareholders preferred to hold shares in rupee denominated jute mill 
companies.11 Otherwise, a rising proportion of the shares were fairly evenly distributed across 
the most urbanised regions of the United Kingdom as more outsiders took shareholdings, with 
only London and the Home Counties taking more than a 10% share in 1919. 
A similar picture emerges for the whole Thomas Duff & Co group of three mill companies, 
including the Victoria Co, in Table 5.9. In this case, data is presented for the regional location 
of individual shareholders, where data was available for a shareholder’s residence at birth and 
death, and residence at the time of taking an initial shareholding in one of the companies. (The 
information given for individuals’ residence at birth and death is irrespective of whether they 
were shareholders at that point in their lifecycle.) 
 
  
                                                          
11
 Although the shares had a rupee listing from 1904, as recorded by the Calcutta business newspaper, 
Capital. 
273 
 
Table 5.9: Shareholder characteristics, residence by region, Samnuggur Co (1874, 1876, 1883, 
1901, 1919), Titaghur Co (1883, 1888, 1895, 1897, 1919), Victoria Co (1883, 1898, 1919). 
Sample size, N = 581 
At 
birth 
When 
became 
share- 
holder 
At 
death 
At 
birth 
When 
became 
share- 
holder 
At 
death 
Regional Location  Number of individuals % 
Dundee* 373 336 336 64% 58% 58% 
Edinburgh 17 23 26 3% 4% 4% 
Glasgow 24 23 22 4% 4% 4% 
Aberdeen 14 8 8 2% 1% 1% 
Rest of Scotland 16 7 10 3% 1% 2% 
London & Home Counties 22 44 77 4% 8% 13% 
North of England 11 12 17 2% 2% 3% 
Rest of England 20 12 10 3% 2% 2% 
County Dublin 31 29 38 5% 5% 7% 
Rest of Ireland 34 32 14 6% 6% 2% 
Calcutta 4 54 5 1% 9% 1% 
Rest of India 5 0 1 1% 0% 0% 
Other 10 1 7 2% 0% 1% 
Total    100% 100% 100% 
Only the Victoria Co and the 1919 share issue for Titaghur Co included addresses consistently. Where an 
address was missing, the residence of shareholders was determined by cross-referencing the 
information given in the firms’ records with information in the Dundee Directory, newspaper obituaries 
and in the household census enumerators for Scotland, England & Wales, and Ireland. 
 
This data reveals some additional features in relation to the changing location of shareholders 
over their lifecycle. A significant number of shareholders took up shares in the firms who had 
been born in Dundee but were no longer resident there. A large number of these were 
probably accounted for by the shareholders resident in Calcutta who were not born there. 
Most shareholders resident in Calcutta retired in the UK, many in Dundee, although some died 
in Calcutta prior to retirement. The other notable feature of the shareholders’ lifecycle was the 
drift of a significant number of shareholders born elsewhere to reside in London and the Home 
Counties when they took up shares, and of a larger number to retire and die there. This 
pattern reflected the prosperity enjoyed by many of the shareholders. One other notable 
characteristic of the distribution of the shareholders that perhaps ran counter to general 
demographic trends in the United Kingdom was the concentration of a significant minority of 
shareholders in County Dublin – encompassing the city of Dublin and its environs – and in the 
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rest of Ireland. These shareholders were predominantly either Quaker merchants and family 
members or part of the rentier class of absentee Protestant landowners who benefitted from 
their compradore relationship to the British imperial power in Ireland. In the absence of 
economic development in the domestic economy, Dundee jute mill shares appear to have 
composed part of their investment portfolio. At the heart of this network of Irish shareholders 
was the Goodbody family of merchants and stockbrokers, which also owned the Goodbody 
jute mill at Clashawan, in Clara, King’s County (present day Offaly).12 
It is also informative to examine more minutely some of the location-related characteristics 
and trends of the lifecycle of shareholders who were born or died in the Dundee region, or 
who were resident there when they became shareholders in one of the Thomas Duff & Co 
group’s mill companies. These data encompass a sample of 417 shareholders who were 
resident in the region at some point in their lifecycle. The Dundee region has been subjectively 
defined to encompass those areas that were recognisably part of the regional economy during 
the period. By this definition, the Dundee region was bounded by Perth in the West, Cupar in 
Fife in the South, and Montrose and Brechin in Forfarshire (now Angus) in the North. 
The Dundee urban area was itself experiencing rapid growth and transformation during the 
period in which the shareholders’ location was sampled.13 Lochee and Broughty Ferry were 
formally absorbed by the city during the period covered by the sample. Improved 
transportation links made Broughty Ferry, Monifieth and Carnoustie to the East, and 
Tayport/Newport/Forgan/Wormit on the south bank of the Tay, appealing residential areas to 
wealthy Dundonians removing their households from the urban squalor and pollution of the 
city, while continuing to commute to work there. The spatial dispersion of the regional textile 
industry between Dundee and the older towns and villages during the heyday of linen 
                                                          
12
 Michael Goodbody, The Goodbodys; Story of an Irish Quaker Family 1630-1950: Millers, Merchants 
and Manufacturers (Dublin, 2011). 
13
B. P. Lenman, E. E. Gauldie and C. M. Lythe, Dundee and Its Textile Industry, 1850-1914 (Dundee, 
1969); William M. Walker, Juteopolis: Dundee and Its Textile Workers, 1885-1923 (Edinburgh, 1979). 
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production gave way to a pattern of productive activity centred on Dundee and its immediate 
environs as the transition was made to jute production.14 
 
Table 5.10: Shareholders located in Dundee Region at least one point in their lifecycle, 
Samnuggur Co (1874, 1876, 1883, 1901, 1919), Titaghur Co (1883, 1888, 1895, 1897, 1919), 
Victoria Co (1883, 1898, 1919). 
Sample size, N = 417 
At 
birth 
When 
became 
share- 
holder 
At 
death 
At 
birth 
When 
became 
share- 
holder 
At 
death 
Location Number of individuals % 
Dundee 218 216 135 52% 52% 32% 
Lochee 7 2 2 2% 0% 0% 
Broughty Ferry 12 23 65 3% 6% 16% 
Monifieth 12 16 14 3% 4% 3% 
Carnoustie 1 4 6 0% 1% 1% 
Kirriemuir 7 6 6 2% 1% 1% 
Forfar 10 8 7 2% 2% 2% 
Brechin 4 3 2 1% 1% 0% 
Arbroath 15 7 7 4% 2% 2% 
Montrose 6 0 0 1% 0% 0% 
Other Angus 20 10 21 5% 2% 5% 
Angus [Forfarshire] Subtotal 312 295 265 75% 71% 64% 
Tayport/Newport/Forgan/Wormit 8 16 27 2% 4% 6% 
St Andrews 0 4 6 0% 1% 1% 
Cupar 2 1 4 0% 0% 1% 
Other Fife 11 4 8 3% 1% 2% 
Fife Subtotal 21 25 45 5% 6% 11% 
Alyth 6 5 8 1% 1% 2% 
Blairgowrie 3 1 4 1% 0% 1% 
Perth 6 3 2 1% 1% 0% 
Other Perthshire 23 7 12 6% 2% 3% 
Perthshire Subtotal 38 16 26 9% 4% 6% 
Outside Dundee region 45 81 81 11% 19% 19% 
 
The table demonstrates a number of features of the distribution of shareholders within the 
Dundee region. There was a net emigration away from the Dundee region during the lifecycle 
of the shareholders in the sample. While 11% who were not born in the Dundee region were 
subsequently resident there when they took an initial share in the mill companies or died 
there, 19% were resident or died outside the region. The city of Dundee – excluding Broughty 
                                                          
14
 Dundee Directory, annual, various years. 
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Ferry and Lochee which were absorbed into the city during the period of the sample – 
accounted for over half the shareholders with a connection to the region in terms of their 
place of birth or their residence when they first became a shareholder, but only a third of the 
shareholders classified by residence at death. The 20% decline in shareholders resident in the 
city at their death compared to when they became shareholders is largely accounted for by the 
migration of shareholders to the well heeled satellite towns around the city, Broughty Ferry, 
Monifieth and Carnoustie to the East, and Tayport/Newport/Forgan/Wormit on the opposite 
bank of the Tay in Fife, whose combined share increased 13%. The remaining shareholders in 
the region were dispersed across the older textile centres of Forfarshire and Perthshire and 
their share remained static throughout their lifecycle. 
 
The Age Profile of Shareholders. 
Taking the sample of 655 shareholders in the three mill companies for the shares issued 
between 1874 and 1919 for whom a year of birth and death could be determined, the 
distribution of shareholders by the decade of their birth is given in Table 5.11. 
 
Table 5.11: Shareholders, decade of birth and average age at death. 
Born 
Average 
Age at 
Death 
Sample 
(total = 
655) 
1820s 77.6 33 
1830s 77.7 69 
1840s 72.7 104 
1850s 72.3 141 
1860s 72.1 141 
1870s 70.4 104 
1880s 68.0 41 
1890s 63.4 14 
 
Of these 655 shareholders, 460 were men and 195 were women, or 70% men and 30% 
women. The overall average age at death was 72.4, 71.1 for men and 75.4 for women. This 
schema makes clear that the most common category of shareholder was a man born in the 
277 
 
1850s or 1860s who took a shareholding in the share issues at the turn of the century or in 
1919 towards the end of their working life. The decline in the average age of death over time is 
presumably an artefact of the increasingly popular base of the shares and the participation of 
lower social classes with a lower life expectancy.  
 
The Distribution of Shareholders by Social Class and Industry. 
To examine the social position of shareholders in more detail – and changes in the class 
composition of the shareholders over time – two variables, wealth at death measured by the 
size of moveable estate recorded in inventories and occupation while a shareholder, are 
examined as indicators of social class. The wealth and occupational distribution of the mass of 
shareholders in all the firms is explored while the shareholders of individual firms are 
examined to look at change over time. In conjunction with the analysis of indicators of social 
class, the distribution of shareholders by industry is also considered in order to examine to 
what extent shareholdings were based on first-hand knowledge of the jute industry. 
Of 411 inventories of moveable estate recorded for the mass of shareholders in the different 
issues of the three companies from 1874 to 1919, the average value of moveable estate was 
£46,490 in constant 1870 prices. The average recorded for 308 male shareholders was £57,123 
and for 103 female shareholders £16,490. The median size of estate for the 411 shareholders 
was £17,462. The mode, measured in intervals of £0-1,000, £1,000-£5,000, £5,000-£10,000 
and then intervals of £10,000, was £5,000-£10,000. The discrepancy between the overall 
average and the median and mode indicates a slightly skewed distribution of moveable wealth 
between a large minority of very wealthy shareholders and a slightly elongated tail of less 
wealthy shareholders. 
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Table 5.12 examines age at death of shareholders utilising a more truncated spectrum of 
wealth intervals. 
 
Table 5.12: Distribution and Age at Death by Size of Moveable Estate, N = 379. 
Moveable Estate 
Age at 
Death 
Sample 
(Total = 
379) 
£100,000 – £745,786 71.7 43 
£50,000 - £100,000 73.6 59 
£10,000 - £50,000 72.4 136 
£5,000 - £10,000 70.8 60 
£1,000 - £5,000 74.1 60 
£0 - £1,000 74.1 21 
 
According to this classification, one is struck by the concentration of shares in the hands of 
very wealthy individuals. The U-shaped age at death distribution reflects how social factors 
giving an advantage to wealthier individuals at one point in time were offset by an influx of less 
wealthy shareholders towards the end of the period sampled, when the life expectancy of all 
social classes had risen. The development of a more popular base of shareholders over time is 
indicated with more precision by examining the average moveable estate at death, grouped 
according to the year an individual shareholder was first recorded as holding shares in any of 
the three companies. 
 
Table 5.13: Moveable Estate at Death ranked by year of first recorded shareholding in any of 
the three mill companies, Samnuggur, Titaghur and Victoria. 
Mill 
company 
Share 
issue 
Moveable 
estate at 
death 
Sample 
size 
Samnuggur 1874-76 £62,261 15 
Samnuggur 1883 £94,557 13 
Victoria 1883 £82,714 19 
Titaghur 1895-97 £31,293 22 
Victoria 1898 £55,768 32 
Samnuggur 1901 £64,057 92 
Samnuggur 1913 £39,789 56 
Titaghur 1919 £22,798 106 
Victoria 1919 £31,800 21 
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From 1883, the overall downward trend is unmistakeable although the value recorded for the 
Titaghur Co in 1895-97 is an outlier. As the firms’ equity expanded and their shares were held 
more widely, new shareholders tended to come from a lower social class as indicated by their 
moveable estate at death. An indication of the directors concern to market the firms’ shares 
more widely to less wealthy individuals was given by changes in denominations of shares. The 
Samnuggur Co’s shares were in denominations of £100 from 1874 to 1883. From 1883, the 
Samnuggur, Titaghur and Victoria Cos’ shares were denominated at £10 but in practice were 
traded in blocks of 5 shares until the end of the nineteenth century. By 1919, individual £10 
shares were being traded. 
 
Gender and Occupation. 
Before examining the occupational distribution of shareholders, the gender distribution is 
considered. Table 5.14 shows the increasing proportion of women who became shareholders 
in the Titaghur Co over time. 
 
Table 5.14: Titaghur Co, 1883-1919, Male and Female Shareholders, (ordinary shares). 
 
No of shareholders % of shareholders Average holding % of total value 
Year 1883 1897 1919 1883 1897 1919 1883 1897 1919 1883 1897 1919 
Male 34 132 267 85% 69% 59% 295 119 100 98% 84% 69% 
Female 6 58 185 15% 31% 41% 31 53 64 2% 16% 31% 
 
There was a very rapid increase in the absolute and relative numbers of female shareholders. 
By 1919, two of every five shareholders were women. Moreover, Table 5.14 shows that as the 
average male shareholding declined sharply to a third of its 1883 value in 1919, the average 
female shareholding doubled, so that the average female shareholder held two thirds of the 
shares of the average male shareholder by 1919. In terms of the total value of shares held by 
non-institutional shareholders, the female share rose from 2% of the ordinary share capital in 
1883 to 31% in 1919. The rising trend in female shareholdings appears to reflect an aspect of 
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the broader trend in the widening of the mill companies’ base of shareholders beyond 
individuals with a direct business relationship to the firms to a shareholding public interested 
purely in receiving a return on their investment. There may also have been more specific 
factors in operation, such as changes in the taxation of property income and death duties 
driving male shareholders to subdivide their holdings with relatives prior to the death of the 
male shareholder. A more gender-specific factor affecting female shareholders – whether 
related to a male shareholder or not - may have been that their class background was both 
wealthy and characterised by very low levels of employment and economic dependence on a 
male spouse or parent, leading households to seek a source of property income higher than 
could be achieved from a bank deposit account or government securities in order to give these 
women long term economic security.15 
Taking all the shareholders identified listed in the share issues of the three mill companies 
from 1874 to 1919, of 1152 shareholders, 399, or 35%, were women. Of these, 216, over half, 
were part of the immediate family – a parent, a child, a spouse or a sibling - of a male 
shareholder in the firms. Only in a small minority of cases were these shares inherited by 
female relatives acting as executors of a male shareholder’s will on his death. 183 had no 
identifiable family connection to a male shareholder, suggesting there was a large class of 
female shareholders in the market making investment decisions that were in some sense 
independent of a male head of household. Only 14 women could be identified as being in 
formal employment, eight of whom did not have a family connection with a male shareholder. 
There were six teachers, one university lecturer, one domestic nurse, one hospital nurse, one 
governess, two housekeepers, one farmer, and one shopkeeper’s assistant. The average 
moveable estate at death of male shareholders was £57,123 compared to £16,490 for females. 
                                                          
15
 Claire Swan, ‘Women Investors within the Scottish Investment Trust Movement of the 1870s’, chapter 
in Anne Laurence, Josephine Maltby, Janette Rutterford (eds), Women and Their Money 1700-1950: 
Essays on Women and Finance (Abingdon, 2009), pp. 178-96. 
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Impressionistically, research of inventories to compile this data indicate that the wealth of 
female shareholders was either inherited from the division of the estate of a father or from a 
spouse, part of which might be invested in shares. Women shareholders who died before a 
spouse’s death seldom left large estates. The averages for moveable estate at death therefore 
suggest an approximate alignment of male and female shareholders as coming from similar 
social backgrounds on average, despite the discrepancy in the values. 
There is no record of a female shareholder attending an annual general meeting of any of the 
thee mill companies up to 1921. Women became significant shareholders in the Thomas Duff 
group of companies towards the end of the period when the shares became more actively 
traded. Their proportion relative to men by 1919 is not dissimilar to that for women investors 
in the Scottish American Investment Trusts of 1873-5, which were actively traded in Dundee.16 
Based on biographical research, the data presented below in Table 5.16 for the occupation of 
Titaghur shareholders over time suggests that approximately 70% of female shareholders were 
dependants of male shareholders in both 1897 and 1919. 
 
Industry and Occupation 
Having considered the female component of the shareholders, it was concluded that their 
social position was overwhelmingly determined by their status as dependents of male heads of 
households, and that over half of these women were related to a male shareholder. The social 
position of the male shareholders can be examined in more detail by analysing their 
distribution by industry, or sector, and then by analysing their distribution by “grade” within 
each industry or sector. 
Taking all male shareholders of the three mill companies in the share issues examined 
between 1874 and 1919, a sample of 523 male shareholders were identified for whom 
                                                          
16
 Swan, ‘Women Investors’, pp. 191-4. 
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industry or sector and an employment grade could be determined. The sample is 
disaggregated by industry or sector in Table 5.15. 
 
Table 5.15: Male Shareholders in Mill Companies, 1874-1919, by industry or sector. 
Industry or sector 
No of 
share-
holders 
%* 
Jute 212 40% 
Non-jute 312 60% 
Finance & trade 101 19% 
Industry & manufacturing 36 7% 
Food & drink processing 30 6% 
Professional 90 16% 
Retail services, skilled trades, small business 54 12% 
Total identified 523 100% 
*Excludes unidentified, as it is assumed that those shareholders whose industry or sector could not be 
identified were distributed across all categories. This probably gives a slight bias favouring the jute 
category, whose occupational status was easier to identify through their connection to Thomas Duff & 
Co. 
 
Shareholders employed in the jute industry were predictably by far the largest category, 
comprising two in five shareholders. This category encompasses mercantile, manufacturing 
and related activities. 199 shareholders were employed in jute manufacture, marketing or a 
combination of both; 11 shareholders specialized in the manufacture of jute mill machinery, 
and one in mill furnishing. Records for 12 shareholders indicate that they were employed in 
the manufacture or marketing of flax-linen as well as jute. The boundary between those within 
the jute industry who specialized in jute manufacture or the marketing of the raw material and 
of finished jute goods is difficult to determine and was fluid over time. Many firms combined 
manufacturing and marketing activities. Some firms engaged in jute manufacturing while also 
trading extensively in raw jute or in finished goods on others’ account. Some manufacturers 
largely delegated these activities. There was also an extensive network of jute merchants who 
were not manufacturers. 31 shareholders were engaged in manufacturing jute firms, 48 in 
mercantile jute firms, and 134 in firms engaged in both, (the latter category including many 
“inside” shareholders associated with mills managed by Thomas Duff). Given the imprecision 
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of the underlying data, perhaps all that can be concluded is that there was no detectable trend 
for outside shareholders who were involved in the jute industry to be merchants or 
manufacturers. 
95 of the shareholders in the jute category were ‘from’ Calcutta – they were employed there 
or had their main business interest there while a shareholder). The remaining 118 in the jute 
category were nearly all from the Dundee region. There were 57 “insider” shareholders in the 
Calcutta category. The insider shareholders in the jute category included 16 directors of 
Thomas Duff & Co and 28 employees, of whom 11 were commercial managers, 15 were mill 
managers, and two were mill assistants. Additionally, there was a group of nine former mill 
managers and engineers who were business associates of Thomas Duff from his time in 
Calcutta and four directors of Schoene, Kilburn & Co. This leaves 38 shareholders in the 
Calcutta category who were “outsiders”. This includes eight Victoria directors, and 21 
directors, two commercial managers and seven mill managers of other Calcutta jute managing 
agencies. 
The non-jute categories comprised 311 – or three in five – shareholders. The largest category 
was finance and trade, with 101 shareholders, which corresponds more or less to 
contemporary classifications of the service sector.17 This included shareholders working in 
                                                          
17
 The breakdown of the non-jute categories is as follows:- 
“Finance & trade” = 101: 12 in banking (excluding bankers holding shares on behalf of their institutions), 
2 in insurance, 4 in property, 16 in shipping services, 3 in stationary (including the wealthy Anglo-Irish 
businessman Charles Wisdom Hely, a character in Joyce’s novel Ulysses), 10 stockbrokers, and 47 
involved in trade, excluding jute. Of the 47 in trade, 18 were general merchants, 10 were in tea, 2 in 
each of rubber, tobacco, and wine, and 1 in each of oil, sugar, timber, typewriters and warehousing. 
“Industry, manufacturing” = 36: 12 in engineering, 6 in chemicals, 5 shipbuilding, 3 textiles, 2 each steel, 
quarrying and needle manufacturing, 1 each boxmaking, soap, vulcanite. 
“Food & drink processing” = 30: 7 brewers/distillers, 7 confectioners, 7 wholesale grocers involved in 
large scale retail, 3 flour manufacturers/millers, 3 agro-business and 2 tobacco manufacturers. 
“Professional” = 90: 27 lawyers, 15 clergymen, 13 doctors, 13 state officials (of whom 2 members of 
parliament and 1 member of the house of lords), 8 military, 5 accountants, and 4 architects. 
“Retail services, skilled trades, small business” = 54: 17 farmers, 7 builders or related trades, 6 grocers, 5 
bakers, 3 horticulture, 2 each journalists, photographers, chemists, 1 each clothing, coppersmith, 
bookbinder, drysalter, jeweller, sawmiller, tanner, watchmaker. 
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fields that serviced the jute industry or purchased its output, such as bankers, stockbrokers, 
shipping and general merchants. The next largest category consisted of the professions, 
divided between those such as lawyers, accountants and architects who serviced the jute 
industry, and unrelated professions such as teachers and clergymen. 
Those in the non-jute category were overwhelmingly “outsiders”, 279, compared to 32 
“insiders” in non-jute occupations. Insiders included associates of the Thomas Duff directors 
such as their lawyers in the Hendry family firm, and the tea merchant firm of Matthewson, 
related by marriage to the director George Nairn. 
 
Change over Time. 
How did the composition of shareholders change over time? The shareholders of Titaghur are 
compared for the years 1883, 1897 and 1919. 
 
Table 5.16: Titaghur Co, Distribution of Male Shareholders by Industry/Sector, 1883-1919. 
 
No 
1897 
1919 
% 
 Industry 1883 1919 1883 1897 1919 
Jute 25 61 85 74% 52% 36% 
Food & drink processing 2 6 17 6% 5% 7% 
Finance & trade 3 22 45 9% 19% 19% 
Industry, manufacturing 0 8 17 0% 7% 7% 
Retail services, skilled trades, small business 2 8 34 6% 7% 15% 
Professional 2 12 36 6% 10% 15% 
Men, total identified 34 117 234 100% 100% 100% 
Others 
   
      
Men, unidentified 1 28 71       
Institutional 0 3 13       
Employed women 0 4 13       
Women dependants of shareholders 3 32 106       
Women dependants of non-shareholders 2 9 31       
Total 40 193 468       
 
The table shows the qualitative change in the ownership of the company between 1883, when 
the shareholders were overwhelmingly employed in the jute industry, and 1897, when they 
declined to half. The decline in the proportion of shares held by those employed in the jute 
sector reflected investors from other industries taking up new shares, the increase being 
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distributed fairly evenly across different categories. These trends continued in the sub-period 
1897-1919. 
While sector or industry serves as an indicator of social position for categories such as small 
businesses and professionals, it cannot do so for larger, hierarchical categories of employment. 
By collating biographical information for job titles to construct a employment “grade” variable, 
occupational position can be analysed more closely for male shareholders. Table 5.17 takes the 
mass of shareholders in the three mill companies, listing “grades” in descending order by class 
position. Where a shareholder experienced mobility between grades between the share issues 
covered by the sample, the grade assigned was the one at which they spent the longest 
duration during the period covered. 
 
Table 5.17: Male Shareholders in Mill Companies, 1874-1919, by employment “grade”. 
Grade 
Sample, 
N = 742 
%* 
Director/partner 275 53% 
Professional 81 15% 
Small proprietor 53 10% 
Manager 36 7% 
Clerk/broker/agent 27 5% 
Supervisory/technical 51 10% 
Unidentified 219  
*Excludes unidentified. 
 
Directors and partners of large firms at the apex of the class structure dominate the sample. 
Professionals and small proprietors were represented as already indicated in the analysis of 
industry or sector. The shares of managers, clerks/brokers/agents and supervisory/technical 
grades may have been overrepresented relative to their weight in the wider shareholding 
public, reflecting the use of shareholdings as a means to incentivise the performance of 
employees and transactors with the mill companies. The general manager in Calcutta, his 
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commercial assistants, and mill managers and supervisors would have placed in each of these 
categories respectively.18 
Table 5.18 examines the changing grade composition of the shareholders over time. 
 
Table 5.18: Titaghur Co, Shareholders’ Employment “Grade”, 1883-1919. 
 
Shareholders %* 
 
1883 1897 1919 1883 1897 1919 
Total 39 181 467    
Men with identified grade 35 145 305 100% 100% 100% 
Director/partner 24 80 123 70% 68% 53% 
Professional 2 12 36 6% 10% 15% 
Small proprietor 1 4 29 3% 3% 12% 
Manager 1 5 13 3% 4% 6% 
Clerk/broker/agent 0 4 8 0% 3% 3% 
Supervisory/technical 6 12 24 18% 10% 10% 
Men, unidentified 1 28 71    
Institutional 0 3 13    
Employed women 0 4 13    
Women no occupation given 5 29 137    
*Excludes unidentified males, institutional shareholders, and women. 
 
The table replicates the dominance of directors or partners of firms from the previous table 
and shows that this was eroded only slowly, remaining stable from 1883 to 1897, despite the 
qualitative increase in outside shareholders over this period. Between 1897 and 1919 the 
proportion of shares held by intermediate categories dominated by outsiders – professionals, 
small proprietors and managers – accelerated. On the other hand, while they increased in 
absolute terms, the share of the lower social categories dominated by those employed in the 
jute industry - clerks and supervisors - remained static. 
 
  
                                                          
18
 The decision to classify mill managers in the supervisory/technical category rather than the manager 
category is arbitrary and subjective but serves to highlight the distinctive group of shareholders who 
were managers of jute mills and had been promoted from a supervisory grade. 
287 
 
A Note on Institutional Shareholdings 
As the previous table illustrated, institutional shareholders had emerged by 1897 and grown to 
13 by 1919 – including the managing agents themselves, Thomas Duff & Co, which took 200 
shares of the 1919 issue. Table 5.19 shows the proportion of shares held by institutions in the 
mill companies. 
 
Table 5.19: Institutional Shareholdings, 1895-1919. 
Share Issue 
Institutional 
holdings 
Total 
shares 
issued 
% 
Titaghur, 1895 1088 20000 5.4% 
Titaghur, 1897 517 20000 2.6% 
Victoria, 1899 2173 15000 14.5% 
Samnuggur, 1901 845 20000 4.2% 
Samnuggur, 1913 4056 28962 14.0% 
Titaghur, 1919 4146 45000 9.2% 
Victoria, 1919 4205 30000 14.0% 
 
The table indicates a fluctuating but rising trend in institutional shareholdings. However, 
institutional shareholdings consisted of two different types, with different motivations. The 
first were holdings by banks, which were not made with the primary purpose of making an 
investment return. Records of share transfers clearly indicate that banks took shares in trust as 
collateral from individual shareholders seeking loans.19 Bank holdings tended to be liquidated 
after a period of time, suggesting the end of the loan agreement with the shareholder 
concerned. These type of holdings were by far the most common institutional shareholding, 
suggesting that the mill companies’ shares were considered creditworthy and low risk by the 
banks. Of a selection of 401 observed share transfers recorded in the minutes of the directors 
                                                          
19
 MS 86/1/1, Samnuggur Co; MS 86/2/1, Victoria Co; MS 86/3/1, Titaghur Co, all MOTD. 
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of the Samnuggur Co and Titaghur Co from 1874 to 1921, 46 transactions involved a bank 
making a sale, and 51 involved a bank making a purchase.20 
 
Table 5.20: Institutional Shareholdings, Banks, 1895-1919. 
Share Issue 
Bank 
holdings 
Total 
shares 
issued 
% 
Titaghur, 1895 1088 20000 5.4% 
Titaghur, 1897 517 20000 2.6% 
Victoria, 1899 2173 15000 14.5% 
Samnuggur, 1901 845 20000 4.2% 
Samnuggur, 1913 3021 28962 10.4% 
Titaghur, 1919 3621 45000 8.0% 
Victoria, 1919 4100 30000 13.7% 
 
The other form of institutional shareholding took the form of holdings taken by investment 
trusts. 
 
Table 5.21: Institutional Shareholdings, Investment Trusts, 1895-1919. 
Share Issue 
Investme
nt Trust 
holdings 
Total 
shares 
issued 
% 
Samnuggur, 1913 1035 28962 3.6% 
Titaghur, 1919 525 45000 1.2% 
Victoria, 1919 105 30000 0.4% 
 
The six investments trusts represented in the sample were the Edinburgh & Dundee 
Investment Trust, The Second Edinburgh & Dundee Investment Trust Ltd, The Third Edinburgh 
& Dundee Investment Trust Ltd, Edinburgh, Aberdeen & Dundee Investment Co Ltd, The 
Scottish Mortgage & Trust Co Ltd and The Scottish Northern Investment Trust Ltd. By far the 
most significant holdings were those of the Edinburgh Investment Trusts in the Samnuggur 
share issue of 1913. Charles Barrie Ovenstone, a director of Thomas Duff & Co, had also 
                                                          
20
 MS 86/1/1/1-18, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 1874-1921; MS 86/3/1/1-17, Titaghur Co, MOTD, 1883-1921. 
Share transfers were selectively sampled. Larger transfers and transfers involving institutions were over-
sampled relative to other kinds of transfer, so the information given is biased but does accurately reflect 
the close correlation of bank sales and purchases of shares. 
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became a director of the Edinburgh & Dundee Investment Trusts by the time of his death in 
1931, but it is not clear if he held the position in 1913.21 
 
Retention of Shares, Share Turnover and Velocity of Share Transfers. 
This study of the shareholders of the Thomas Duff & Co group mill companies has emphasized 
the development of a much wider base of shareholders over time as the firms issued more 
equity to finance expansion. However, the variables examined so far give little indication about 
how actively traded the shares were. Chapter 2 considered evidence of how the shares of the 
rupee mill companies in Calcutta were actively traded. Did the wider base of shareholdings of 
the Dundee firms correspond to the development of an active market for Sterling jute mill 
companies? 
The most direct evidence of trading in shares in the mill companies comes from the minute 
books of the directors of the Samnuggur Co and the Titaghur Co, which appear to have 
recorded all share transfers. As mentioned above, the directors took a close interest in share 
transfers over which the firms’ articles of association gave them extensive discretion. The 
records of share transfers were extensively but selectively sampled, with comprehensive 
coverage for the earlier years to 1900, and a focus on larger transfers of 50 shares or more 
thereafter [MH sampling query]. Impressionistically, the observations sampled probably 
represent well over half of all transfers. Table 5.21 gives an indication of transfers of ordinary 
shares in the Titaghur Co. Transfers were defined as “market” transactions if they were not 
between family members, although the minute books do not state clearly whether transfers 
were arranged directly between individuals, through the offices of the directors themselves, or 
through a broker on the Dundee stock exchange. 
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 “Dundee Business Man’s Death”, Scotsman, p. 11, 31 Jan 1931. 
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Table 5.21: Samnuggur Co, share transfers as % of total shares, annual averages, 1884-1920. 
Years 
“Market” 
transactions 
*All 
transactions 
Market Sample 
1884-89 2.3% 3.5% 69% 30 
1890s 4.4% 7.8% 60% 71 
1900s 3.1% 3.6% 91% 41 
1910s 1.6% 2.3% 73% 46 
1884-1920 2.9% 4.3% 74% 188 
 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the sample, the data recorded for transfers of Samnuggur 
ordinary shares does suggest that the shares were sparsely traded throughout the period. 
“Market” transactions between non-family members predominated but fell to 60% of share 
transfers during the decade of the 1890s when a number of directors died and passed on large 
shareholdings to family members.22 
The sparse trading of shares does suggest a greater degree of long-term commitment by 
shareholders in the Dundee mills to seek a return on their investment through dividends and a 
lesser degree of speculative churning in the pursuit of capital gains than was common in 
Calcutta. This impression is confirmed by examining the retention of shares by holders of 
Titaghur shares at the time of the 1897 share issue. The level of retention can be examined by 
comparing the 1897 shareholder list with the list of shareholders prior to the new issue shares 
of 1919. 
The 1897 share issue raised the ordinary share capital to £300,000, called up incrementally up 
to 1905.23 Of 229 shareholders in the Titaghur Co at the time of the 1897 share issue, 70 were 
deceased by the time of the new share issue of 1919. The executors of two deceased 
shareholders increased their shareholding while nine executors decreased their shareholdings. 
The executors of eight deceased, large shareholders transferred shares to 30 other family 
                                                          
22
 Impressionistically, Titaghur followed the same long term pattern, given the dual trading in the two 
firms’ shares, although the timing of share issues may have created a short term discrepancy. Further 
research into the minutes of the directors, cross-referenced with the records of transactions recorded 
on the Dundee Stock Exchange would be required to determine how actively the shares were traded 
with a greater degree of precision. 
23
 MS 86/3/1/9, Titaghur Co, MOTD, p. 418, 3 Jan 1905. 
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members but also sold a net balance of shares, amounting to 12% of the ordinary share 
capital. The executors of 51 deceased shareholders sold out their shareholdings altogether, 
31% of the value of the ordinary share capital. A further 70 shareholders sold out their shares, 
amounting to 4%. 44 shareholders reduced their shareholding, also 16%. In all, 182 
shareholders sold shares equivalent to 63% of the ordinary share capital. 
21 shareholders increased their shareholding, 9% of the share capital. The remaining 55% of 
the sold share capital had been acquired by 400 new shareholders by 1919. 17 of the new 
shareholders were institutional. 108 of the new shareholders were connected to a family 
shareholding; they took up 27% of the ordinary share capital. 275 were new shareholders with 
no family connection, taking up 28% of the ordinary share capital. 
The cumulative 66% turnover in the period 1897-1919 is of the same order of magnitude as 
the selected observations for share transfers in the directors’ minutes for Titaghur Co for the 
same period. If it is assumed that the selective sample of share transfers in Table 5.21 captured 
a third of the total value of share transfers during this period, this would amount to total 
transfers valued at £341,400, or 114% of the ordinary share capital. Based on this assumption, 
this would suggest that the 66% of the share capital sold changed hands twice during this 
period, or an annual velocity of share transfers of about 5% of the ordinary share capital. 
 
Conclusion. 
The managing agents proved capable practitioners of a strategy of gaining access to capital 
markets to finance expansion through widening share ownership.  As shown in Chapter 2, 
dividend payments were competitive relative to the average Calcutta managing agents of jute 
mills and compared favourably to most alternative investment opportunities in Dundee, on a 
scale comparable to more exclusive companies with superior dividend performance, such as 
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the Alliance Trust.24 Therefore, Thomas Duff & Co were able to avoid shareholder discontent. 
The evidence suggests that shareholders were loyal and had a long-term commitment to 
holding the companies’ shares and remained passive recipients of dividends throughout. Scott 
was unable to appeal to shareholder activism to challenge the direction of the board in 1900 
and was ousted. The managing agents were able to expand the mill companies to ensure an 
increasing income stream of rents generated from the managed companies. 
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 Munn, Investing for Generations, Introduction. 
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Conclusion. 
This thesis has examined the history of Thomas Duff & Co and its influential role in the Calcutta 
jute industry. This history demonstrates that managing agents like Thomas Duff & Co with 
operational control of jute manufacturing companies in Calcutta possessed a competitive 
advantage that was translated into lucrative rents. Thomas Duff & Co confirms the evidence in 
the secondary literature of the role for this form of managerial hierarchy under the historically 
specific conditions of a colonial context in which markets functioned in India and in their 
relationship to world economy in the age of the ‘imperialism of free trade’. 
In the introduction, some of the macro-level questions in the historiography of British 
colonialism were referred to in order to frame the context in which the jute industry there 
developed, particularly the impact on colonial India’s economic development of the 
relationship to world trade imposed on it by British political rule and the related question of 
colonialism’s contribution to industrial development. While the research presented in the 
preceding chapters has not been concerned primarily to address such macro-level questions, 
some of the findings are suggestive. It is not in doubt that the jute industry’s rapid growth in 
Calcutta made a significant contribution to export earnings and to creating urban industrial 
employment in a sector that was far more productive than traditional agriculture. However, 
many historians have demonstrated the negative effects of agrarian Bengal’s reliance on jute 
as a cash crop and the asymmetrical power relationships in the extension of credit to the 
peasantry by intermediaries in the jute value chain, leading to long run changes in the security 
of land tenure to the detriment of the peasantry.1 Bagchi has emphasized the enclave nature 
of the development of jute manufacturing and the limited linkage effects.2 If one concentrates 
                                                          
1
 Goswami, Industry, Trade & Peasant Society; Bose, Peasant Labour and Colonial Capital. 
2
 Bagchi, Private Investment in India. 
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on the urban industrial sector that is the subject of this study, the positive contribution of 
British investment in the industry is questionable. Even in the most favourable case of Thomas 
Duff & Co, the largest jute manufacturer which raised most of its share capital in the United 
Kingdom for investment in Calcutta, it is doubtful whether there was a net flow of funds into 
India in the period 1870-1921. 33% of the initial capital of the Samnuggur Co floated in the 
1870s was that of Thomas Duff himself, which had been earned during his period of 
stewardship of the Borneo Co’s Barnagore mill in the 1860s. The other shareholders were 
repaid their initial investment and and that required for subsequent share issues many times 
over by the flow of dividend payments back to the United Kingdom, while the share of the 
direct producers, the peasants who produced the raw jute, and the workers who 
manufactured it, remained pitiful. 
Chapter 1 presented a quantitative study of the development of the jute industry in Calcutta 
from 1870 to 1921. There was limited technical change in the industry over time and limited 
scope to innovate and to capture internal economies of scale. This growth was extensive, 
driven by the application of more factors of production, rather than a qualitative improvement 
in productivity or product- and process- innovation. The dominance of raw jute in the cost 
structure proved to be the crucial input affecting industry performance. This entailed a 
strategic imperative to buy jute cheaply at the right point in the seasonal cycle, leading to 
rising jute stocks held by the industry over time, which necessitated access to sources of credit 
to finance working capital. 
There was a long term trend for profits to decline, mirrored by a narrowing of the equity base 
on which shareholders could earn high dividends. The evidence presented is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the formation of the Indian Jute Mills Association in the 1880s and the use 
of short-time working to limit output in periods of depressed demand was successful at 
managing competitive pressures in the industry, while storing up the seeds of crisis in the 
inter-war period. 
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Chapter 2 extended the analysis to make a quantitative assessment of the variations in the 
performance of different firms within the industry, taking the managing agent as the basic unit 
of analysis. It demonstrated that there were significant variations in performance of the mill 
companies under different managing agents over time. Thomas Duff & Co was one of the ‘big 
four’ managing agents to expand rapidly and increase market share. While the technical 
barriers to entry in the industry were low, it was demonstrated that there was limited entry by 
new managing agents during the period, suggesting significant barriers to entry in terms of 
access to the information and other forms of competitive advantage internalized by those 
managing agents which survived. The managing agents who survived converged on a range of 
performance which allowed most to remain profitable. The variation in performance showed 
that the mills managed by Thomas Duff & Co were some of the most profitable during this 
period. There were significant differences in the performance of managing agents based in 
Calcutta who managed Rupee companies, and those based in the UK who managed Sterling 
companies. The Rupee companies were more susceptible to competitive pressures than the 
Sterling companies in general because of their relationship to the discipline of capital markets 
and tended to perform better over time, while the excessive rents charged by some of the 
managing agents of Sterling mills had a deleterious effect on firm performance. Thomas Duff & 
Co, one of the managing agents of Sterling mill companies, was an exception.  
The quantitative evidence of industry- and firm-level performance poses questions about the 
nature of the competitive advantage that firms internalized which were assessed by the case 
study of Thomas Duff & Co. Thomas Duff & Co were atypical of the managing agents operating 
in the Calcutta jute industry in some ways. The atypical nature of Thomas Duff & Co permitted 
inferences to be drawn about the functioning of the managing agency system. Its relatively 
transparent accounts as a private limited company rather than a partnership and its specialism 
in jute allowed the scale of rents derived from the jute industry to be isolated and studied. 
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Chapter 3 studied the evolution of Thomas Duff & Co within the framework of principal-agent 
theory. The use of the public limited company form allowed the directors of the Samnuggur Co 
to pool location-specific knowledge from both Dundee and Calcutta and to internalize their 
collective competitive advantage, while solving principal-agent problems to establish an 
effective multinational management structure. A functional managerial hierarchy that was 
capable of adapting to change and reproducing competitive advantage emerged through the 
creation of a career path promoting Calcutta managers to the directorate in Dundee. The plc 
form did not dissolve the importance of family networks in the operation of Thomas Duff & Co 
and its managed firms. Rather, the resources of various family networks – in the form of 
knowledge and equity - were reinforced and protected through marriage. The firm succeeded 
in creating a virtuous circle of profitability of the managed firms that permitted the 
maintenance of high returns to ordinary shareholders, rapid growth of productive capacity 
while permitting the extraction of very significant rents. 
Chapter 4 showed how Thomas Duff & Co actively shaped the business environment in which 
they operated by anticipating and neutralising threats to their control of the directorate, 
intervening in the supply chain to manage costs and cajoling other managing agents to cooperate 
to manage competition. There were several episodes of internal dissent within the directorate 
over access to managing agency rents. They were successfully resisted before they threatened 
to call the whole structure into question through unwanted attention in the eyes of the media 
and the law courts – and by extension – the ordinary ‘outsider’ shareholders. 
An external market threat in the form of rising jute prices was dealt with by an informal 
process of backwards integration which allowed it to capture the directors of the raw jute 
trading firm of R Sim & Co, limiting the risks associated with fluctuating prices. In this case, 
Thomas Duff & Co were able to leverage their market power while using family networks, 
(through appointment of sons of the Thomas Duff & Co directors as managers of R Sim & Co), 
to ensure privileged access to the raw material. 
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In relation to managing horizontal competition, Thomas Duff & Co was able to bring its 
distinctive competitive advantage as a jute specialist to bear in playing a disproportionately 
prominent role in the affairs of the Indian Jute Mills Association. They played a significant role 
in advocating short-time agreements and periodic restrictions on investment in new capacity 
that enabled the industry to consolidate from the late-1880s. Although this entailed short-
term costs to the firm in terms of sacrificing its competitive lead in certain destination markets, 
it served its long-term strategy of managing the effects of competition as a relatively small firm 
without the financial resources to weather crisis of some of its more diversified competitors. 
In the final chapter, it was shown how Thomas Duff & Co engaged in a process of learning 
about the functioning of relatively competitive capital markets in Calcutta. This knowledge was 
transferred to Dundee, where they pioneered the controlled expansion of the equity base of 
the managed companies to take on a more popular character – encompassing professionals, 
petit bourgeois and their own skilled employees. This permitted the managing agents to raise 
investment funds on a sufficient scale to finance the rapid expansion of the jute companies 
they managed, while retaining sufficient stakes themselves to maintain control and maintain 
access to lucrative managing agency rents. 
The case of Thomas Duff & Co enhances our understanding of the evolution of free standing 
companies into multinational managing agents. It was an example of strategic control from 
overseas of unusual longevity that endured until its conversion to a rupee company in the 
1950s, bucking the inter-war trend for these firms to disappear under changed circumstances.3 
This case suggests fruitful avenues for future research would include the comparative study of 
Thomas Duff & Co and other Calcutta-based managing agents, such as Bird & Co, Andrew Yule 
                                                          
3
 Mira Wilkins, “The Free-Standing Company, 1870-1914: An Important Type of Foreign Direct 
Investment”, The Economic History Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, (May, 1988), pp. 259-282; Mira Wilkins and 
Harm Schroter, The Free-Standing Company in the World Economy 1830-1996 (Oxford, 1998); Geoffrey 
Jones, Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (Oxford, 2000); Mark Casson, 'Institutional diversity in overseas enterprise; explaining the 
free-standing company', Business History, 36.4, pp. 95–108, 1994. 
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& Co, and Jardine, Henderson. It is instructive that Thomas Duff & Co’s general manager in 
Calcutta, Sir Alexander R Murray, was recruited to direct the affairs of Jardine, Henderson in 
1921 before returning to the directorate of Thomas Duff & Co after his retirement to the UK in 
the 1930s.  
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Appendix: Notes on sources and quantitative methods 
employed in Chapters 2-3. 
 
This appendix makes some observations about the use of deflators in Chapters 1 and 2 before 
detailing methods of estimation in specific tables. Most of the variables presented in Chapters 
1 and 2 are utilized to demonstrate long-term trends but the scope to analyse relationships 
between the variables was limited. The appendix concludes with some general remarks about 
some of the issues with processing the data to permit further research that analyses the 
nature of the relationships between the variables presented in Chapters 1 and 2 more closely. 
Per Loom Measures 
All per loom measures in this chapter derive from a comprehensive table of sacking, hessian 
and total looms for the industry and for individual mills collated from primary sources. Sacking, 
hessian and total loom figures for individual firms from Anon., Jute Mills in Bengal, (Dundee, 
1880), p. 88; D. R. Wallace, The Romance of Jute, (Calcutta, 2nd edition, 1928); annual series 
‘Jute Mills in India’ giving breakdown of sacking and hessian looms published by Calcutta firms 
of jute brokers, Poppe, Delius & Co 1895-99, continued by JA Dykes & Co 1900-09, Moran & 
Co, 1910-21, reproduced in Dundee Advertiser, 1895-1905, Indian Jute Mills Association, 
annual Report of the Committee 1905-21. Figures for individual firms 1870-95 from company 
annual reports published in Friend of India & Statesman, 1879-83, Dundee Courier and Dundee 
Advertiser, 1879-95. The availability of firm-level data for total looms is more comprehensive 
than for hessian and sacking looms. Combined with figures for start and end years bookending 
discontinuities in the figures, missing data for the ratio of sacking to hessian looms for the 
period 1870-95 can be extrapolated in nearly all cases, or are estimated as continuous where 
the total loom figure is unchanged. 
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Deflators (especially Figures 1.4-1.6.) 
In order to explore trends in real terms over time, variables have been expressed in constant 
1873 prices where appropriate. To calculate deflators, I have used the price index from 
“weighted index of all commodity prices, 1861-1931”, Government of India, Department of 
Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Index Numbers of Indian Prices (Delhi, 1933), third 
issue, cited in Michelle McAlpin, “Price Movements and Economic Fluctuations”, in Desai, M & 
Kumar, D (eds), Cambridge Economic History of India, Volume 2, 1757-1970, (Cambridge, 
1983), pp. 903-4. [For the equivalent calculations of deflators in sterling in Chapters 3-4, I have 
used the price index “Board of Trade Wholesale Price Indices 1871-1980", from B.R. Mitchell, 
British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 3rd ed, 1988), pp 728-9.] 
There are obvious limitations to using a general price index to deflate prices to develop a more 
precise analysis about the relationships of variables. This is demonstrated by considering the 
relative movement of prices if McAlpin’s price index is harmonised for comparison with 
Bagchi’s estimates for the price of jute textile machinery from 1900: 
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Year 
Bagchi, 
Index nos. 
Of prices of 
textile 
machinery 
exported 
from UK to 
Bengal 1904 
= 100 
McAlpin’s 
general price 
index 
adjusted 
1904 = 100 
1904-05 100 100 
1905-06 99 112 
1906-07 100 131 
1907-08 106 138 
1908-09 109 148 
1909-10 112 132 
1910-11 126 124 
1911-12 125 128 
1912-13 112 144 
1913-14 105 150 
1914-15 101 155 
1915-16 118 150 
1916-17 152 153 
1917-18 188 154 
1918-19 186 178 
1919-20 251 249 
1920-21 302 250 
1921-22 321 226 
Source: "Table 8.1. An approximate measure of gross fixed investment in the jute industry in Bengal, 
1905-6 to 1938-39", Bagchi, Private Investment in India, pp. 273-4. 
 
Jute textile machinery prices lagged behind the general price index from 1906-07 to 1915-16, 
then leapt ahead in 1917-18 and in 1920-22. For the purpose of measuring the real value of 
fixed investment in the jute industry, it would be preferable to use Bagchi’s price series. Similar 
considerations would apply to deflating the value of raw material inputs utilizing the various 
raw jute price indices discussed below. These could be used to calculate alternative estimates 
to the ones based on McAlpin’s index in Table 1.5 and in Figures 1.7-1.9 
Data for the minority of jute mill firms which were Sterling companies owned or 
headquartered in the UK are expressed in rupees at the company accounting exchange rate for 
any given year for the purpose of comparison. As most data measured in sterling in firms’ 
published accounts were simply expressing values for inputs and outputs purchased in India, 
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this is unproblematic, but where values for inputs purchased or for capital invested in the UK 
were affected by the 50% depreciation of the rupee between 1885 and 1898, this has the 
effect of inflating the values of the stock measures of the Sterling companies such as 
investment in fixed capital. This introduces a bias into some industry calculations based on 
aggregated firm data in Chapter 1 and for some inter-firm comparisons in Chapter 2. For 
instance, profitability measured as a percentage return on capital employed in Tables 1.7 - 1.8 
and Figure 1.14 is underestimated for the Sterling companies for this reason. 
 
Capital employed per worker, labour productivity and wages (Table 1.2) 
While physical capital employed per worker is given in Table 1.2, further research is required 
to assess whether Government of India figures for total workers employed in the industry 
were reliable and consistent and how to cross-reference this data with firm-level data to 
calculate productivity. Firm-level data for wages is extremely scarce. For instance, Ranajit Das 
Gupta, Labour and Working Class in Eastern India: Studies in colonial history, (Calcutta, 1994), 
points out the way in which official figures consistently understated the number of casual 
‘daily’ workers employed in the jute mills until inter-war changes in regulation led to a 
formalising of labour relations in the industry. 
 
Value of jute stocks per loom (Figure 1.8) 
The estimates of the values in Figure 1.8 take into account that some mill companies changed 
the months in which they reported their accounts, especially towards the end of the period, 
and so dropped out of the estimate. In a few cases, missing values for individual companies 
and for the minority of companies reporting in other months were estimated by taking the 
average reported value. 
Using the Government of India price series for maximum annual prices of the first assortment 
of jute to come on the market in a given season, it is possible to show that the volume of jute 
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stock per loom increased as well as the value, providing further evidence of more strategic 
behaviour by firms to manage costs over time. This conclusion is based on the assumption that 
this trend was unlikely to have been sustained if firm behaviour wasn’t minimally rational and 
that an alternative explanation based on firms’ incompetence in raw materials purchases 
across the industry is implausible. 
 
Jute stocks per loom (tons), and raw jute prices, (constant 1873 rupees). 
 
Sources: As in Figure 1.8; Government of India, Statistical Abstract of British India, “Jute, Bengal, first 
assortment (average of maximum prices).”; GH Le Maistre, Investors India Year Book, 1920 (Calcutta, 
1921), p. 114, “Area under Jute, Outturn and Prices, 1900-19. Average price per 400 lbs of Naraingunge 
jute.” 
 
Working Capital (Table 1.6, Figures 1.10 – 1.12.) 
The data used takes end-of-year accounts running from September to March, with most 
accounts closing in December, and assumes that this presents a reasonable approximation to 
the result for all firms in December because any seasonal biases of firms reporting before 
December should be balanced by a similar number of firms reporting after December. This 
seems a reasonable assumption as the results for average jute stocks of firms reporting in 
December are not significantly different for the average of all firms in all months. 
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Profitability (Table 1.8, Figures 1.13 – 1.14) 
An alternative measure of profitability in the industry is take the real returns, in constant 
prices, of profits relative to investment in fixed capital. Three alternative measures are possible 
– gross profits after interest in constant prices relative to gross expenditure on fixed capital, to 
net expenditure on fixed capital after accounting for depreciation (the replacement value of 
capital employed), or to the latter measure including reserve funds. To calculate real returns, 
requires considering the returns relative to the real value of investment in fixed capital in a 
previous time period. For all three measures, I have calculated the “real” values by summing 
the incremental increases in the value of fixed capital in constant prices for a given year in 
which the capital was added to. 
Due to changes in the method of stating annual accounts by the rupee jute mills, consistent 
figures are available for the latter measure – net expenditure on fixed capital including reserve 
funds. The figures for net expenditure on fixed capital excluding reserve funds are less reliable 
as some firms didn’t clearly distinguish between reserve funds and depreciation funds while 
some did. Figures for gross expenditure on fixed capital become obscure from the late 1890s 
until 1912, as many firms ceased to publish this figure in their accounts because they were 
concerned to emphasize that the replacement value of their fixed capital after accounting for 
funds set aside for depreciation would compare favourably with newer firms entering the 
industry in order to retain the confidence of their shareholders. I have estimated gross 
expenditure on fixed capital by extrapolating from the available data in the annual accounts 
for sums added to depreciation. However, this cannot account for sums spent on repairs and 
replacements or for arbitrary transfers that occurred out of the depreciation account. 
Unfortunately, the more reliable figure - net expenditure on fixed capital after depreciation, 
including reserve funds – produces the most unsatisfactory results. As mills had to defer 
investing in new capacity and repairs and replacements during the war, they set aside very 
large sums to depreciation and reserves in preparation for renewed investment after the war. 
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This had the effect that the cost of capital for many firms by the end of the war was either 
negligible or negative. As the denominator for calculating profits relative to capital employed, 
this produces unintelligible results for calculating any long term trend. 
Gross profits after interest were compared by prospective investors with two alternative 
measures of profitability, “gross profits” and “net profits after depreciation” (Table 1.8). Gross 
profits provide the best measure of productive efficiency [MK: why?] within the industry by 
comparing the cost of physical inputs and revenue earned from sales by individual firms. Gross 
profits after interest were measured to take into account the additional cost of external short 
term finance which was often resorted to by firms borrowing from their managing agents or 
from banks to use as working capital to cover the cost of jute purchases. Working capital 
requirements varied sharply throughout the year due to the seasonality of the raw jute 
market, which led most firms to rely on short term bank finance rather than on their own 
capital. I have followed the Investors India Year Book in excluding debenture loans from the 
gross profits after interest measure. The data for gross profits are taken from the Investors 
India Year Book for the period 1903-19 but are not available for the preceding period as most 
firms included interest payments, insurance and commissions as a subcategory of costs on 
working account, which were not published in annual reports. “Net profit after depreciation” 
measures the residual profits available for distribution to the shareholders or for reinvestment 
after firms had met all their external financial obligations, including debenture payments, and 
had set aside funds to cover the deterioration of their fixed capital. Balances which were 
frequently carried over by firms from the previous year or half year to smooth dividend 
payments or for other purposes are excluded from the measure in order to examine 
performance in a given year. 
Profitability, returns to gross expenditure on fixed capital, (constant 1873 prices), 1874-1921. 
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Profitability, returns to net expenditure on fixed capital after depreciation, (constant 1873 
prices), 1874-1921 
 
Profitability, returns to net expenditure on fixed capital after depreciation, including reserves, 
(constant 1873 prices), 1874-1921. 
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Profitability, return to gross expenditure on fixed capital, %. 
 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Gross profit     10.6% 24.3% 
Gross profit after interest 11.6% 7.3% 7.2% 17.1% 
Net profit after depreciation 7.2% 5.1% 4.8% 13.8% 
 
Profits, return to net expenditure on fixed capital, %. 
 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Gross profit     14.0% 40.4% 
Gross profit after interest 15.1% 9.3% 9.5% 30.0% 
Net profit after depreciation 9.4% 6.7% 6.4% 23.7% 
 
Profits - return to net expenditure on fixed capital including reserves. 
 
1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
Gross profit     15.6% 58.5% 
Gross profit after interest 16.0% 10.3% 10.5% 42.4% 
Net profit after depreciation 10.4% 7.3% 7.1% 34.3% 
 
Managing agency commissions (Figures 1.15 – 1.16, Table 1.9) 
Jute Mills in Bengal published in Dundee in 1880 surveyed the level of managing agency 
commissions charged in the jute industry. In 1904, the newspaper Capital (Calcutta) 
republished a similar survey from the Indian Textile Journal (Lokanathan, p. 335). These 
sources show that managing agents’ commissions were generally a fixed percentage of sales 
revenue or profits. Taken with scattered and fragmentary information in newspapers for the 
whole period 1870-1919, together with individual data for firms such as the mill companies 
managed by Thomas Duff & Co. and Finlay Muir & Co., it is possible to estimate the long term 
trend in commissions as a percentage of sales or of profits for the industry as a whole. From 
1880 to 1904, the trend was for more managing agents to charge commission as a percentage 
of profits rather than as a percentage of sales revenues. Those firms which continued to 
charge commission based on sales had generally reduced the percentage charged. The firms 
charging commission as a percentage of profits generally had a fixed income per month which 
reflected the costs incurred to employ clerical labour for marketing the managed mills’ output 
at their Calcutta offices. In addition they were guaranteed a minimum income in the event of 
low profits, approximately Rs 20,000 annually for a 500 loom mill - which increased in line with 
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increases in looms employed. This trend suggests that the managing agents were sensitive to 
the criticism made by shareholders during the crisis years of the late 1870s and mid-1880s – 
and articulated in the press and Jute Mills in Bengal – that a commission on sales revenue gave 
them an incentive to maximise sales revenue at the expense of profitability and dividends paid 
to the shareholders. Weaker managing agents such as Ernsthausen or agents seeking entry to 
the industry such as Anderson, Wright tended to charge a lower level of commission, 
suggesting a level of inter-agency competition to attract shareholder loyalty.  
To calculate industry commissions paid to managing agents over time, sales-based 
commissions and profit-based commissions were estimated for the individual managing agents 
oin the basis of the information above and then aggregated. Although sales data are not 
known from 1890 for most firms, they can be estimated by calculating individual firms’ sales as 
a proportion of the industry sales, taking the firm’s share of total looms in the industry as the 
proportion. Precise data for gross profits exists from 1903 and are estimated for 1876-1902 
based on gross profits after interest on the assumption that the ratio of gross profits to gross 
profits after interest from 1876 to 1902 was similar to the ratio that is known for the period 
1903-1919, when it remained reasonably stable. 
 
Cost Structure (Chapter 2, Table 2.6) 
The data available for comparing costs and sales for different firms are limited because the 
jute mill companies ceased to publish this information in their half-yearly accounts as reported 
in the newspapers at the end of the 1880s. Annualised costs and value of output data are 
available for the decade 1879-1888 for 13 of the 20 firms that were in operation for some or 
all of this period. However, missing data, the high level of attrition of firms in existence at the 
beginning of the period, the entry of new firms towards the end of the period, differences in 
hessian to sacking loom ratios and different months used to end the accounting year, make it 
difficult to draw meaningful inferences from any comparison. 
314 
 
Cost on working account per loom in rupees (constant prices, 1873 = 1), 1879-88. 
Mill 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 
Average 
1879-88 
Budge-Budge 3722 - 4931 4674 3959 3307 - 3105 3428 - 3784 
Rishra/Calcutt
a 
3623                     
Fort Gloster 3883 3535 4025 4205 3962 3969 - - -  -  3930 
Goosery     3829 4214 4147             
Gourepore -  -  5079 4375 4135 4473 3695 3048 3489 4091 4019 
Hooghly           2581 -  3991 4664 3248   
Howrah 3618 -  4564 5360 5074 -  2401 2838 3393 3014 3565 
Seebpore -  2771 4056 4287 4131 3641 -  2560 3237 2902 3422 
Asiatic -  -  3186 1732               
Union       3007 3614 3495 3123 2724 3239 3026 3176 
Barnagore -  3072 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -    
Champdany 2385 2863 5146 2793 3524 2990 2418 2668 3120 4005 3170 
Ganges  - 4152 -  4737 4625 3886 3885 -  -  -  
 
India  - -  5034 4525 -  -  4234 3674 -  6251 
 
Titaghur             3666 3793 4538 5178   
Weighted 
average 
3385 3245 4622 4111 4054 3285 3175 3073 3542 3871 3780 
St dev as % of 
average 18% 18% 15% 26% 12% 18% 23% 17% 17% 31% 19% 
£ denotes Sterling company. – denotes missing data. 
Sources: Jute Mills in Bengal, half-yearly reports in Friend of India and Statesman, Dundee Advertiser. 
 
Output value per loom in rupees (constant prices, 1873 = 1), 1879-88. 
Mill 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 
Average 
1879-88 
Budge-Budge 4154 - 5827 6038 5345 3080 - 3197 3904 - 4334 
Rishra/Calcutt
a 
3551 
          
Fort Gloster 3619 3423 4452 5519 5152 3769 - - - - 4324 
Goosery 
  
4401 5240 4251 
      
Gourepore - - 5637 5878 5469 4623 3905 3194 4277 7542 5050 
Hooghly 
     
2112 - 4186 5617 6023 
 
Howrah 4032 - 5374 6912 6432 - 2265 3000 4154 5464 4461 
Seebpore 
 
2941 4593 5293 5052 3438 - 2566 3592 5372 4082 
Asiatic - - 3240 
        
Union 
   
3782 4674 4028 3143 2855 4048 5465 3999 
Barnagore - 3321 - - - - - - - - 
 
Champdany 2525 3542 6263 3700 3519 3128 2260 3157 3882 4903 3623 
Ganges - 4010 - 5921 5439 3836 3818 - - - 4517 
India - - 5676 4913 - - 4415 1976 - 5390 4474 
Titaghur 
      
3383 3674 4777 6820 
 
Weighted 
average 
3534 3450 5333 5138 4907 3258 3123 3083 4204 5711 4318 
St dev as % of 
average 
18% 11% 18% 19% 17% 23% 26% 20% 15% 15% 18% 
 
  
315 
 
Profit on working account per loom in rupees (constant prices, 1873 = 1), 1879-88. 
Mill Company 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 
Average 
1879-88 
Budge-Budge 433  - 896 1364 1386 -227  - 92 476  - 550 
Rishra/Calcutt
a 
-72                     
Fort Gloster -264 -112 427 1314 1190 -200  -  -  -  - 394 
Goosery     571 1026 105             
Gourepore  -  - 558 1503 1334 150 210 146 789 3452 1030 
Hooghly           -469  - 194 953 2775   
Howrah 413  - 810 1552 1359  - -136 162 761 2449 897 
Seebpore  - 171 538 1007 921 -203  - 5 355 2470 660 
Asiatic  -  - 55 -
1732 
              
Union       75 1060 533 20 130 809 2439 824 
Barnagore £  - 249  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -   
Champdany £ 140 679 1117 907 -4 138 -158 489 762 898 454 
Ganges £  - -82  - 1309 868 -277 29  -  -  - 
 
India £  -  - 693 1070  - -515 -208 -101 533 762 319 
Titaghur £             -283 -119 239 1642   
Weighted 
average 
149 205 711 1027 853 -27 -52 10 663 1840 538 
St dev as % of 
average 
204
% 
156
% 
43% 89% 61% 
1248
% 
323
% 
1872
% 
36% 51% 94% 
 
Compared to the data on profitability and share prices, there is a paucity of data after 1888 
available to analyse the relative efficiency and productivity of individual firms in the industry. 
Working account data – detailing firm income from sales and expenditure on discrete inputs –
has survived for the Titaghur Jute Company during the 1880s and 1890s. I have reconstructed 
the working accounts of the Thomas Duff & Co. mills based on monthly statements published 
in the minute books of meetings of the directors. Similar data to that depicted for the 1880s 
above exists for the Champdany mill managed by Finlay, Muir & Co., (1874-1921), the Alliance 
and Alexandra mills managed by Begg Dunlop & Co., (1910-20), and the Angus mill managed by 
Bemis & Co., (1913-21), but I have not been able to obtain this type of data for Birds, Andrew 
Yule, and Jardine Skinner, Thomas Duff & Co.’s main competitors. The data above are 
combined in Figures 2.1 – 2.2 and in Table 2.7 in Chapter 2. 
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Weighting for variations in the use of hessian and sacking looms over time and between 
firms 
Do the differences in hessian to sacking loom ratios depicted in Table 2.5 lead to systematic 
biases in the commensurability of the cross-section and time-series data considered in 
Chapters 1 and 2? Given that most firms adopted similar proportions of hessian to sacking 
looms over time, it is unlikely to have a serious impact on the cross-section data in any given 
year comparing firm performance in Chapter 2. Over time, the objections of bias may be more 
serious. Evidence obtained from reconstructing the monthly working accounts of the mills 
managed by Thomas Duff & Co, Samnuggur 1 & 2 mills combined, Titaghur no 1 mill, and 
Titaghur no 2 mill (see Table 1.4), can be used to calculate the jute raw material costs, the 
overhead working costs, and the sales revenue on a per loom basis, for hessian and sacking 
looms respectively. The evidence from the Samnuggur and Titaghur companies shows 
substantial differences between hessian and sacking costs and output values/ sales income per 
ton of input-output, which might be expected to be reflected in similar differences measured 
on a per loom basis, given that hessian looms were wider than sacking looms. However, the 
actual results measured on a per loom basis are counter-intuitive. Despite requiring more 
expensive raw materials and more labour to operate the looms, hessians were a lighter 
product, manufactured with a single thread warp and finer yarns, where sackings used a 
double- or triple-thread warp and thicker yarns. (Warp is the set of lengthwise yarns that are 
held in tension on a frame or loom. T Woodhouse & Kilgour, P, The Jute Industry; from Seed to 
Finished Cloth (London, 1921), pp. 99-105.) This characteristic has the effect of largely 
equalising the differences in costs per ton and sales income per ton of hessians relative to 
sackings when measured on a per loom basis. Across the three Thomas Duff mills for the 
period 1904-1914, total hessian costs per loom averaged 92% of the average for all looms. 
Hessian sales income per loom averaged 95% of the average for all looms. The different 
percentages for costs and sales income per ton entailed that hessians were significantly more 
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profitable than sackings. The differences in per loom figures for hessians and sackings for the 
three mills were insignificant and the values over time were relatively stable. While the 
relative prices of hessian and sacking inputs and outputs fluctuated at the margin – and the 
previous chapter presented evidence of a significant improvement in the efficient utilisation of 
hessian looms during the 1890s – it is reasonable to infer that the figures above for the 
Thomas Duff & Co mills are representative for the whole industry throughout the period 1870-
1921. Differences between firms in terms in employing hessian and sacking looms can only 
explain a small part of the total variation in performance across firms when measuring costs 
and sales per loom. 
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Measuring costs, sales and output 
 
1) Raw jute and price indices. 
Price differentials were not simply a function of additional shipping costs but reflected the fact 
that raw jute was not a uniform product. Higher quality jute tended to be exported in order to 
account for deterioration in the course of shipping so that the jute was of the requisite quality 
to enter the manufacturing process upon arrival at its destination. The lack of uniformity of the 
raw material was reflected by the variety of permutations in which different categories of raw 
jute – ‘baled and loose’, ‘jute, rejections and cuttings’ – were combined in the initial batching 
and preparing process for the purpose of spinning. Bales of raw jute typically comprised an 
‘assortment’ of ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ quality jute ready to be combined for batching. 
Moreover, in the calculation of price indices, price differentials reflect the variegation and 
hierarchy of stages within the jute marketing process from field to factory – a process that 
would often involve several commodity exchanges and prices - not a single sale/purchase. This 
lack of uniformity extended across time too, both within the course of a jute season and from 
year to year. Thus jute quality was indicated by assigning ‘marks’ to different qualities of jute 
as a guide to buyers and sellers in determining market prices. Some marks became more 
trusted over time as a consistent and reliable designator of price. However, during the course 
of a jute season, there was always a marked deterioration in quality within each mark over 
time that was factored in to the price calculations of buyers and sellers. Moreover, as 
Goswami, points out in Industry, Trade and Peasant Society, there was a general trend from 
year to year of deterioration in the quality of marks and the invention of new, higher-grade 
marks. This process was by no means a disinterested one of seeking to impartially designate 
quality but was necessarily a process in which the changing balance of asymmetrical relations 
of market power between buyer and seller, between the peasant, the village moneylender and 
jute trader, and the European managing agent, were condensed and crystallised. 
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Consider the selection of spot prices and annual average prices for raw jute collated in the 
table below. 
Figure: Raw jute prices (constant 1873 prices), rupees per ton (all spot prices for January, all 
averages January-December, (2) Jute, Bengal, first assortment (average of maximum prices)). 
YEAR. 
(1) 
Jute, 
picke
d 
(Calc
utta) 
(2) 
Jute, 
Bengal, 
first 
assortm
ent 
(3) 
Average 
all 
classes, 
Naraing
unge 
(4) 
Fine 
Naraing
unge 
(5) 
Export 
price 
(6) 
Estimat
e of 
price of 
jute 
importe
d into 
Calcutta 
(7) 
Samnug
gur No. 
1 mill 
(8) 
Differen
tial 
betwee
n (7) 
and (6) 
(9) 
Samnug
gur Co 
price of 
jute in 
stock 
1873 102 146     112         
1891 107 138     105 103 102 -11%   
1892 182 142     112 102 105 7% 106 
1893 152 159     119 110 110 -4%   
1894 202 171     131 100 125 24% 112 
1895 149 167     142 96 113 15%   
1896 137 151     117 92 71 -28% 116 
1897 135 125     127 69 96 35% 71 
1898 125 135     119 77 110 26% 89 
1899 143 141     143 98 128 19% 113 
1900 137 134 136 145 138 94 91 0% 103 
1901 137 141 132 143 135 86 93 8% 104 
1902 142 145 132 147 139 95 95 -4% 113 
1903 170 156 142 155 101 102 118 13% 130 
1904 169 164 152 163 106 111 127 11%   
1905 170 171 161 172 131 126 137 5% 151 
1906 184 195 184 203 126 150 152 -3% 182 
1907 265 214 184 245 117 115 160 37% 151 
1908 141 174 140 211 129 94 110 17% 119 
1909 133 144 126 167 138 95 108 11% 118 
1910 136 144 128 155 150 114 116 -4% 132 
1911 202 179 157 191 170 130 136 2% 144 
1912 177 192 171 205 203 132 134 2% 145 
1913 209 214 207 246 155 155 153 -6% 176 
1914 279 232 224 251 127 117 150 32% 111 
1915 166 202 176 199 128 105 113 6% 109 
1916 188 184 148 188 154 117 141 14% 128 
1917 205 184 144 167 175 99 132 30% 108 
1918 138 165 123 125 178 106 114 3% 100 
1919 177 161 117 119 210 143 100   85 
1920 167 185         93   78 
1921 205           83   83 
Average 
       
9% 
 
St dev 
       
15% 
 
Source: Column (1), Government of India, Collated from Statements No. 202 (1905), No. 209./ No. 199 
(1922) ‘Wholesale prices of staple articles of export and import’; (2), GOI, No. 204 (1905), No. 211. 
(1922) ‘Average annual wholesale prices of staple commodities in Calcutta’; (3) & (4), G. H. Le Maistre, 
Investors India Year Book, 1920 (Calcutta, 1921), p. 114, “Area under Jute, Outturn and Prices, 1900-19. 
Average price per 400 lbs of Naraingunge jute.”; (5)-(6) derived from GOI trade accounts; (7)-(9), MS 
86/1, Samnuggur Jute Co.  
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In considering the data above, it should be borne in mind that they have been adjusted to 
estimate January-December averages for the purpose of comparison by assuming that prices 
changed smoothly from month to month, which is clearly unrealistic. The original data from 
the Investors India Year Book from which columns (3) and (4) are derived are for average prices 
during the jute season running from July to June. The original data from the Government of 
India trade statistics from which columns (5) and (6) are derived are for average prices running 
from April to March. 
Column (1) presents a series of spot prices on January 1st - the mid-point in the jute season - 
published in Government of India price series for staple commodities. In most years, the 
January price would give a reasonable indication of the average annual price as prices tended 
to rise or decline throughout the course of a season, although purchases were more heavily 
concentrated in the months from September to November. It records the price of “picked jute” 
exported from Calcutta. Column (2) represents an annual “average of the maximum 
[presumably maxima for respective months] prices” for “Bengal, first assortment” jute, i.e. the 
first mark of the season that baled together a combination of high, medium and low grade 
jute. I assume these are annualised by jute season and have adjusted them accordingly to 
obtain January to December values. Columns (3) and (4) give average annual prices for all 
classes of Naraingunge and of fine Naraingunge jute respectively. Naraingunge, near Dacca, 
had become the dominant jute emporium of the mofussil by the 1890s and was home to the 
baling operations of large operators such as Rallis and Davids and the preferred port of call of 
the Calcutta mills for obtaining jute of reliable quality. The prices given in columns (5) and (6) 
are derived from Government of India trade statistics for the values and volume of jute 
exported and of jute imported into Calcutta respectively. Figures for the value of jute imported 
into Calcutta are only given for the years 1890-99, during which period they averaged 74% of 
the export value, but with a standard deviation of 7%. The values for the remaining years are 
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then calculated at 74% of the export value but clearly the estimated value in any given year is 
likely to be subject to some margin of error.  
It is necessary to pause to consider what is connoted by this latter price in order to explain this 
price differential. While there is no explanatory note accompanying the Government of India 
trade data, this price series is given in the accounts of the rail and river-borne trade for imports 
into Calcutta. It is possible, therefore, that this is in fact the price obtaining for jute purchased 
in one of the upcountry jute emporia and that the differential with the price of exported jute 
consists of the rail and river freight costs obtaining between sales in upcountry markets and 
the arrival of raw jute in Calcutta, which a priori, it seems logical to assume were 
proportionally much greater than shipping freight costs for export. Further research is required 
to account for the weight of transport costs in the price of jute consumed by the Calcutta mills. 
This leaves open the question of what alternative price series might better be used to calculate 
the cost of raw jute consumed by the Calcutta mills. As one would expect, the average prices 
given in columns (1)-(4) for different categories of raw jute lie somewhere in between the 
export price (5) and the ‘upcountry’ price (6), and are more closely correlated to (5) at the 
beginning and (6) at the end of the period, presumably reflecting the increasing weight of 
Calcutta mill demand relative to export demand. 
My estimates of the price of jute consumed by the Samnuggur Company given in column (7) 
actually correlate better to the upcountry price (6) than to the average prices in columns (1) to 
(4) – the average price differential is 9% with a standard deviation of 15%. There are wide 
discrepancies between the price of jute consumed by the Samnuggur Co (7) and the price of its 
raw jute stocks (9). The latter is the more reliable figure as the quantities of jute consumed in 
order to calculate (7) are derived from an assumption that the percentage of total jute 
consumed that was wasted in the manufacturing process gives an accurate indication of jute 
purchased, (i.e. quantities of raw jute consumed are derived from data given for the weight of 
manufactured output). This disparity requires further exploration to see if it consistently 
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reflects the time lag between jute consumed and jute purchased for stock and price 
differences from the end of one season to the start of the next. I return to this issue below 
after considering problems with the sales and output data. There appear to be limitations as to 
what can be inferred about the industry’s jute costs from firm-level data.  
 
 
2) Sales and Output 
Jute mills outside the Calcutta metropolitan area represented a negligible proportion of total 
consumption and production of jute and jute manufactures so the all-India trade statistics 
were taken to accurately represent the Calcutta industry. This is confirmed by cross 
referencing the data for the quantity of jute manufactures produced given in the trade 
statistics with data provided from the mid-1890s by the Indian Jute Mills Association for the 
Calcutta mills, which are consistent. Government of India returns were based on an official 
year from April 1st to March 31st while IJMA annual figures for production of jute manufactures 
were calculated on the basis of twelve months from January to December. IJMA figures for raw 
jute consumption by the mills were calculated on the basis of the jute “season” which ran from 
July 1st to June 30th. However, these differences should not substantially bias estimates of the 
long term trends. 
The series for the quantity of raw jute consumed was calculated for the period 1875-1889 by 
aggregating the returns collected from individual mills by the Government of India. An 
estimate for consumption by the industry was then calculated by calculating estimates for 
those firms which did not return a figure based on the average consumption per loom in a 
given year weighted by that mill’s average jute consumption in years for which returns exist 
compared with the industry average. The coverage of Government of India returns was low 
during the late 1870s but was fairly comprehensive during the decade of the 1880s. Thus, my 
estimate of the industry’s consumption of raw jute becomes more reliable over time. The 
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Government of India ceased collecting data for jute consumed by the mills from 1889. The 
Indian Jute Mills Association provided figures for raw jute consumed by the mills based on data 
collected from their membership from 1896, with averages provided for the three-year period 
from 1893-5. The figures slightly underestimate the total for the industry as they do not 
include jute consumed by the small Indian-owned Arathoon or Soorah mills which remained 
outside the IJMA. It is not possible to construct a series for the price of raw jute consumed by 
the industry in a given year with the same confidence as the series for quantity. No reliable 
data exists for average annual prices weighted according to quantities purchased. Purchases 
were concentrated heavily between September and December. Raw jute purchased by the 
mills in a given year at a given price could differ substantially from the raw jute actually 
consumed through the mediation of stocks carried over from previous years. 
With these caveats in mind, the best estimate available of the long term trend is derived from 
the price of raw jute exported abroad. Prices for raw jute imported into Calcutta were derived 
from the values and quantities given in Government figures during the 1890s but discontinued 
thereafter. A comparison of the Calcutta price with the equivalent price of jute exported 
abroad for these years shows that the Calcutta price was on average 74% of the price of 
exported jute, varying between 65% and 86% in any given year, (although, there were years in 
which Dundee newspapers reported that the price of raw jute in Dundee was actually lower 
than in Calcutta due to the vagaries of market forces and the mistaken expectations of 
speculative purchasers). Presumably, freight and insurance costs – and the higher quality of 
jute exported – accounted for the difference. My crude estimate of the trend calculated the 
Calcutta price of raw jute for 1875-90 and 1900-21 at 74% of the price for exported jute. My 
estimate accords closely with the average prices of Naraingunge marks of raw jute from 1900-
1919 published in the Investors India Year Book – within 10% in 14 out of the 20 years. Using 
the estimated price series, the trend in the value of jute consumed can be calculated for the 
purpose of comparison with the trend in the value of sales and output of jute manufactures. 
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It is necessary to focus on ‘real’ magnitudes measured by an external observer where possible 
in order to consider the degree in which other variables under consideration that derive from 
the aggregation of individual firms’ accounts may be biased by the interested nature of the 
process whereby the firm presents variables in its annual accounts that may be fictitious for 
purposes that benefit the firm at the expense of the objective presentation of its real 
performance. Specifically, my discussion of firm performance and profitability relies on profits 
as reported in firm accounts but I have been cautious to pursue an examination of relative 
costs and revenue data deriving from Government of India trade data and IJMA data. I have 
presented a juxtaposition of the long term trend in sales and raw jute costs while avoiding 
making direct comparisons in specific years or seeking to compare them in order to derive 
estimates for, say, labour costs. 
The quantity and value of sales of jute manufactures are based on Government of India figures 
for exports to foreign countries and for Indian coastwise trade including Burma. Figures for 
inland trade by rail and river and for local consumption in Calcutta have not been included as 
there is no consistent series available and this category of sales only formed a small and 
rapidly declining proportion of the total, about 3 % in the 1870s declining to a negligible 
proportion. The Government of India data for quantities of jute manufactures sold are 
consistent with the data published by the IJMA from 1892. The Government data records the 
quantities of sacking manufactures sold measured in bags and of hessian cloth sold measured 
in yards but provides no aggregate measure in uniform units. 
The discussion relating to sales and output Chapter 1 assumed that sales data derived from the 
Government of India trade statistics represented a reasonably robust proxy for output. Further 
analysis of individual firm data for inventories of manufactured goods reported in end-of-year 
account broadly confirms this hypothesis, with the caveat that inventories represented a 
‘significant’ magnitude in a few years where the industry was affected by crisis and weak 
demand at the beginning of the period of study, and again during the war years when scarcity 
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of shipping and freight, and time lags and uncertainty surrounding government orders of war 
supplies again led to a large build-up of inventory. 
Sales, inventory, estimated output, (constant 1873 rupees). 
 
Estimated 
inventory of 
cloth & bags 
Change in 
value of 
inventory 
Value of sales 
(Government 
of India trade 
statistics) (Rs) 
% difference 
between 
output and 
sales 
Estimate of 
output value 
(Rs) 
1875 2,075,283         
1876 1,014,606 -1,060,677 12,819,900 -8.3% 11,759,223 
1877 797,693 -216,912 11,093,869 -2.0% 10,876,956 
1878 1,416,673 618,980 11,870,269 5.2% 12,489,249 
1879 1,901,742 485,069 13,730,293 3.5% 14,215,362 
1880 987,809 -913,933 17,233,189 -5.3% 16,319,256 
1881 1,524,468 536,659 20,562,715 2.6% 21,099,374 
1882 1,867,979 343,512 25,300,433 1.4% 25,643,944 
1883 2,385,039 517,059 22,919,694 2.3% 23,436,753 
1884 1,234,200 -1,150,838 21,850,653 -5.3% 20,699,815 
1885 2,153,523 919,323 17,693,653 5.2% 18,612,976 
1886 1,342,594 -810,928 19,499,803 -4.2% 18,688,875 
1887 1,403,376 60,781 28,364,742 0.2% 28,425,523 
1888 2,076,939 673,564 34,579,151 1.9% 35,252,714 
1889 1,819,692 -257,247 33,977,393 -0.8% 33,720,146 
1890 1,401,815 -417,877 33,793,598 -1.2% 33,375,721 
1891 1,368,998 -32,817 35,568,322 -0.1% 35,535,506 
1892 1,987,102 618,105 35,550,720 1.7% 36,168,824 
1893 1,773,036 -214,066 37,837,890 -0.6% 37,623,824 
1894 2,111,000 337,964 46,438,796 0.7% 46,776,760 
1895 2,036,448 -74,553 52,995,345 -0.1% 52,920,793 
1896 1,906,535 -129,913 50,957,669 -0.3% 50,827,756 
1897 2,101,874 195,339 49,456,151 0.4% 49,651,490 
1898 2,121,278 19,404 57,181,644 0.0% 57,201,048 
1899 2,512,448 391,170 63,305,339 0.6% 63,696,508 
1900 2,371,950 -140,498 66,642,457 -0.2% 66,501,959 
1901 3,837,754 1,465,804 74,614,692 2.0% 76,080,496 
1902 3,807,033 -30,721 84,136,144 0.0% 84,105,423 
1903 3,029,897 -777,136 92,258,543 -0.8% 91,481,408 
1904 3,366,614 336,717 100,162,339 0.3% 100,499,056 
1905 4,958,448 1,591,834 106,500,200 1.5% 108,092,034 
1906 6,841,060 1,882,613 114,729,828 1.6% 116,612,440 
1907 6,116,647 -724,413 127,672,432 -0.6% 126,948,019 
1908 4,871,712 -1,244,934 101,225,882 -1.2% 99,980,947 
1909 3,503,088 -1,368,624 121,754,826 -1.1% 120,386,202 
1910 3,920,738 417,650 128,621,664 0.3% 129,039,314 
1911 3,151,665 -769,074 117,500,727 -0.7% 116,731,653 
1912 5,768,437 2,616,772 147,416,610 1.8% 150,033,382 
1913 5,813,252 44,815 172,717,259 0.0% 172,762,075 
1914 5,355,253 -457,999 149,390,053 -0.3% 148,932,054 
1915 10,517,842 5,162,588 217,718,969 2.4% 222,881,557 
1916 10,643,832 125,990 233,287,983 0.1% 233,413,973 
1917 16,944,696 6,300,864 241,093,714 2.6% 247,394,579 
1918 17,746,735 802,039 261,382,122 0.3% 262,184,161 
1919 8,994,349 -8,752,386 260,140,001 -3.4% 251,387,614 
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The table demonstrates the structural break that occurred after the crisis of weak demand of 
the mid-1880s. In the 11 years from 1886, the positive or negative difference between sales 
and output averaged 4.1% due to mismatched supply and demand. For the whole period 1887 
to 1919, the difference average 0.9%, suggesting that the claims made by the Indian Jute Mills 
Association to have managed increases in supply to match increased demand had some 
foundation. 
 
Measuring the Volume of Sales and Output 
The IJMA published three series for the volume of sales of jute manufactures, one for total 
“baggings” to the foreign and domestic markets expressed in uniform units, one for total 
hessian and total sacking sales and also HC Bose & Co.’s statement for sales of different 
products to different markets by different shippers. The latter statement provides a figure for 
the volume of total sales measured in “bags” which calculates a yard of hessian cloth as 
equating to between 84-88% of a sacking bag, presumably based on weight, suggesting that 
the figures for sacking bags were also standardised by weight. These figures are consistent 
with the statement for total baggings in the first IJMA series. On this basis it is possible to 
extrapolate from the IJMA data to the Government of India data to calculate a uniform 
measure of total sales of sacking and hessians measured in uniform “bags” in order to observe 
the change over time. 
Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate any explanation of what weight was used as the 
basis to calculate a standardised unit of bagging. Therefore, it is not possible to calculate the 
actual weight of sales of jute manufactures for the purpose of comparison with the weight of 
raw jute used to manufacture them. 
Two sources give disaggregated data for sales of different product lines of cloth and bags of 
varying weight. From its inception in 1885 until its abandonment in 1889, the IJMA published a 
weekly sales list for approximately 60 categories of bag and 15 categories of cloth, specifying 
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the weight of each category. Bag sales were overwhelmingly of cheaper sacking quality and 
cloth sales of dearer hessian quality. The sales list was republished in the Dundee Advertiser 
and Dundee Courier. Taking sales during the course of 1888, the average bag weight was 1.90 
lbs and the average weight of a yard of cloth 0.64 lbs. From 1906 onwards, the IJMA annual 
report published HC Bose’s annual statement of "Actual clearances of jute fabrics from 
Calcutta to all places during 12 months ending December". This statement included a 
breakdown of bags exported to foreign markets excluding East Asia and of cloth exported to 
the Americas, Australia, London and Liverpool. The average bag weight in peacetime years was 
1.91 lbs, varying between 1.82 lbs in 1913 and 2.00 lbs in 1921. In the three wartime years 
1915-17 for which data are available, the average bag weight declined dramatically in the 
range from 1.16-1.48 lbs due to huge government orders for hessian sandbags. The average 
weight of a yard of cloth was .65lbs with very little year to year variation. The Bose charts do 
not distinguish between different weights of hessian cloth, by far the largest component of 
total cloth sales. Hessian cloth specifications varied between 0.5 lbs per yard and .75 lbs per 
yard. I have assumed sales of different specifications were in the same ratio as for 1888, giving 
an average weight of 0.64 lbs per hessian yard. Based on the almost exact correlation between 
the 1888 bag weights and those for 1906 onwards, the weight of industry sales for the whole 
period to 1905 using the 1888 figures could be estimated for future research. 
Once the weight of output is calculated, it permits estimation of value added in the 
manufacturing process and of changes in the efficiency of processing the raw material by 
reducing wastage in the manufacturing process, a key variable affecting profitability.  
 
‘Wastage’ of raw jute inputs 
Having estimated the weight of industry sales, it is then possible to estimate the weight of 
industry output based on the value of the change in industry inventory of manufactured goods 
discussed above. This produces a striking result in the table below showing a very large 
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discrepancy between the weight of raw jute ‘consumed’ (or at least purchased) by the mills 
and the weight of output. 
 
Discrepancy in weight of raw material relative to output. 
  
1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 
1870-
1921 
1892-
1921 
Discrepancy (GOI) 34% 36% 25% 20% 17% 25%   
Discrepancy (IJMA)     30% 23% 18%   23% 
 
Both estimates of industry output – derived from Government of India and the IJMA data for 
sales – show a consistently large discrepancy relative to raw jute consumed. Some discrepancy 
is to be expected due to the wastage of raw jute in the manufacturing process. The monthly 
accounts of the mills managed by Thomas Duff & Co. assumed a shrinkage of jute of 13% up to 
1895, declining to 8% to 1902, and then 5% from then onwards, (Samnuggur Co., MOTD, 
MS/86/1/1/5, Samnuggur Co, 29 Jan 1896, 3 Jun 1902.) Allowance was made separately for a 
“gunny surplus” for shrinkage in the weight and breadth of finished bags of 1 inch per bag, 
later reduced to half an inch per bag. (Ibid., 3 Jun 1902.) The Champdany Co.’s studies of 
wastage from 1881-86 calculated an annual wastage for the Wellington branch mill in a range 
between 9.74% and 13.65% “from jute to cloth”. A proportion of this shrinkage in weight could 
be assigned to waste of jute from the point when it entered the manufacturing process when it 
was weighed for batching to the point where the finished goods emerged after weaving and 
finishing. The Champdany mill manager Crabbe, writing in 1887, referred to a study at the mill 
“some years ago” of waste of jute in process running at 9%, “between preparing and spinning 
6%; between spinning and weaving 3%.” Struth, the Wellington mill manager, calculated waste 
at 10.6%, of which 8.1% was “jute dust thrown out”, and 2.4% was “thread waste” that was 
unsuitable for reuse, stating that these figures were no worse than those for the Howrah mill 
which he had obtained. (Crabbe, Special Report on Champdany mill, MOTD, Champdany Co., 
UGD MS 91/7/1/2/2/3, MOTD 1883-89, 16 Feb 1887.) A similar study by the Samnuggur Co. in 
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1894 showed “that the waste swept up and burned amounted to 5.89% of the jute used, but 
the difference between the weight of the jute used and the weight of cloth and twine 
produced is equal to 9.2%.” (MS 86/1/1/4, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 2 May 1894, p. 360). This 
discrepancy may point to a further component in the shrinkage in weight of jute from the 
point of purchase to the point of sale of the finished good, loss of weight due to moisture that 
may have occurred from the point in time when mills made purchases of raw jute and the 
point when it entered the production process, having been stored for varying periods of time 
as stock in the mills’ jute godowns. In the Champdany report referred to above, Crabbe goes 
on to state: 
“We are quite aware of the fact that there is little waste in Dundee mills, but it must be 
remembered that they use only dry jute there, whilst we use at the beginning of the season 
jute having moisture of 12 or 13%, or say with 5% moisture all the year round. Add to this the 
fact that we have a very different climate here to contend with.” 
This point is interesting in that it may have led the Dundee competitors to overestimate the 
cost advantages enjoyed by the Calcutta mills (See Seafield Works, Dundee, comparison of 
costs – UDA MS 95-12-2). Moreover, Crabbe’s point relating to the uneven distribution of 
moisture content over the course of the jute season seems to give credence to the notion that 
loss of weight could occur between the point of purchase and the point of production as no 
allowance for seasonal variation was made in the wastage allowance in the production process 
proper by the mills managed by Thomas Duff & Co. (The seasonal variation is confirmed by the 
monthly figures provided for the Wellington mills from 1881-86 in UGD MS 91/7/1/2/2/2-3, 
MOTD 1873-79, 1883-89). 
The problem of raw jute purchases with a high moisture content seems to have been 
particularly pronounced for certain varieties of cuttings such as Dowrah jute, with a moisture 
content of 20% being referred to in extreme cases, but these varieties were never made up a 
very large proportion of the total raw jute consumed. (Struth, report on Wellington mill, ibid; 
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James Luke, visiting director’s report, UGD 91/1/2/2/3, MOTD, Champdany Co., 28 Mar 1888; 
Samnuggur Co., MS 86/1/1/8, MOTD, 5 Aug 1902, p.255.) Jute purchased on the open market 
in the Calcutta bazaar was also maligned for its reputation for a high moisture content, leading 
the mills’ managing agents’ to seek direct contracting relationships with agents at the main 
upcountry marts, such as Naraingunge and Serajgunge, who dealt in raw jute: 
“the purchases advised by mail still showed a considerable percentage of dowrah and bazaar jute 
which while apparently cheaper on paper, [the agents] did not consider equal value in the working, 
taking into consideration the heavy wastage and moisture found in this jute, besides the relatively 
poorer spin which it gives and also the risk of trouble with the workers [paid by piecework].” (MS 
86/1/1/8, Samnuggur Co, MOTD, 30 Sep 102, p. 297.) 
Mill agents’ complaints about moisture were a staple of the British business press in Calcutta 
(“Calcutta Jute Market”, Dundee Courier, 25 Sep 1894, p. 4) although there were established 
procedures to claim compensation for jute failing to meet agreed quality standards for 
moisture, adjudicated by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, which tended to favour the IJMA 
against intermediaries dealing in raw jute.  
This digression is not to explore these relationships in the jute value chain but it does establish 
that the existing data for raw jute consumed, whether derived from Government of India or 
IJMA sources, must be interpreted with some care in so far as it can be taken to accurately 
represent the weight of raw jute entering the manufacturing process. From firm-level data in 
company records, there appeared to be no standard practice for measuring loss of weight at 
different stages from point of purchase to the sale of the finished good. 
In conclusion, the hypothesis that a large part of the discrepancy in the weight of the 
industry’s purchases of raw jute relative to the weight of the output of manufactured goods 
can be accounted for by a combination of moisture and wastage in the production process 
cannot be discounted. However, an average of 23-25% discrepancy seems large compared to 
the qualitative evidence available for the Champdany and Samnuggur mills. The declining 
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trend in the discrepancy between the weight of raw jute consumed and the weight of output is 
striking. According to the Government of India data, it declined by half from 34% in the 1870s 
to 17% in the 1910s. The trend is mirrored in the IJMA figures, declining from 30% in the 1890s 
to 18% in the 1910s. With the caveats already mentioned in relation to the accuracy of the 
data, the consistency of the trend from two alternative sources might be taken to suggest that 
there was some increase in the market power of the jute mills in their interventions in the raw 
jute market, especially when the widespread complaint observing a long term secular decline 
in the quality of jute is taken into consideration. Goswami interprets the complaint as 
essentially a ruse by the mill companies to force raw jute dealers to accept lower quality marks 
being assigned to jute of a standard quality in order to reduce the mills’ raw jute costs at their 
expense. It seems plausible that some deterioration in quality may have in fact occurred, given 
the extension of jute cultivation to more marginal lands without discounting the substance of 
Goswami’s observation. 
The data on wastage for the Samnuggur mill, managed by Thomas Duff & Co, also suggests 
that the Calcutta mills learned to adapt production techniques transferred from Dundee to 
Calcutta conditions in order to reduce wastage in the production process. 
